We now consider the whole Chandogya-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somyedam
agra asid ekam evadvitiyam.' This means--That which is Being, i.e. this
world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a
manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of
the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being
endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the
question, the world was also 'without a second.' This proves the non-
difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause
also,' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the
creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to
differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable
and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the
effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i.e.
the highest Brahman.
And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with
all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the
world can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on
another guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on
the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold
world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible;
the text continues,'That deity thought--Let me now enter those three
beings with this living Self (jiva atman) and distinguish names and
forms'--which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things
(for this is meant by the "three beings") to possess various names and
forms, by entering into them by means of the giva, which is of the
nature of my Self.'The possession of names and forms must thus be
understood to be effected by the jiva entering into matter as its Self.
There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the
highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together
with the jivas. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having
entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient
beings).'And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient
beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state,
constitutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand
the highest Brahman constitutes their Self--this is proved by the
antaryamin-brahmana and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised
above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter
together with the jivas, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so
far only as it (i.e. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for
its body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in
the beginning one only' are unobjectionable in every way. All change and
all imperfection belongs only to the beings constituting Brahman's body,
and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a
treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be
further elucidated under II, 1, 22.--The Chandogya-text then further
teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in
Brahman 'in that all this has its Self; and further inculcates this
truth in 'Thou art that.'
Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of
the general cause and its effect: 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Ch. Up.
III, 14, 1); 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known,
then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That Self is all this'
(Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman indeed is all this' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); 'The
Self only is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative
difference: 'Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere
than in the Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is not any plurality here'
(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any
plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the passage 'For
where there is duality as it were, one sees the other; but when for him
the Self has become all, whereby then should he sec and whom?'(Bri. Up.
11,4, 13)--in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who
does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows--intimates
that non-difference only is real.
It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with
arambhana, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e.
the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and
non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prakara), is
denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes
constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state,
when--just owing to that subtle state--they are incapable of being
(conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form:
Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the
body of Brahman is constituted by all sentient and non-sentient beings
in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being
thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then
is in its 'effected' state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to
be non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. And that in
the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as
constituted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied
therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the
difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved
by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.
Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and
effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality, are
unable to prove what they wish to prove; for the True and the False
cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either
that Brahman is false or that the world is real.--Those again who (like
Bhaskara) hold the effect also to be real--the difference of the soul
and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference
is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of
Brahman and matter being essential--enter into conflict with all those
texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as
the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all
evil, &c., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter
undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them,
nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman--as being
indivisible--must be undivided while entering into connexion with the
upadhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if
they say that it is only the power (sakti), not Brahman itself, which
undergoes a change; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power
are non-different.
Others again (Yadavaprakasa) hold that the general cause, i.e. Brahman,
is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an
enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed
with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance
abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of
pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by
dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient
matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the
substance called clay assumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or
as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so
on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of
constituent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a
ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an
enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on
those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the
attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different
effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the
substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and
the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is'
constitutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one
in so far as their substance is constituted by clay. It is thus one
substance only, viz. 'that which is,' that appears in different
conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from
Brahman.--But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture,
Smriti, Itihasa, Purana and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smriti, Itihasa
and Purana alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman--a
being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful,
instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not
limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpassable bliss.
Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which
the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the
beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I
grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'Verily, in the beginning this was
Brahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the
most excellent Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas--Indra,
Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu, isana' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11);
'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing
whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait.
Ar. II, 4, 1, 1, 2); 'There was in truth Narayana only, not Brahma, not
Isana, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor
Agni, nor Soma, nor Surya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged
in meditation' &c. (Mahana. Up. I, 1)--these and other texts prove that
the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Narayana. For as the terms
'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of
the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by
the term 'Narayana,' it follows that they all mean Narayana. That the
Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also,
'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities--he is
the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him
neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smriti,
'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahma)--desirous to produce from his
own body beings of many kind--first with a thought created the waters
and placed his seed in them' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itihasas and Puranas also
declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Narayana, of
whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous
to create sent forth from a thousandth part of himself the souls in two
divisions.' 'From Vishnu the world originated and in him it abides.'
