There is nothing contradictory in allowing that certain texts declare
the essential distinction of matter, souls, and the Lord, and their
mutual relation as modes and that to which the modes belong, and that
other texts again represent them as standing in the relation of cause
and effect, and teach cause and effect to be one. We may illustrate this
by an analogous case from the Karmakanda. There six separate oblations
to Agni, and so on, are enjoined by separate so-called originative
injunctions; these are thereupon combined into two groups (viz. the new
moon and the full-moon sacrifices) by a double clause referring to those
groups, and finally a so-called injunction of qualification enjoins the
entire sacrifice as something to be performed by persons entertaining a
certain wish. In a similar way certain Vedanta-texts give instruction
about matter, souls, and the Lord as separate entities ('Perishable is
the pradhana, imperishable and immortal Hara,' &c., Svet Up. I, 10; and
others); then other texts teach that matter and souls in all their
different states constitute the body of the highest Person, while the
latter is their Self ('Whose body the earth is,' &c.); and finally
another group of texts teaches--by means of words such as 'Being,'
'Brahman,' 'Self,' denoting the highest Self to which the body belongs--
that the one highest Self in its causal and effected states comprises
within itself the triad of entities which had been taught in separation
('Being only this was in the beginning'; 'In that all this has its Self;
'All this is Brahman').--That the highest Self with matter and souls for
its body should be simply called the highest Self, is no more
objectionable than that that particular form of Self which is invested
with a human body should simply be spoken of as Self or soul--as when we
say 'This is a happy soul.'
Nescience cannot be terminated by the simple act of cognising Brahman as
the universal self.
The doctrine, again, that Nescience is put an end to by the cognition of
Brahman being the Self of all can in no way be upheld; for as bondage is
something real it cannot be put an end to by knowledge. How, we ask, can
any one assert that bondage--which consists in the experience of
pleasure and pain caused by the connexion of souls with bodies of
various kind, a connexion springing from good or evil actions--is
something false, unreal? And that the cessation of such bondage is to be
obtained only through the grace of the highest Self pleased by the
devout meditation of the worshipper, we have already explained. As the
cognition of universal oneness which you assume rests on a view of
things directly contrary to reality, and therefore is false, the only
effect it can have is to strengthen the ties of bondage. Moreover, texts
such as 'But different is the highest Person' (Bha. Gi. XV, 17), and
'Having known the Self and the Mover as separate' (Svet. Up. I, 6),
teach that it is the cognition of Brahman as the inward ruler different
from the individual soul, that effects the highest aim of man, i.e.
final release. And, further, as that 'bondage-terminating' knowledge
which you assume is itself unreal, we should have to look out for
another act of cognition to put an end to it.--But may it not be said
that this terminating cognition, after having put an end to the whole
aggregate of distinctions antagonistic to it, immediately passes away
itself, because being of a merely instantaneous nature?--No, we reply.
Since its nature, its origination, and its destruction are all alike
fictitious, we have clearly to search for another agency capable of
destroying that avidya which is the cause of the fiction of its
destruction!--Let us then say that the essential nature of Brahman
itself is the destruction of that cognition!--From this it would follow,
we reply, that such 'terminating' knowledge would not arise at all; for
that the destruction of what is something permanent can clearly not
originate!--Who moreover should, according to you, be the cognising
subject in a cognition which has for its object the negation of
everything that is different from Brahman?--That cognising subject is
himself something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman!--This may not be,
we reply: he himself would in that case be something to be negatived,
and hence an object of the 'terminating' cognition; he could not
therefore be the subject of cognition!--Well, then, let us assume that
the essential nature of Brahman itself is the cognising subject!--Do you
mean, we ask in reply, that Brahman's being the knowing subject in that
'terminating' cognition belongs to Brahman's essential nature, or that
it is something fictitiously superimposed on Brahman? In the latter case
that superimposition and the Nescience founded on it would persist,
because they would not be objects of the terminating cognition, and if a
further terminating act of knowledge were assumed, that also would
possess a triple aspect (viz. knowledge, object known, and subject
knowing), and we thus should be led to assume an infinite series of
knowing subjects. If, on the other band, the essential nature of Brahman
itself constitutes the knowing subject, your view really coincides with
the one held by us. [FOOTNOTE 146:1] And if you should say that the
terminating knowledge itself and the knowing subject in it are things
separate from Brahman and themselves contained in the sphere of what is
to be terminated by that knowledge, your statement would be no less
absurd than if you were to say 'everything on the surface of the earth
has been cut down by Devadatta with one stroke'--meaning thereby that
Devadatta himself and the action of cutting down are comprised among the
things cut down!--The second alternative, on the other hand--according
to which the knowing subject is not Brahman itself, but a knower
superimposed upon it--would imply that that subject is the agent in an
act of knowledge resulting in his own destruction; and this is
impossible since no person aims at destroying himself. And should it be
said that the destruction of the knowing agent belongs to the very
nature of Brahman itself [FOOTNOTE 147:1], it would follow that we can
assume neither plurality nor the erroneous view of plurality, nor avidya
as the root of that erroneous view.--All this confirms our theory, viz.
