13. Some also (teach) thus.
Moreover, the followers of one sakha explicitly teach that the connexion
with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of
disadvantage, while for the highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind,
but constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a
Lord and Ruler, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree.
One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu.
Up. III, 1, 1).--But the text, 'Having entered by means of that jiva-
self I will differentiate names and forms,' teaches that the
differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the
elements of the jiva-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this implies that
Brahman also, as the Self of the individual soul, possesses definite
shapes, divine, human, and so on, and is to be denominated by the
corresponding names. Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to
which injunctions and prohibitions are addressed--such as 'a Brahmana is
to sacrifice'--and hence necessarily is under the power of karman.--To
this the next Sutra replies.
14. For (Brahman is) without form merely, since it is the principal
agent with regard to that.
Brahman, although by entering into bodies, human, divine, and so on, it
becomes connected with various forms, yet is in itself altogether devoid
of form, and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in
the case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.--Why?--Because as it is
that which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the
relation of a superior (pradhana). For the text, 'The Ether (Brahman)
indeed is the accomplisher of names and forms; that which is without
these two is Brahman,' teaches that Brahman, although entering into all
beings, is not touched by name and form, but is that which brings about
name and form.--But, an objection is raised, if Brahman is the inner
ruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body, how can it be
said that it is altogether destitute of form?--There is a difference, we
reply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in
which it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to
which the body gives rise; but as Brahman does not share those pleasures
and pains, it has no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and
prohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman. The
highest Brahman therefore is like a being without form, and hence,
although abiding within all things, free from all imperfection and
endowed with all blessed qualities.
But, an objection is raised, texts such as 'the True, knowledge,
infinite is Brahman' suggest a Brahman whose nature is constituted
exclusively by non-differentiated light; while at the same time a
Brahman endowed with qualities--such as omniscience, being the cause of
the world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of immediately
realising its wishes and purposes--is expressly negatived by texts such
as 'not so, not so' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6), and therefore must be held to
be false. How then can it be maintained that Brahman possesses the
'twofold characteristics' mentioned under Sutra 11?--To this the next
Sutra replies.
15. And in the same way as (a Brahman) consisting of light; (the texts
thus) not being devoid of meaning.
In order that texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'
may not be devoid of meaning, we have to admit that light (intelligence)
constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. But analogously we have
also to admit that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'; for
otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all imperfections, all-
knowing, the cause of the world, and so on, would in their turn be
devoid of meaning.
16. And (the text) says so much only.
Moreover the text 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' only
teaches that Brahman has light for its essential nature, and does not
negative those other attributes of Brahman--omniscience, being the cause
of the world, &c.--which are intimated by other texts. What is the
object of the negation in 'not so, not so' will be shown further on.
17. (This Scripture) also shows, and it is also stated in Smriti.
That Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free
from all imperfections, the whole body of Vedanta-texts clearly declares:
'That highest great lord of lords, that highest deity of deities'; 'He
is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him
neither parent nor lord '; 'There is no effect and no cause known of him,
no one is seen like unto him or higher. His high power is revealed as
manifold, as essential action of knowledge and strength' (Svet. Up. VI,
7-9); 'He who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu.
I, 1,9); 'From fear of him the wind blows, from fear of him the sun
moves'; 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'That from
which all speech with the mind turns away, not having reached it,
knowing the bliss of that Brahman man fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9);
'He who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault,
without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, 19).--And Smriti: 'He who knows me to be
unborn and without a beginning, the Supreme Lord of the worlds';
'Pervading this entire universe, by one part of mine I do abide'; 'With
me as supervisor Prakriti brings forth the universe of the movable and
the immovable, and for this reason the world does ever move round'; 'But
another is the Supreme Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who
pervading the three worlds supports them--the eternal Lord' (Bha. Gi. X,
3; 42; IX, 10; XV, 17); 'The all-working, all-powerful one, rich in
knowledge and strength, who becomes neither less nor more, who is self-
dependent, without beginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness
nor exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire; the blameless one, raised
above all, without support, imperishable.'--As thus Brahman in whatever
place it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics,' the imperfections
dependent on those places do not touch it.
18. For this very reason comparisons, such as reflected images of the
sun and the like.
