The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 25
Two great combinations are fighting for mastery. One has the avowed
purpose of extending its power until it is in a fair way to absorb the
rest of the states one after the other. The other group fights to beat
off the fate that threatens, and it acknowledges that it cannot succeed
unless it crushes its opponents into such a state as will take from
them the desire and the power to attempt another war for supremacy.
Whichever side wins, the other will feel an impulse to continue to act
in alliance. And we may have a Europe of two great federal states, with
the little states at their mercy.
For example, how can Great Britain and France ever be opponents again,
as in the old days? The sense of common sacrifices would of itself make
them more than friends, but the consciousness that each depends on the
other in dealing with the great danger will never fail them, and it
will force them into some kind of political union. In the same way, we
should expect to see a greatly altered relation between Great Britain
and her colonies. Three-quarters of a million of colonial defenders
constitute a contribution that demands reward. As the colonies depend
on the mother country for some important elements of defense, and Great
Britain cannot comfort herself with the assurance of safety unless she
has a broad imperial power for its basis, it would seem natural to
expect some kind of imperial union. As to Belgium, when she escapes
from the grasp of Germany, what mind has the ingenuity to foresee her
fate? If she relies on the promise of neutralization, she is again
tempting fate. If she is annexed to France, with some kind of autonomy,
German enmity will be aroused.
Probably her fate is to be bound up with the fate of the other small
states of Europe, states which in the present war are hardly entirely
sovereign. Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Greece, and
Portugal have lost something of the power to direct their internal
affairs. In war they have had a lesson of the necessity of bending to
the will of an external government, which they will probably remember
many times in the days of peace. When once a state has yielded at the
dictation of a neighbor, and made money out of it, the next time it
is pressed yielding becomes an easier thing. The fate of these small
states in a possible era of fierce competition between two great groups
would be very perplexing. In an era of peace through federation, says
the advocate of peace, it would be much happier.
In short, it is a practical question that our idealist puts to us. Here
is a world that has gone mad, shall it not turn to reason again? The
old system has broken down, shall we try to make it work again? To do
so will lead us to just the disaster that now overwhelms us. Shall we
not try a plan which will not cost us in money half what the old system
of preparation cost, and which if it fails cannot be more of a failure
than the old system has proved? If autocracy stands in the way, let us
hope that autocracy will give way before the march of the spirit of the
times. And finally, the law of unification is working so strongly in
these days of international relations, that we are at last at the point
at which we cannot longer elect to remain distinct in our national
activities. We must choose between a world state through conquest, and
a world state through mutual agreement. Which shall we take? To try to
go on with the states entirely distinct, is to invite their conquest by
a great state.
CHAPTER XII
A FEDERATION OF NATIONS
Taking into consideration the obstacles and the advantages summarized
in the two preceding chapters what are we going to do when the war
comes to an end? The easiest and most likely thing is to adjust
ourselves as quickly and quietly as possible to the peace that is given
to us, take up the old problems of living as nearly as we can where
we left them in 1914--or in 1917, when the war began for the United
States--and trust to our good stars to guide us to a happy haven. But
if there is one thing this war has shown, it is that trusting to stars
is not a safe protection against war. The only thing sensible people
ought to count on in these days is the judgment of their capable and
efficient minds. And it seems that the suggestion of the men who wish
to obtain peace by coöperation is worthy of the most careful debate by
men who have the best interest of humanity at heart.
When the war ends it may be that the world will not have arrived
at the time when such a scheme can be adopted, but we should not be
hasty in saying so. It is not a scheme to be disposed of by newspaper
editors, who rarely have time to weigh the conditions of such a serious
matter, or of senators and representatives, whose views arise out of
party interests, or of high officials as a class, who are usually
overburdened with administrative matters. It is a thing for all the
people to consider, and in order that it may have the fairest and
most conspicuous hearing, there should be a great world congress, not
composed of theorists merely, but of the most practical statesmen, who
will take up the matter in a spirit of friendliness, with the intention
of adopting the scheme if it can be received in a manner that warrants
the hope of success.
