15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows
from what begins with the word arambhana.
Under II, 1, 7 and other Sutras the non-difference of the effect, i.e.
the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was assumed, and it was on this
basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded.
The present Sutra now raises a prima facie objection against that very
non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.
On the point in question the school of Kanada argues as follows. It is
in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the
cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas: the
ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of
cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the
same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument; nobody
applies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth,' or vice versa. A
third argument rests on the difference of effects: water is not fetched
from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There,
fourthly, is the difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the
effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the cause
has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly
with a broad basis; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we
say 'The jar has gone to pieces.' There, sixthly, is a numerical
difference: the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the
seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing
agent (which would result from cause and effect being identical); for if
the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the
activity of the agent?--Let us then say that, although the effect _exists_
(at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful
towards the effect.--But in that case the activity of the agent would
have to be assumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything
would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and
non-eternal things!--Let us then say that the effect, although always
existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the
activity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be purposeless,
and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!--
This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another
manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a _regressus in
infinitum_. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another
manifestation (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is
eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation
is said to originate, we lapse into the asatkaryavada (according to
which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if
the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that
the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar
things. For things which admittedly possess manifesting power, such as
lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular
objects to be manifested by them: we do not see that a lamp lit for
showing a jar does _not_ at the same time manifest waterpots and other
things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in
so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which
previously did _not_ exist; and thus the theory of the previous
existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite
causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects; clay
e.g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can
become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the
hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (determining the
definite effect which will result from the cause).
But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the
previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the
activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence
before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to
operate elsewhere than on the effect; and as this 'elsewhere' comprises
without distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's
activity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also (not
only to cloth).--Not so, the Vaiseshika replies. Activity applied to a
certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which
inheres in that cause.
Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is
non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as
an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical
thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the
causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things
such as jars, the so-called effect, i.e. the jar or pot, rests
altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars,
waterpots, &c., viewed as different from their causal substance, viz.
clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on
empirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal; while
the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the
entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i.e. Brahman
which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on
the empirical assumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while
reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows
that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause; the
effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our
theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver
erroneously imagined in the shell is inappropriate because the non-
reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while
the non-reality of the shell-silver is so proved; for as a matter of
fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of
jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the reality of everything apart
from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that
reasoning rests, we reply--on the fact that the clay only is continuous,
permanent, while everything different from it is discontinuous, non-
permanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the
continuously existing rope only--which forms the substrate of the
imagined snake--is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which
is non-continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the permanently
enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous
effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is
real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as
e.g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected
thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to
destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that
which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is
false, no less than the silver imagined in the shell, the
anirvakaniyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see
above, p. 102 ff.).--We further ask, 'Is a causal substance, such as
clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it
passed over into some special modified condition?' The former
alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the
cause originates effects at all times; and the latter must equally be
rejected, because the passing over of the cause into a special state
would oblige us to postulate a previous passing over into a different
state (to account for the latter passing over) and again a previous one,
& c., so that a _regressus in infinitum_ would result.--Let it then be
said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed
unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place
(this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect).--But this
also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal
substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed
condition; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again.--
Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk
from clay, gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived; that this
perception is not sublated with regard to time and place--while, on the
other hand, the perception of silver in the shell is so sublated--and
that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that
the effect _does_ originate from the cause. For this argumentation does
not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the
mere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-ornament? or is it the
gold coins (used for making ornaments) which originate? or is it the
gold, as forming the substrate of the coins [FOOTNOTE 434:1]? The mere
gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no
effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could
apply itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity
with regard to itself.--But, an objection is raised, the svastika-
ornament is perceived as different from the gold!--It is not, we reply,
different from the gold; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other
thing but gold is perceived.--But the existence of another thing is
proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word,
and so on!--By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which
have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no
less than the idea of, and the word denoting, shell-silver, and hence
have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the
second place, is the _gold coin_ originative of the svastika-ornament;
for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the
threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated
by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin; for the gold
in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the
svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their
causal substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the
entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal; for
it also is an effect.
In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything
apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the assumption
of things such as clay, gold, &c., being real, and have thereby proved
the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal
substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are;
for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.