Because Brahman, although abiding in manifold places, ever possesses the
twofold characteristics, and hence does not share the imperfections due
to those places, scriptural texts illustrate its purity in the midst of
inferior surroundings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water,
mirrors, and the like. Compare e.g., 'As the one ether is rendered
manifold by jars and the like, or as the one sun becomes manifold in
several sheets of water; thus the one Self is rendered manifold by
abiding in many places. For the Self of all beings, although one, abides
in each separate being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time,
as the moon reflected in water.'
19. But because it is not apprehended like water, there is no equality.
The 'but' indicates an objection.--The highest Self is not apprehended
in earth and other places in the same way as the sun or a face is
apprehended in water or a mirror. For the sun and a face are erroneously
apprehended as abiding in water or a mirror; they do not really abide
there. When, on the other hand, Scripture tells us that the highest Self
dwells in the earth, in water, in the soul, &c., we apprehend it as
really dwelling in all those places. That the imperfections caused by
water and mirrors do not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due
to the fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the water
and the mirror. Hence there is no real parallelism between the thing
compared (the highest Self) and the thing to which it is compared (the
reflected image).
20. The participation (on Brahman's part) in increase and decrease, due
to its abiding within (is denied); on account of the appropriateness of
both (comparisons), and because thus it is seen.
The comparison of the highest Self to the reflected sun and the rest is
meant only to deny of the Self that it participates in the imperfections--
such as increase, decrease, and the like--which attach to the earth and
the other beings within which the Self abides.--How do we know this?--
From the circumstance that on this supposition both comparisons are
appropriate. In the scriptural text quoted above Brahman is compared to
ether, which although one becomes manifold through the things--jars and
so on--within it; and to the sun, which is multiplied by the sheets of
water in which he is reflected. Now the employment of these comparisons--
with ether which really does abide within the jars and so on, and with
the sun which in reality does not abide in the water--is appropriate
only if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest Self does not
participate in the imperfections inherent in earth and so on. Just as
ether, although connecting itself separately with jars, pots, and so on,
which undergo increase and decrease, is not itself touched by these
imperfections; and just as the sun, although seen in sheets of water of
unequal extent, is not touched by their increase and decrease; thus the
highest Self, although abiding within variously-shaped beings, whether
non-sentient like earth or sentient, remains untouched by their various
imperfections--increase, decrease, and so on--remains one although
abiding in all of them, and ever keeps the treasure of its blessed
qualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity.--The comparison of
Brahman with the reflected sun holds good on the following account. As
the sun is not touched by the imperfections belonging to the water,
since he does not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason
for his sharing those imperfections, thus the highest Self, which really
abides within earth and the rest, is not affected by their imperfections;
for as the nature of the highest Self is essentially antagonistic to all
imperfection, there is no reason for its participating in the
imperfection of others.--'And as this is seen.' This means--Since we
observe in ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between
two things for the reason that although they do not possess all
attributes in common, they yet have some attribute in common. We say, e.
g. 'this man is like a lion.'--The conclusion from all this is that the
highest Self, which is essentially free from all imperfections and a
treasure as it were of all blessed qualities, in no way suffers from
dwelling within the earth and the rest.
An objection is raised. In the Brihad-aranyaka, in the chapter beginning
'There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial,' the
whole material world, gross and subtle, is at first referred to as
constituting the form of Brahman, and next a special form of Brahman is
mentioned: 'And what is the form of that Person? Like a saffron-coloured
raiment,' &c. But thereupon the text proceeds, 'Now follows the teaching--
not so, not so; for there is not anything else higher than this "not so.
" 'This passage, referring to all the previously mentioned forms of
Brahman by means of the word 'so,' negatives them; intimating thereby
that Brahman is nothing else than pure Being, and that all distinctions
are mere imaginations due to Brahman not knowing its own essential
nature. How then can Brahman possess the twofold characteristics?--To
this the next Sutra replies.
21. For the text denies the previously declared so-muchness; and
declares more than that.