that since bondage springs from ajnana in the form of an eternal stream
of karman, it can be destroyed only through knowledge of the kind
maintained by us. Such knowledge is to be attained only through the due
daily performance of religious duties as prescribed for a man's caste
and asrama, such performance being sanctified by the accompanying
thought of the true nature of the Self, and having the character of
propitiation of the highest Person. Now, that mere works produce limited
and non-permanent results only, and that on the other hand works not
aiming at an immediate result but meant to please the highest Person,
bring about knowledge of the character of devout meditation, and thereby
the unlimited and permanent result of the intuition of Brahman being the
Self of all--these are points not to be known without an insight into
the nature of works, and hence, without this, the attitude described--
which is preceded by the abandonment of mere works--cannot be reached.
For these reasons the enquiry into Brahman has to be entered upon _after_
the enquiry into the nature of works.
[FOOTNOTE 146:1. According to which Brahman is not jnanam, but jnatri.]
[FOOTNOTE 147:1. And, on that account, belongs to what constitutes man's
highest aim.]
The Vedantin aiming to ascertain the nature of Brahman from Scripture,
need not be disconcerted by the Mimamsa-theory of all speech having
informing power with regard to actions only.
Here another prima facie view [FOOTNOTE 148:1] finally presents itself.
The power of words to denote things cannot be ascertained in any way but
by observing the speech and actions of experienced people. Now as such
speech and action always implies the idea of something to be done
(karya), words are means of knowledge only with reference to things to
be done; and hence the matter inculcated by the Veda also is only things
to be done. From this it follows that the Vedanta-texts cannot claim the
position of authoritative means of knowledge with regard to Brahman,
which is (not a thing to be done but) an accomplished fact.--Against
this view it must not be urged that in the case of sentences expressive
of accomplished facts--as e.g. that a son is born to somebody--the idea
of a particular thing may with certainty be inferred as the cause of
certain outward signs--such as e.g. a pleased expression of countenance--
which are generally due to the attainment of a desired object; for the
possible causes of joy, past, present, and future, are infinite in
number, and in the given case other causes of joy, as e.g. the birth
having taken place in an auspicious moment, or having been an easy one,
& c., may easily be imagined. Nor, again, can it be maintained that the
denotative power of words with regard to accomplished things may be
ascertained in the way of our inferring either the meaning of one word
from the known meaning of other words, or the meaning of the radical
part of a word from the known meaning of a formative element; for the
fact is that we are only able to infer on the basis of a group of words
known to denote a certain thing to be done, what the meaning of some
particular constituent of that group may be.--Nor, again, when a person,
afraid of what he thinks to be a snake, is observed to dismiss his fear
on being told that the thing is not a snake but only a rope, can we
determine thereby that what terminates his fear is the idea of the non-
existence of a snake. For there are many other ideas which may account
for the cessation of his fear--he may think, e.g., 'this is a thing
incapable of moving, devoid of poison, without consciousness'--the
particular idea present to his mind we are therefore not able to
determine.--The truth is that from the fact of all activity being
invariably dependent on the idea of something to be done, we learn that
the meaning which words convey is something prompting activity. All
words thus denoting something to be done, the several words of a
sentence express only some particular action to be performed, and hence
it is not possible to determine that they possess the power of denoting
their own meaning only, in connexion with the meaning of the other words
of the sentence.--(Nor must it be said that what moves to action is not
the idea of the thing to be done, but the idea of the means to do it;
for) the idea of the means to bring about the desired end causes action
only through the idea of the thing to be done, not through itself; as is
evident from the fact that the idea of means past, future, and even
present (when divorced from the idea of an end to be accomplished), does
not prompt to action. As long as a man does not reflect 'the means
towards the desired end are not to be accomplished without an effort of
mine; it must therefore be accomplished through my activity'; so long he
does not begin to act. What causes activity is thus only the idea of
things to be done; and as hence words denote such things only, the Veda
also can tell us only about things to be done, and is not therefore in a
position to give information about the attainment of an infinite and
permanent result, such result being constituted by Brahman, which is
(not a thing to be done, but) an accomplished entity. The Veda does, on
the other hand, actually teach that mere works have a permanent result
('Imperishable is the merit of him who offers the katurmasya-sacrifices,'
and so on); and hence it follows that to enter on an enquiry into
Brahman for the reason that the knowledge of Brahman has an infinite and
permanent result, while the result of works is limited and non-permanent,
is an altogether unjustified proceeding.
