The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 26

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 26

Some of the fundamental ideas of a federation were embodied, as we have

seen, in the plans of the Abbé St. Pierre and the philosopher, Kant.

Living at a time when the state was conceived as the seat of power,

they trusted to force to execute the will of the suggested government

that was to provide peace. Bentham, however, was deeply impressed

with morality as a force for good government, and he was willing to

trust his proposed system to the reasonable impulses of men. To him it

is possible to reply that if men were so reasonable that they would

respect an agreement to settle disputes by arbitration, they would

be reasonable enough to avoid the differences which run into such

disputes. In our modern world reason thrives best when it is reënforced

by authority.

 

The attempt of Alexander I, of Russia, to obtain some practical

realization of the principle of a federated Europe in behalf of peace

followed these lines as closely as could be expected, but, it must be

confessed, in a very lame way. The failure of his efforts has been

taken as proof that the idea is impracticable. But it does not follow

that it is impracticable to the same extent and in the same way today

as in 1815. No Metternich now controls the policy of the majority of

the European courts. Republican institutions exist to an appreciable

extent in most of them. The mind of Europe is more nearly a unit today

than a century ago, and commerce, travel, and international sympathy

bind nations together as never before. Moreover all these unifying

forces are growing rapidly. When the feeling engendered by the war

subsides, and it always does subside after a war, the nations will

be more conscious of one another and less willing to challenge one

another than before they engaged in the present appalling struggle.

In these things there is a hope that the federation of Europe for the

preservation of peace would be more possible than in the times of

Metternich. I do not mean that all obstacles are removed, but they are

fewer than formerly.

 

Considering these things I find myself driven, in closing my essay,

to a serious examination of the possibility of creating a world

federation out of the chaos that now floats over the globe--not an

integrated world empire, with power over all phases of political

action, but a federation that will have authority to regulate the

forces that make for war. If such a thing could be created and accepted

by the states of the world, it would make the present struggle, with

all its horrors, the best and most fortunate event that has come to

humanity since the beginning of the Christian era. If the war should

result in the thorough defeat of the present régime in Germany,

followed by the creation of a world federation into which Germany

should be forced to come, with her pride so reduced that she could be

kept obedient to the federation until the virus of world power should

get out of her system, the world would have passed a milestone in

civilization, and for our part in it future generations would thank us

to the end of time.

 

The organization of the American Union in 1787-1789 was a similar

process on a smaller scale. So many of its features are analogous to

conditions that suggest themselves in connection with the proposition

of a world federation that it is worth while to recall them. If we are

not led to conclude that a similar step should be taken at this time

in the larger sphere, we shall at least have a clearer idea of what

such a federation would mean, and it may happen that we shall conclude

that it is not so difficult a thing to establish as appears on first

sight.

 

Before the war for independence the American colonies it is true,

were not as separate as the present European states, but they were so

distinct in their ideals and purposes that no one thought their union

possible. When Franklin proposed a very mild sort of concentration in

1754 his suggestion was rejected in the colonies because it involved

the surrender of some of the colonial separateness. Had no pressure

come from the outside it is difficult to see what would have forced the

thirteen colonies to come together.

 

The external pressure was the conviction that Great Britain was about

to adopt a policy by which the interests of the colonies would be

subservient to the interests of British traders, thus destroying their

partially avowed hope of a distinctly American policy. Then came seven

years of war and four years of fear lest Great Britain should recover

through American dissension what she had lost in the trial of arms.

Under such conditions the newly liberated states were willing to form

the American union.

 

A similar pressure on the nations will exist in the burden of

preparedness and the danger of a renewal of the present struggle. The

last three years of conflict are more burdensome to the world than the

seven years of the American revolution to the states engaged against

Great Britain. Moreover, the danger of chaotic conditions in the future

is as great as the danger that confronted the Americans in 1787. Every

period is a critical period in history, but that which follows the

present struggle is especially important.

 

When our revolution ended a majority of our people thought the old

system good enough. The men--and there were many of them--who pointed

out the advantages to the western world of a great federated state

were pronounced idealists. “Practical” men meant to go on living in a

“practical” way. But the idealists were led by Washington, Madison,

and Hamilton, and the logic of events came to their aid. Dissensions

appeared, taxes were not paid, and the national debt seemed on the

verge of repudiation. Then the country was willing to listen to the

idealists; and the American federated state was established.