It is impossible to understand the text 'not so, not so' as negativing
those distinctions of Brahman which had been stated previously. If the
text meant that, it would be mere idle talk. For none but a person not
in his right mind would first teach that all the things mentioned in the
earlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of Brahman--as
which they are not known by any other means of proof--and thereupon
deliberately negative his own teaching. Although among the things
mentioned there are some which, in themselves, are known through other
means of proof, yet they are not thus known to be modes of Brahman, and
others again are known neither in themselves nor as modes of Brahman.
The text therefore cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known,
but gives fundamental instruction about them. Hence the later passage
cannot be meant as a sheer negation, but must be taken as denying the
previously described 'so-muchness' of Brahman; i.e. the passage denies
that limited nature of Brahman which would result from Brahman being
viewed as distinguished by the previously stated attributes only. The
word _so_ refers to that limited nature, and the phrase _not so_
therefore means that Brahman is not distinguished by the previously
stated modes _only_. This interpretation is further confirmed by the
fact that after that negative phrase further qualities of Brahman are
declared by the text: 'For there is not anything higher than this _not
so_. Then comes the name, the _True of the True_; for the pranas are the
True, and he is the True of them.' That means: Than that Brahman which
is expressed by the phrase 'not so' there is no other thing higher, i.e.
there is nothing more exalted than Brahman either in essential nature or
in qualities. And of that Brahman the name is the 'True of the True.'
This name is explained in the next clause, 'for the pranas,' &c. The
term pranas here denotes the individual souls, so called because the
pranas accompany them. They are the 'True' because they do not, like the
elements, undergo changes implying an alteration of their essential
nature. And the highest Self is the 'True of the True' because while the
souls undergo, in accordance with their karman, contractions and
expansions of intelligence, the highest Self which is free from all sin
knows of no such alternations. He is therefore more eminently _true_
than they are. As thus the complementary passage declares Brahman to be
connected with certain qualities, the clause 'not so, not so' (to which
that passage is complementary) cannot deny that Brahman possesses
distinctive attributes, but only that Brahman's nature is confined to
the attributes previously stated.--Brahman therefore possesses the
twofold characteristics. That the clause 'not so' negatives Brahman's
being fully described by the attributes previously mentioned, was above
proved on the ground that since Brahman is not the object of any other
means of proof, those previous statements cannot refer to what is
already proved, and that the final clause cannot therefore be meant to
deny what the previous clauses expressly teach. The next Sutra now
confirms this circumstance of Brahman not lying within the sphere of the
other means of proof.
22. That (is) unmanifested; for (this Scripture) declares.
Brahman is not manifested by other means of proof; for Scripture says,
'His form is not to be seen, no one beholds him with the eye' (Ka. Up.
II, 6, 9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III,
1, 8).
23. Also in perfect conciliation, according to Scripture and Smriti.
Moreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment,
i.e. in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition
of Brahman takes place, not in any other state. This Scripture and
Smriti alike teach. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by
understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses by him the
Self can be gained. The Self chooses him as his own' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23);
'When a man's nature has become purified by the serene light of
knowledge, then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts' (Mu. Up.
III, 1, 9). Smriti: 'Neither by the Vedas, nor austerities, nor gifts,
nor by sacrifice, but only by exclusive devotion, may I in this form be
known and beheld in truth and also entered into' (Bha. Gi. XI, 53,54).
The scriptural text beginning 'Two are the forms of Brahman,' which
declares the nature of Brahman for the purposes of devout meditation,
cannot therefore refer to Brahman's being characterised by two forms, a
material and an immaterial, as something already known; for apart from
Scripture nothing is known about Brahman.
24. And there is non-difference (of the intention of Brahman's
distinguishing attributes), as in the case of light; and the light (is)
intuited as constituting Brahman's essential nature by repetition of the
practice (of meditation).
That the clause 'not so' negatives not Brahman's possessing two forms, a
material and an immaterial one, but only Brahman's nature being
restricted to those determinations, follows therefrom also that in the
vision of Vamadeva and others who had attained to intuition into
Brahman's nature, the fact of Brahman having all material and immaterial
beings for its attributes is apprehended in non-difference, i.e. in the
same way as the fact of light (i.e. knowledge) and bliss constituting
Brahman's essential nature. Compare the text 'Seeing this the Rishi
Vamadeva understood, I am Manu and the sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And
that light and bliss constitute Brahman's nature was perceived by
Vamadeva and the rest through repeated performance of the practice of
devout meditation. In the same way then, i.e. by repeated meditation,
they also became aware that Brahman has all material and immaterial
things for its distinguishing modes.--The next Sutra sums up the proof
of Brahman's possessing twofold characteristics.
