All knowledge is of the Real.
'Those who understand the Veda hold that all cognition has for its
object what is real; for Sruti and Smriti alike teach that everything
participates in the nature of everything else. In the scriptural account
of creation preceded by intention on the part of the Creator it is said
that each of these elements was made tripartite; and this tripartite
constitution of all things is apprehended by Perception as well. The red
colour in burning fire comes from (primal elementary) fire, the white
colour from water, the black colour from earth--in this way Scripture
explains the threefold nature of burning fire. In the same way all
things are composed of elements of all things. The Vishnu Purana, in its
account of creation, makes a similar statement: "The elements possessing
various powers and being unconnected could not, without combination,
produce living beings, not having mingled in any way. Having combined,
therefore, with one another, and entering into mutual associations--
beginning with the principle called Mahat, and extending down to the
gross elements--they formed an egg," &c. (Vi. Pu. I, 2, 50; 52). This
tripartiteness of the elements the Sutrakara also declares (Ve. Su. III,
1, 3). For the same reason Sruti enjoins the use of Putika sprouts when
no Soma can be procured; for, as the Mimamsakas explain, there are in
the Putika plant some parts of the Soma plant (Pu. Mi. Su.); and for the
same reason nivara grains may be used as a substitute for rice grains.
That thing is similar to another which contains within itself some part
of that other thing; and Scripture itself has thus stated that in shells,
& c., there is contained some silver, and so on. That one thing is
called "silver" and another "shell" has its reason in the relative
preponderance of one or the other element. We observe that shells are
similar to silver; thus perception itself informs us that some elements
of the latter actually exist in the former. Sometimes it happens that
owing to a defect of the eye the silver-element only is apprehended, not
the shell-element, and then the percipient person, desirous of silver,
moves to pick up the shell. If, on the other hand, his eye is free from
such defect, he apprehends the shell-element and then refrains from
action. Hence the cognition of silver in the shell is a true one. In the
same way the relation of one cognition being sublated by another
explains itself through the preponderant element, according as the
preponderance of the shell-element is apprehended partially or in its
totality, and does not therefore depend on one cognition having for its
object the false thing and another the true thing. The distinctions made
in the practical thought and business of life thus explain themselves on
the basis of everything participating in the nature of everything else.'
In dreams, again, the divinity creates, in accordance with the merit or
demerit of living beings, things of a special nature, subsisting for a
certain time only, and perceived only by the individual soul for which
they are meant. In agreement herewith Scripture says, with reference to
the state of dreaming, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses,
no roads; then he creates chariots, horses, and roads. There are no
delights, no joys, no bliss; then he creates delights, joys, and bliss.
There are no tanks, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes,
and rivers. For he is the maker' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). The meaning of
this is, that although there are then no chariots, &c., to be perceived
by other persons, the Lord creates such things to be perceived by the
dreaming person only. 'For he is the maker'; for such creative agency
belongs to him who possesses the wonderful power of making all his
wishes and plans to come true. Similarly another passage, 'That person
who is awake in those who are asleep, shaping one lovely sight after
another, that indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is
called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes
beyond it' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 8).--The Sutrakara also, after having in two
Sutras (III, 2, 1; 2) stated the hypothesis of the individual soul
creating the objects appearing in dreams, finally decides that that
wonderful creation is produced by the Lord for the benefit of the
individual dreamer; for the reason that as long as the individual soul
is in the samsara state, its true nature--comprising the power of making
its wishes to come true--is not fully manifested, and hence it cannot
practically exercise that power. The last clause of the Katha text ('all
worlds are contained in it,' &c.) clearly shows that the highest Self
only is the creator meant. That the dreaming person who lies in his
chamber should go in his body to other countries and experience various
results of his merit or demerit--being at one time crowned a king,
having at another time his head cut off, and so on--is possible in so
far as there is created for him another body in every way resembling the
body resting on the bed.
The case of the white shell being seen as yellow, explains itself as
follows. The visual rays issuing from the eye are in contact with the
bile contained in the eye, and thereupon enter into conjunction with the
shell; the result is that the whiteness belonging to the shell is
overpowered by the yellowness of the bile, and hence not apprehended;
the shell thus appears yellow, just as if it were gilt. The bile and its
yellowness is, owing to its exceeding tenuity, not perceived by the
bystanders; but thin though it be it is apprehended by the person
suffering from jaundice, to whom it is very near, in so far as it issues
from his own eye, and through the mediation of the visual rays, aided by
the action of the impression produced on the mind by that apprehension,
it is apprehended even in the distant object, viz. the shell.--In an
analogous way the crystal which is placed near the rose is apprehended
as red, for it is overpowered by the brilliant colour of the rose; the
brilliancy of the rose is perceived in a more distinct way owing to its
close conjunction with the transparent substance of the crystal.--In the
same way the cognition of water in the mirage is true. There always
exists water in connexion with light and earth; but owing to some defect
of the eye of the perceiving person, and to the mysterious influence of
merit and demerit, the light and the earth are not apprehended, while
the water _is_ apprehended.--In the case again of the firebrand swung
round rapidly, its appearance as a fiery wheel explains itself through
the circumstance that moving very rapidly it is in conjunction with all
points of the circle described without our being able to apprehend the
intervals. The case is analogous to that of the perception of a real
wheel; but there is the difference that in the case of the wheel no
intervals are apprehended, because there are none; while in the case of
the firebrand none are apprehended owing to the rapidity of the movement.
