The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 17

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 17

While these two processes of national feeling ran their courses,

several political events, which have already been described added

vigor to the antagonism that was rising against Germany. Her attitude

toward the Boers when they were at war against Great Britain was one,

Delcassé’s wise adjustment of the Fashoda incident was another, his

clever formation of the _Entente Cordiale_ between France and Britain

was another, the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was still

another, the defeat of Russia by Japan and her elimination as a threat

against British interests in India was another, and the formation of

the Triple _Entente_ by Great Britain, France, and Russia, announced in

1907, was the final act of the series. Great Britain was not only again

seriously concerned in Continental affairs, but a combination had been

formed of three great European nations, with the strongest power of the

East as a flying buttress, to hold back the much dreaded aggressions

of the Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The

Balance of Power had come to its most logical state of development;

for instead of having one great state balancing between the other

states around it, we now had the great states of the world ranged in

two camps, each side checking the other in the belief that in so doing

it was preserving the world from war.

 

It is hard to establish a balance when two opposing sides are strong

and mutually jealous of one another; for the opposition of forces is

then formed to secure mutual advantages, and not to promote the common

interest through the preservation of equilibrium. In such a case one

side or the other, possibly each side, is apt to fancy itself the

stronger, and if it acts on that assumption it arouses the apprehension

of the other which finds itself tempted to make a counter stroke.

Once such a step is taken equilibrium is lost. This is what happened

in 1914. The train of events that led up to the destruction of the

international balance is now to be described.

 

Here we must go back to the days when Delcassé was foreign secretary

in Paris, 1898-1905. One of his achievements was to come to agreement

with Spain and Italy in reference to the northern coast of Africa. He

effected a treaty with the former nation by which French and Spanish

spheres of influence in Morocco were defined, and another with Italy

by which the right of France in Tunis was accorded in exchange for

recognition of the right of Italy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

 

Making this treaty by Italy did not constitute treason to the Triple

Alliance, since it was clearly advantageous for Italy without

infringing the rights of either Germany or Austria; but it alarmed

Germany, already drawing close to Turkey, because the object of Italian

policy was to get territory over which Turkey had a vital claim. Nor

was it pleasant for the kaiser to see one of the members of the Triple

Alliance acting in coöperation with the members of the _Entente_ in so

important a matter.

 

Taking these achievements in connection with the formation of the Dual

Alliance and the mutual approach of France and Great Britain, Germany

had reason to feel that she was being isolated. Her whole population

resented this turn of events, seeing in it a sort of challenge hurled

forth by France, who at last found herself strong enough to assume

a position of self-assertion. It is true that Delcassé only placed

Germany in a position of isolation like that which Bismarck imposed on

France for many years; and it was, in strict logic, as fair for him

to treat Germany thus as for Bismarck to isolate France. Let Germany

submit to her fate, as France submitted, when she had to submit. But

we are not dealing with logical matters here. It is a plain fact that

confronts us. Germany, who had been strong through three decades

without seeking to expand her territory, suddenly realized that

her opponents were forming a combination stronger than hers, their

acquisition of territory that followed set her in a rage, and she made

plans for getting her share in the world that was to be taken. Under

the system of balance then recognized as the proper means of regulating

international relations her course was a natural result of Delcassé’s

policy.

 

The particular portion of the earth to which she turned her eyes was

Turkey. While she supported the plans of Austria-Hungary to acquire

territory on the Adriatic, she herself looked further to the East. She

encouraged the party at Constantinople known as the “Young Turks,”

she furnished improved arms to the Turkish army, she formed plans

to establish her influence in Palestine, and she projected a great

railroad to Bagdad in the center of the Euphrates-Tigris Valley. It was

a sphere of influence that might be considered more than a fair offset

for the lands her rivals were about to gain.

 

At the same time Germany found a means of restoring her prestige, which

was sorely wilted by the progress of her rivals. The occasion arose in

connection with France’s occupation of Morocco, which had begun without

the aid or consent of the kaiser.

 

Morocco had long been under a line of independent sultans. Most of

her commerce was with Great Britain although German capitalists had

received concessions within her border. As the country next to the

French province of Algeria, France looked upon it as her own particular

sphere of influence. We have already seen that Italy conceded this

claim, 1901, while France conceded Italy’s claim to Tripoli and

Cyrenaica. In 1904 France conceded Great Britain’s practical supremacy

in Egypt and in return was assured the protectorate over Morocco. She

asked no concession from Germany but came to an agreement with Spain,

who had a small strip of territory south of the Straits of Gibraltar.