25. Hence (Brahman is distinguished) by what is infinite; for thus the
characteristics (hold good).
By the arguments stated it is proved that Brahman is distinguished by
the infinite multitude of blessed qualities. And this being so, it
follows that Brahman possesses the twofold characteristics.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'that which has twofold characteristics.'
26. But on account of twofold designation, as the snake and its coils.
It has been shown in the preceding adhikarana that the entire non-
sentient universe is the outward form of Brahman. For the purpose of
proving Brahman's freedom from all imperfection, an enquiry is now begun
into the particular mode in which the world may be conceived to
constitute the form of Brahman. Is the relation of the two like that of
the snake and its coils; or like that of light and the luminous body,
both of which fall under the same genus; or like that of the individual
soul and Brahman, the soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that
reason a part (amsa) of Brahman?--On the assumption of this last
alternative, which is about to be established here, it has been already
shown under two preceding Sutras (I, 4, 23; II, 1, 14), that from
Brahman, as distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their
subtle form, there originates Brahman as distinguished by all those
beings in their gross form.
Which then of the alternatives stated above is the true one?--The
material world is related to Brahman as the coils to the snake, 'on
account of twofold designation.' For some texts declare the identity of
the two: 'Brahman only is all this'; 'The Self only is all this.' Other
texts again refer to the difference of the two: 'Having entered into
these three deities with this jiva-self, let me differentiate names and
forms.' We therefore consider all non-sentient things to be special
forms or arrangements of Brahman, as the coils are of a coiled-up snake
or a coiled-up rope.
27. Or else like light and its abode, both being fire.
The _or_ sets aside the other two alternatives. If Brahman itself only
appeared in the form of non-sentient things--as the snake itself only
constitutes the coils--both sets of texts, those which declare
difference as well as those which declare the unchangeableness of
Brahman, would be contrary to sense. We therefore, adopting the second
alternative, hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of
light and that in which it abides, i.e. the luminous body. The two are
different, but at the same time they are identical in so far as they
both are fire (tejas). In the same way the non-sentient world
constitutes the form of Brahman.
28. Or else in the manner stated above.
The _but_ sets aside the two preceding alternatives. One substance may
indeed connect itself with several states, but the former of the two
alternatives implies that Brahman itself constitutes the essential
nature of non-sentient matter, and thus there is no escape from the
objections already stated under Sutra 27. Let then the second
alternative be adopted according to which Brahma-hood (brahmatva)
constitutes a genus inhering in Brahman as well as in non-sentient
matter, just as fire constitutes the common genus for light and luminous
bodies. But on this view Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic
character inhering in the Lord (isvara), sentient souls and non-sentient
matter, just as the generic character of horses (asvatva) inheres in
concrete individual horses; and this contradicts all the teaching of
Sruti and Smriti (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete
entity). We therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in
the same relation as the one previously proved for the individual soul
in Sutra II, 3, 43; 46; viz. that it is an attribute incapable of being
realised apart from Brahman and hence is a part (amsa) of the latter.
The texts referring to the two as non-different may thus be taken in
their primary sense; for the part is only a limited place of that of
which it is a part. And the texts referring to the two as different may
also be taken in their primary sense; for the distinguishing attribute
and that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different. Thus
Brahman's freedom from all imperfection is preserved.--Lustre is an
attribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part
of the gem; the same relation also holds good between generic character
and individuals having that character, between qualities and things
having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way souls as
well as non-sentient matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts.
29. And on account of denial.
Texts such as 'This is that great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri.
Up. IV, 4, 25), 'By the old age of the body that does not age' (Ch. Up.
