The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 18

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 18

On the other hand, Germany was not fully pleased at the outcome of

the affair. The appearance of Great Britain in it was an indication

that the _Entente_ was a thing of vitality. Germany had been forced

to moderate her demands, taking colonial territory while her whole

thought for the future was not developing African colonies but curbing

the power of France. Not only was France not checked, but she was much

strengthened in a vital part of her power. She had acquired lands in

just the region that she needed them to carry out her ambition to

control the western end of the Mediterranean. If some day Spain were to

become a republic, could she fail to establish cordial relations with

the republic of France, and thus be swept into the anti-German group?

It may well be that in these reflections were born two German impulses:

first to win Great Britain to some kind of a compromise with Germany,

detaching her, at least for a time, from the _Entente_; and second, to

strike a vital blow before Russia was entirely recovered. Within the

next three years she acted on each of these impulses.

 

At the same time it became evident that the Triple Alliance was

crumbling, and this was another source of anxiety to Germany. It meant

that she should hasten her steps if she was to carry forward her great

purpose. It was in September, 1911, while the Agadir incident was still

unsettled, that Italy began the war with Turkey to establish control

of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In view of Germany’s well-known friendliness

with Turkey, this step was most unexpected. It could only mean that

Italy was not disposed to subordinate her own interests to those of

Germany at Constantinople. If she had not felt certain of support by

the _Entente_ powers, in case Germany turned on her, she would hardly

have ventured to begin the war.

 

Another advance made by _Entente_ powers within the period under

consideration was in Persia. This ancient state was in sad disorder.

Weak and unpatriotic shahs, bold bands of brigands, and foreign

intrigues plunged it into such a condition that it invited the

domination of foreign nations. Russia approached from the north, and

Great Britain appeared in the south, where rich oil fields had caught

her eye.

 

After some initial gains the two powers came to an agreement in 1907

by which they established their respective spheres of influence, so

that Persia was occupied at the two ends, north and south, by strong

powers, and the middle portion was in such a chaotic state that its

future seemed very doubtful. By making loans to the shah and furnishing

capital for public improvements British and Russian capitalists enabled

their respective countries to tighten their grips on Persia. Soon that

country was in the throes of revolution, a so-called Nationalist party

came into power which was not able to rule without the aid of Russia

and Great Britain. So far did the foreign influence go that Morgan W.

Shuster, an American financial adviser of the shah who had tried hard

to place the government on a satisfactory basis, was fain to withdraw

from Persia in despair. To the rest of the world it seemed that the

independence of the country was near its end.

 

A mere glance will show us what these developments meant for Germany

and Austria-Hungary. Remembering that Italy was acting with the

_Entente_ in her African policy, we see that the entire southern shore

of the Mediterranean was passing into hands adverse to the central

powers, and that the new combination stretched out a long arm to the

Persian Gulf and the region south of the Caspian. In view of Germany’s

hope that she would some day gain through Syria a railway route to the

Far East, the trend of things in Persia threatened to close the narrow

gap that was left her for such a route by completing the absorption

of the kingdom of the shah. Should she allow the gap to be stopped,

or should she strike while there was still time? And if she did not

strike, what was there in the system of the Balance of Power that could

be counted on as a guarantee that she was not a passive victim to the

play of politics in the system then in use?

 

Furthermore, it was evident that Germany’s prestige was being

undermined by the progressive steps of her rivals. Three times had

she rattled the saber over the Moroccan incidents, and each time with

decreasing terror in the minds of her opponents. Perhaps its rattling

had been one of the main facts in promoting the union of those

opponents, since it always brought before them the picture of Germany

embattled against the rest of Europe. To strike a blow that would teach

France and Russia a lesson would restore German prestige and bring the

balance back to the German side of the rivalry, if it did not do more.

 

There is good ground for the guess that it was expected in high

quarters in Berlin that the blow would do far more than restore

prestige. It is true that the plan to which I am about to refer has not

been openly accepted by responsible agents of state, but it was widely

advocated by a portion of the people, the Pan-Germans. It involved the

union of Austria-Hungary and Germany in a great state, Mittel-Europa,

with strong influence in the Near East. Treitschke and many others had

written and spoken for such a thing, and to a large number of Germans

it had become a sacred ideal. When some one spoke to the deaf Colussus

about the acquisition of territory in Africa he exclaimed: “Cameroons?

What are we to do with this sand-box? Let us take Holland; then we

shall have colonies.” It was a part of the dream of the Pan-Germans

that the proposed Mittel-Europa should extend from the Baltic to the

Black Sea. If such a thing could be carried through, how excellent a

trump card to play against the _Entente_ plotters!

