54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of mantras and the rest.
The 'or' here has the sense of 'and.' The 'and the rest' comprises
generic characteristics, qualities, number, similarity, order of
succession, substances, and actions. As there is nothing contrary to
reason in mantras and the rest, although mentioned in the text of one
sakha only, finding, on the basis of such means of proof as direct
statement, and so on, their application in all sakhas, since the
sacrifice to which they belong is one and the same in all sakhas; so
there is likewise no contradiction in the meditations under discussion
being undertaken by members of all sakhas.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'what is connected with constituent elements of the
sacrifice.'
55. There is pre-eminence of plenitude, as in the case of the sacrifice;
for thus Scripture shows.
The sacred text (Ch. Up. V, 12 ff.) enjoins a meditation on Vaisvanara,
the object of which is the highest Self, as having for its body the
entire threefold world, and for its limbs the heavenly world, the sun,
the wind, and so on. The doubt here arises whether separate meditations
have to be performed on the highest Being in its separate aspects, or in
its aggregate as well as in its distributed aspect, or in its aggregate
aspect only.--In its separate aspects, the Purvapakshin maintains; since
at the outset a meditation of that kind is declared. For on the Rishis
in succession telling Asvapati the objects of their meditation, viz. the
sky, the sun, and so on, Asvapati explains to them that these
meditations refer to the head, eye, and so on, of the highest Being, and
mentions for each of these meditations a special fruit. And the
concluding explanation 'he who worships Vaisvanara as a span long, &c.,'
is merely meant to gather up into one, as it were, the preceding
meditations on the parts of Vaisvanara.--Another Purvapakshin holds that
this very concluding passage enjoins a further meditation on Vaisvanara
in his collective aspect, in addition to the previously enjoined
meditations on his limbs; for that passage states a separate result, 'he
eats food in all worlds,' &c. Nor does this destroy the unity of the
whole section. The case is analogous to that of the meditation on
'plenitude' (bhuman; Ch. Up. VII, 23). There, in the beginning,
separate meditations are enjoined on name, and so on, with special
results of their own; and after that a meditation is enjoined on bhuman,
with a result of its own, 'He becomes a Self-ruler,' &c. The entire
section really refers to the meditation on bhuman; but all the same
there are admitted subordinate meditations on name, and so on, and a
special result for each.--These views are set aside by the Sutra, 'There
is pre-eminence of plenitude,' i.e. there is reason to assume that
Vaisvanara in his fulness, i.e. in his collective aspect, is meant;
since we apprehend unity of the entire section. From the beginning of
the section it is manifest that what the Rishis desire to know is the
Vaisanara Self; it is that Self which Asvapati expounds to them as
having the Universe for his body, and in agreement therewith the last
clause of his teaching intimates that the intuition of Brahman (which is
none other than the Vaisvanara Self)--which is there characterised as
the food of all worlds, all beings, all Selfs--is the fruit of the
meditation on Vaisvanara. This summing up proves the whole section to
deal with the same subject. And on the basis of this knowledge we
determine that what the text says as to meditations on the separate
members of the Vaisanara Self and their special results is merely of the
nature of explanatory comment (anuvada) on parts of the meditation on
the collective Self.--This decision is arrived at as in the case of the
sacrifice. For to the injunction of certain sacrifices--such as 'Let a
man, on the birth of a son, offer a cake on twelve potsherds to
Vaisvanara'--the text similarly adds remarks on parts of the oblation,
'there is an oblation on eight potsherds,' and so on.--The meditation
therefore has to be performed on the entire Vaisvanara Self only, not on
its parts. This, moreover, Scripture itself intimates, in so far, namely,
as declaring the evil consequences of meditation on parts of the Self
only, 'your head would have fallen off if you had not come to me'; 'you
would have become blind,' and so on. This also shows that the reference
to the text enjoining meditations on name, &c., proves nothing as to our
passage. For there the text says nothing as to disadvantages connected
with those special meditations; it only says that the meditation on
plenitude (bhuman) has a more excellent result. The section, therefore,
although really concerned with enjoining the meditation on the bhuman,
at the same time means to declare that the special meditations also are
fruitful; otherwise the meditation on the bhuman could not be
recommended, for the reason that it has a more excellent result than the
preceding meditations.--The conclusion, therefore, is that the text
enjoins a meditation on the collective Vaisvanara Self only.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'the pre-eminence of plenitude.'
56. (The meditations are) separate, on account of the difference of
words, and so on.