VIII, 1, 5), deny of Brahman the properties of non-sentient matter. From
this it follows that the relation of the two can only be that of
distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished, and hence of part and
whole. Brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in
their subtle state is the cause; distinguished by the same beings in
their gross state is the effect: the effect thus is non-different from
the cause, and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is
likewise known. All these tenets are in full mutual agreement. Brahman's
freedom from defects also is preserved; and this and Brahman's being the
abode of all blessed qualities prove that Brahman possesses the 'twofold
characteristics.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the coils of the
snake.'
30. (There is something) higher than that; on account of the
designations of bridge, measure, connexion, and difference.
The Sutras now proceed to refute an erroneous view based on some
fallacious arguments, viz. that there is a being higher even than the
highest Brahman, the supreme cause, material as well as operative, of
the entire world--a refutation which will confirm the view of Brahman
being free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless
transcendentally exalted qualities.--There is some entity higher than
the Brahman described so far as being the cause of the world and
possessing the twofold characteristics. For the text 'That Self is a
bank (or bridge), a boundary' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1) designates the Self
as a bank or bridge (setu). And the term 'setu' means in ordinary
language that which enables one to reach the other bank of a river; and
from this we conclude that in the Vedic text also there must be meant
something to be reached. The text further says that that bridge is to be
crossed: 'He who has crossed that bridge, if blind,' &c.; this also
indicates that there must be something to be reached by crossing. Other
texts, again, speak of the highest Brahman as something measured, i.e.
limited. 'Brahman has four feet (quarters), sixteen parts.' Such
declarations of Brahman being something limited suggest the existence of
something unlimited to be reached by that bridge. Further there are
texts which declare a connexion of the bridge as that which is a means
towards reaching, and a thing connected with the bridge as that to be
reached: 'the highest bridge of the Immortal' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'he is
the bridge of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). For this reason also
there is something higher than the Highest.--And other texts again
expressly state that being beyond the Highest to be something different:
'he goes to the divine Person who is higher than the Highest' (Mu. Up.
III, 2, 8); 'by this Person this whole universe is filled; what is
higher than that is without form and without suffering' (Svet. Up. III,
9-10). All this combined shows that there is something higher than the
highest Brahman.--The next Sutra disposes of this view.
31. But on account of resemblance.
The 'but' sets aside the purvapaksha. There is no truth in the assertion
that from the designation of the Highest as a bridge (or bank) it
follows that there is something beyond the Highest. For Brahman in that
text is not called a bank with regard to something to be reached thereby;
since the additional clause 'for the non-confounding of these worlds'
declares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as it binds
to itself (setu being derived from _si_, to bind) the whole aggregate of
sentient and non-sentient things without any confusion. And in the
clause 'having passed beyond that bridge' the _passing beyond_ means
_reaching_; as we say, 'he passes beyond the Vedanta,' meaning 'he has
fully mastered it.'
32. It subserves the purpose of thought; as in the case of the feet.
Where the texts speak of Brahman as having four quarters, and sixteen
parts, or say that 'one quarter of him are all these beings' (Ch. Up.
III, 12, 6), they do so for the purpose of thought, i.e. meditation,
only. For as texts such as 'the Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'
teach Brahman, the cause of the world, to be unlimited, it cannot in
itself be subject to measure. The texts referring to measure therefore
aim at meditation only, in the same way as texts such as 'Speech is one
foot (quarter) of him, breath another, the eye another, the mind
another' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2).--But how can something that in itself is
beyond all measure, for the purpose of meditation, be spoken of as
measured? To this the next Sutra replies.
33. Owing to difference of place, as in the case of light, and so on.
Owing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted by special
places, such as speech, and so on, Brahman in so far as connected with
these adjuncts may be viewed as having measure; just as light and the
like although spread everywhere may be viewed as limited, owing to its
connexion with different places--windows, jars, and so on.
34. And on account of possibility.
Nor is there any truth in the assertion that, because texts such as 'he
is the bridge of the Immortal' intimate a distinction between that which
causes to reach and the object reached, there must be something to be
reached different from that which causes to reach; for the highest Self
may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being reached; cp.
'The Self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the Self
chooses by him the Self can be gained' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 23).
35. Thus, from the denial of anything else.
Nor can we allow the assertion that there is something higher than the
highest because certain texts ('the Person which is higher than the
highest'; 'beyond the Imperishable there is the highest,' &c.) refer to
such a difference. For the same texts expressly deny that there is
anything else higher than the highest--'than whom there is nothing else
higher, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger' (Svet. Up. III, 9).