To this we make the following reply.--To set aside the universally known
mode of ascertaining the connexion of words and their meanings, and to
assert that all words express only one non-worldly meaning (viz. those
things to be done which the Veda inculcates), is a proceeding for which
men paying due attention to the means of proof can have only a slight
regard. A child avowedly learns the connexion of words and meanings in
the following way. The father and mother and other people about him
point with the finger at the child's mother, father, uncle, &c, as well
as at various domestic and wild animals, birds, snakes, and so on, to
the end that the child may at the same time pay attention to the terms
they use and to the beings denoted thereby, and thus again and again
make him understand that such and such words refer to such and such
things. The child thus observing in course of time that these words of
themselves give rise to certain ideas in his mind, and at the same time
observing neither any different connexion of words and things, nor any
person arbitrarily establishing such connexion, comes to the conclusion
that the application of such and such words to such and such things is
based on the denotative power of the words. And being taught later on by
his elders that other words also, in addition to those learned first,
have their definite meaning, he in the end becomes acquainted with the
meanings of all words, and freely forms sentences conveying certain
meanings for the purpose of imparting those meanings to other persons.
And there is another way also in which the connexion of words and things
can easily be ascertained. Some person orders another, by means of some
expressive gesture, to go and inform Devadatta that his father is doing
well, and the man ordered goes and tells Devadatta 'Your father is doing
well.' A by-stander who is acquainted with the meaning of various
gestures, and thus knows on what errand the messenger is sent, follows
him and hears the words employed by him to deliver his message: he
therefore readily infers that such and such words have such and such a
meaning.--We thus see that the theory of words having a meaning only in
relation to things to be done is baseless. The Vedanta-texts tell us
about Brahman, which is an accomplished entity, and about meditation on
Brahman as having an unlimited result, and hence it behoves us to
undertake an enquiry into Brahman so as fully to ascertain its nature.
We further maintain that even on the supposition of the Veda relating
only to things to be done, an enquiry into Brahman must be undertaken.
For 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be
meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He is to be searched out, him we
must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a Brahmana having
known him practise wisdom' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 21); 'What is within that
small ether, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood' (Ch. Up.
VIII, 1,1); 'What is in that small ether, that is to be meditated upon'
(Mahanar. Up. X, 7)--these and similar texts enjoin a certain action,
viz. meditation on Brahman, and when we then read 'He who knows Brahman
attains the highest,' we understand that the attainment of Brahman is
meant as a reward for him who is qualified for and enters on such
meditation. Brahman itself and its attributes are thus established
thereby only--that they subserve a certain action, viz. meditation.
There are analogous instances in the Karmakanda of the Veda. When an
arthavada-passage describes the heavenly vorld as a place where there is
no heat, no frost, no grief, &c., this is done merely with a view to
those texts which enjoin certain sacrifices on those who are desirous of
the heavenly world. Where another arthavada says that 'those who perform
certain sattra-sacrifices are firmly established,' such 'firm
establishment' is referred to only because it is meant as the reward for
those acting on the text which enjoins those sattras, 'Let him perform
the ratri-sattras' (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 3, 17). And where a text says that a
person threatening a Brahmana is to be punished with a fine of one
hundred gold pieces, this statement is made merely with reference to the
prohibitory passage, 'Let him not threaten a Brahmana'(Pu. Mi. Su. III,
4, 17).
We, however, really object to the whole theory of the meaning of words
depending on their connexion with 'things to be done,' since this is not
even the case in imperative clauses such as 'bring the cow.' For you are
quite unable to give a satisfactory definition of your 'thing to be done
'(karya). You understand by 'karya' that which follows on the existence
of action (kriti) and is aimed at by action. Now to be aimed at by
action is to be the object (karman) of action, and to be the object of
action is to be that which it is most desired to obtain by action
(according to the grammarian's definition). But what one desires most to
obtain is pleasure or the cessation of pain. When a person desirous of
some pleasure or cessation of pain is aware that his object is not to be
accomplished without effort on his part, he resolves on effort and
begins to act: in no case we observe an object of desire to be aimed at
by action in any other sense than that of its accomplishment depending
on activity. The prompting quality (prerakatva) also, which belongs to
objects of desire, is nothing but the attribute of their accomplishment
depending on activity; for it is this which moves to action.--Nor can it
be said that 'to be aimed at by action' means to be that which is
'agreeable' (anukula) to man; for it is pleasure only that is agreeable
to man. The cessation of pain, on the other hand, is not what is
'agreeable' to man. The essential distinction between pleasure and pain
is that the former is agreeable to man, and the latter disagreeable
(pratikula), and the cessation of pain is desired not because it is
agreeable, but because pain is disagreeable: absence of pain means that
a person is in his normal condition, affected neither with pain nor
pleasure. Apart from pleasure, action cannot possibly be agreeable, nor
does it become so by being subservient to pleasure; for its essential
nature is pain. Its being helpful to pleasure merely causes the resolve
of undertaking it.--Nor, again, can we define that which is aimed at by
action as that to which action is auxiliary or supplementary (sesha),
while itself it holds the position of something principal to be
subserved by other things (seshin); for of the sesha and seshin also no
proper definition can be given. It cannot be said that a sesha is that
which is invariably accompanied by an activity proceeding with a view to
something else, and that the correlate of such a sesha is the seshin;
for on this definition the action is not a sesha, and hence that which
is to be effected by the action cannot be the correlative seshin. And
moreover a seshin may not be defined as what is correlative to an action
proceeding with a view to--i. e. aiming at--something else; for it is
just this 'being aimed at' of which we require a definition, and
moreover we observe that also the seshin (or 'pradhana') is capable of
action proceeding with a view to the sesha, as when e.g. a master does
something for--let us say, keeps or feeds--his servant. This last
criticism you must not attempt to ward off by maintaining that the
master in keeping his servant acts with a view to himself (to his own
advantage); for the servant in serving the master likewise acts with a
view to himself.--And as, further, we have no adequate definition of
'karya,' it would be inappropriate to define sesha as that which is
correlative to karya, and seshin as that which is correlative to sesha.--
Nor, finally, may we define 'that which is aimed at by action' as that
which is the final end (prayojana) of action; for by the final end of an
action we could only understand the end for which the agent undertakes
the action, and this end is no other than the desired object. As thus
'what is aimed at by action' cannot be defined otherwise than what is
desired, karya cannot be defined as what is to be effected by action and
stands to action in the relation of principal matter (pradhana or
seshin).