But in the latter case also the cognition is true.--Again, in the case
of mirrors and similar reflecting surfaces the perception of one's own
face is likewise true. The fact is that the motion of the visual rays
(proceeding from the eye towards the mirror) is reversed (reflected) by
the mirror, and that thus those rays apprehend the person's own face,
subsequently to the apprehension of the surface of the mirror; and as in
this case also, owing to the rapidity of the process, there is no
apprehension of any interval (between the mirror and the face), the face
presents itself as being in the mirror.--In the case of one direction
being mistaken for another (as when a person thinks the south to be
where the north is), the fact is that, owing to the unseen principle (i.
e. merit or demerit), the direction which actually exists in the other
direction (for a point which is to the north of me is to the south of
another point) is apprehended by itself, apart from the other elements
of direction; the apprehension which actually takes place is thus
likewise true. Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either
through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal
affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the
double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating,
becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon. One apparatus
apprehends the moon in her proper place; the other which moves somewhat
obliquely, apprehends at first a place close by the moon, and then the
moon herself, which thus appears somewhat removed from her proper place.
Although, therefore, what is apprehended is the one moon distinguished
by connection with two places at the same time--an apprehension due to
the double apparatus of vision--yet, owing to the difference of
apprehensions, there is a difference in the character of the object
apprehended, and an absence of the apprehension of unity, and thus a
double moon presents itself to perception. That the second spot is
viewed as qualifying the moon, is due to the circumstance that the
apprehension of that spot, and that of the moon which is not apprehended
in her proper place, are simultaneous. Now here the doubleness of the
apparatus is real, and hence the apprehension of the moon distinguished
by connexion with two places is real also, and owing to this doubleness
of apprehension, the doubleness of aspect of the object apprehended, i.e.
the moon, is likewise real. That there is only one moon constituting the
true object of the double apprehension, this is a matter for which
ocular perception by itself does not suffice, and hence what is actually
seen is a double moon. That, although the two eyes together constitute
one visual apparatus only, the visual rays being divided through some
defect of the eyes, give rise to a double apparatus--this we infer from
the effect actually observed. When that defect is removed there takes
place only one apprehension of the moon as connected with her proper
place, and thus the idea of one moon only arises. It is at the same time
quite clear how the defect of the eye gives rise to a double visual
apparatus, the latter to a double apprehension, and the latter again to
a doubleness of the object of apprehension.
We have thus proved that all cognition is true. The shortcomings of
other views as to the nature of cognition have been set forth at length
by other philosophers, and we therefore do not enter on that topic. What
need is there, in fact, of lengthy proofs? Those who acknowledge the
validity of the different means of knowledge, perception, and so on, and--
what is vouched for by sacred tradition--the existence of a highest
Brahman--free from all shadow of imperfection, of measureless excellence,
comprising within itself numberless auspicious qualities, all-knowing,
immediately realising all its purposes--, what should they not be able
to prove? That holy highest Brahman--while producing the entire world as
an object of fruition for the individual souls, in agreement with their
respective good and ill deserts--creates certain things of such a nature
as to become common objects of consciousness, either pleasant or
unpleasant, to all souls together, while certain other things are
created in such a way as to be perceived only by particular persons, and
to persist for a limited time only. And it is this distinction--viz. of
things that are objects of general consciousness, and of things that are
not so--which makes the difference between what is called 'things
sublating' and 'things sublated.'--Everything is explained hereby.
Neither Scripture nor Smriti and Purana teach Nescience.
The assertion that Nescience--to be defined neither as that which is nor
as that which is not--rests on the authority of Scripture is untrue. In
passages such as 'hidden by the untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), the word
'untrue' does not denote the Undefinable; it rather means that which is
different from 'rita,' and this latter word--as we see from the passage
'enjoying the rita' (Ka. Up. 1,3, 1)--denotes such actions as aim at no
worldly end, but only at the propitiation of the highest Person, and
thus enable the devotee to reach him. The word 'anrita' therefore
denotes actions of a different kind, i.e. such as aim at worldly results
and thus stand in the way of the soul reaching Brahman; in agreement
with the passage 'they do not find that Brahma-world, for they are
carried away by anrita' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2). Again, in the text 'Then
there was neither non-Being nor Being' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 1), the terms
'being' and 'non-being' denote intelligent and non-intelligent beings in
their distributive state. What that text aims at stating is that
intelligent and non-intelligent beings, which at the time of the
origination of the world are called 'sat' and 'tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6),
are, during the period of reabsorption, merged in the collective
totality of non-intelligent matter which the text denotes by the term
'darkness' (Ri. Samh. X, 129, 3). There is thus no reference whatever to
something 'not definable either as being or non-being': the terms
'being' and 'non-being' are applied to different mode; of being at
different times. That the term 'darkness' denotes the collective
totality of non-intelligent matter appears from another scriptural
passage, viz, 'The Non-evolved (avyaktam) is merged in the Imperishable
(akshara), the Imperishable in darkness (tamas), darkness becomes one
with the highest divinity.' True, the word 'darkness' denotes the subtle
condition of primeval matter (prakriti), which forms the totality of non-
intelligent things; but this very Prakriti is called Maya--in the text
'Know Prakriti to be Maya,' and this proves it be something
'undefinable': Not so, we reply; we meet with no passages where the word
'Maya' denotes that which is undefinable. But the word 'Maya' is
synonymous with 'mithya,' i.e. falsehood, and hence denotes the
Undefinable also. This, too, we cannot admit; for the word 'Maya' does
not in all places refer to what is false; we see it applied e.g. to such
things as the weapons of Asuras and Rakshasas, which are not 'false' but
real. 'Maya,' in such passages, really denotes that which produces
various wonderful effects, and it is in this sense that Prakriti is
called Maya. This appears from the passage (Svet. Up. IV, 9) 'From that
the "mayin" creates all this, and in that the other one is bound up by
maya.' For this text declares that Prakriti--there called Maya--produces
manifold wonderful creations, and the highest Person is there called
'mayin' because he possesses that power of maya; not on account of any
ignorance or nescience on his part. The latter part of the text
expressly says that (not the Lord but) another one, i.e. the individual
soul is bound up by maya; and therewith agrees another text, viz. 'When
the soul slumbering in beginningless Maya awakes' (Gaud. Ka.). Again, in
the text 'Indra goes multiform through the Mayas' (Ri. Samh. VI, 47, 18),
the manifold powers of Indra are spoken of, and with this agrees what
the next verse says, 'he shines greatly as Tvashtri': for an unreal
being does not shine. And where the text says 'my Maya is hard to
overcome' (Bha. Gi. VII, 14), the qualification given there to Maya, viz.