So also other texts: 'For there is nothing else higher than this "not
so"' (i.e. than this Brahman designated by the phrase 'not so'; Bri. Up.
II, 3, 6); 'Of him none is the Lord, his name is great glory' (Mahanar.
Up. I, 10).
But what then is the entity referred to in the text 'tato yad
uttarataram '? (Svet. Up. III, 10)?--The passage immediately preceding
(8), 'I know that great person, &c.; a man who knows him passes over
death,' had declared that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to
immortality; and the clause (9), 'Higher than whom there is nothing else,'
had confirmed this by declaring that Brahman is the Highest and that
there is no other thing higher. In agreement herewith we must explain
stanza 10 as giving a reason for what had been said, 'Because that which
is the highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without form
and without suffering, therefore (tatah) those who know him become
immortal,' &c. On any other explanation stanza 10 would not be in
harmony with stanza 8 where the subject is introduced, and with what is
declared in stanza 9.--Analogously in the text 'He goes to the divine
Person who is higher than the highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8) 'the highest'
means the aggregate soul (samasha-purusha), which in a previous passage
had been said to be 'higher than the high Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); and
the 'higher' refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent
qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.
36. The omnipresence (possessed) by that, (understood) from the
declaration of extent.
That omnipresence which is possessed 'by that,' i.e. by Brahman, and
which is known 'from declarations of extent,' and so on, i.e. from texts
which declare Brahman to be all-pervading, is also known from texts such
as 'higher than that there is nothing.' Declarations of extent are e.g.
the following: 'By this Person this whole Universe is filled' (Svet. Up.
III. 9); 'whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside
and outside by Narayana' (Mahanar. Up.); 'The eternal, pervading,
omnipresent, which the Wise consider as the source of all beings' (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 6). The 'and the rest' in the Satra comprises passages such as
'Brahman indeed is all this,' 'The Self indeed is all this,' and the
like. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is absolutely supreme.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Highest.'
37. From thence the reward; on account of possibility.
It has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout
meditation, that the soul in all its states is imperfect, while the
Supreme Person to be reached by it is free from imperfections, the owner
of blessed qualities and higher than everything else. Being about to
investigate the nature of meditation, the Sutrakara now declares that
the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. Release,
which consists in attaining to the highest Person, from that highest
Person only: and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed
by the Veda--whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world--come from
the highest Person only. The Sutra therefore says generally, 'from
thence the reward.'--'Why so?'--'Because that only is possible.'
For it is he only--the all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous one--
who being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and the like, as well
as by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms
of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists
in attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is non-
intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result
connected with a future time.
38. And on account of scriptural declaration.
That he bestows all rewards--whether in the form of enjoyment or Release--
Scripture also declares 'This indeed is the great, the unborn Self, the
eater of food, the giver of wealth' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24); and 'For he
alone causes delight' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).--Next a prima facie view is
stated.
39. For the same reasons Jaimini (thinks it to be) religious action.
For the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural declaration, the
teacher Jaimini thinks that religious works, viz. sacrifices, gifts,
offerings, and meditation, of themselves bring about their rewards. For
we observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like,
and charitable gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly
or indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about their rewards
immediately, they may do so mediately, viz. by means of the so-called
_apurva_. This follows also from the form of the Vedic injunctions, such
as 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' As such
injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object
desired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world and the like, there is
no other way left than to assume that the result (which is seen not to
spring directly from the sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of
the apurva.
40. But the former, Badarayana (thinks), on account of the designation
(of deities) as the cause.
The reverend Badarayana maintains the previously declared awarding of
rewards by the Supreme Person since the scriptural texts referring to
the different sacrifices declare that the deities only, Agni, Vayu, and
so on, who are propitiated by the sacrifices--which are nothing else but
means to propitiate deities--are the cause of the rewards attached to
the sacrifices. Compare texts such as 'Let him who is desirous of
prosperity offer a white animal to Vayu. For Vayu is the swiftest god.