(Let it then be said that the 'niyoga,' i.e. what is commonly called the
apurva--the supersensuous result of an action which later on produces
the sensible result--constitutes the prayojana--the final purpose--of
the action.--But) the apurva also can, as it is something different from
the direct objects of desire, viz. pleasure and the cessation of pain,
be viewed only as a means of bringing about these direct objects, and as
something itself to be effected by the action; it is for this very
reason that it is something different from the action, otherwise the
action itself would be that which is effected by the action. The thing
to be effected by the action-which is expressed by means of optative and
imperative verbal forms such as yajeta, 'let him sacrifice'--is, in
accordance with the fact of its being connected with words such as
svargakamah, 'he who is desirous of heaven', understood to be the means
of bringing about (the enjoyment of) the heavenly world; and as the
(sacrificial) action itself is transitory, there is assumed an
altogether 'new' or 'unprecedented' (apurva) effect of it which (later
on) is to bring about the enjoyment of heaven. This so-called 'apurva'
can therefore be understood only with regard to its capability of
bringing about the heavenly world. Now it certainly is ludicrous to
assert that the apurva, which is assumed to the end of firmly
establishing the independent character of the effect of the action first
recognised as such (i.e. independent), later on becomes the means of
realising the heavenly world; for as the word expressing the result of
the action (yajta) appears in syntactical connexion with 'svargakamah'
(desirous of heaven), it does not, from the very beginning, denote an
independent object of action, and moreover it is impossible to recognise
an independent result of action other than either pleasure or cessation
of pain, or the means to bring about these two results.--What, moreover,
do you understand by the apurva being a final end (prayojana)?-You will
perhaps reply, 'its being agreeable like pleasure.'--Is then the apurva
a pleasure? It is pleasure alone which is agreeable!--Well, let us then
define the apurva as a kind of pleasure of a special nature, called by
that name!--But what proof, we ask, have you for this? You will, in the
first place, admit yourself that you do not directly experience any
pleasure springing from consciousness of your apurva, which could in any
way be compared to the pleasure caused by the consciousness of the
objects of the senses.--Well, let us say then that as authoritative
doctrine gives us the notion of an apurva as something beneficial to man,
we conclude that it will be enjoyed later on.--But, we ask, what is the
authoritative doctrine establishing such an apurva beneficial to man?
Not, in the first place, ordinary, i.e. non-Vedic doctrine; for such has
for its object action only which always is essentially painful. Nor, in
the next place, Vedic texts; for those also enjoin action only as the
means to bring about certain results such as the heavenly world. Nor
again the Smriti texts enjoining works of either permanent or occasional
obligation; for those texts always convey the notion of an apurva only
on the basis of an antecedent knowledge of the apurva as intimated by
Vedic texts containing terms such as svargakamah. And we, moreover, do
not observe that in the case of works having a definite result in this
life, there is enjoyment of any special pleasure called apurva, in
addition to those advantages which constitute the special result of the
work and are enjoyed here below, as e.g. abundance of food or freedom
from sickness. Thus there is not any proof of the apurva being a
pleasure. The arthavada-passages of the Veda also, while glorifying
certain pleasurable results of works, as e.g. the heavenly world, do not
anywhere exhibit a similar glorification of a pleasure called apurva.
From all this we conclude that also in injunctory sentences that which
is expressed by imperative and similar forms is only the idea that the
meaning of the root--as known from grammar--is to be effected by the
effort of the agent. And that what constitutes the meaning of roots, viz.
the action of sacrificing and the like, possesses the quality of
pleasing the highest Person, who is the inner ruler of Agni and other
divinities (to whom the sacrifices are ostensibly offered), and that
through the highest Person thus pleased the result of the sacrifice is
accomplished, we shall show later on, under Su. III, 2, 37--It is thus
finally proved that the Vedanta-texts give information about an
accomplished entity, viz. Brahman, and that the fruit of meditation on
Brahman is something infinite and permanent. Where, on the other hand,
Scripture refers to the fruit of mere works, such as the katurmasya-
sacrifices, as something imperishable, we have to understand this
imperishableness in a merely relative sense, for Scripture definitely
teaches that the fruit of all works is perishable.