 

In 1905 Delcassé was quietly preparing to carry out his plan for the

development of Morocco, when the kaiser landed in Tangiers without

the slightest warning, and announced in a public address that he had

come to visit his friend, the independent sultan of Morocco, in whose

country all foreign nations had equal rights. The speech was received

by the world as a challenge to France and a means of announcing that

Germany was no longer to be ignored. The moment of the landing at

Tangiers was well chosen by the kaiser; for only three weeks earlier

Russia, the ally of France, had been defeated by the Japanese at Mukden

and could give her no assistance.

 

In this unfortunate situation it was necessary for France to bend

before the storm. She agreed to submit the whole Moroccan question

to an international congress, thus appealing to the principle of the

Concert of Europe, and when she learned that the kaiser demanded that

she dismiss the minister whose hands had been played so skillfully

against Germany, she agreed to that also.

 

The dismissal of Delcassé recalls an incident of 1807. In that year

Napoleon forced the king of Prussia to dismiss Stein, his great

minister, who was bending all his efforts to reëstablish Prussia on a

war footing. It marked the triumph of Napoleon’s power for the time

being, but it was a futile action; for Stein out of office under such

circumstances had more influence than ever, and the shameful way in

which he was treated only emphasized Prussia’s humiliation and made the

Prussians more determined than ever to assert their national power.

Similar results in France in 1905 followed the stab given to that

nation’s faithful and efficient minister.

 

The international congress assembled at Algeciras in 1906. It adopted

a compromise decision, which gave something to each side and satisfied

neither. Germany was supposed to have gained when the congress

recognized the territorial integrity of Morocco under the sovereignty

of the sultan and guaranteed equal rights of trade in the country to

the citizens of all the signatory powers. On the other hand, France

and Spain were jointly to have the right to instruct and furnish

officers for the Moroccan police force. Winning in a quarrel rarely

makes the victor think well of the vanquished. Certainly Germany,

who had now blocked the plans of France, was not less bitter in her

attitude toward that nation; while France, feeling that she had been

caught at a disadvantage, smothered her indignation and waited for the

opportunity to make things even.

 

In 1907 disturbances occurred in Moroccan ports and French marines

were landed to preserve order. When they were not withdrawn in a year

Germany protested and an irritating diplomatic discussion followed. At

last Germany was persuaded to submit the point actually at issue to

the Hague tribunal, whose decision was not conclusive and satisfied

neither side. Then a Franco-German convention was held to pass on the

rights of each nation in Morocco. Its decision, given in February,

1909, announced that the interest of Germany in the province was

only economic; and as France agreed to give equal protection in such

matters, the kaiser promised he would not interfere in the country. In

each of these incidents war seemed about to begin, and Europe awaited

the results in great anxiety. When the clouds lifted the nations

breathed freely again.

 

Still there was no way under the existing system to solve the

difficulty that presented itself, had Germany only decided that she

would not trust her cause to peaceful negotiation. The fact that she

took such a step was to her own people but a mark of the kaiser’s

love of peace. This and similar incidents, in which the militarists

carried their country to the verge of war only to be held back by the

hand of the emperor served to lay the foundation for that popular

belief in Germany that a peace policy had been steadily followed under

provocations and that Europe was indebted to Wilhelm II for immunity

from war. In reality the system of balance of power had needlessly

brought the world to the verge of a bitter and unnecessary conflict.

 

Almost immediately after the war clouds lifted Europe had evidence of

the small amount of tolerance the leading classes of Germany had for

the slightest manifestation of the spirit of compromise in the matter

under discussion. The chancellor under whom the recent settlement was

made was von Bülow, who thought it better to adjust so small a quarrel

than to incur the responsibility of war. His action received the stern

denunciation of the military party. So strong was the criticism that he

was forced to retire from office, his place going to Bethmann-Hollweg,

who had the support of the militarists. The only explanation to be

advanced for this turn of the affair is that the German national spirit

was so much excited by the long agitation of men like Treitschke that a

concession which others might consider only trifling seemed to them a

sacrifice of national honor.

 

In 1911 occurred a third Moroccan incident, in which Bethmann-Hollweg

took occasion to recover some of the attitude of assertiveness that

von Bülow had given up in 1909. In pursuance of their plan to extend

their protectorate over Morocco the French occupied Fez with a military

force. A short time later the German warship _Panther_ entered the

Moroccan port of Agadir, ostensibly to protect German property. It was

soon known that the German government proposed to hold the _Panther_ at

Agadir un