The man thus approaches Vayu with his proper share, and Vayu leads him
to prosperity.' And the whole instruction which the texts give, as to
the means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those
results, is required on account of the injunctions only, and hence it
cannot be doubted that it has reference to the injunctions. The
apparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the
text only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof
will assent to that apparatus, as stated by the text, being set aside
and an apurva about which the text says nothing being fancifully assumed.
And that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the
thing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which on
the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised
as the meaning of the root-element of such words as 'yajeta,' viz. the
sacrifice (yaga), which consists in the propitiation of a divine being,
and not some additional supersensuous thing such as the apurva, we have
already proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as 'Vayu is the swiftest
god' teach that Vayu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards. And
that it is fundamentally the highest Self--as constituting the inner
Self of Vayu and other deities--which is pleased by offerings, and
bestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as 'Offerings and
pious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the Universe. He is
Agni and Vayu, he is Sun and Moon' (Mahanar. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in
the antaryamin-brahmana, 'He who dwells in Vayu, of whom Vayu is the
body'; 'He who dwells in Agni,' &c. Smriti expresses itself similarly,
'Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form,
of him do I make that faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he
endeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires--those
indeed being ordained by me' (Bha. Gi. VII, 21-22); 'For I am the
enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices' (IX, 24)--where Lord means him
who bestows the reward for the sacrifices. 'To the gods go the
worshippers of the gods, and those devoted to me go to me' (VII, 23). In
ordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire wealth in
various forms, and by means of this propitiate their king, either
directly or through his officials and servants; and the king thereupon
is seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their
services and presents. The Vedanta-texts, on the other hand, give
instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other
means of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who is free from all shadow
even of imperfection, and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted
qualities in their highest state of perfection; on sacrifices, gifts,
oblations, which are helpful towards the propitiation of that Person; on
praise, worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him; and on
the rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows, viz. temporal happiness
and final Release.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'reward.'
THIRD PADA.
1. What is understood from all the Vedanta-texts (is one), on account of
the non-difference of injunction and the rest.
The Sutras have stated whatever has to be stated to the end of rousing
the desire of meditation-concluding with the fact that Brahman bestows
rewards. Next the question is introduced whether the vidyas (i.e. the
different forms of meditation on Brahman which the Vedanta-texts enjoin)
are different or non-different, on the decision of which question it
will depend whether the qualities attributed to Brahman in those vidyas
are to be comprised in one act of meditation or not.--The first
subordinate question arising here is whether one and the same meditation--
as e.g. the vidya of Vaisvanara--which is met with in the text of
several sakhas, constitutes one vidya or several.--The vidyas are
separate, the Purvapakshin maintains; for the fact that the same matter
is, without difference, imparted for a second time, and moreover stands
under a different heading--both which circumstances necessarily attend
the text's being met with in different sakhas--proves the difference of
the two meditations. It is for this reason only that a restrictive
injunction, such as the one conveyed in the text, 'Let a man tell this
science of Brahman to those only who have performed the rite of carrying
fire on their head' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 10)--which restricts the impaiting
of knowledge to the Atharvanikas, to whom that rite is peculiar--has any
sense; for if the vidyas were one, then the rite mentioned, which is a
part of the vidya, would be valid for the members of other sakhas also,
and then the restriction enjoined by the text would have no meaning.--
This view is set aside by the Sutra, 'What is understood from all the
Vedanta-texts' is one and the same meditation, 'because there is non-
difference of injunction and the rest.' By injunction is meant the
injunction of special activities denoted by different verbal roots--such
as upasita 'he should meditate,' vidyat 'he should know.' The and the
rest' of the Sutra is meant to comprise as additional reasons the
circumstances mentioned in the Purva Mimamsa-sutras (II, 4, 9). Owing to
all these circumstances, non-difference of injunction and the rest, the
same vidya is recognised in other sakhas also. In the Chaandogya (V, 12,
2) as well as in the Vajasaneyaka we meet with one and the same
injunction (viz. 'He should meditate on Vaisvanara'). The form
(character, rupa) of the meditations also is the same, for the form of a
cognition solely depends on its object; and the object is in both cases
the same, viz. Vaisvanara. The name of the two vidyas also is the same,
viz. the knowledge of Vaisvanara. And both vidyas are declared to have
the same result, viz. attaining to Brahman. All these reasons establish
the identity of vidyas even in different sakhas.--The next Sutra refers
to the reasons set forth for his view by the Purvapakshin and refutes
them.