Nor is it possible to hold that the Lord is pure 'Being' only, for such
'Being' is admitted to be an element of the Lord; and moreover all
'Being' has difference. Nor can it be maintained that the Lord's
connexion with all his auspicious qualities--knowledge, bliss, and so
on--is occasional (adventitious) merely; it rather is essential and
hence eternal. Nor may you avail yourself of certain texts--viz. 'His
high power (sakti) is revealed as manifold, as essential, and (so) his
knowledge, strength and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-
knowing, all-cognising' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), and others--to the end of
proving that what is essential is only the Lord's connexion with the
_potentialities_ (sakti) of knowledge, bliss, and so on. For in the
Svetasvatara-text the word 'essential' independently qualifies
'knowledge, strength, and action' no less than 'sakti'; and your
explanation would necessitate so-called implication (lakshana). Nor
again can it be said that in words such as sarvjna (all-knowing), the
formative suffix expresses potentiality only, as it admittedly does in
other words such as pakaka (cook); for grammar does not teach that all
these (krit) affixes in general express potentiality or capability only.
It rather teaches (cp. Panini III, 2, 54) that a few krit-affixes only
have this limited meaning; and in the case of pakaka and similar words
we must assume capability to be denoted, because there is no other
explanation open to us.--If, moreover, the Lord were held to be only a
part of the Sat it would follow that the Sat, as the whole, would be
superior to the Lord just as the ocean is superior to a wave, and this
would be in conflict with ever so many scriptural texts which make
statements about the Lord, cp. e.g. 'Him the highest great lord of
lords'; 'There is none seen like to him or superior' (Svet. Up. VI, 7,
8). If, moreover, mere Being is held to be the Self of all and the
general whole, and the Lord only a particular part of it, this would
imply the stultification of all those texts which declare the Lord to be
the general Self and the whole of which all beings are parts; for jars
and platters certainly cannot be held to be parts of, and to have their
being in, pitchers (which themselves are only special things made of
clay). Against this you perhaps will plead that as Being in general is
fully present in all its parts, and hence also in that part which is the
Lord, all other things may be viewed as having their Self in and being
parts of, him.--But from your principles we might with equal right draw
the inference that as Being in general is fully present in the jar, the
Lord is a part of the jar and has his Self in that! From enunciations
such as 'the jar is,' 'the cloth is,' it appears that Being is an
attribute of things, and cannot therefore be a substance and a cause. By
the 'being' of a thing we understand the attribute of its being suitable
for some definite practical effect; while its 'non-being' means its
suitability for an effect of an opposite nature.--Should it on the other
hand be held that substances only have being, the (unacceptable)
consequence would be that actions, and so on, are non-existent. And if
(to avoid this consequence) it were said that the being of actions, and
so on, depends on their connexion with substances, it would be difficult
to show (what yet should be shown) that 'being' is everywhere of one and
the same nature. Moreover, if everything were non-different in so far as
'being,' there would be a universal consciousness of the nature of
everything, and from this there would follow a general confusion of all
good and evil (i.e. every one would have conscious experience of
everything) This point we have explained before. For all these reasons
non-difference can only have the meaning set forth by us.--Here the
following doubt may arise. In the case of childhood, youth, and so on,
we observe that different ideas and different terms are applied to
different states of one and the same being; in the case of clay, wood,
gold, &c., on the other hand, we observe that different ideas and terms
are applied to different things. On what ground then do you determine
that in the case of causes and effects, such as e.g. clay and jars, it
is mere difference of state on which the difference of ideas and terms
is based?--To this question the next Sutra gives a reply.
[FOOTNOTE 434:1. In other words--is the golden ornament originated by
the mere formless substance, gold; or by the form belonging to that
special piece of gold (a coin, a bar, &c.), out of which the ornament is
fashioned; or by the substance, gold, in so far as possessing that
special form? The rukaka of the text has to be taken in the sense of
nishka.]
[FOOTNOTE 455:1. The meaning of the four words constituting the clause
therefore would be, 'On account of speech (i.e. for the sake of the
accomplishment of certain activities such as the bringing of water,
which are preceded by speech), there is touched (by the previously
mentioned substance clay) an effect and a name; i.e. for the sake of, &c.,
clay modifies itself into an effect having a special name.'The
Commentary remarks that' arambhanam 'cannot be taken in the sense of
upadana; since, on the theory of the unreality of effects, the effect is
originated not by speech but by thought (imagination) only; and on the
parinama doctrine the effect is likewise not originated by speech but by
Brahman.]