 

It was received with derision by the publicists of Europe. They could

not believe that republican government would succeed in an area as

large as that of the thirteen states. Their fears were not realized

and today most of their descendants live under republican government

of some form or other. We should not blame them too much. They had

never seen republican government operated on a large scale, and they

were not able to imagine that it could operate on a large scale. If

they could have seen it working with their mind’s eye, they would have

had confidence in its operation. The Americans were accustomed to

using their imagination, and seeing the “experiment” working in their

imagination, they could adopt it and make it work.

 

The greatest obstacle to “federation” in the American constitutional

convention was the jealousy of small states toward the large states.

Since it would have been unwise to leave any state out of the proposed

system, the small states were in a position to make demands. When they

were allowed equality in the senate they became quite reasonable. This

obstacle could hardly exist in the formation of a great federation for

the elimination of war; for the small states would probably be the

first to accept such a plan, as our small states were most willing to

adopt our constitution, once it was prepared. It would give them as

perfect security as they could desire, and without such a guaranty

their continued existence is always precarious.

 

Next to the fears of the small states was the unwillingness of many

people in the states to give up the idea that only a state should

control the happiness of its citizens, and that the union, if formed,

would destroy or lessen individual liberty. This idea inhered in

whatever idea of state sovereignty the people of the day held. To form

a federation to enforce peace would undoubtedly limit to some extent

the sovereignty of the present states of Europe. But sovereignty in

itself is worth nothing. It exists to give in general some forms

of life and dignity to states. If a surrender of part of a state’s

sovereignty will give that state immunity from wars perpetually, is it

not sovereignty well exchanged? No American state suffered because

it gave up control over its right to make war, but, on the contrary,

it gained immensely. Such a right is a costly necessity, a thing to

be held tenaciously as long as we are in a condition which makes wars

necessary, but to be given up as quickly as we can do without it.

 

To enter a federation would mean that individual nations would give

up the right to expand their territories. Germany could not acquire

more territory under such a system, unless she got it by agreement of

the parties concerned. The British empire could become no larger by

any forceful process. But this would not be a hardship. The only real

justification of expansion is to enlarge trade areas. A federation

to eliminate war would necessarily adopt a policy which allowed all

states an “open door” in trade. This was one of the essential things in

the formation of our union; for we read that no state shall interfere

within its borders with the rights of the citizens of other states to

trade there. Under such circumstances territorial expansion becomes

useless.

 

When the American states were trying to form that simple kind of union

that was expressed in the articles of confederation, Maryland long

refused to join. She was jealous of the great size of her neighbors and

especially of Virginia, whose claim to the Northwest was in general not

disputed. Experience showed that her fears were groundless. Virginia

not only never became a menace to Maryland, but she soon realized

that her wide boundaries were worthless to her under a system which

guaranteed her against quarrels with her neighbors, and as a result she

surrendered her Northwestern lands. Under a federation an undeveloped

part of Asia or Africa would be open as freely to Germans as to others

for trade, settlement, and the happiness of life, just as our Northwest

was open to Virginians, Pennsylvanians, and New Englanders alike. The

only thing that Virginia gave up in relinquishing her lands was the

right to call herself a big state, that is, self-glorification, a thing

the nations would have to give up in a federation. But might it not be

well exchanged for the right to call themselves safe from warfare?

 

When the American constitution was being debated the small states

declared they would not “federate” unless they were given privileges

which guaranteed them against absorption by the large states, while the

large states declared they would not “federate” unless it was arranged

that the small states should not have the power to defeat measures that

were for the common good. Each side was very honest in suspecting the

other, and great patience and persistence were necessary to bring them

together in a compromise which gave neither what it at first demanded.

For us it is interesting to observe that in actual practice there has

never been a time when the large states seemed to threaten to devour

the small states, nor a time when the small states placed their welfare

against any measure that concerned the general good of the country. The

union formed, the people began to debate questions that had nothing

to do with this or that state, general policies that cut across great

sections of the federation, without regard to the states as such.

 

It seems that if a federation of Europe were once formed a development

might be expected of a somewhat similar nature. At least, it is not