2. If it be said (that the vidyas are not one) on account of difference,
we deny this, since even in one (vidya there may be repetition).
If it be said that there is no oneness of vidya, because the fact of the
same matter being stated again without difference, and being met with in
a different chapter, proves the object of injunction to be different; we
reply that even in one and the same vidya some matter may be repeated
without any change, and under a new heading (in a different chapter); if,
namely, there is difference of cognising subjects. Where the cognising
person is one only, repetition of the same matter under a new heading
can only be explained as meaning difference of object enjoined, and
hence separation of the two vidyas. But where the cognising persons are
different (and this of course is eminently so in the case of different
sakhas), the double statement of one and the same matter explains itself
as subserving the cognition of those different persons, and hence does
not imply difference of matter enjoined.--The next Sutra refutes the
argument founded on a rite enjoined in the Mundaka.
3. For (the sirovrata) concerns the mode of the study of the Veda; also
on account of (that rite) being a heading in the samakara; and the
restriction is like that of the libations.
What the text says as to a restriction connected with the 'vow of the
head,' does not intimate a difference of vidyas. For that vow does not
form part of the vidya. The restriction refers only to a peculiarity of
the _study_ of the Veda on the part of the Atharvanikas, being meant to
establish that they should possess that special qualification which the
rite produces; but it does not affect the vidya itself. This is proved
by the subsequent clause, 'a man who has not performed that rite may not
_read_ the text,' which directly connects the rite with the studying of
the text. And it is further proved by the fact that in the book of the
Atharvanikas, called 'samakara,' that rite is referred to as a rite
connected with the Veda (not with the special vidya set forth in the
Mundaka), viz. in the passage, 'this is explained already by the Veda-
observance' (which extends the details of the sirovrata, there called
veda-vrata, to other observances). By the _knowledge of Brahman_
(referred to in the Mundaka-text 'let a man tell this science of Brahman
to those only,' &c.), we have therefore to understand knowledge of the
Veda in general. And that restriction is 'like that of the
libations'--i. e. it is analogous to the restriction under which the
sava-libations, beginning with the Saptasurya-libation, and terminating
with the Sataudana-libation, are offered in the one fire which is used
by the followers of the Atharvan, and not in the ordinary three fires.
4. Scripture also declares this.
Scripture also shows that (identical) meditation is what all the Vedanta-
texts intimate. The Chandogya (VIII, 1, 1 ff.) declares that that which
is within the small space in the heart is to be enquired into, and then
in reply to the question what the thing to be enquired into is, says
that it is the highest Self possessing the eight attributes, freedom
from all evil and the rest, which is to be meditated upon within the
heart. And then the Taittiriya-text, referring to this declaration in
the Chandogya, says, 'Therein is a small space, free from all grief;
what is within that is to be meditated upon' (Mahanar. Up. X, 23), and
thus likewise enjoins meditation on the highest Self possessing the
eight qualities. And this is possible only if, owing to unity of vidya,
the qualities mentioned in the first text are included also in the
meditation enjoined in the second text.--Having thus established the
unity of meditations, the Sutras proceed to state the practical effect
of such unity.
5. (Meditation) thus being equal, there is combination (of gunas); on
account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves
injunction.
The meditation in all Vedanta-texts thus being the same, the qualities
mentioned in one text are to be combined with those mentioned in another;
'on account of non-difference of purport in the case of what subserves
injunction.' We find that in connexion with certain injunctions of
meditation--such as the meditation on Vaisvanara, or the small ether
within the heart--the text of some individual Vedanta-book mentions
certain secondary matters (qualities, guna) which subserve that
meditation; and as these gunas are connected with the meditation they
are to be comprised in it, so that they may accomplish their aim, i.e.
of subserving the meditation. For the same reason therefore we have to
enclose in the meditation gunas mentioned in other Vedanta-texts; for
being also connected with the meditation they subserve it in the same
way.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is intimated by all Vedanta-texts. |
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