'consisting of the gunas,' shows that what is meant is Prakriti
consisting of the three gunas.--All this shows that Scripture does not
teach the existence of a 'principle called Nescience, not to be defined
either as that which is or that which is not.'
Nor again is such Nescience to be assumed for the reason that otherwise
the scriptural statements of the unity of all being would be unmeaning.
For if the text 'Thou art that,' be viewed as teaching the unity of the
individual soul and the highest Self, there is certainly no reason,
founded on unmeaningness, to ascribe to Brahman, intimated by the word
'that'--which is all-knowing, &c.--Nescience, which is contradictory to
Brahman's nature.--Itihasa and Purana also do not anywhere teach that to
Brahman there belongs Nescience.
But, an objection is raised, the Vishnu Purana, in the sloka, 'The stars
are Vishnu,' &c. (II, 12, 38), first refers to Brahman as one only, and
comprising all things within itself; thereupon states in the next sloka
that this entire world, with all its distinctions of hills, oceans, &c.,
is sprung out of the 'ajnana' of Brahman, which in itself is pure 'jnana,'
i.e. knowledge; thereupon confirms the view of the world having sprung
from ajnana by referring to the fact that Brahman, while abiding in its
own nature, is free from all difference (sl. 40); proves in the next two
slokas the non-reality of plurality by a consideration of the things of
this world; sums up, in the following sloka, the unreality of all that
is different from Brahman; then (43) explains that action is the root of
that ajnana which causes us to view the one uniform Brahman as manifold;
thereupon declares the intelligence constituting Brahman's nature to be
free from all distinction and imperfection (44); and finally teaches
(45) that Brahman so constituted, alone is truly real, while the so-
called reality of the world is merely conventional.--This is not, we
reply, a true representation of the drift of the passage. The passage at
the outset states that, in addition to the detailed description of the
world given before, there will now be given a succinct account of
another aspect of the world not yet touched upon. This account has to be
understood as follows. Of this universe, comprising intelligent and non-
intelligent beings, the intelligent part--which is not to be reached by
mind and speech, to be known in its essential nature by the Self only,
and, owing to its purely intelligential character, not touched by the
differences due to Prakriti--is, owing to its imperishable nature,
denoted as that which is; while the non-intelligent, material; part
which, in consequence of the actions of the intelligent beings undergoes
manifold changes, and thus is perishable, is denoted as that which is
not. Both parts, however, form the body of Vasudeva, i.e. Brahman, and
hence have Brahman for their Self. The text therefore says (37), 'From
the waters which form the body of Vishnu was produced the lotus-shaped
earth, with its seas and mountains': what is meant is that the entire
Brahma-egg which has arisen from water constitutes the body of which
Vishnu is the soul. This relation of soul and body forms the basis of
the statements of co-ordination made in the next sloka (38), 'The stars
are Vishnu,' &c.; the same relation had been already declared in
numerous previous passages of the Purana ('all this is the body of Hari,'
& c.). All things in the world, whether they are or are not, are
Vishnu's body, and he is their soul. Of the next sloka, 'Because the
Lord has knowledge for his essential nature,' the meaning is 'Because of
the Lord who abides as the Self of all individual souls, the essential
nature is knowledge only--while bodies divine, human, &c., have no part
in it--, therefore all non-intelligent things, bodies human and divine,
hills, oceans, &c., spring from his knowledge, i.e. have their root in
the actions springing from the volitions of men, gods, &c., in whose
various forms the fundamental intelligence manifests itself. And since
non-intelligent matter is subject to changes corresponding to the
actions of the individual souls, it may be called 'non-being,' while the
souls are 'being.'--This the next sloka further explains 'when knowledge
is pure,' &c. The meaning is 'when the works which are the cause of the
distinction of things are destroyed, then all the distinctions of bodies,
human or divine, hills, oceans, &c.--all which are objects of fruition
for the different individual souls--pass away.' Non-intelligent matter,
as entering into various states of a non-permanent nature, is called
'non-being'; while souls, the nature of which consists in permanent
knowledge, are called 'being.' On this difference the next sloka insists
(41). We say 'it is' of that thing which is of a permanently uniform
nature, not connected with the idea of beginning, middle and end, and
which hence never becomes the object of the notion of non-existence;
while we say 'it is not' of non-intelligent matter which constantly
passes over into different states, each later state being out of
connexion with the earlier state. The constant changes to which non-
intelligent matter is liable are illustrated in the next sloka, 'Earth
is made into a jar,' &c. And for this reason, the subsequent sloka goes
on to say that there _is_ nothing but knowledge. This fundamental
knowledge or intelligence is, however, variously connected with manifold
individual forms of being due to karman, and hence the text adds: 'The
one intelligence is in many ways connected with beings whose minds
differ, owing to the difference of their own acts' (sl 43, second half).