 

Francis Joseph, of Austria-Hungary, was too stout a patriot to hand his

country over to the schemes of the Pan-Germans, but he was approaching

an already long deferred demise. The heir-apparent, Ferdinand, was

supposed to be a great admirer of the kaiser, and the advocates of

union had high hopes that he would promote their desires. Suddenly

came the crime of Sarajevo. In a peculiar manner it dashed the hopes

of the dreamers; for not only was their chief reliance taken away,

but the new heir-apparent was supposed to be a pacific man who would

favor constitutional government. Such a ruler would hardly support

the formation of a great empire built after the fashion of Prussian

autocracy. It was the inspiration of the moment to have the war come,

and demonstrate the glory of Germany and Austria-Hungary, while the

old emperor still lived. And if it was precipitated in the interest of

Austria-Hungary, that was all the greater reason that the people of

the dual empire should feel under obligation to the military power that

carried it through. Possibly they would be so much impressed that they

would sweep a youthful emperor on with them in the realization of a

great united empire.

 

It is not certain how far the Pan-German party controlled the policy of

government in July, 1914; but it does not seem too much to attribute

such plans to men who did not hesitate to dream of the annexation

of Holland and who had definitely planned for the acquisition of

Constantinople. The imagination of a German patriot is no mean thing

in ordinary situations; but a great sweep would be vouchsafed to it

when its possessor realized that his country was being outplayed by

the diplomats and the grim Captain of Death. It was an extraordinary

situation that the Germans confronted in July, 1914, and there was not

much time for deliberation.

 

This chapter is not written to show that Germany was, or was not,

responsible for the war. If it explains how it was that the German

people believed that the war was forced on them, it will accomplish

more than it was designed to accomplish. But it is intended to enable

persons to keep calm heads in these times of perplexity in order to

understand how each side approached the great conflict. It is evident

that the _Entente_ powers thought that Germany wished to change Europe

into a great empire with herself at the head, while the central powers

felt that the chains were being riveted around about them.

 

In view of this long train of events the last week in that fateful July

assumes small proportions. If Ferdinand had not been killed war would

still have hung over the horizon. If Serbia had accepted the Austrian

ultimatum war would still have threatened; for though it may have been

averted for the moment, the Triple _Entente_ would still have existed,

nor would it have brooked the increase of German prestige that the

backdown of Serbia would have implied. If Russia had not mobilized her

army, Germany may not have mobilized, but the ancient fear of Russia as

an overwhelming opponent when she was once organized in the modern way

would have remained as a threat of dire consequences.

 

The theory of the Balance of Power is built upon the idea that states

act for their own interests in the restraint of one another from

overweening ambition. At bottom it is selfish. It assumes a state

of rivalry; and it is necessary to the theory that as fast as one

side gains in strength the other shall gain also. If the _Entente_

nations acquire Morocco, Tripoli, Cyrenaica, and parts of Persia, the

central powers must gain also or they are over-balanced. And who is to

determine how much they shall gain? Manifestly each will strive to get

all it can. The very process of gaining stimulates antipathy and makes

war a probability.

 

Another observation that is worthy of consideration is that balance is

logically possible only when more than two sides are opposed to one

another. When Great Britain, France and Russia had varying purposes

it was not difficult for Bismarck to play one against the other and

so keep the equilibrium. But when it happened that the central powers

became so strong that they constituted a threat against every other

nation in the world, it was natural for the other nations to unite to

check them. In such a condition no true balance of power could exist,

and it was folly to expect that theory to serve as it served in former

days.

 

One of the things the world ought to learn from the war that now

afflicts it is that no nation can conquer the world by stealth. It is

one of the happy shortcomings of political selfishness that its agents

usually fancy they can cover their tracks. How often do we see a bad

politician doing something wrong in the false confidence that while he

knows what he is doing the people cannot see it! So with Germany in the

years before the war. Making her plans for large accretions of power,

she thought she could steal a march on other nations and gain in a

spurt a position from which at a later time she could extend her power

by other and still larger sweeps of conquest. She did not think that

the other nations would take part until it was too late.

 

But the rest of the world was as wide awake as she. No man in England

accustomed to view political things in the large failed to see the

instant the war began that the hour of crisis for his country was at

hand. If Great Britain had not fought in August, 1914, she would have

been the stupidest nation in the world. To have allowed her greatest

rival to sit down in the French channel ports would have been suicidal

for her. The only probable explanation of Germany’s failure to realize