We thus arrive at the settled conclusion that, since the fruit of mere
works is limited and perishable, while that of the cognition of Brahman
is infinite and permanent, there is good reason for entering on an
enquiry into Brahman--the result of which enquiry will be the accurate
determination of Brahman's nature.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
'Enquiry.'
What then is that Brahman which is here said to be an object that should
be enquired into?--To this question the second Sutra gives a reply.
[FOOTNOTE 148:1. This view is held by the Prabhakara Mimamsakas.]
2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c., of this (world proceed).
The expression 'the origin', &c., means 'creation, subsistence, and
reabsorption'. The 'this' (in 'of this') denotes this entire world with
its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and
comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls from Brahma down
to blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former
actions) in definite places and at definite times. 'That from which,' i.
e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is
antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses
infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on;
who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the
creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed--he is
Brahman: such is the meaning of the Sutra.--The definition here given of
Brahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhrigu Varuni went to
his father Varuna, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman', &c., up to 'That from
which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that
into which they enter at their death, try to know that: that is Brahman.'
A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of
Brahman from the characteristic marks stated in this passage?--It is not
possible, the Purvapakshin contends. The attributes stated in that
passage--viz. being that from which the world originates, and so on--do
not properly indicate Brahman; for as the essence of an attribute lies
in its separative or distinctive function, there would result from the
plurality of distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman
itself.--But when we say 'Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young,
has reddish eyes,' &c., we also make a statement as to several
attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to one Devadatta only;
similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is
one Brahman only!--Not so, we reply. In Devadatta's case we connect all
attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other
means of knowledge; otherwise the distinctive power of several
attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of
several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case
under discussion, on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement
as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the
distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the
idea of several Brahmans.--But we maintain that the unity of the term
'Brahman' intimates the unity of the thing 'Brahman'!--By no means, we
reply. If a man who knows nothing about cows, but wishes to know about
them, is told 'a cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated
horns, or no horns,' the mutally exclusive ideas of the possession of
entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several
individual cows, although the term 'cow' is one only; and in the same
way we are led to the idea of several distinct Brahmans. For this reason,
even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the
thing, the definition of which is desired.--Nor again are the
characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the
world, &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks
(upalakshana), because the thing to be defined by them is not previously
known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of
something already known from a certain point of view, being known in a
different aspect--as when it is said 'Where that crane is standing, that
is the irrigated field of Devadatta.'--But may we not say that from the
text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an
idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin, &c.,
of the world may be taken as collateral indications (pointing to
something already known in a certain way)?--Not so, we reply; either of
these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect
of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence
deprives both of their force.--Brahman cannot therefore be known through
the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion.
To this prima facie view we make the following reply. Brahman can be
known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and reabsorption of
the world--these characteristics occupying the position of collateral
marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that,
apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of
Brahman is known; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is
known to us as possessing supreme greatness (brihattva) and power of
growth (brimhana)--this being the meaning of the root brimh (from which
'Brahman' is derived). Of this Brahman, thus already known (on the basis
of etymology), the origination, sustentation, and reabsorption of the
world are collateral marks. Moreover, in the Taitt. text under
discussion, the relative pronoun--which appears in three forms, (that)
'from whence,' (that) 'by which,' (that) 'into which'--refers to
something which is already known as the cause of the origin, and so on,
of the world. This previous knowledge rests on the Ch. passage, 'Being
only this was in the beginning,' &c., up to 'it sent forth fire'--which
declares that the one principle denoted as 'being' is the universal
material, and instrumental cause. There the clause 'Being only this was
in the beginning, one only,' establishes that one being as the general
material cause; the word 'without a second' negatives the existence of a
second operative cause; and the clauses 'it thought, may I be many, may
I grow forth', and 'it sent forth fire', establish that one being (as
the cause and substance of everything). If, then, it is said that
Brahman is that which is the root of the world's origination,
subsistence, and reabsorption, those three processes sufficiently
indicate Brahman as that entity which is their material and operative
cause; and as being the material and the operative cause implies
greatness (brihattva) manifesting itself in various powers, such as
omniscience, and so on, Brahman thus is something already known; and as
hence origination, &c., of the world are marks of something already
known, the objection founded above on the absence of knowledge of
another aspect of Brahman is seen to be invalid.--Nor is there really
any objection to the origination, &c., of the world being taken as
characteristic marks of Brahman in so far as they are distinctive
attributes. For taken as attributes they indicate Brahman as something
different from what is opposed to those attributes. Several attributes
which do not contradict each other may serve quite well as
characteristic marks defining one thing, the nature of which is not
otherwise known, without the plurality of the attributes in any way
involving plurality of the thing defined; for as those attributes are at
once understood to belong to one substrate, we naturally combine them
within that one substrate. Such attributes, of course, as the possession
of mutilated horns (mentioned above), which are contradictorily opposed
to each other, necessarily lead to the assumption of several individual
cows to which they severally belong; but the origination, &c., of the
world are processes separated from each other by difference of time only,
and may therefore, without contradiction, be connected with one Brahman
in succession.--The text 'from whence these beings', &c., teaches us
that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c., of the world, and of
this Brahman thus known the other text 'The True, knowledge, the
Infinite is Brahman', tells us that its essential nature marks it off
from everything else. The term 'True' expresses Brahman in so far as
possessing absolutely non-conditioned existence, and thus distinguishes
it from non-intelligent matter, the abode of change, and the souls
implicated in matter; for as both of these enter into different states
of existence called by different names, they do not enjoy unconditioned
being. The term 'knowledge' expresses the characteristic of permanently
non-contracted intelligence, and thus distinguishes Brahman from the
released souls whose intelligence is sometimes in a contracted state.