The instances coming under this head of discussion are all those
meditations on Brahman which have for their only result final Release,
which consists in attaining to Brahman--such as the meditation on that
which is, the meditation on the bhuman, the meditation on the small
space within the heart, the Upakosala meditation, the Sandilya
meditation, the meditation on Vaisvanara, the meditation on the Self of
bliss, the meditation on the Imperishable, and others--whether they be
recorded in one sakha only or in several sakhas. To a different category
belong those meditations which have a special object such as Prana, and
a special result.--The doubt here arises whether the meditations of the
former class are all to be considered as identical, or as separate--The
Purvapakshin holds that they are all one; for, he says, they all have
one and the same object of meditation, viz. Brahman. For the nature of
all cognition depends on the object cognised; and the nature of the
meditations thus being one, the meditations themselves are one.--This
view the Sutra controverts. The meditations are different, on account of
the difference of terms and the rest. The 'and the rest' comprises
repetition (abhyasa), number (samkhya), quality (guna), subject-matter
(prakriya), and name (namadheya; cp. Pu. Mi. Su. II, 2, 1 ff.). We meet
in those meditations with difference of connexion, expressing itself in
difference of words, and so on; which causes difference on the part of
the meditations enjoined. The terms enjoining meditation, 'he knows,'
'he is to meditate' (veda; upasita), and so on, do indeed all of them
denote a certain continuity of cognition, and all these cognitions have
for their object Brahman only, but all the same those cognitions differ
in so far as they have for their object Brahman, as variously qualified
by special characteristics mentioned in the meditation; in one
meditation he is spoken of as the sole cause of the world, in another as
free from all evil, and so on. We therefore arrive at the decision that
clauses which describe special forms of meditation having for their
result the attainment to Brahman, and are complete in themselves, convey
the idea of separate independent meditations, and thus effect separation
of the vidyas. This entire question was indeed already decided in the
Purva Mimamsa-sutras (II, 2, 1), but it is here argued again to the end
of dispelling the mistaken notion that the Vedanta-texts aim at
knowledge only, and not at the injunction of activities such as
meditation. The meditations, therefore, are separate ones.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'difference of words and the rest.'
57. Option, on account of the non-difference of result.
It has been proved that the meditation on that which truly is, the
meditation on the small ether within the heart, and so on--all of which
have for their result the attainment to Brahman--are separate
meditations. The question now arises whether all these meditations
should be combined by each meditating devotee, on account of such
combination being useful to him; or whether, in the absence of any use
of such combination, they should be undertaken optionally.--They may be
combined, the Purvapakshin holds; since it is observed that different
scriptural matters are combined even when having one and the same result.
The Agnihotra, the Daisapurnamasa oblation, and other sacrifices, all of
them have one and the same result, viz. the possession of the heavenly
world; nevertheless, one and the same agent performs them all, with a
view to the greater fulness of the heavenly bliss aimed at. So the
different meditations on Brahman also may be cumulated with a view to
greater fulness of intuition of Brahman.--This view the Sutra rejects.
Option only between the several meditations is possible, on account of
the non-difference of result. For to all meditations on Brahman alike
Scripture assigns one and the same result, viz. intuitive knowledge of
Brahman, which is of the nature of supreme, unsurpassable bliss. 'He who
knows Brahman attains the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), &c. The
intuitive knowledge of Brahman constitutes supreme, unsurpassable bliss;
and if such intuition may be reached through one meditation, of what use
could other meditations be? The heavenly world is something limited in
respect of place, time, and essential nature, and hence a person
desirous of attaining to it may cumulate works in order to take
possession of it to a greater extent, and so on. But an analogous
proceeding cannot be resorted to with regard to Brahman, which is
unlimited in every sense. All meditations on Brahman tend to dispel
Nescience, which stands in the way of the intuition of Brahman, and thus
equally have for their result the attaining to Brahman; and hence there
is option between them. In the case, on the other hand, of those
meditations which aim at other results than Brahman, there may either be
choice between the several meditations, or they may be cumulated--as one
may also do in the case of sacrifices aiming at the attainment of the
heavenly world;--for as those results are not of an infinite nature one
may aim at realising them in a higher degree. This the next Sutra
declares.
58. But meditations aiming at objects of desire may, according to one's
liking, be cumulated or not; on account of the absence of the former
reason.
The last clause means--on account of their results not being of an
infinite nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'option.'