16. And because (the cause) is perceived in the existence of the effect.
This means--because gold which is the cause is perceived in the
existence of its effects, such as earrings and the like; i.e. on account
of the recognition of gold which expresses itself in the judgment 'this
earring is gold.' We do not on the other hand perceive the presence of
clay, and so on, in gold, and so on. The case of the cause and the
effect is thus analagous to that of the child and the youth: the word
'effect' denotes nothing else but the causal substance which has passed
over into a different condition. He also who holds the effect to be a
new thing acknowledges that the effect is connected with a different
state, and as this different state suffices to account for the
difference of ideas and words, we are not entitled to assume a new
substance which is not perceived. Nor must it be said that the
recognition of the gold in the earring is due to generic nature (the two
_things_ being different, but having the same generic nature); for we
perceive no new substance which could be the abode of the generic
character. What we actually perceive is one and the same substance
possessing the generic characteristics of gold, first in the causal
state and then in the effected state. Nor again can it be said that even
on the supposition of difference of substance, recognition of the cause
in the effect results from the continuity of the so-called intimate
cause (samavayi-karaina). For where there is difference of substances
we do not observe that mere continuity of the abode gives rise to the
recognition (of one substance) in the other substance residing in that
abode.-But in the case of certain effects, as e.g. scorpions and other
vermin which originate from dung, that recognition of the causal
substance, i.e. dung (to which you refer as proving the identity of
cause and effect), is not observed to take place!--You misstate the
case, we reply; here also we _do_ recognise in the effect that substance
which is the primal cause, viz. earth.--But in smoke, which is the
effect of fire, we do not recognise fire!--True! but this does not
disprove our case. Fire is only the operative cause of smoke; for smoke
originates from damp fuel joined with fire. That smoke is the effect of
damp fuel is proved thereby, as well as that both have smell (which
shows them to be alike of the substance of earth).--As thus the identity
of the substance is perceived in the effect also, we are entitled to
conclude that the difference of ideas and terms rests on difference of
state only. The effect, therefore, is non-different from the
cause.--This is so for the following reason also.
17. And on account of the existence of that which is posterior.
On account of the existence of the posterior, i.e. the effect existing
in the cause--for this reason also the effect is non-different from the
cause. For in ordinary language as well as in the Veda the effect is
spoken of in terms of the cause; as when we say, 'all these things--jars,
platters, &c.--were clay only this morning'; or when the Veda says,
'Being only was this in the beginning.'
18. If it be said 'not, on account of the designation of the (effect as
the) non-existent; we reply, not so, on account (of such designation
being due to) another attribute, (as appears) from the complementary
passage, from Reasoning, and from another Vedic text.
The assertion that ordinary speech as well as the Veda acknowledges the
existence of the effect in the cause cannot be upheld 'on account of the
designation of (the effect as) the non-existent.' For the Veda says,
'Non-being only was this in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); 'Non-
being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 6. 1); 'In the
beginning truly this was not anything whatever.' And in ordinary
language we say 'In the morning all this--jars, platters, and so on,--
was not.'--This objection the Sutra proceeds to refute. 'Not so, on
account of such designation being due to another attribute.' The
designation of the effected substance as the non-existent is due to the
effect having at an earlier time a different quality, i.e. a different
constitution; not to its being, as you think, absolutely non-existing.
The quality different from the quality of existence is non-existence;
that is to say, of the world designated as _this_, the quality of
existence is constituted by name and form, while the quality of non-
existence consists in the subtle state opposed to name and form.--But
how is this known?--'From the complementary passage, from Reasoning, and
from another text.' The complementary passage is the one following on
the last text quoted above, viz. 'that Non-existent formed the resolve
"may I be". The resolve referred to in this complementary text serving
as an inferential sign to determine that the Non-existence spoken of is
other than absolute Non-existence, we, on the basis of the observation
that all the three texts quoted treat of the same matter, conclude that
in the other two texts also the Non-existent has to be understood in the
same sense. 'From Reasoning.' Reasoning shows Being and Non-being to be
attributes of things. The possession, on the part of clay, of a certain
shape, a broad base, a belly-shaped body, and so on, is the cause of our
thinking and saying 'the jar exists,' while the connexion, on the part
of the clay, with a condition opposed to that of a jar is the cause of
our thinking and saying 'the jar does not exist.' A condition of the
latter kind is e. g.--the clay's existing in the form of two separate
halves of a jar, and it is just this and similar conditions of the clay
which account for our saying that the jar does not exist. We do not
perceive any non-existence of the jar different from the kind of non-
existence described; and as the latter sufficiently accounts for all
current ideas and expressions as to non-existence, there is no occasion
to assume an additional kind of non-existence.--And also 'from another
text.' The text meant is that often quoted, 'Being only was this in the
beginning.' For there the view of the absolute non-being of the effect
is objected to, 'But how could it be thus?' &c., and then the decision
is given that from the beginning the world was 'being.' This matter is
clearly set forth in the text 'This was then undistinguished; it became
distinguished by name and form' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7).