And the term 'Infinite' denotes that, whose nature is free from all
limitation of place, time, and particular substantial nature; and as
Brahman's essential nature possesses attributes, infinity belongs both
to the essential nature and to the attributes. The qualification of
Infinity excludes all those individual souls whose essential nature and
attributes are not unsurpassable, and who are distinct from the two
classes of beings already excluded by the two former terms (viz. 'true
being' and 'knowledge').--The entire text therefore defines Brahman--
which is already known to be the cause of the origination, &c., of the
world--as that which is in kind different from all other things; and it
is therefore not true that the two texts under discussion have no force
because mutually depending on each other. And from this it follows that
a knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic
marks--such as its being the cause of the origination, &c., of the world,
free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful, and so on.
To those, on the other hand, who maintain that the object of enquiry is
a substance devoid of all difference, neither the first nor the second
Sutra can be acceptable; for the Brahman, the enquiry into which the
first Sutra proposes, is, according to authoritative etymology,
something of supreme greatness; and according to the second Sutra it is
the cause of the origin, subsistence, and final destruction of the world.
The same remark holds good with regard to all following Sutras, and the
scriptural texts on which they are based--none of them confirm the
theory of a substance devoid of all difference. Nor, again, does
Reasoning prove such a theory; for Reasoning has for its object things
possessing a 'proving' attribute which constantly goes together with an
attribute 'to be proved.' And even if, in agreement with your view, we
explained the second Sutra as meaning 'Brahman is that whence proceeds
the error of the origination, &c., of the world', we should not thereby
advance your theory of a substance devoid of all difference. For, as you
teach, the root of all error is Nescience, and Brahman is that which
witnesses (is conscious of) Nescience, and the essence of witnessing
consciousness consists in being pure light (intelligence), and the
essence of pure light or intelligence is that, distinguishing itself
from the Non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is
different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric thought and
speech (vyavahara). All this implies the presence of difference--if
there were no difference, light or intelligence could not be what it is,
it would be something altogether void, without any meaning.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'origination and so on.'
An objection to the purport of the preceding Sutras here presents itself.--
The assertion that Brahman, as the cause of the origination, &c., of the
world, must be known through the Vedanta-texts is unfounded; for as
Brahman may be inferred as the cause of the world through ordinary
reasoning, it is not something requiring to be taught by authoritative
texts.--To this objection the next Sutra replies.
3. Because Scripture is the source (of the knowledge of Brahman).
Because Brahman, being raised above all contact with the senses, is not
an object of perception and the other means of proof, but to be known
through Scripture only; therefore the text 'Whence these creatures are
born,' &c., has to be accepted as instructing us regarding the true
nature of Brahman.--But, our opponent points out, Scripture cannot be
the source of our knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is to be known
through other means. For it is an acknowledged principle that Scripture
has meaning only with regard to what is not established by other sources
of knowledge.--But what, to raise a prima facie counter objection, are
those other sources of knowledge? It cannot, in the first place, be
Perception. Perception is twofold, being based either on the sense-
organs or on extraordinary concentration of mind (yoga). Of Perception
of the former kind there are again two sub-species, according as
Perception takes place either through the outer sense-organs or the
internal organ (manas). Now the outer sense-organs produce knowledge of
their respective objects, in so far as the latter are in actual contact
with the organs, but are quite unable to give rise to the knowledge of
the special object constituted by a supreme Self that is capable of
being conscious of and creating the whole aggregate of things. Nor can
internal perception give rise to such knowledge; for only purely
internal things, such as pleasure and pain, fall within its cognisance,
and it is incapable of relating itself to external objects apart from
the outer sense-organs. Nor, again, perception based on Yoga; for
although such perception--which springs from intense imagination--
implies a vivid presentation of things, it is, after all, nothing more
than a reproduction of objects perceived previously, and does not
therefore rank as an instrument of knowledge; for it has no means of
applying itself to objects other than those perceived previously. And if,
after all, it does so, it is (not a means of knowledge but) a source of
error.--Nor also inference either of the kind which proceeds on the
observation of special cases or of the kind which rests on
generalizations (cp. Nyaya Su. I, 1,5,). Not inference of the former
kind, because such inference is not known to relate to anything lying
beyond the reach of the senses. Nor inference of the latter kind,
because we do not observe any characteristic feature that is invariably
accompanied by the presence of a supreme Self capable of being conscious
of, and constructing, the universe of things.--But there _is_ such a
feature, viz. the world's being an effected thing; it being a matter of
common experience that whatever is an effect or product, is due to an
agent who possesses a knowledge of the material cause, the instrumental
cause, the final end, and the person meant to make use of the thing