59. They belong to the constituent members, as the bases.
A doubt arises whether meditations such as the one enjoined in the text,
'Let him meditate on the syllable Om as the Udgitha,' which are
connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice such as the Udgitha,
contribute towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, and hence must
be performed at the sacrifice as part of it; or whether they, like the
godohana vessel, benefit the agent apart from the sacrifice, and
therefore may be undertaken according to desire.--But has it not been
already decided under III, 3, 42 that those meditations are generally
beneficial to man, and not therefore restricted to the sacrifices?--True;
it is just for the purpose of further confirming that conclusion that
objections are now raised against it on the ground of some inferential
marks (linga) and reasoning. For there it was maintained on the strength
of the text 'therefore he does both' that those meditations have results
independent of the sacrifice. But there are several reasons favouring
the view that those meditations must be connected with the sacrifices as
subordinate members, just as the Udgitha and the rest to which the
meditations refer.
Their case is by no means analogous to that of the godohana vessel, for,
while in the case of the latter, the text expressly declares the
existence of a special result, 'For him who is desirous of cattle he is
to bring water in a godohana,' the texts enjoining those meditations do
not state special results for them. For clauses such as 'he is to
meditate on the Udgitha' intimate only that the Udgitha is connected
with the meditation; while their connexion with certain results is known
from other clauses, such as 'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith,
with the Upanishad, that is more vigorous' (according to which the
result of such meditations is only to strengthen the result of the
sacrifices). And when a meditation of this kind has, on the ground of
its connexion with the Udgitha or the like--which themselves are
invariably connected with sacrifices--been cognised to form an element
of a sacrifice, some other passage which may declare a fruit for that
meditation can only be taken as an arthavada; just as the passage which
declares that he whose sacrificial ladle is made of parna wood does not
hear an evil sound. In the same way, therefore, as the Udgitha and so on,
which are the bases of those meditations, are to be employed only as
constituent parts of the sacrifices, so the meditations also connected
with those constituent parts are themselves to be employed as
constituent parts of the sacrifices only.
60. And on account of injunction.
The above conclusion is further confirmed by the fact of injunction, i.e.
thereby that clauses such as 'he is to meditate on the Udgitha' enjoin
the meditation as standing to the Udgitha in the relation of a
subordinate member. Injunctions of this kind differ from injunctions
such as 'he is to bring water in the godohana vessel for him who desires
cattle'; for the latter state a special qualification on the part of him
who performs the action, while the former do not, and hence cannot claim
independence.
61. On account of rectification.
The text 'from the seat of the Hotri he sets right the wrong Udgiha'
shows that the meditation is necessarily required for the purpose of
correcting whatever mistake may be made in the Udgitha. This also proves
that the meditation is an integral part of the sacrificial performance.
62. And on account of the declaration of a quality being common (to all
the Vedas).
The text 'By means of that syllable the threefold knowledge proceeds.
With _Om_ the Adhvaryu gives orders, with _Om_ the Hotri recites, with _Om_
the Udgatri sings,' which declares the pranava--which is a 'quality' of
the meditation, in so far as it is its basis--to be common to the three
Vedas, further shows that the meditation has to be employed in connexion
with the sacrifice. For the meditation is connected with the Udgitha,
and the Udgitha is an integral part of all sacrificial performances
whatever.
Of the prima facie view thus far set forth the next Sutra disposes.
63. Rather not, as the text does not declare their going together.
It is not true that the meditations on the Udgitha and the rest are
bound to the sacrifices in the same way as the Udgitha, and so on,
themselves are; for Scripture does not declare that they go together
with, i.e. are subordinate constituents of the Udgitha, and so on. The
clause 'Let him meditate on the Udgitha' does not indeed itself state
another qualification on the part of the agent (i.e. does not state that
the agent in entering on the meditation is prompted by a motive other
than the one prompting the sacrifice); but the subsequent clause,
'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that
becomes more vigorous,' intimates that knowledge is the means to render
the sacrificial work more efficacious, and from this it follows that the
meditation is enjoined as a means towards effecting a result other than
the result of the sacrifice. And hence the meditation cannot be viewed
as a subordinate member of the Udgitha, which itself is a subordinate
member of the sacrifice. It rather has the Udgitha for its basis only.
He only indeed who is qualified for the sacrifice is qualified for the
meditation, since the latter aims at greater efficaciousness of the
sacrifice; but this does not imply that the meditation necessarily goes
with the sacrifice. By the greater vigour of the sacrifice is meant its
non-obstruction by some other sacrificial work of greater strength, its
producing its effect without any delay.--The case of a statement such as
'he whose ladle is of parna wood hears no evil sound' is different.