Intelligence, pure, free from stain and grief, &c., which constitutes
the intelligent element of the world, and unintelligent matter--these
two together constitute the world, and the world is the body of Vasudeva;
such is the purport of sloka 44.--The next sloka sums up the whole
doctrine; the words 'true and untrue' there denote what in the preceding
verses had been called 'being' and 'non-being'; the second half of the
sloka refers to the practical plurality of the world as due to karman.
Now all these slokas do not contain a single word supporting the
doctrine of a Brahman free from all difference; of a principle called
Nescience abiding within Brahman and to be defined neither as that which
is nor as that which is not; and of the world being wrongly imagined,
owing to Nescience. The expressions 'that which is' and 'that which is
not' (sl 35), and 'satya' (true) and 'asatya' (untrue; sl 45), can in no
way denote something not to be defined either as being or non-being. By
'that which is not' or 'which is untrue,' we have to understand not what
is undefinable, but that which has no true being, in so far as it is
changeable and perishable. Of this character is all non-intelligent
matter. This also appears from the instance adduced in sl 42: the jar is
something perishable, but not a thing devoid of proof or to be sublated
by true knowledge. 'Non-being' we may call it, in so far as while it is
observed at a certain moment in a certain form it is at some other
moment observed in a different condition. But there is no contradiction
between two different conditions of a thing which are perceived at
different times; and hence there is no reason to call it something
futile (tuchcha) or false (mithya), &c.
Scripture does not teach that Release is due to the knowledge of a non-
qualified Brahman.--the meaning of 'tat tvam asi.'
Nor can we admit the assertion that Scripture teaches the cessation of
avidya to spring only from the cognition of a Brahman devoid of all
difference. Such a view is clearly negatived by passages such as the
following: 'I know that great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness;
knowing him a man becomes immortal, there is no other path to go' (Svet.
Up. III, 8); 'All moments sprang from lightning, the Person--none is
lord over him, his name is great glory--they who know him become
immortal' (Mahana. Up. I, 8-11). For the reason that Brahman is
characterised by difference all Vedic texts declare that final release
results from the cognition of a qualified Brahman. And that even those
texts which describe Brahman by means of negations really aim at setting
forth a Brahman possessing attributes, we have already shown above.
In texts, again, such as 'Thou art that,' the co-ordination of the
constituent parts is not meant to convey the idea of the absolute unity
of a non-differenced substance: on the contrary, the words 'that' and
'thou' denote a Brahman distinguished by difference. The word 'that'
refers to Brahman omniscient, &c., which had been introduced as the
general topic of consideration in previous passages of the same section,
such as 'It thought, may I be many'; the word 'thou,' which stands in co-
ordination to 'that,' conveys the idea of Brahman in so far as having
for its body the individual souls connected with non-intelligent matter.
This is in accordance with the general principle that co-ordination is
meant to express one thing subsisting in a twofold form. If such
doubleness of form (or character) were abandoned, there could be no
difference of aspects giving rise to the application of different terms,
and the entire principle of co-ordination would thus be given up. And it
would further follow that the two words co-ordinated would have to be
taken in an implied sense (instead of their primary direct meaning). Nor
is there any need of our assuming implication (lakshana) in sentences
[FOOTNOTE 130:1] such as 'this person is that Devadatta (known to me
from former occasions)'; for there is no contradiction in the cognition
of the oneness of a thing connected with the past on the one hand, and
the present on the other, the contradiction that arises from difference
of place being removed by the accompanying difference of time. If the
text 'Thou art that' were meant to express absolute oneness, it would,
moreover, conflict with a previous statement in the same section, viz.
'It thought, may I be many'; and, further, the promise (also made in the
same section) that by the knowledge of one thing all things are to be
known could not be considered as fulfilled. It, moreover, is not
possible (while, however, it would result from the absolute oneness of
'tat' and 'tvam') that to Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge,
which is free from all imperfections, omniscient, comprising within
itself all auspicious qualities, there should belong Nescience; and that
it should be the substrate of all those defects and afflictions which
spring from Nescience. If, further, the statement of co-ordination
('thou art that') were meant to sublate (the previously existing wrong
notion of plurality), we should have to admit that the two terms 'that'
and 'thou' have an implied meaning, viz. in so far as denoting, on the
one hand, one substrate only, and, on the other, the cessation of the
different attributes (directly expressed by the two terms); and thus
implication and the other shortcomings mentioned above would cling to
this interpretation as well. And there would be even further
difficulties. When we form the sublative judgment 'this is not silver,'
the sublation is founded on an independent positive judgment, viz. 'this
is a shell': in the case under discussion, however, the sublation would
not be known (through an independent positive judgment), but would be
assumed merely on the ground that it cannot be helped. And, further,
there is really no possibility of sublation, since the word 'that' does
not convey the idea of an attribute in addition to the mere substrate.