'In that all this has its Self; it is the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7);
'There is here no plurality; from death to death goes he who sees here
plurality as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'For where there is duality
as it were, there one sees another; but when for him the Self only has
become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see?' (Bri. Up.
II, 4, 13); 'Indra goes manifold by means of his mayas' (Bri. Up. II, 5,
19);--these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different
from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated
by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception; for in the way set
forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception
really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if
there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture,
to which no imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final
position among the means of knowledge; and which, although dependent on
Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of
words, yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it
follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is
unreal.
Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the
falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non-
real. For it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual souls:
Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all
living bodies; as we know from many texts: 'Having entered into them
with this living Self (Ch. Up. VI, 3); 'The one god hidden within all
beings' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'The one god entered in many places'; 'That
Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth' (Ka. Up. I, 3,12);
'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.--But
if you maintain that the one Brahman constitutes the soul in all living
bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect
the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation
affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and
that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released
souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant,
and so on.
Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non-duality of Brahman
give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the
reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and
so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on
which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the
same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in
mirrors, crystals, sword-blades, &c., remain distinct owing to their
limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another
large, one being bright, another dim, and so on.--But you have said that
scriptural texts such as 'Having entered with this living Self show that
the souls are not different from Brahman!--They are indeed not different
in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an
imagined difference.--To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to
Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no
room for imagination of any kind! Nor also to the individual souls; for
this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul
depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul! Not
so, the advaita-vadin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the
existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain; their
relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual
dependence and the like, which are held to constitute defects in the
case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, the very
nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be
established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a
whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of
a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different
from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they
are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts--in the same
way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the
dimness of the mirror--they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may
be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the
reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error;
for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release.
And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the
question as to its cause is not to be raised.
This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the
true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the
admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality.
For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of
Nescience is constituted by the soul in its essential, not fictitiously
imagined, form; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience.
If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is
the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in
it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (jada) is the abode of
Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge
a third aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which is pure
intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fictitiously superimposed on
Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the
abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature
being however qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect; we must
negative this also, since that which has an absolutely homogeneous
nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience.
The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience,
and you therefore define nothing.--Moreover, the theory of Nescience
abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of
establishing a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it
really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood
the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains
Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be
released.--But Nescience persists because other souls are not released!--
Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not
destroyed!--But we assume a different Nescience for each soul; that soul
whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience
is not destroyed will remain in Bondage!--You now argue on the
assumption of a special avidya for each soul. But what about the
distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to
the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former
alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is
pure, non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alternative the
assumption of avidya to account for the distinction of souls would be
purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives
arise--Does this avidya which gives rise to the fictitious distinction
of souls belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?--If you say 'to
Brahman', your view coincides with mine.--Well then, 'to the souls'!--
But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is assumed for the
purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls?--Let us then view
the matter as follows--those several avidyas which are assumed for the
purpose of establishing the distinction of souls bound and released, to
those same avidyas the distinction of souls is due.--But here you reason
in a manifest circle: the avidyas are established on the basis of the
distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when
the avidyas are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and
sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and
plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant; while in the
case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establishing
the several avidyas on the basis of the very souls which are assumed to
be due to those avidyas. And if you attempt to give to the argument a
somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyas abiding
in the earlier souls which fictitiously give rise to the later souls, we
point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and
moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences
of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The
same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which
effects the fictitious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the
avidyas abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is assumed a
beginningless flow of avidyas, it follows that there is also a
beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those
avidyas, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is
supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be
established. Concerning your assertion that, as Nescience is something
unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such
defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only; we remark
that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the
highest Brahman itself.--But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has
for its essence pure cognition!--Is Nescience then to be dealt with by
rational arguments? If so, it will follow that, on account of the
arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not
cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question--
When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul passes away, owing to
the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or
does it not perish? In the former case Release is nothing else but
destruction of the essential nature of the soul; in the latter case the
soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since
it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.--You have further
maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits
of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and
so on, of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors,
crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point
requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and
other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.)
pass away?--When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pass
away!--Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of
those imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by
analogy the individual soul also must be assumed to persist, and from
this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected
image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by analogy the
soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.--
Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non-advantageous
(apurushartha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that
disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman--which
corresponds to the thing reflected--that is conscious of the
imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which
corresponds to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the two
former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and
the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on
the other--on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not
hold good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is
conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts; for neither of the
two is a being capable of consciousness. And, moreover, Brahman's being
conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience.