There the text does not declare that the quality of consisting of parna
wood is the direct means of bringing about the result of no evil sound
being heard; hence there is no valid reason why that quality should not
be subordinate to the ladle, which itself is subordinate to the
sacrifice; and as it is not legitimate to assume for the mere
subordinate constituents of a sacrifice special fruits (other than the
general fruit of the sacrifice), the declaration as to no evil sound
being heard is to be viewed as a mere arthavada (i.e. a mere additional
statement meant further to glorify the result of the sacrifice--of which
the ladle made of parna wood is a subordinate instrument).
64. And because (Scripture) shows it.
A scriptural text, moreover, shows that the meditation is necessary for,
and restricted to, the sacrificial performance. For the text 'A Brahman
priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the
officiating priests'--which declares that all priests are saved through
the knowledge of the Brahman--has sense only on the understanding that
that knowledge is not restricted to the Udjatri, and so on (i.e. not to
those priests who are engaged in carrying out the details of the
sacrifices which are the 'bases' of the meditations).--The conclusion,
therefore, is that those meditations are not restricted to the
sacrifices, subordinate members of which serve as their 'bases.'--This
terminates the adhikarana of 'like the bases.'
FOURTH PADA.
1. The benefit to man results from thence, on account of scriptural
statement; thus Badarayana thinks.
We have concluded the investigation into the oneness or diverseness of
meditations--the result of which is to indicate in which cases the
special points mentioned in several meditations have to be combined, and
in which not. A further point now to be investigated is whether that
advantage to the meditating devotee, which is held to accrue to him from
the meditation, results from the meditation directly, or from works of
which the meditations are subordinate members.--The Reverend Badarayana
holds the former view. The benefit to man results from thence, i.e. from
the meditation, because Scripture declares this to be so. 'He who knows
Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'I know that great
Person of sun-like lustre beyond the darkness. A man who knows him truly
passes over death; there is no other path to go' (Svet. Up. III, 8); 'As
the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their
form, thus a man who possesses knowledge, freed from name and form, goes
to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8).--
Against this view the Purvapakshin raises an objection.
2. On account of (the Self) standing in a complementary relation, they
are arthavadas, as in other cases; thus Jaimini opines.
What has been said as to Scripture intimating that a beneficial result
is realised through the meditations by themselves is untenable. For
texts such as 'he who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' do not teach
that the highest aim of man is attained through knowledge; their purport
rather is to inculcate knowledge of Truth on the part of a Self which is
the agent in works prescribed. Knowledge, therefore, stands in a
complementary relation to sacrificial works, in so far as it imparts to
the acting Self a certain mystic purification; and the texts which
declare special results of knowledge, therefore, must be taken as mere
arthavadas. 'As in the case of other things; so Jaimini thinks,' i.e. as
Jaimini holds that in the case of substances, qualities, and so on, the
scriptural declaration of results is of the nature of arthavada.--But it
has been shown before that the Vedanta-texts represent as the object to
be attained, by those desirous of Release, on the basis of the knowledge
imparted by them, something different from the individual Self engaged
in action; cp. on this point Su. I, 1, 15; I, 3, 5; I, 2, 3; I, 3, 18.
And Su. II, 1, 22 and others have refuted the view that Brahman is to be
considered as non-different from the personal soul, because in texts
such as 'thou art that' it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter.
And other Sutras have proved that Brahman must, on the basis of numerous
scriptural texts, be recognised as the inner Self of all things material
and immaterial. How then can it be said that the Vedanta-texts merely
mean to give instruction as to the true nature of the active individual
soul, and that hence all meditation is merely subservient to sacrificial
works?--On the strength of numerous inferential marks, the Purvapakshin
replies, which prove that in the Vedanta-texts all meditation is really
viewed as subordinate to knowledge, and of the declarations of co-
ordination of Brahman and the individual soul (which must be taken to
imply that the two are essentially of the same nature), we cannot help
forming the conclusion that the real purport of the Vedanta-texts is to
tell us of the true nature of the individual soul in so far as different
from its body.--But, again it is objected, the agent is connected no
less with ordinary worldly works than with works enjoined by the Veda,
and hence is not invariably connected with sacrifices (i.e. works of the
latter type); it cannot, therefore, be maintained that meditations on
the part of the agent necessarily connect themselves with sacrifices in
so far as they effect a purification of the sacrificer's mind!--There is
a difference, the Purvapakshin rejoins. Worldly works can proceed also
if the agent is non-different from the body; while an agent is qualified
for sacred works only in so far as he is different from the body, and of
an eternal non-changing nature. Meditations, therefore, properly connect
themselves with sacrifices, in so far as they teach that the agent
really is of that latter nature. We thus adhere to the conclusion that
meditations are constituents of sacrificial actions, and hence are of no
advantage by themselves.--But what then are those inferential marks
which, as you say, fully prove that the Vedanta-texts aim at setting
forth the nature of the individual soul?--To this the next Sutra replies.