To this it must not be objected that the substrate was previously
concealed, and that hence it is the special function of the word 'that'
to present the substrate in its non-concealed aspect; for if, previously
to the sublative judgment, the substrate was not evident (as an object
of consciousness), there is no possibility of its becoming the object
either of an error or its sublation.--Nor can we allow you to say that,
previously to sublation, the substrate was non-concealed in so far as
(i. e. was known as) the object of error, for in its 'non-concealed'
aspect the substrate is opposed to all error, and when that aspect
shines forth there is no room either for error or sublation.--The
outcome of this is that as long as you do not admit that there is a real
attribute in addition to the mere substrate, and that this attribute is
for a time hidden, you cannot show the possibility either of error or
sublation. We add an illustrative instance. That with regard to a man
there should arise the error that he is a mere low-caste hunter is only
possible on condition of a real additional attribute--e.g. the man's
princely birth--being hidden at the time; and the cessation of that
error is brought about by the declaration of this attribute of princely
birth, not by a mere declaration of the person being a man: this latter
fact being evident need not be declared at all, and if it is declared it
sublates no error.--If, on the other hand, the text is understood to
refer to Brahman as having the individual souls for its body, both words
('that' and 'thou') keep their primary denotation; and, the text thus
making a declaration about one substance distinguished by two aspects,
the fundamental principle of 'co-ordination' is preserved, On this
interpretation the text further intimates that Brahman--free from all
imperfection and comprising within itself all auspicious qualities--is
the internal ruler of the individual souls and possesses lordly power.
It moreover satisfies the demand of agreement with the teaching of the
previous part of the section, and it also fulfils the promise as to all
things being known through one thing, viz. in so far as Brahman having
for its body all intelligent and non-intelligent beings in their gross
state is the effect of Brahman having for its body the same things in
their subtle state. And this interpretation finally avoids all conflict
with other scriptural passages, such as 'Him the great Lord, the highest
of Lords' (Svet. Up. VI, 7); 'His high power is revealed as manifold'
(ibid. VI, 8); 'He that is free from sin, whose wishes are true, whose
purposes are true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1), and so on.
But how, a question may be asked, can we decide, on your interpretation
of the text, which of the two terms is meant to make an original
assertion with regard to the other?--The question does not arise, we
reply; for the text does not mean to make an original assertion at all,
the truth which it states having already been established by the
preceding clause, 'In that all this world has its Self.' This clause
does make an original statement--in agreement with the principle that
'Scripture has a purport with regard to what is not established by other
means'--that is, it predicates of 'all this,' i.e. this entire world
together with all individual souls, that 'that,' i.e. Brahman is the
Self of it. The reason of this the text states in a previous passage,
'All these creatures have their root in that which is, their dwelling
and their rest in that which is'; a statement which is illustrated by an
earlier one (belonging to a different section), viz. 'All this is
Brahman; let a man meditate with calm mind on this world as beginning,
ending, and breathing in Brahman' (Ch. Up. III. 14, 1). Similarly other
texts also teach that the world has its Self in Brahman, in so far as
the whole aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent beings
constitutes Brahman's body. Compare 'Abiding within, the ruler of beings,
the Self of all'; 'He who dwells in the earth, different from the earth,
whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the
earth within--he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal. He who
dwells in the Self,'&c. (Bri. Up. III, 7,3; 22); 'He who moving within
the earth, and so on--whose body is death, whom death does not know, he
is the Self of all beings, free from sin, divine, the one God, Narayana'
(Subal. Up. VII, 1); 'Having created that he entered into it; having
entered it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And also in the
section under discussion the passage 'Having entered into them with this
living Self let me evolve names and forms,' shows that it is only
through the entering into them of the living soul whose Self is Brahman,
that all things possess their substantiality and their connexion with
the words denoting them. And as this passage must be understood in
connexion with Taitt. Up. II, 6 (where the 'sat' denotes the individual
soul) it follows that the individual soul also has Brahman for its Self,
owing to the fact of Brahman having entered into it.--From all this it
follows that the entire aggregate of things, intelligent and non-
intelligent, has its Self in Brahman in so far as it constitutes
Brahman's body. And as, thus, the whole world different from Brahman
derives its substantial being only from constituting Brahman's body, any
term denoting the world or something in it conveys a meaning which has
its proper consummation in Brahman only: in other words all terms
whatsoever denote Brahman in so far as distinguished by the different
things which we associate with those terms on the basis of ordinary use
of speech and etymology.--The text 'that art thou' we therefore
understand merely as a special expression of the truth already
propounded in the clause 'in that all this has its Self.'
This being so, it appears that those as well who hold the theory of the
absolute unity of one non-differenced substance, as those who teach the
doctrine of bhedabheda (co-existing difference and non-difference), and
those who teach the absolute difference of several substances, give up
all those scriptural texts which teach that Brahman is the universal
Self. With regard to the first-mentioned doctrine, we ask 'if there is
only one substance; to what can the doctrine of universal identity
refer?'--The reply will perhaps be 'to that very same substance.'--But,
we reply, this point is settled already by the texts defining the nature
of Brahman [FOOTNOTE 134:1], and there is nothing left to be determined
by the passages declaring the identity of everything with Brahman.--But
those texts serve to dispel the idea of fictitious difference!--This, we
reply, cannot, as has been shown above, be effected by texts stating
universal identity in the way of co-ordination; and statements of co-
ordination, moreover, introduce into Brahman a doubleness of aspect, and
thus contradict the theory of absolute oneness.--The bhedabheda view
implies that owing to Brahman's connexion with limiting adjuncts
(upadhi) all the imperfections resulting therefrom--and which avowedly
belong to the individual soul--would manifest themselves in Brahman
itself; and as this contradicts the doctrine that the Self of all is
constituted by a Brahman free from all imperfection and comprising
within itself all auspicious qualities, the texts conveying that
doctrine would have to be disregarded. If, on the other hand, the theory
be held in that form that 'bhedabheda' belongs to Brahman by its own
nature (not only owing to an upadhi), the view that Brahman by its
essential nature appears as individual soul, implies that imperfections
no less than perfections are essential to Brahman, and this is in
conflict with the texts teaching that everything is identical with
Brahman free from all imperfections.--For those finally who maintain
absolute difference, the doctrine of Brahman being the Self of all has
no meaning whatsoever--for things absolutely different can in no way be
one--and this implies the abandonment of all Vedanta-texts together.