And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other
knowing subject _but_ Brahman and the soul.--It would, moreover, be
necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka)
with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience
itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be
the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved
being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the
existence of the soul is that which _is formed_ by Nescience, just as
shell-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the
fictitiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is
the abode of Nescience.--If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of
Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of)
the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman
should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares,
is preceded by 'seeing' on his part, and to the differentiation of names
and forms. If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely
homogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience;
and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.
For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Maya and Nescience
must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Maya, i.e.
illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And
without being conscious of others the lord of Maya is unable to delude
them by his Maya; and Maya herself cannot bring about the consciousness
of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude
others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.--
Perhaps you will say that the Maya of Brahman causes him to be conscious
of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion.
But if Maya causes Brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated
intelligence, absolutely homogeneous and free from all foreign elements--
to become conscious of other beings, then Maya is nothing but another
name for Nescience.--Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of
the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, Maya
which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and
thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is _not_
avidya.--But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is
known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be
nothing else but avidya. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings
apart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none
but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!--
Let us then define avidya as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of
unreal things. Maya then, as not being the cause of such a
disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of
avidya!--But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the
moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not
disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidya; and if, on
the other hand, Maya which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it
presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of
disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would
be permanently connected with Brahman's nature.--Well, if it were so,
what harm would there be?--The harm would be that such a view implies
the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts
inculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were,
& c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should
he see, and whom should he see?'--But those texts set forth the Real;
Maya on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency
is not in real conflict with the texts!--Brahman, we reply, has for its
essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or
affected with, unreal Maya, without avidya. Of what use, we further ask,
should an eternal non-real Maya be to Brahman?--Brahman by means of it
deludes the individual souls!--But of what use should such delusion be
to Brahman?--It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!--But of what
use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?--Do we not then
see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full
happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?--The cases are
not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind
would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements
unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself,
unreal of such a play!--The arguments set forth previously also prove
the impossibility of the fictitious existence of an individual soul
considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman considered as the
abode of Maya.
We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of
Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with
beginningless avidya, and owing to this avidya is conscious of plurality
within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of
avidya belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the
distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman
affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that
Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true
existence: the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of
teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fictitious one, and all such
fiction can be explained by means of the avidya of one intelligent being.
The case is analogous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and
pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are
fictitiously shaped out of the avidya of the one dreaming subject. For
the same reason there is no valid foundation for the assumption of many
avidyas. For those also who hold that avidya belongs to the individual
souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of
one's own self and other persons, is real; and if it is unreal it can be
accounted for by the avidya of one subject. This admits of being stated
in various technical ways.--The distinctions of bondage and of one's own
self and other persons are fictitiously shaped by one's own avidya; for
they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.--Other
bodies also have a Self through me only; for they are bodies like this
my body.--Other bodies also are fictitiously shaped by my avidya; for
they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fictitious creations,
as this my body is.--The whole class of intelligent subjects is nothing
but _me_; for they are of intelligent nature; what is _not me_ is seen
to be of non-intelligent nature; as e.g. jars.--It thus follows that the
distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and
released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fictitiously created by
the avidya of one intelligent subject.
The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not able to account
for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an
infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should
attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained
release; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be
rationally accounted for.--But the souls are 'infinite'; this accounts
for there being souls not yet released!--What, pray, do you understand
by this 'infinity' of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted?
This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not
be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord
surely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is
not all-knowing.--But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's
not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that
he is not all-knowing!--Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely
separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a
number, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen
vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it
moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non-
intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further
follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we
understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds
that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is
considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said
to be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means
nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is
substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and
spatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things
which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially
limited--such as earthen vessels, and so on--which are also limited in
point of space and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including
Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of space
and time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural
texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever
('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and similar texts), and
moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to
origination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else
but a being's passing through the stages of origination, decay, and so
on.