3. On account of (such) conduct being seen.
It is seen, viz in Scripture, that those who knew Brahman busied
themselves chiefly with sacrifices.--Asvapati Kaikeya had a deep
knowledge of the Self; but when three Rishis had come to him to receive
instruction regarding the Self, he told them 'I am about, to perform a
sacrifice, Sirs' (Ch. Up. V, II). Similarly we learn from Smriti that
Janaka and other princes deeply versed in the knowledge of Brahman
applied themselves to sacrificial works, 'By works only Janaka and
others attained to perfection'; 'He also, well founded in knowledge,
offered many sacrifices.' And this fact--that those who know Brahman
apply themselves to works chiefly--shows that knowledge (or meditation)
has no independent value, but serves to set forth the true nature of the
active Self, and thus is subordinate to work.--An even more direct proof
is set forth in the next Sutra.
4. On account of direct scriptural statement.
Scripture itself directly declares knowledge to be subordinate to works,
'whatever he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad, that
is more vigorous'. Nor can it be said that this text refers, on the
ground of leading subject-matter (prakarana), to the Udgitha only; for
direct scriptural statement (suti) is stronger than subject-matter, and
the words 'whatever he does with knowledge' clearly refer to knowledge
in general.
5. On account of the taking hold together.
The text 'then both knowledge and work take hold of him' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,
2) shows that knowledge and work go together, and this going together is
possible only if, in the manner stated, knowledge is subordinate to work.
6. On account of injunction for such a one.
That knowledge is subordinate to works follows therefrom also that works
are enjoined on him only who possesses knowledge. For texts such as 'He
who has learnt the Veda from a family of teachers,' &c. (Ch. Up. VIII,
15), enjoin works on him only who has mastered the sacred texts so as
fully to understand their meaning--for this is the sense of the term
'learning' (adhyayana). Hence the knowledge of Brahman also is enjoined
with a view to works only: it has no independent result of its own.
7. On account of definite rule.
Another argument for our conclusion is that the text 'Doing works here
let a man desire to live a hundred years,' &c. (Is. Up. II), expressly
enjoins lifelong works on him who knows the Self. The general conclusion,
therefore, is that knowledge (meditation) is merely auxiliary to works.
Of this view the next Sutra finally disposes.
8. But on account of the teaching of the different one, Badarayana's
(view is valid); as this is seen.
Knowledge by itself benefits man; since Scripture teaches that the
object of knowledge is the highest Brahman which, as it is of an
absolutely faultless and perfect nature, is other than the active
individual soul.
Badarayana, therefore, holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of
its own. Let the inferential marks (referred to by the Purvapakshin) be;
the direct teaching of the texts certainly refers to a being different
from the Self that acts; for we clearly see that their object is the
highest creative Brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities,
which cannot possibly be attributed to the individual Self whether in
the state of Release or of bondage: 'Free from evil, free from old age,'
& c. &c. In all those texts there is not the slightest trace of any
reference to the wretched individual soul, as insignificant and weak as
a tiny glow-worm, implicated in Nescience and all the other evils of
finite existence. And the fruit of that knowledge of the highest Person
the texts expressly declare, in many places, to be immortality--which
consists in attaining to Him. The view of knowledge by itself
benefitting man therefore is well founded.--The Sutras proceed to
dispose of the so-called inferential marks.
9. But the declarations are equal.
The argument that knowledge must be held subordinate to work because we
learn from Scripture that those who know Brahman perform sacrificial
works, will not hold good; since, on the other hand, we also see that
men knowing Brahman abandoned all work; cp. texts such as 'The Rishis
descended from Kavasha said: For what purpose should we study the Veda?
for what purpose should we sacrifice?' As it thus appears that those who
know Brahman give up works, knowledge cannot be a mere auxiliary to
works.--But how can it be accounted for that those who know Brahman both
do and do not perform works?--Works may be performed in so far as
sacrifices and the like, if performed by one not having any special wish,
stand in subordinate relation to the knowledge of Brahman; hence there
is no objection to texts enjoining works. And as, on the other hand,
sacrifices and such-like works when aiming at results of their own are
opposed to the knowledge of Brahman which has Release for its only
result, there is all the less objection to texts which suggest the non-
performance of works. If, on the other hand, knowledge were subordinate
to works, works could on no account be dispensed with.--Against the
assertion that Scripture directly declares knowledge to be subordinate
to works the next Sutra declares itself.