Those, on the other hand, who take their stand on the doctrine,
proclaimed by all Upanishads, that the entire world forms the body of
Brahman, may accept in their fulness all the texts teaching the identity
of the world with Brahman. For as genus (jati) and quality (guna), so
substances (dravya) also may occupy the position of determining
attributes (viseshana), in so far namely as they constitute the body of
something else. Enunciations such as 'the Self (soul) is, according to
its works, born either (as) a god, or a man, or a horse, or a bull,'
show that in ordinary speech as well as in the Veda co-ordination has to
be taken in a real primary (not implied) sense. In the same way it is
also in the case of generic character and of qualities the relation of
'mode' only (in which generic character and qualities stand to
substances) which determines statements of co-ordination, such as 'the
ox is broken-horned,' 'the cloth is white.' And as material bodies
bearing the generic marks of humanity are definite things, in so far
only as they are modes of a Self or soul, enunciations of co-ordination
such as 'the soul has been born as a man, or a eunuch, or a woman,' are
in every way appropriate. What determines statements of co-ordination is
thus only the relation of 'mode' in which one thing stands to another,
not the relation of generic character, quality, and so on, which are of
an exclusive nature (and cannot therefore be exhibited in co-ordination
with substances). Such words indeed as denote substances capable of
subsisting by themselves occasionally take suffixes, indicating that
those substances form the distinguishing attributes of other substances--
as when from danda, 'staff,' we form dandin, 'staff-bearer'; in the case,
on the other hand, of substances not capable of subsisting and being
apprehended apart from others, the fact of their holding the position of
attributes is ascertained only from their appearing in grammatical co-
ordination.--But, an objection is raised, if it is supposed that in
sentences such as 'the Self is born, as god, man, animal,' &c., the body
of a man, god, &c., stands towards the Self in the relation of a mode,
in the same way as in sentences such as 'the ox is broken-horned,' 'the
cloth is white,' the generic characteristic and the quality stand in the
relation of modes to the substances ('cow,' 'cloth') to which they are
grammatically co-ordinated; then there would necessarily be simultaneous
cognition of the mode, and that to which the mode belongs, i.e. of the
body and the Self; just as there is simultaneous cognition of the
generic character and the individual. But as a matter of fact this is
not the case; we do not necessarily observe a human, divine, or animal
body together with the Self. The co-ordination expressed in the form
'the Self is a man,' is therefore an 'implied' one only (the statement
not admitting of being taken in its primary literal sense).--This is not
so, we reply. The relation of bodies to the Self is strictly analogous
to that of class characteristics and qualities to the substances in
which they inhere; for it is the Self only which is their substrate and
their final cause (prayojana), and they are modes of the Self. That the
Self only is their substrate, appears from the fact that when the Self
separates itself from the body the latter perishes; that the Self alone
is their final cause, appears from the fact that they exist to the end
that the fruits of the actions of the Self may be enjoyed; and that they
are modes of the Self, appears from the fact that they are mere
attributes of the Self manifesting itself as god, man, or the like.
These are just the circumstances on account of which words like 'cow'
extend in their meaning (beyond the class characteristics) so as to
comprise the individual also. Where those circumstances are absent, as
in the case of staffs, earrings, and the like, the attributive position
is expressed (not by co-ordination but) by means of special derivative
forms--such as dandin (staff-bearer), kundalin (adorned with earrings).
In the case of bodies divine, human, &c., on the other hand, the
essential nature of which it is to be mere modes of the Self which
constitutes their substrate and final cause, both ordinary and Vedic
language express the relation subsisting between the two, in the form of
co-ordination, 'This Self is a god, or a man,' &c. That class
characteristics and individuals are invariably observed together, is due
to the fact of both being objects of visual perception; the Self, on the
other hand, is not such, and hence is not apprehended by the eye, while
the body is so apprehended. Nor must you raise the objection that it is
hard to understand how that which is capable of being apprehended by
itself can be a mere mode of something else: for that the body's
essential nature actually consists in being a mere mode of the Self is
proved--just as in the case of class characteristics and so on--by its
having the Self only for its substrate and final cause, and standing to
it in the relation of a distinguishing attribute. That two things are
invariably perceived together, depends, as already observed, on their
being apprehended by means of the same apparatus, visual or otherwise.
Earth is naturally connected with smell, taste, and so on, and yet these
qualities are not perceived by the eye; in the same way the eye which
perceives the body does not perceive that essential characteristic of
the body which consists in its being a mere mode of the Self; the reason
of the difference being that the eye has no capacity to apprehend the
Self. But this does not imply that the body does not possess that
essential nature: it rather is just the possession of that essential
nature on which the judgment of co-ordination ('the Self is a man, god,'
& c.) is based. And as words have the power of denoting the relation of
something being a mode of the Self, they denote things together with
this relation.--But in ordinary speech the word 'body' is understood to
mean the mere body; it does not therefore extend in its denotation up to
the Self!--Not so, we reply. The body is, in reality, nothing but a mode
of the Self; but, for the purpose of showing the distinction of things,
the word 'body' is used in a limited sense. Analogously words such as
'whiteness,' 'generic character of a cow,' 'species,''quality,' are used
in a distinctive sense (although 'whiteness' is not found apart from a
white thing, of which it is the prakara, and so on). Words such as
'god,' 'man,' &c., therefore do extend in their connotation up to the
Self. And as the individual souls, distinguished by their connexion with
aggregates of matter bearing the characteristic marks of humanity,
divine nature, and so on, constitute the body of the highest Self, and
hence are modes of it, the words denoting those individual souls extend
in their connotation up to the very highest Self. And as all intelligent
and non-intelligent beings are thus mere modes of the highest Brahman,
and have reality thereby only, the words denoting them are used in co-
ordination with the terms denoting Brahman.--This point has been
demonstrated by me in the Vedarthasamgraha. A Sutra also (IV, 1, 3) will
declare the identity of the world and Brahman to consist in the relation
of body and Self; and the Vakyakara too says 'It is the Self--thus
everything should be apprehended.'