produced. It further is matter of experience that whatever consists of
non-sentient matter is dependent on, or ruled by, a single intelligent
principle. The former generalization is exemplified by the case of jars
and similar things, and the latter by a living body in good health,
which consists of non-intelligent matter dependent on an intelligent
principle. And that the body is an effected thing follows from its
consisting of parts.--Against this argumentation also objections may be
raised. What, it must be asked, do you understand by this dependence on
an intelligent principle? Not, we suppose, that the origination and
subsistence of the non-intelligent thing should be dependent on the
intelligent principle; for in that case your example would not help to
prove your contention. Neither the origin nor the subsistence of a
person's healthy body depends on the intelligent soul of that person
alone; they rather are brought about by the merit and demerit of all
those souls which in any way share the fruition of that body--the wife,
e.g. of that person, and others. Moreover, the existence of a body made
up of parts means that body's being connected with its parts in the way
of so-called intimate relation (sama-vaya), and this requires a certain
combination of the parts but not a presiding intelligent principle. The
existence of animated bodies, moreover, has for its characteristic mark
the process of breathing, which is absent in the case of the earth, sea,
mountains, &c.--all of which are included in the class of things
concerning which you wish to prove something--, and we therefore miss a
uniform kind of existence common to all those things.--Let us then
understand by the dependence of a non-intelligent thing on an
intelligent principle, the fact of the motion of the former depending on
the latter!--This definition, we rejoin, would comprehend also those
cases in which heavy things, such as carriages, masses of stone, trees,
& c., are set in motion by several intelligent beings (while what you want
to prove is the dependence of a moving thing on one intelligent
principle). If, on the other hand, you mean to say that all motion
depends on intelligence in general, you only prove what requires no
proof.--Another alternative, moreover, here presents itself. As we both
admit the existence of individual souls, it will be the more economical
hypothesis to ascribe to them the agency implied in the construction of
the world. Nor must you object to this view on the ground that such
agency cannot belong to the individual souls because they do not possess
the knowledge of material causes, &c., as specified above; for all
intelligent beings are capable of direct knowledge of material causes,
such as earth and so on, and instrumental causes, such as sacrifices and
the like. Earth and other material substances, as well as sacrifices and
the like, are directly perceived by individual intelligent beings at the
present time (and were no doubt equally perceived so at a former time
when this world had to be planned and constructed). Nor does the fact
that intelligent beings are not capable of direct insight into the
unseen principle--called 'apurva,' or by similar names--which resides in
the form of a power in sacrifices and other instrumental causes, in any
way preclude their being agents in the construction of the world. Direct
insight into powers is nowhere required for undertaking work: what _is_
required for that purpose is only direct presentative knowledge of the
things endowed with power, while of power itself it suffices to have
some kind of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to the task of making
pots and jars on the strength of the direct knowledge they possess of
the implements of their work--the wheel, the staff, &c.--without
troubling about a similar knowledge of the powers inherent in those
implements; and in the same way intelligent beings may apply themselves
to their work (to be effected by means of sacrifices, &c.), if only they
are assured by sacred tradition of the existence of the various powers
possessed by sacrifices and the like.--Moreover, experience teaches that
agents having a knowledge of the material and other causes must be
inferred only in the case of those effects which can be produced, and
the material and other causes of which can be known: such things, on the
other hand, as the earth, mountains, and oceans, can neither be produced,
nor can their material and other causes ever be known; we therefore have
no right to infer for them intelligent producers. Hence the quality of
being an effected thing can be used as an argument for proving the
existence of an intelligent causal agent, only where that quality is
found in things, the production of which, and the knowledge of the
causes of which, is possible at all.--Experience further teaches that
earthen pots and similar things are produced by intelligent agents
possessing material bodies, using implements, not endowed with the power
of a Supreme Lord, limited in knowledge and so on; the quality of being
an effect therefore supplies a reason for inferring an intelligent agent
of the kind described only, and thus is opposed to the inference of
attributes of a contrary nature, viz. omniscience, omnipotence, and
those other attributes that belong--to the highest Soul, whose existence
you wish to establish.--Nor does this (as might be objected) imply an
abandonment of all inference. Where the thing to be inferred is known
through other means of proof also, any qualities of an opposite nature
which maybe suggested by the inferential mark (linga) are opposed by
those other means of proof, and therefore must be dropped. In the case
under discussion, however, the thine; to be inferred is something not
guaranteed by any other means of proof, viz. a person capable of
constructing the entire universe; here there is nothing to interfere
with the ascription to such a person of all those qualities which, on
the basis of methodical inference, necessarily belong to it.--The
conclusion from all this is that, apart from Scripture, the existence of
a Lord does not admit of proof.