The next two Sutras confirm the doctrine of the non-difference of the
effect from the cause by two illustrative instances.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As threads when joined in a peculiar cross-arrangement are called a
piece of cloth, thus acquiring a new name, a new form, and new functions,
so it is with Brahman also.
20. And as the different vital airs.
As the one air, according as it undergoes in the body different
modifications, acquires a new name, new characteristics, and new
functions, being then called prana, apana, and so on; thus the one
Brahman becomes the world, with its manifold moving and non-moving
beings.--The non-difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause,
is thus fully established.
Here terminates the 'arambhana' adhikarana.
21. From the designation of the 'other' (as non-different from Brahman)
there result (Brahman's) not creating what is beneficial, and other
imperfections.
'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman'--these and similar texts which
declare the non-difference of the world from Brahman, teach, as has been
said before, at the same time the non-difference from Brahman of the
individual soul also. But an objection here presents itself. If these
texts really imply that the 'other one,' i.e. the soul, is Brahman,
there will follow certain imperfections on Brahman's part, viz. that
Brahman, endowed as it is with omniscience, the power of realising its
purposes, and so on, does not create a world of a nature beneficial to
itself, but rather creates a world non-beneficial to itself; and the
like. This world no doubt is a storehouse of numberless pains, either
originating in living beings themselves or due to the action of other
natural beings, or caused by supernatural agencies. No rational
independent person endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial
to himself. And as you hold the view of the non-difference of the world
from Brahman, you yourself set aside all those texts which declare
Brahman to be different from the soul; for were there such difference,
the doctrine of general non-difference could not be established. Should
it be maintained that the texts declaring difference refer to difference
due to limiting adjuncts, while the texts declaring non-difference mean
essential non-difference, we must ask the following question--does the
non-conditioned Brahman know, or does it not know, the soul which is
essentially non-different from it? If it does not know it, Brahman's
omniscience has to be abandoned. If, on the other hand, it knows it,
then Brahman is conscious of the pains of the soul--which is non-
different from Brahman--as its own pains; and from this there
necessarily follows an imperfection, viz. that Brahman does not create
what is beneficial and does create what is non-beneficial to itself. If,
again, it be said that the difference of the soul and Brahman is due to
Nescience on the part of both, and that the texts declaring difference
refer to difference of this kind, the assumption of Nescience belonging
to the soul leads us to the very alternatives just stated and to their
respective results. Should the ajnana, on the other hand, belong to
Brahman, we point out that Brahman, whose essential nature is self-
illuminedness, cannot possibly be conscious of ajnana and the creation
of the world effected by it. And if it be said that the light of Brahman
is obscured by ajnana, we point to all the difficulties, previously set
forth, which follow from this hypothesis--to obscure light means to make
it cease, and to make cease the light of Brahman, of whom light is the
essential nature, means no less than to destroy Brahman itself. The view
of Brahman being the cause of the world thus shows itself to be
untenable.--This prima facie view the next Sutra refutes.
22. But (Brahman is) additional, on account of the declaration of
difference.