[FOOTNOTE 130:1. Which are alleged to prove that samanadhikaranya is to
be explained on the basis of lakshana.]
[FOOTNOTE 134:1. Such as 'The True, knowledge,' &c.]
Summary statement as to the way in which different scriptural texts are
to reconciled.
The whole matter may be summarily stated as follows. Some texts declare
a distinction of nature between non-intelligent matter, intelligent
beings, and Brahman, in so far as matter is the object of enjoyment, the
souls the enjoying subjects, and Brahman the ruling principle. 'From
that the Lord of Maya creates all this; in that the other one is bound
up through that Maya' (Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'Know Prakriti to be Maya, and
the great Lord the ruler of Maya' (10); 'What is perishable is the
Pradhana, the immortal and imperishable is Hara: the one God rules the
Perishable and the Self' (Svet Up. I, 10)--In this last passage the
clause 'the immortal and imperishable is Hara,' refers to the enjoying
individual soul, which is called 'Hara,' because it draws (harati)
towards itself the pradhana as the object of its enjoyment.--' He is the
cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither
parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'The master of the pradhana and of
the individual souls' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'The ruler of all, the lord of
the Selfs, the eternal, blessed, undecaying one' (Mahanar. Up. XI, 3);
'There are two unborn ones, one knowing, the other not knowing, one a
ruler, the other not a ruler' (Svet. Up. 1, 9); 'The eternal among the
non-eternal, the intelligent one among the intelligent, who though one
fulfils the desires of many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'Knowing the enjoyer,
the object of enjoyment and the Mover' (Svet. Up. I, 12); 'One of them
eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Svet. Up. IV,
6); 'Thinking that the Self is different from the Mover, blessed by him
he reaches Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'There is one unborn female
being, red, white, and black, uniform but producing manifold offspring.
There is one unborn male being who loves her and lies by her; there is
another who leaves her after he has enjoyed her' (Svet. Up. IV, 5). 'On
the same tree man, immersed, bewildered, grieves on account of his
impotence; but when he sees the other Lord contented and knows his glory,
then his grief passes away' (Svet. Up. IV, 9).--Smriti expresses itself
similarly.--'Thus eightfold is my nature divided. Lower is this Nature;
other than this and higher know that Nature of mine which constitutes
the individual soul, by which this world is supported' (Bha. Gi. VII, 4,
5). 'All beings at the end of a Kalpa return into my Nature, and again
at the beginning of a Kalpa do I send them forth. Resting on my own
Nature again and again do I send forth this entire body of beings, which
has no power of its own, being subject to the power of nature' (Bha. Gi.
IX, 7, 8); 'With me as supervisor Nature brings forth the movable and
the immovable, and for this reason the world ever moves round' (Bha. Gi.
IX, 10); 'Know thou both Nature and the Soul to be without beginning'
(XIII, 19); 'The great Brahman is my womb, in which I place the embryo,
and thence there is the origin of all beings' (XIV, 3). This last
passage means--the womb of the world is the great Brahman, i.e. non-
intelligent matter in its subtle state, commonly called Prakriti; with
this I connect the embryo, i.e. the intelligent principle. From this
contact of the non-intelligent and the intelligent, due to my will,
there ensues the origination of all beings from gods down to lifeless
things.
Non-intelligent matter and intelligent beings--holding the relative
positions of objects of enjoyment and enjoying subjects, and appearing
in multifarious forms--other scriptural texts declare to be permanently
connected with the highest Person in so far as they constitute his body,
and thus are controlled by him; the highest Person thus constituting
their Self. Compare the following passages: 'He who dwells in the earth
and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth
is, and who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,
the immortal,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 7, 3-23); 'He who moves within the
earth, whose body the earth is, &c.; he who moves within death, whose
body death is,' &c.(Subala Up. VII, 1). In this latter passage the word
'death' denotes what is also called 'darkness,' viz. non-intelligent
matter in its subtle state; as appears from another passage in the same
Upanishad,'the Imperishable is merged in darkness.' And compare also
'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ar.
III, 24).