10. (It is) non-comprehensive.
The scriptural declaration does not refer to all meditations, but only
to the meditation on the Udgitha. In the clause 'what he does with
knowledge,' the 'what' is in itself indefinite, and therefore must be
defined as connecting itself with the Udgitha mentioned in the previous
clause, 'Let him meditate on the Udgitha.' The sentence cannot be
construed to mean 'whatever he does is to be done with knowledge,' but
means 'that which he does with knowledge becomes more vigorous,' and _that
which is_ done with knowledge that is the Udgitha. The next Sutra
refutes the argument set forth in Sutra 5.
11. There is distribution, as in the case of the hundred.
As knowledge and work have different results, the text 'of him knowledge
and work lay hold' must be understood in a distributive sense, i.e. as
meaning that knowledge lays hold of him to the end of bringing about its
own particular result, and that so likewise does work. 'As in the case
of a hundred,' i.e. as it is understood that, when a man selling a field
and a gem is said to receive two hundred gold pieces, one hundred are
given for the field and one hundred for the gem.
12. Of him who has merely read the Veda.
Nor is there any force in the argument that knowledge is only auxiliary
to work because works are enjoined on him who possesses knowledge. For
the text which refers to the man 'who has read the Veda' enjoins works
on him who has merely _read_ the texts, and _reading_ there means
nothing more than the apprehension of the aggregate of syllables called
Veda, without any insight into their meaning. A man who has thus
mastered the words of the Veda apprehends therefrom that it makes
statements as to works having certain results, and then on his own
account applies himself to the enquiry into the meaning of those
declarations; he who is desirous of work applies himself to the
knowledge of works; he who is desirous of Release applies himself to the
knowledge of Brahman. And even if the injunction of _reading_ were
understood as prompting to the understanding of the text also, all the
same, knowledge would not be a subsidiary to works. For _knowledge_, in
the sense of the Upanishads, is something different from mere cognition
of sense. In the same way as the performance of such works as the
Jyotishtoma sacrifice is something different from the cognition of the
true nature of those works; so that vidya, which effects the highest
purpose of man, i. e. devout meditation (dhyana, upasana), is something
different from the mere cognition of the true nature of Brahman.
Knowledge of that kind has not the most remote connexion even with works.
13. Not so, on account of non-specification.
Nor is it true that the text 'Doing works here,' &c., is meant to divert
him who knows the Self from knowledge and restrict him to works. For
there is no special reason to hold that that text refers to works as
independent means of a desirable result: it may as well be understood to
refer to works merely subordinate to knowledge. As he who knows the Self
has to practise meditation as long as he lives, he may also have to
practise, for the same period, works that are helpful to meditation.
Having thus refuted the objection on the ground of the reason of the
matter, the Sutrakara proceeds to give his own interpretation of the
text.
14. Or the permission is for the purpose of glorification.
The _or_ has assertive force. The introductory words of the Upanishad,
'Hidden in the Lord is all this,' show knowledge to be the subject-
matter; hence the permission of works can aim only at the glorification
of knowledge. The sense of the text therefore is--owing to the power of
knowledge a man although constantly performing works is not stained by
them.
15. Some also, by proceeding according to their liking.
In some sakhas, moreover, we read that he who possesses the knowledge of
Brahman may, according to his liking, give up the state of a householder,
'What shall we do with offspring, we who have this Self and this world?'
(Bri. Up. V, 4, 22.) This text also proves knowledge not to be
subsidiary to works; for if it were so subsidiary, it would not be
possible for him who knows Brahman to give up householdership (with all
the works obligatory on that state) according to his liking.
16. And destruction.
There is moreover a Vedanta-text which declares the knowledge of Brahman
to destroy work-good and evil--which is the root of all the afflictions
of transmigratory existence: 'The knot of the heart is broken, all
doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is
high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). This also contradicts the view of
knowledge being subordinate to works.