The word 'but' sets aside the prima facie view. To the individual soul
capable of connexion with the various kinds of pain there is additional,
i.e. from it there is different, Brahman.--On what ground?--'Owing to
the declaration of difference.' For Brahman is spoken of as different
from the soul in the following texts:--'He who dwells in the Self and
within the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the
body, who rules the Self within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the
immortal' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowing as separate the Self and the
Mover, blessed by him he gains Immortality' (Svet. Up. I, 6); 'He is the
cause, the Lord of the lords of the organs' (i.e. the individual souls)
(Svet Up. VI, 9); 'One of them eats the sweet fruit; without eating the
other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'There are two, the one knowing, the
other not knowing, both unborn, the one a ruler, the other not a ruler'
(Svet. Up. I, 9); 'Embraced by the prajna. Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21);
'Mounted by the prajna. Self' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 35); 'From that the ruler
of maya sends forth all this, in that the other is bound up through maya
(Svet. Up. IV, 9); 'the Master of the Pradhana and the souls, the lord
of the gunas' (Svet. Up. VI, 16);'the eternal among eternals, the
intelligent among the intelligent, who, one, fulfils the desires of
many' (Svet. Up. VI, 13); 'who moves within the Unevolved, of whom the
Unevolved is the body, whom the Unevolved does not know; who moves
within the Imperishable, of whom the Imperishable is the body, whom the
Imperishable does not know; who moves within Death, of whom Death is the
body, whom Death does not know; he is the inner Self of all beings, free
from evil, the divine one, the one God, Narayana'; and other similar
texts.
23. And as in the analogous case of stones and the like, there is
impossibility of that.
In the same way as it is impossible that the different non-sentient
things such as stones, iron, wood, herbs, &c., which are of an extremely
low constitution and subject to constant change, should be one in nature
with Brahman, which is faultless, changeless, fundamentally antagonistic
to all that is evil, &c. &c.; so it is also impossible that the
individual soul, which is liable to endless suffering, and a mere
wretched glowworm as it were, should be one with Brahman who, as we know
from the texts, comprises within himself the treasure of all auspicious
qualities, &c. &c. Those texts, which exhibit Brahman and the soul in
coordination, must be understood as conveying the doctrine, founded on
passages such as 'of whom the Self is the body,' that as the jiva
constitutes Brahman's body and Brahman abides within the jiva as its
Self, Brahman has the jiva for its mode; and with this doctrine the co-
ordination referred to is not only not in conflict but even confirms it--
as we have shown repeatedly, e.g. under Su. I, 4, 22. Brahman in all its
states has the souls and matter for its body; when the souls and matter
are in their subtle state Brahman is in its causal condition; when, on
the other hand, Brahman has for its body souls and matter in their gross
state, it is 'effected' and then called world. In this way the co-
ordination above referred to fully explains itself. The world is non-
different from Brahman in so far as it is its effect. There is no
confusion of the different characteristic qualities; for liability to
change belongs to non-sentient matter, liability to pain to sentient
souls, and the possession of all excellent qualities to Brahman: hence
the doctrine is not in conflict with any scriptural text. That even in
the state of non-separation-described in texts such as, 'Being only this
was in the beginning'--the souls joined to non-sentient matter persist
in a subtle condition and thus constitute Brahman's body must
necessarily be admitted; for that the souls at that time also persist in
a subtle form is shown under Sutras II, I, 34; 35. Non-division, at that
time, is possible in so far as there is no distinction of names and
forms. It follows from all this that Brahman's causality is not contrary
to reason.
Those, on the other hand, who explain the difference, referred to in
Sutra 22, as the difference between the jiva in its state of bondage and
the jiva in so far as free from avidya, i.e. the unconditioned Brahman,
implicate themselves in contradictions. For the jiva., in so far as free
from avidya, is neither all-knowing, nor the Lord of all, nor the cause
of all, nor the Self of all, nor the ruler of all--it in fact possesses
none of those characteristics on which the scriptural texts found the
difference of the released soul; for according to the view in question
all those attributes are the mere figment of Nescience. Nor again can
the Sutra under discussion be said to refer to the distinction, from the
individual soul, of a Lord fictitiously created by avidya--a distinction
analogous to that which a man in the state of avidya makes between the
shell and the silver; for it is the task of the Vedanta to convey a
knowledge of that true Brahman which is introduced as the object of
enquiry in the first Sutra ('Now then the enquiry into Brahman') and
which is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and what
they at this point are engaged in is to refute the objections raised
against the doctrine of that Brahman on the basis of Smriti and
Reasoning.--The two Sutras II, 1, 8; 9 really form a complementary
statement to what is proved in the present adhikarana; for their purport
is to show also that things of different nature can stand to each other
in the relation of cause and effect. And the Sutra II, 1, 7 has
reference to what is contained in the previous adhikarana.
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'designation of the other.'
24. Should it be said that (it is) not, on account of the observation of
employment; we say, not so; for as in the case of milk.