Other texts, again, aim at teaching that the highest Self to whom non-
intelligent and intelligent beings stand in the relation of body, and
hence of modes, subsists in the form of the world, in its causal as well
as in its effected aspect, and hence speak of the world in this its
double aspect as that which is (the Real); so e.g. 'Being only this was
in the beginning, one only without a second--it desired, may I be many,
may I grow forth--it sent forth fire,' &c., up to 'all these creatures
have their root in that which is,' &c., up to 'that art thou, O
Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 2-8); 'He wished, may I be many,' &c., up to 'it
became the true and the untrue' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). These sections also
refer to the essential distinction of nature between non-intelligent
matter, intelligent beings, and the highest Self which is established by
other scriptural texts; so in the Chandogya passage, 'Let me enter those
three divine beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names
and forms'; and in the Taitt. passage, 'Having sent forth that he
entered into it; having entered it he became sat and tyat, knowledge and
(what is) without knowledge, the true and the untrue,' &c. These two
passages evidently have the same purport, and hence the soul's having
its Self in Brahman--which view is implied in the Ch. passage--must be
understood as resting thereon that the souls (together, with matter)
constitute the body of Brahman as asserted in the Taitt. passage ('it
became knowledge and that which is without knowledge,' i.e. souls and
matter). The same process of evolution of names and forms is described
elsewhere also, 'All this was then unevolved; it became evolved by form
and name' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7). The fact is that the highest Self is in
its causal or in its 'effected' condition, according as it has for its
body intelligent and non-intelligent beings either in their subtle or
their gross state; the effect, then, being non-different from the cause,
and hence being cognised through the cognition of the cause, the result
is that the desired 'cognition of all things through one' can on our
view be well established. In the clause 'I will enter into these three
divine beings with this living Self,' &c., the term 'the three divine
beings' denotes the entire aggregate of non-sentient matter, and as the
text declares that the highest Self evolved names and forms by entering
into matter by means of the living souls of which he is the Self, it
follows that all terms whatsoever denote the highest Self as qualified
by individual Selfs, the latter again being qualified by non-sentient
matter. A term which denotes the highest Self in its causal condition
may therefore be exhibited in co-ordination with another term denoting
the highest Self in its 'effected' state, both terms being used in their
primary senses. Brahman, having for its modes intelligent and non-
intelligent things in their gross and subtle states, thus constitutes
effect and cause, and the world thus has Brahman for its material cause
(upadana). Nor does this give rise to any confusion of the essential
constituent elements of the great aggregate of things. Of some parti-
coloured piece of cloth the material cause is threads white, red, black,
& c.; all the same, each definite spot of the cloth is connected with one
colour only white e.g., and thus there is no confusion of colours even
in the 'effected' condition of the cloth. Analogously the combination of
non-sentient matter, sentient beings, and the Lord constitutes the
material cause of the world, but this does not imply any confusion of
the essential characteristics of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment,
and the universal ruler, even in the world's 'effected' state. There is
indeed a difference between the two cases, in so far as the threads are
capable of existing apart from one another, and are only occasionally
combined according to the volition of men, so that the web sometimes
exists in its causal, sometimes in its effected state; while non-
sentient matter and sentient beings in all their states form the body of
the highest Self, and thus have a being only as the modes of that--on
which account the highest Self may, in all cases, be denoted by any term
whatsoever. But the two cases are analogous, in so far as there persists
a distinction and absence of all confusion, on the part of the
constituent elements of the aggregate. This being thus, it follows that
the highest Brahman, although entering into the 'effected' condition,
remains unchanged--for its essential nature does not become different--
and we also understand what constitutes its 'effected' condition, viz.
its abiding as the Self of non-intelligent and intelligent beings in
their gross condition, distinguished by name and form. For becoming an
effect means entering into another state of being.
Those texts, again, which speak of Brahman as devoid of qualities,
explain themselves on the ground of Brahman being free from all touch of
evil. For the passage, Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5--which at first negatives all
evil qualities 'free from sin, from old age, from death, from grief,
from hunger and thirst', and after that affirms auspicious qualities
'whose wishes and purposes come true'--enables us to decide that in
other places also the general denial of qualities really refers to evil
qualities only.--Passages which declare knowledge to constitute the
essential nature of Brahman explain themselves on the ground that of
Brahman--which is all-knowing, all-powerful, antagonistic to all evil, a
mass of auspicious qualities--the essential nature can be defined as
knowledge (intelligence) only--which also follows from the 'self-
luminousness' predicated of it. Texts, on the other hand, such as 'He
who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'His high power is revealed as
manifold, as essential, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8);
'Whereby should he know the knower' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14), teach the
highest Self to be a knowing subject. Other texts, again, such as 'The
True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1), declare
knowledge to constitute its nature, as it can be denned through
knowledge only, and is self-luminous. And texts such as 'He desired, may
I be many' (Taitt. Up. II, 6); 'It thought, may I be many; it evolved
itself through name and form' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), teach that Brahman,
through its mere wish, appears in manifold modes. Other texts, again,
negative the opposite view, viz. that there is a plurality of things not
having their Self in Brahman. 'From death to death goes he who sees here
any plurality'; 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19);
'For where there is duality as it were' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 14). But these
texts in no way negative that plurality of modes--declared in passages
such as 'May I be many, may I grow forth'--which springs from Brahman's
will, and appears in the distinction of names and forms. This is proved
by clauses in those 'negativing' texts themselves, 'Whosoever looks for
anything elsewhere than in the Self', 'from that great Being there has
been breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6, 10).--On
this method of interpretation we find that the texts declaring the
essential distinction and separation of non-sentient matter, sentient
beings, and the Lord, and those declaring him to be the cause and the
world to be the effect, and cause and effect to be identical, do not in
any way conflict with other texts declaring that matter and souls form
the body of the Lord, and that matter and souls in their causal
condition are in a subtle state, not admitting of the distinction of
names and forms while in their 'effected' gross state they are subject
to that distinction. On the other hand, we do not see how there is any
opening for theories maintaining the connexion of Brahman with Nescience,
or distinctions in Brahman due to limiting adjuncts (upadhi)--such and
similar doctrines rest on fallacious reasoning, and flatly contradict Scripture. |
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