The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 27

The Lost Fruits of Waterloo 27

In our American constitution-making one often heard the question,

“What will become of the liberties of the citizen of the state under

the federation?” The answer was well made at the time: “Will not the

citizen of the state still be the citizen of the state, and will not

the state continue to guarantee him all that it can now guarantee

him? Does he not also pass under the protection of the federation as

truly as the citizens of any of the states? All that the federation

proposes to do is to take charge of the functions that concern the

things for which the federation is founded, and these are things to

which the states are not so well adjusted as a united government.” And

so it proved in practice. No American has ever had reason to think

his liberty lessened because the union was formed; and he has been

immensely stronger in all his rights on the high seas, in traveling

abroad, in being safe from the burdens of foreign wars, and in his

rights of trade in the uttermost parts of the earth; for he has been

the citizen of a great federation of small states.

 

Applying the analogy to the suggested federation of the world it

appears that under such a system the citizen of France, Great Britain,

Russia, or the United States would in nowise lose his rights under

his own government, and he would gain vastly in relief from burdens.

He would no longer have to think of wars, his trade relations would

be adjusted in such a way that no other man could have what he did

not have. In short, for all the purposes for which the federation was

founded he would stand on equal footing with any other man, and for the

purposes for which his own state existed he would have all the rights

he had before. His only losses would be in casting off the burdens

that grow out of international rivalry under the present system.

 

One of the things for which the American union was created was the

payment of the revolutionary debts. Compared with the debts the colony

had incurred individually before the revolution, and compared with

their ability to pay them at the time, these debts were large, although

they proved, under the union, a very small burden. It was the sense of

security under a government which had eliminated the possibility of

interstate wars that made the burden light.

 

The amount of indebtedness that the several nations in the present

war have contracted seems appalling. It would become a comparatively

light burden, if we could feel that for the future the world had

nothing to do but to pay it. The waste of interstate rivalry, the

burden of preparations for future wars, the loss to industry through

uncertainties on account of wars, all these things would disappear from

the consideration of the financiers, the credit of a federated world

would become excellent, and bonds that are likely to be quoted very low

when the artificial stimulus they get from patriotism is taken away

would be considered better investments than any bonds ever offered

under the existing system of states. The capitalists of the world,

like the American capitalists of 1787-1789, should be the most earnest

supporters of federation.

 

In the United States a great deal has been said about “entangling

alliances.” As the term was used a century ago it meant an alliance

that was likely to make us parties to the quarrels of European states,

one against the other. Into such a maze of selfish maneuvers it would

never be well for us to enter. But to take our place in a federation to

preserve peace would be quite another thing. That it would pledge us to

the discharge of a duty is not to be doubted; but we should be entering

no intrigue. We should be doing the most patriotic thing possible; for

the very essence of the act would be to protect ourselves from the

possibility of being drawn into “entangling alliances” with Europe.

Let us suppose that the old system is continued, and that Germany has

a mind to pay off what she may consider an old score. Suppose she

tries to set Mexico up against us, or to induce Japan to attack the

Philippines, or to interfere with any weaker American government in

such a way as to threaten the integrity of the Monroe doctrine, have

we not an “entangling alliance” on hand? If Germany emerges from the

present war strong enough to threaten the world as before the war,

when other nations found it necessary to form _ententes_ against her,

we shall not dare remain outside of some kind of alliance that will

be formed to check her pretensions. World federation is the guaranty

against the formation of “entangling alliances” on the part of the

United States.

 

In drawing the parallels between the formation of our union and the

possible creation of a federation of nations, it is hard to avoid the

inference that the two systems lead to the same end, federated general

government. And yet they are not the same. Our union was created to

take over a large area of government which the individual states could

not conduct successfully. It has a direct bearing on the citizens of

the states, it even has its own citizenship, although it was a long

time after 1787 before it was defined. It has popular elections, a

postal system, and hundreds of other things which no one would allot

to the kind of federation discussed here. It has been cited only for

the argument that can legitimately be derived from analogous conditions

relating to the difficulties of forming the union.

 

A world federation, on the other hand, could have only one main

purpose, the preservation of peace. No other bonds should knit it

together except those which exist for that purpose. They would be

strong enough for the strain that would be put upon them, and no

stronger. They would be made for a specific object by persons who would

be careful that they were properly made. A federation of this kind

could not be adopted until it was approved by the authorities in the

constituent nations, which would guarantee that it did not sacrifice

the individuality of those nations. In fact, so great would be the

obstacles at this point that it is safe to say that there would be more

danger that the federation would be too weak rather than that it would

be too strong.

 

* * * * *

 

Here ends this statement of the arguments for the only possible plan

of coöperation that will, if adopted, give the world enduring peace.

It would be easier to form a league to enforce peace by arbitration

and moral suasion than to form a federation with power sufficient

to enforce its decrees. But a league would in all probability be

flouted by the states as often as their interests seemed to them to

make it advisable. Reverting to the analogy of our own formative

period in national government, a league would be like our articles of

confederation, weak and insufficient because they did not authorize the

central government to coërce a recalcitrant state. As a step toward a

more desirable end the articles of federation were worth while: as a

similar step a league of nations might be better than nothing, but it

would not lead to the end to which the world is looking.

 

The idea of a federation of nations has been behind many a

philosopher’s dream. Jesus looked forward to it when he offered the

world “my peace,” and many another has held that somewhere in the

shadowy future a millennial era of super-government and peace will fall

upon the earth. It would be a great thing if at this day we could take

a step toward the realization of an ideal whose universality attests

its desirability. The “fruits of Waterloo” were lost a century ago by

a wide margin, due to the less perfect comprehension the world then had

of the advantages of federated peace. If they are lost at the end of

this war it will be by a smaller discrepancy. Some time they will be

secured, not because men have dreamed of them; but because, in such a

case at least, dreams are but “suppressed desires.”

 

The writer of a book can do no more than raise his voice to the people

who do things. To that large class who make things happen he can only

give impulse and hope. His cry goes to those who govern, to those who

direct the press, and to all citizens who feel responsibility for the

formation of good public opinion. If he speaks to them faithfully and

without prejudice or mere enthusiasm, he has done all he can do. The

results are on the knees of the gods.

 

 

 

 

INDEX

 

 

Adams, John Quincy, and the Monroe Doctrine, 79.

 

Agadir, 171.

 

Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of, 66.

 

Albania, in the Balkan war of 1912-1913, 89, 125, 126;

origin of, 106, 108, 121.

 

Alexander I, of Russia, 155;

his peace plans, 36, 45-63;

his personal qualities, 46;

his education, 46-48;

and the Treaty of Tilsit, 49;

eyes opened to Napoleon, 50;

his friendship for France, 51;

“grouped” by Castlereagh, 52;

signs treaty of Chaumont, 52;

enters Paris in 1814, 54;

at Congress of Vienna, 55;

and Poland, 56;

and the Holy Alliance, 59-64;

and Baroness Krüdener, 60;

and the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, 66;

at Conference at Troppau, 68-70;

his change of policy, 70;

and the Greek war of independence, 77;

and a federation of nations, 263.

 

Algeciras, Conference at, 168

 

Alliance, the Treaty of, 65;

the Quadruple, 65, 66, 67;

the Quintuple, 66, 67, 68, 69, 79;

disruption of, 69.

See Holy Alliance.

 

Alsace and Lorraine, 92.

 

American Peace Society, 37.

 

Armageddon, 1-5, 15.