We have so far determined that it is in no way unreasonable to hold that
the highest Brahman, which is all-knowing, capable of realising its
purposes, &c., has all beings, sentient and non-sentient, for its body,
and hence constitutes the Self of all and differs in nature from
everything else. We now proceed to show that it is not unreasonable to
hold that, possessing all those attributes, it is able to effect by its
mere will and wish the creation of this entire manifold Universe.--But,
it may here be said, it is certainly a matter of observation that agents
of limited power are obliged to employ a number of instrumental agencies
in order to effect their purposes; but how should it follow therefrom
that the view of the all-powerful Brahman producing the world without
such instrumental agencies is in any way irrational?--As, we reply, it
is observed in ordinary life that even such agents as possess the
capability of producing certain effects stand in need of certain
instruments, some slow-witted person may possibly imagine that Brahman,
being destitute of all such instruments, is incapable of creating the
world. It is this doubt which we have to dispel. It is seen that potters,
weavers, &c., who produce jars, cloth, and the like, are incapable of
actually producing unless they make use of certain implements, although
they may fully possess the specially required skill. Men destitute of
such skill are not capable of production, even with the help of
implements; those having the capacity produce by means of the
instruments only. This leads to the conclusion that Brahman also,
although possessing all imaginable powers, is not capable of creating
the world without employing the required instrumental agencies. But
before creation there existed nothing that could have assisted him, as
we know from texts such as 'Being only this was in the beginning';
'there was Narayana alone.' Brahman's creative agency thus cannot be
rendered plausible; and hence the prima facie view set forth in the
earlier part of the Sutra, 'Should it be said that (it is) not; on
account of the observation of employment (of instruments).'
This view is set aside by the latter part of the Sutra, 'not so; for as
in the case of milk.' It is by no means a fact that every agent capable
of producing a certain effect stands in need of instruments. Milk, e.g.
and water, which have the power of producing certain effects, viz. sour
milk and ice respectively, produce these effects unaided. Analogously
Brahman also, which possesses the capacity of producing everything, may
actually do so without using instrumental aids. The 'for' in the Sutra
is meant to point out the fact that the proving instances are generally
known, and thus to indicate the silliness of the objection. Whey and
similar ingredients are indeed sometimes mixed with milk, but not to the
end of making the milk turn sour, but merely in order to accelerate the
process and give to the sour milk a certain flavour.
25. And as in the case of the gods and so on, in (their) world.
As the gods and similar exalted beings create, each in his own world,
whatever they require by their mere volition, so the Supreme Person
creates by his mere volition the entire world. That the gods about whose
powers we know from the Veda only (not through perception) are here
quoted as supplying a proving instance, is done in order to facilitate
the comprehension of the creative power of Brahman, which is also known
through the Veda.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the observation of
employment.'
26. Or the consequence of the entire (Brahman entering into the effect),
and stultification of (Brahman's) being devoid of parts.
'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'This indeed was in the
beginning not anything'; 'The Self alone indeed was this in the
beginning'--these and other texts state that in the beginning Brahman
was one only, i.e. without parts--that means: Brahman, in its causal
state, was without parts because then all distinction of matter and
souls had disappeared. This one, non-divided, Brahman thereupon having
formed the resolution of being many divided itself into the aggregate of
material things--ether, air, and so on--and the aggregate of souls from
Brahma down to blades of grass. This being so, it must be held that the
entire highest Brahman entered into the effected state; that its
intelligent part divided itself into the individual souls, and its non-
intelligent part into ether, air, and so on. This however stultifies all
those often-quoted texts which declare Brahman in its causal state to be
devoid of parts. For although the cause is constituted by Brahman in so
far as having for its body matter and souls in their subtle state, and
the effect by Brahman invested with matter and souls in their gross
state; the difficulty stated above cannot be avoided, since also that
element in Brahman which is embodied is held to enter into the effect.
If, on the other hand, Brahman is without parts, it cannot become many,
and it is not possible that there should persist a part not entering
into the effected state. On the ground of these unacceptable results we
conclude that Brahman cannot be the cause.--This objection the next
Sutra disposes of.
27. But on account of Scripture; (Brahman's possession of various
powers) being founded upon the word.