17. And of him who is chaste; for in Scripture (this is declared).
The knowledge of Brahman belongs to those who have to observe chastity,
and men living in that state have not to perform the Agnihotra, the
Darsapurnamasa, and similar works. For this reason also knowledge cannot
be subsidiary to works.--But, it may be objected, there is no such
condition of life; for texts such as 'he is to perform the Agnihotra as
long as he lives,' declare men to be obliged to perform sacrifices and
the like up to the end of their lives, and Smriti texts contradicting
Scripture have no authority.--To meet this the Sutra adds 'for in
Scripture.' The three stages of life are recognised in Scripture only;
cp. texts such as 'Those who in the forest practise penance and faith'
(Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); 'Wishing for that world only mendicants wander forth
from their homes' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22). The text as to the lifelong
obligatoriness of the Agnihotra is valid for those only who do not
retire from worldly life.
18. A reference (only) Jaimini (holds them to be), on account of absence
of injunction; for (Scripture) forbids.
The argument for the three stages of life, founded on their mention in
Vedic texts, has no force, since all those references are only of the
nature of anuvada. For none of those texts contain injunctive forms. The
text 'There are three branches of sacred observance,' &c. (Ch. Up. II,
23, 1), is meant to glorify the previous meditation on Brahman under the
form of the pranava, as appears from the concluding clause 'he who is
firmly grounded in Brahman obtains immortality'; it therefore cannot
mean to enjoin the three conditions of life as valid states. In the same
way the text 'And those who in the forest practise penance and faith'
refers to the statements previously made as to the path of the gods, and
cannot therefore be meant to make an original declaration as to another
condition of life. Scripture moreover expressly forbids that other
condition, 'a murderer of men is he who removes the fire,' &c. There are
therefore no conditions of life in which men are bound to observe
chastity. This is the opinion of the teacher Jaimini.
19. It is to be accomplished, Badarayana holds, on account of scriptural
statement of equality.
Badarayana is of opinion that, in the same way as the condition of
householdership, those other conditions of life also are obligatory;
since in the section beginning 'there are three branches of sacred duty'
all the three conditions of life are equally referred to, with a view to
glorifying him who is firmly grounded in Brahman. The reference there
made to the condition of the householder necessarily presupposes that
condition to be already established and obligatory, and the same
reasoning then holds good with regard to the other conditions mentioned.
Nor must it be said that the special duties mentioned at the beginning
of the section--sacrifice, study, charity, austerity, Brahmakarya--all
of them belong to the state of the householder (in which case the text
would contain no reference to the other conditions of life); for on that
supposition the definite reference to a threefold division of duties,
'Sacrifice, &c. are the first, austerity the second, Brahmakarya the
third,' would be unmeaning. The proper explanation is to take the words'
sacrifice, study, and charity' as descriptive of the condition of the
householder; the word 'austerity' as descriptive of the duties of the
Vaikhanasa and the wandering mendicant, who both practise mortification;
and the word 'Brahmakarya' as referring to the duties of the Brahmakarin.
The term 'Brahmasamstha' finally, in the concluding clause, refers to
all the three conditions of life, as men belonging to all those
conditions may be founded on Brahman. Those, the text means to say, who
are destitute of this foundation on Brahman and only perform the special
duties of their condition of life, obtain the worlds of the blessed;
while he only who at the same time founds himself on Brahman attains to
immortality.--In the text 'and those who in the forest,' &c. the mention
made of the forest shows that the statement as to the path of the gods
has for its presupposition the fact that that stage of life which is
especially connected with the forest is one generally recognised.--So
far it has been shown that the other stages of life are no less
obligatory than that of the householder, whether we take the text under
discussion as containing merely a reference to those stages (as
established by independent means of proof) or as directly enjoining them.
The next Sutra is meant to show that the latter view is after all the
right one.
20. Or an injunction, as in the case of the carrying.
As the second part of the text 'Let him approach carrying the firewood
below the ladle; for above he carries it for the gods' (which refers to
a certain form of the Agnihotra), although having the form of an anuvada,
yet must be interpreted as an injunction, since the carrying of firewood
above is not established by any other injunction; so the text under
discussion also must be taken as an injunction of the different stages
of life (which are not formally enjoined elsewhere). No account being
taken of the text of the Jabalas, 'Having completed his studentship he
is to become a householder,' &c., it is thus a settled conclusion that
the texts discussed, although primarily concerned with other topics,
must at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several
conditions of life. From this it follows that the text enjoining the
performance of the Agnihotra up to the end of life, and similar texts,
are not universally binding, but concern those only who do not retire
from worldly life.--The final conclusion therefore is that as the
knowledge of Brahman is enjoined on those who lead a life of austerity
(which does not require the performance of sacrifices and the like), it
is not subordinate to works, but is in itself beneficial to man.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'benefit to man.'