The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to
our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahma down to a blade of
grass, springs from the avidya attached to Brahman which in itself is
absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of
pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from
the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the
distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman,
whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous
elements, owing to the influence of avidya illusorily manifests itself
(vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there
exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world
is 'non-different' from Brahman.
To this the Dvaitavadin, i.e. the Vaiseshika, replies as follows. The
doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self-
illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidya and hence sees
plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of
right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e.
cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of
Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded.
This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the
hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin.
Nor is there any proof for the assertion that effects apart from their
causes are mere error, like shell-silver, the separate existence of the
effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no
valid reasoning of the kind. The assertion that the cause only is real
because it persists, while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and
waterpots--are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that
the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not
sublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any
soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing
to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined
either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being
perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non-
permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it
is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with
reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is
perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and
time _other_ than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves
only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time,
but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form,
viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not
sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self
is.--Nor is there any truth in the assertion that the effect cannot
originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect
may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring
conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the
assertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter
into connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the
cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.--
But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously
connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally
unmodified!--Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions
of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other
cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault
then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a
special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c.,
producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause
possesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency
is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.--Further
there is no proof for the assertion that originative agency cannot
belong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined
gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the
like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected
with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess
originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect
different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the
svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence
of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different
things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error analogous to that of
shell-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is
perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination
and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that
time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that
perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived
svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to
the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and
hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the
reality of the effect.--And the attempts to prove the unreality of the
world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a
previous part of this work.
We further object to the assertion that it is one Self which bestows on
all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this
it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and
pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and
others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is
conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again
must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of
all pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos,
which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs;
for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego.
The organ of egoity (ahamkara), on the other hand, which is the same as
the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it
is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body
and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.--Nor is there
any proof for your assertion that all bodies must be held to spring from
the avidya of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent,
effects, fictitious. For that all bodies are the fictitious creations of
avidya is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of
proof must be held to be real.--Nor again can you uphold the assertion
that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we
observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non-
intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of
intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among
them, of pleasures and pains.--You have further maintained 'Through me
only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fictitious
creations of _my_ avidya; _I_ alone constitute the whole aggregate of
intelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have
attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but
the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of
his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure
intelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is
altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different
from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all
effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless,
for the Veda also is the effect of avidya, and the effort spent on it
therefore is analogous to the effort of taking hold of the silver
wrongly imagined in the shell. Or, to put it from a different point of
view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the
effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fictitious existence.
Knowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end
to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fictitious
product of avidya; or because it is itself of the nature of avidya; or
because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of
avidya; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends
on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidya; it is thus no better
than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end
to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again
from a different point of view, Brahman constituted by pure non-
differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by
knowledge, which is the effect of avidya; or since it is to be attained
by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidya;
or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of
avidya. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false;
as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata
Morgana).
Nor does Brahman, constituted by pure non-differenced intelligence,
shine forth by itself, so as not to need--for its cognition--other means
of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to
be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of
particular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular
cognising subjects--this also has been proved previously. And the
different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non-
differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just
now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidya.
Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non-
differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidya, and implicates itself in
the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide
only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general.
Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess
illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light
(enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established
knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to
some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove
the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non-
differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and
object such 'svayamprakasata' could not possibly belong. With regard
again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real
effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that
although you allow to such effects, being non-sublatcd as it were, a
kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'--vyavaharika),
you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but
products of avidya; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on
the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving
that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may
you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by
Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and
hence of the essence of avidya, it is in no better case than the
instances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to
be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when
once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this
reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that
some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis,
the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that
principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a
universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning
leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we
are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover,
for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge,
bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the
ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from
mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts
(which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise
and say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the
principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus
sublated by the assertion as to the Void, which is later in order than
the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the assertion as to the
Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation;
for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting
on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between
Perception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general
unreality, founded on the Vedanta. The proper conclusion therefore is
that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and
are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to
special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which
themselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real
and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able
to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and
things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought,
whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light
(illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular
object, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced
Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing
subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether
referring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis
of empirical thought.
Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real
substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyasa), for the reason
that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may
take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an
error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the
abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself
are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now
argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is
unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnishing the required basis for
error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a
fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the
defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal; and if
we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all
these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two
cases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.
You further asserted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs,
it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must
have been released before this, none being left in the state of bondage;
and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and
released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the
fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if
the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite
number like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these
instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also
infinite in number.--But do we not actually see that all these things
have definite numbers, 'Here are ten jars; a thousand beans,' &c.?--True,
but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so
on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other
limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this
sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls
should be released; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).--
Nor are you entitled to maintain that the real separation of individual
souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non-
intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the
circumstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each
other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of
things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars
does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.--You
further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls
it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of
this limited with regard to time and space also, and that hence its
infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things
substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time
and place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of
their connexion with space and time has hence to be determined in
dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with _all_
space and _all_ time results from such other means of proof, and hence
there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to
space and time, and its limitation in point of substance--which is due
to the existence of other souls).--But mere substantial limitation, as
meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that
Brahman is not infinite!--Well, then you yourself are in no better case;
for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidya. From this
admission it follows that Brahman also is something 'different', and
thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling
to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed
that Brahman differs in nature from avidya, then Brahman's nature itself
is constituted by avidya, and the text defining Brahman as 'the True,
knowledge, infinite' is contrary to sense.--If the reality of
'difference' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction
between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates
of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof
of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of
limitation of space and time, not on absence of substantial limitation;
absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a
hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other
hand, the whole world, as constituting Brahman's body, is its mode, and
Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.--
We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as
different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world,
is different from Brahman.
Against this view the Sutra now declares itself as follows.--The non-
difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from
'what begins with the word arambhana'--which proves such non-difference;
'what begins with the word arambhana' means those clauses at the head of
which that word is met with, viz. 'vakarambhanam vikaro namadheyam
mrittikety eva satyam'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only,
without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent
forth fire'; 'having entered with this living Self; 'In the True, my son,
all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True
they rest'; 'In that all that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is
the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 1-8)--it is these
clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other
chapters, that the Sutra refers to. For these texts prove the non-
difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and
sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind
the idea of Brahman constituting the sole cause of the entire world and
of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil,
'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is
heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein
there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the
general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The
pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe,
raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through
another,'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon,
in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause,
quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from
the cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay
there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as
jars, pots, and the like, which are fashioned out of one piece of clay,
are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is
not different from it.'In order to meet the objection that according to
Kanada's doctrine the effect constitutes a substance different from the
cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the
effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience,
'vakarambhanam vikaro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'. Arambhanam must
here be explained as that which is taken or touched (a-rabh = a-labh;
and 'alambhah sparsahimsayoh'); compare Panini III, 3, 113, as to the
form and meaning of the word. 'Vaka,' 'on account of speech,' we take to
mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as
the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech,'Fetch water
in the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the
material clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters
into contact with) an effect (vikara), i.e. a particular make or
configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the
shape of a belly, and a special name (namadheya), viz. _pitcher_, and so
on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the
end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay
receives a new configuration and a new name. [FOOTNOTE 455:1] Hence jars
and other things of clay are clay (mrittika), i.e. are of the substance
of clay, only; this _only_ is true (satyam), i.e. known through
authoritative means of proof; _only_ (eva), because the effects are not
known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore,
such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only
as it assumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and
the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and
gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of
life--youth, old age, &c.--which he has reached.--The fact of our saying
'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by
the Purvapakshin as proving that the effect is something different from
the cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that
origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one
and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance
is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and
different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed
as depending on the activity of an agent. The objections again which are
connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not
acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the
admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the
effect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.--But it is a
contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is
originated!--This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows
nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A
substance enters into different states in succession; what passes away
is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the
substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its
states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkarya theory.--
But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in
the asatkarya theory!--If he, we retort, who holds the asatkarya theory
is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself
originate, he is similarly landed in the satkarya theory; and if he
holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a
_regressus in infinitum_. According to us, on the other hand, who hold
that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from
that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on,
belong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this
theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being
a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two
halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty. |
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