Every nation in the world has reason to desire the establishment of an
enduring peace; but the United States has a larger interest in such
an issue of the war than any other nation. Since we became a nation
we have gone on developing along peaceful lines. Having had no reason
to fear our neighbors and being so remote from Europe that we were
not likely to be molested from that part of the world, we formed
our institutions on the basis of peace. Our public ideals, our sense
of citizenship, the aims of our law-making have all been such as are
natural for a nation that has nothing to fear from external enemies.
One result of the present war is to relegate these ideals into the
junk-heap of institutions, unless we can be assured that peace is a
certainty. Under a system of competition between states we cannot
afford to be less ready for war than any other great nation. We must
have a large navy and a great army ready to meet the blows of any
power that feels that it has reason to interfere with our peaceful
development. We must become a militaristic republic, a thing which
seems against nature. When such an attempt has been made in the past,
the result has been an oligarchy. In the United States it would
probably lead to a sad clash of social classes mingled with vicious
party politics and timidity in the national legislature. And yet, under
a continuation of the old system it would be folly to endeavor to get
along without an army and navy large enough to protect us from the
initial swoop of some powerful adversary.
If from this fate the advocate of coöperation can offer an escape, it
behooves us to listen to his scheme. We should weigh it carefully and
be willing to take some kind of a chance to secure its adoption, if in
it there is the possibility of successful operation.
To be perfectly fair to those who suggest leagues or federations we
should remember that we are not dealing with the ideas of pacifists, as
such. The schemes that are set forth by the friends of lasting peace
come from men who are giving all their energies to the prosecution of
the war. They believe, as much as any of us, that the war should be
pressed with every ounce of the nation’s strength. They are fighting as
hard as any one in the country, and they desire the defeat of Germany
as much as any soldier or statesman in the world. They are fighting to
establish a basis on which the peace of the world can be built. They
are not cranks, and even if they are mistaken, they are honestly trying
to call mankind to the better way.
One of their suggestions is a league of peace, to be composed of the
civilized nations. As we have seen, it is loosely organized and does
not allow the central authority of the league enough power to punish
a state that tries to withdraw from the league. Nor does it grant the
central authority the right to punish a state which, after submitting
its case to the proposed tribunal of arbitration and losing the
decision, decides to go to war in defiance of the tribunal’s judgment.
What would Germany do, for example, if she had lost such a judgment and
did not wish to accept her defeat? Strong and well prepared for war,
she might disregard all respect for the opinion of the world, if she
felt that her future was at stake, and we can hardly doubt that her own
people would support her.
Connected with the idea of a league is the plan, advocated by those
who place respect for law above all other considerations, for creating
a high court of judicature, with judges selected from all nations,
which shall have authority to try and give judgment on all disputes
of nations. As a part of a strongly organized federation such a court
would have great influence, but if it existed under a league it could
hardly have enough authority to secure the obedience of the great
states. As for the small states, they never give trouble any how,
except as they act in association with some great state, or as they
are threatened by some great power. No union for peace can accomplish
its object that does not deal with the great states, and any scheme
suggested may leave the small states out of consideration. On the other
hand, the small states are deeply interested in forming such a union,
since it would give them a safety they could hardly get otherwise.
The proposed plans for a league of peace and for an international
court of arbitration were announced before the war or in its early
stages. They were made with an eye to the most that the nations could
be induced to give up of their control over their own actions. It is
possible that their authors would not follow the same plans if they
were forced to make them today. The war has shown us several things.
It has revealed Germany’s reason for opposing steadily all the real
peace plans at the Hague conferences. It has shown us what fate
awaits the world after the war, unless there is a return to reason
and coöperation. It is possible that in writing out a plan for peace
today the gentlemen who met in Carpenters’ Hall, Philadelphia, in June,
1915, would feel justified in supporting a stronger proposition.
Mr. H. N. Brailsford, in a book called _A League of Nations_, London,
1917, announces the outline of a working scheme, which he hopes
the friends of peace will consider. Its chief features are: 1. An
international court of justice to consider and pass on justiciable
cases, with a council of conciliation to pass on non-justiciable cases,
and a pledge by the states that they will not make war nor mobilize
their troops until the court or council has within a stipulated time
passed on the several matters in dispute. 2. An executive of the league
to take steps, military or economic, to enforce the obligations of
the members of the league. 3. The guarantee of the right of secession
together with the possibility of expelling a state. 4. A consideration
of disarmament on land and sea. 5. An international commission to
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