Against all this the Purvapakshin now restates his case as follows:--It
cannot be gainsaid that the world is something effected, for it is made
up of parts. We may state this argument in various technical forms. 'The
earth, mountains, &c., are things effected, because they consist of
parts; in the same way as jars and similar things.' 'The earth, seas,
mountains, &c., are effects, because, while being big; (i.e. non-atomic),
they are capable of motion; just as jars and the like.' 'Bodies, the
world, &c., are effects, because, while being big, they are solid
(murtta); just as jars and the like.'--But, an objection is raised, in
the case of things made up of parts we do not, in addition to this
attribute of consisting of parts, observe any other aspect determining
that the thing is an effect--so as to enable us to say 'this thing is
effected, and that thing is not'; and, on the other hand, we do observe
it as an indispensable condition of something being an effect, that
there should be the possibility of such an effect being brought about,
and of the existence of such knowledge of material causes, &c. (as the
bringing about of the effect presupposes).--Not so, we reply. In the
case of a cause being inferred on the ground of an effect, the knowledge
and power of the cause must be inferred in accordance with the nature of
the effect. From the circumstance of a thing consisting of parts we know
it to be an effect and on this basis we judge of the power and knowledge
of the cause. A person recognises pots, jars and the like, as things
produced, and therefrom infers the constructive skill and knowledge of
their maker; when, after this, he sees for the first time a kingly
palace with all its various wonderful parts and structures, he concludes
from the special way in which the parts are joined that this also is an
effected thing, and then makes an inference as to the architect's
manifold knowledge and skill. Analogously, when a living body and the
world have once been recognised to be effects, we infer--as their maker--
some special intelligent being, possessing direct insight into their
nature and skill to construct them.--Pleasure and pain, moreover, by
which men are requited for their merit and demerit, are themselves of a
non-intelligent nature, and hence cannot bring about their results
unless they are controlled by an intelligent principle, and this also
compels us to assume a being capable of allotting to each individual
soul a fate corresponding to its deserts. For we do not observe that non-
intelligent implements, such as axes and the like, however much they may
be favoured by circumstances of time, place, and so on, are capable of
producing posts and pillars unless they be handled by a carpenter. And
to quote against the generalization on which we rely the instance of the
seed and sprout and the like can only spring from an ignorance and
stupidity which may be called truly demoniac. The same remark would
apply to pleasure and pain if used as a counter instance. (For in all
these cases the action which produces an effect must necessarily be
guided by an intelligent principle.)--Nor may we assume, as a 'less
complicated hypothesis,' that the guiding principle in the construction
of the world is the individual souls, whose existence is acknowledged by
both parties. For on the testimony of observation we must deny to those
souls the power of seeing what is extremely subtle or remote in time or
place (while such power must necessarily be ascribed to a world-
constructing intelligence). On the other hand, we have no ground for
concluding that the Lord is, like the individual souls, destitute of
such power; hence it cannot be said that other means of knowledge make
it impossible to infer such a Lord. The fact rather is that as his
existence is proved by the argument that any definite effect presupposes
a causal agent competent to produce that effect, he is proved at the
same time as possessing the essential power of intuitively knowing and
ruling all things in the universe.--The contention that from the world
being an effect it follows that its maker does not possess lordly power
and so on, so that the proving reason would prove something contrary to
the special attributes (belonging to a supreme agent, viz. omnipotence,
omniscience, &c.), is founded on evident ignorance of the nature of the
inferential process. For the inference clearly does not prove that there
exist in the thing inferred all the attributes belonging to the proving
collateral instances, including even those attributes which stand in no
causal relation to the effect. A certain effect which is produced by
some agent presupposes just so much power and knowledge on the part of
that agent as is requisite for the production of the effect, but in no
way presupposes any incapability or ignorance on the part of that agent
with regard to things other than the particular effect; for such
incapability and ignorance do not stand towards that effect in any
causal relation. If the origination of the effect can be accounted for
on the basis of the agent's capability of bringing it about, and of his
knowledge of the special material and instrumental causes, it would be
unreasonable to ascribe causal agency to his (altogether irrelevant)
incapabilities and ignorance with regard to other things, only because
those incapabilities, &c., are observed to exist together with his
special capability and knowledge. The question would arise moreover
whether such want of capability and knowledge (with regard to things
other than the one actually effected) would be helpful towards the
bringing about of that one effect, in so far as extending to all other
things or to some other things. The former alternative is excluded
because no agent, a potter e.g., is quite ignorant of all other things
but his own special work; and the second alternative is inadmissible
because there is no definite rule indicating that there should be
certain definite kinds of want of knowledge and skill in the case of all
agents [FOOTNOTE 168:1], and hence exceptions would arise with regard to
every special case of want of knowledge and skill. From this it follows
that the absence of lordly power and similar qualities which (indeed is
observed in the case of ordinary agents but) in no way contributes
towards the production of the effects (to which such agents give rise)
is not proved in the case of that which we wish to prove (i.e. a Lord, creator of the world), and that hence Inference does not establish qualities contrary (to the qualities characteristic of a Lord). |
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