21. If it be said that they are mere glorification, on account of their
reference; not so, on account of the newness.
The following point is next enquired into. Are texts such as 'That
Udgitha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the supreme
place, the eighth' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 3) meant to glorify the Udgitha as a
constituent element of the sacrifice, or to enjoin a meditation on the
Udgitha as the best of all essences, and so on? The Purvapakshin holds
the former view, on the ground that the text declares the Udgitha to be
the best of all essences in so far as being a constituent element of the
sacrifice. The case is analogous to that of texts such as 'the ladle is
this earth, the ahavaniya is the heavenly world,' which are merely meant
to glorify the ladle and the rest as constituent members of the
sacrifice.--This view the latter part of the Sutra sets aside 'on
account of newness.' Texts, as the one referring to the Udgitha, cannot
be mere glorifications; for the fact of the Udgitha being the best of
essences is not established by any other means of proof, and the text
under discussion cannot therefore be understood as a mere anuvada, meant
for glorification. Nor is there, in proximity, any injunction of the
Udgitha on account of connexion with which the clause declaring the
Udgitha to be the best of all essences could naturally be taken as an
anuvada (glorifying the thing previously enjoined in the injunctive
text); while there is such an injunction in connexion with the (anuvada)
text 'The ladle is this earth,' and so on. We thus cannot but arrive at
the conclusion that the text is meant to enjoin a meditation on the
Udgitha as being the best of all essences, and so on--the fruit of such
meditation being an increase of vigour and efficacy on the part of the
sacrifice.
22. And on account of the words denoting becoming.
That the texts under discussion have an injunctive purport also follows
from the fact that they contain verbal forms denoting becoming or
origination--'he is to meditate' and the like; for all such forms have
injunctive force. All these texts therefore are meant to enjoin special
forms of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of mere
glorification.'
23. Should it be said that (the stories told in the Upanishads) are for
the purpose of the Pariplava; not so, since (certain stories) are
specified.
We meet in the Vedanta-texts with certain stories such as 'Pratardana
the son of Divodasa came to the beloved abode of Indra,' &c., and
similar ones. The question here arises whether the stories are merely
meant to be recited at the Asvamedha sacrifice or to convey knowledge of
a special kind.--The Purvapakshin maintains that as the text' they tell
the stories' declares the special connexion of those stories with the so-
called pariplava performance, they cannot be assumed to be mainly
concerned with knowledge.--This view the Sutra negatives, on the ground
that not all stories of that kind are specially connected with the
pariplava. The texts rather single out special stories only as suitable
for that performance; on the general injunction quoted above there
follows an injunction defining _which_ stories are to be told, 'King
Manu, the son of Vivasvat,' &c. The stories told in the Vedanta-texts do
not therefore form parts of the pariplava performance, but are connected
with injunctions of meditations.
24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with
injunctions).
That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby
also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such
as 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is
analogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow
subserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of
recitation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the pariplava.'
25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire
and so on.
The Sutras return, from their digression into the discussion of two
special points, to the question as to those whose condition of life
involves chastity. The above Sutra declares that as persons of that
class are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with
meditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality;' 'those
who in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a
knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i.e. a knowledge of the
Agnihotra, the Darsapurnamasa, and all those other sacrifices which
require the preliminary establishnlent of the sacred fires, but a
knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special
condition of life.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of
the fire.'
26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural
statement of sacrifices and the rest; as in the case of the horse.
If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the
like, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of
accomplishing this in the case of householders also; and the mention
made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as 'Brahmanas seek to know
him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4,
22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge,
since the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on
the desire of knowledge.--Of this view the Sutra disposes. In the case
of householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory,
knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as
the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary
to knowledge. 'They seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said
only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge
is brought about; just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword,'
because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill.
What we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been
repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from
the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted
by such terms as dhyana or upasana, i.e. meditation; which is of the
nature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive
clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought
(pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect,
and being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such
meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme
Person, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of
sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This
is what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means.
The conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge
has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent
and occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means
of locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge,
although itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the
different works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice,
giving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be
performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the
thoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is
pervaded-worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection'
(Bha. Gi. XVIII, 5; 46).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need of all.' |
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