The 'but' sets aside the difficulty raised. There is no
inappropriateness; 'on account of Scripture.' Scripture declares on the
one hand that Brahman is not made up of parts, and on the other that
from it a multiform creation proceeds. And in matters vouched for by
Scripture we must conform our ideas to what Scripture actually says.--
But then Scripture might be capable of conveying to us ideas of things
altogether self-contradictory; like as if somebody were to tell us
'Water with fire'!--The Sutra therefore adds 'on account of its being
founded on the word.' As the possession, on Brahman's part, of various
powers (enabling it to emit the world) rests exclusively on the
authority of the word of the Veda and thus differs altogether from other
matters (which fall within the sphere of the other means of knowledge
also), the admission of such powers is not contrary to reason. Brahman
cannot be either proved or disproved by means of generalisations from
experience.
28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold (powers).
If attributes belonging to one thing were on that account to be ascribed
to other things also, it would follow that attributes observed in non-
sentient things, such as jars and the like, belong also to the
intelligent eternal Self, which is of an altogether different kind. But
that such attributes do not extend to the Self is due to the variety of
the essential nature of things. This the Sutra expresses in 'for (there
are) manifold (powers).' We perceive that fire, water, and so on, which
are of different kind, possess different powers, viz. heat, and so on:
there is therefore nothing unreasonable in the view that the highest
Brahman which differs in kind from all things observed in ordinary life
should possess innumerous powers not perceived in ordinary things. Thus
Parasara also--in reply to a question founded on ordinary observation--
viz. 'How can creative energy be attributed to Brahman, devoid of
qualities, pure, &c.?'--declares 'Numberless powers, lying beyond the
sphere of all ordinary thought, belong to Brahman, and qualify it for
creation, and so on; just as heat belongs to fire.' Similarly, Scripture
says, 'what was that wood, what was that tree from which they built
heaven and earth?' &c. (Ri. Samh. X, 81); and 'Brahman was that wood,
Brahman was that tree', and so on.--Objections founded on ordinary
generalisations have no force against Brahman which differs in nature
from all other things.
29. And on account of the defects of his view also.
On his view, i.e. on the view of him who holds the theory of the
Pradhana or something similar, the imperfections observed in ordinary
things would attach themselves to the Pradhana also, since it does not
differ in nature from those things. The legitimate conclusion therefore
is that Brahman only which differs in nature from all other things can
be held to be the general cause.
The Pradhana, moreover, is without parts; how then is it possible that
it should give rise to a manifold world, comprising the 'great principle,'
and so on?--But there _are_ parts of the Pradhana, viz. Goodness,
Passion, and Darkness!--This we reply necessitates the following
distinction. Does the aggregate of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness
constitute the Pradhana? or is the Pradhana the effect of those three?
The latter alternative is in conflict with your own doctrine according
to which the Pradhana is cause only. It moreover contradicts the number
of tattvas (viz. 24) admitted by you; and as those three gunas also have
no parts one does not see how they can produce an effect. On the former
alternative, the gunas not being composed of parts must be held to
aggregate or join themselves without any reference to difference of
space, and from such conjunction the production of gross effects cannot
result.--The same objection applies to the doctrine of atoms being the
general cause. For atoms, being without parts and spatial distinction of
parts, can join only without any reference to such spatial distinction,
and hence do not possess the power of originating effects.
30. And (the divinity is) endowed with all powers, because that is seen.
The highest divinity which is different in nature from all other things
is endowed with all powers; for scriptural texts show it to be such,
'His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential, and so his
knowledge, force, and action' (Svet. Up. VI, 8). In the same way another
text first declares the highest divinity to differ in nature from
everything else, 'Free from sin, from old age, from death and grief,
from hunger and thirst', and then goes on to represent it as endowed with
all powers, 'realising all its wishes, realising all its intentions', &c.
(Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Compare also 'He, consisting of mind, having prana
for his body, whose form is light, who realises his wishes,' &c. (Ch. Up.
III, 14, 2).
31. Not, on account of the absence of organs; this has been explained
(before).
Although the one Brahman is different from all other beings and endowed
with all powers, we yet infer from the text 'Of him there is known no
effect and no instrument,' that as it is destitute of instruments it
cannot produce any effect.--To this objection an answer has already been
given in II, 1, 27; 28, 'on account of its being founded on the word,'
and 'for there are manifold (powers).' That for which the sacred word is
the only means of knowledge, and which is different from all other
things, is capable of producing those effects also of the instrumental
means of which it is destitute. It is in this spirit that Scripture says
'He sees without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he
hastens and grasps' (Svet. Up. III, 19).--Here terminates the adhikarana
of 'the consequence of the entire (Brahman).' |
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