2. But the subtle (body), on account of its capability.
The elements in their fine state are what is called the 'Unevolved,' and
this entering into a particular condition becomes the body. It is the
'Unevolved' in the particular condition of the body, which in the text
under discussion is called the 'Unevolved.' 'On account of its
capability,' i.e. because Unevolved non-sentient matter, when assuming
certain states and forms, is capable of entering on activities promoting
the interest of man. But, an objection is raised, if the 'Unevolved' is
taken to be matter in its subtle state, what objection is there to our
accepting for the explanation of our text that which is established in
the Sankhya-system? for there also the 'Unevolved' means nothing else
but matter in its subtle state.
To this the next Sutra replies--
3. (Matter in its subtle state) subserves an end, on account of its
dependence on him (viz. the Supreme Person).
Matter in its subtle state subserves ends, in so far only as it is
dependent on the Supreme Person who is the cause of all. We by no means
wish to deny unevolved matter and all its effects in themselves, but in
so far only as they are maintained not to have their Self in the Supreme
Person. For the fact is that they constitute his body and He thus
constitutes their Self; and it is only through this their relation to
him that the Pradhana, and so on, are capable of accomplishing their
several ends. Otherwise the different essential natures of them all
could never exist,--nor persist, nor act. It is just on the ground of
this dependence on the Lord not being acknowledged by the Sankhyas that
their system is disproved by us. In Scripture and Smriti alike, wherever
the origination and destruction of the world are described, or the
greatness of the Supreme Person is glorified, the Pradhana and all its
effects, no less than the individual souls, are declared to have their
Self in that Supreme Person. Compare, e.g. the text which first says
that the earth is merged in water, and further on 'the elements are
merged in the Mahat, the Mahat in the Unevolved, the Unevolved in the
Imperishable, the Imperishable in Darkness; Darkness becomes one with
the highest divinity.' And 'He of whom the earth is the body,' &c. up to
'he of whom the Unevolved is the body; of whom the Imperishable is the
body; of whom death is the body; he the inner Self of all beings, free
from all evil, the divine one, the one God Narayana.' And Earth, water,
fire, air, ether, mind, intellect, egoity--thus eightfold is my nature
divided. Lower is this nature; other than this and higher know that
nature of mine which has become the individual soul by which this world
is supported. Remember that all beings spring from this; I am the origin
and the dissolution of the whole Universe. Higher than I there is none
else; all this is strung on me as pearls on a thread' (Bha. Gi VII, 4-7).
And 'the Evolved is Vishnu, and the Unevolved, he is the Person and time.--
The nature (prakriti) declared by me, having the double form of the
Evolved and the Unevolved, and the soul-both these are merged in the
highest Self. That Self is the support of all, the Supreme Person who
under the name of Vishnu is glorified in the Vedas and the Vedanta books.'
4. And on account of there being no statement of its being an object of
knowledge.
If the text meant the Non-evolved as understood by the Sankhyas it would
refer to it as something to be known; for the Sankhyas, who hold the
theory of Release resulting from the discriminative knowledge of the
Evolved, the Non-evolved, and the soul, admit that all these are objects
of knowledge. Now our text does not refer to the Un-evolved as an object
of knowledge, and it cannot therefore be the Pradhana assumed by the
Sankhyas.
5. Should it be said that (the text) declares (it); we say, not so; for
the intelligent Self (is meant), on account of subject-matter.
'He who has meditated on that which is without sound, without touch,
without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell,
without beginning, without end, beyond the Great, unchangeable; is freed
from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3,15), this scriptural text,
closely following on the text under discussion, represents the
'Unevolved' as the object of knowledge!--Not so, we reply. What that
sloka represents as the object of meditation is (not the Unevolved but)
the intelligent Self, i.e. the Supreme Person. For it is the latter who
forms the general subject-matter, as we infer from two preceding
passages, viz. 'He who has knowledge for his charioteer, and who holds
the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, the highest
place of Vishnu'; and 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not
shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and
subtle intellect.' For this reason, also, the clause 'Higher than the
person there is nothing' cannot be taken as meant to deny the existence
of an entity beyond the 'purusha' in the Sankhya sense. That the highest
Self possesses the qualities of being without sound, &c., we moreover
know from other scriptural texts, such as Mu. Up. I, 1, 6 'That which is
not to be seen, not to be grasped,' &c. And the qualification 'beyond
the Great, unchangeable' is meant to declare that the highest Self is
beyond the individual Self which had been called 'the Great' in a
previous passage 'beyond the intellect is the Great Self.'
6. And of three only there is this mention and question.
In the Upanishad under discussion there is mention made of three things
only as objects of knowledge--the three standing to one another in the
relation of means, end to be realised by those means, and persons
realising,--and questions are asked as to those three only. There is no
mention of, nor question referring to, the Unevolved.--Nakiketas
desirous of Release having been allowed by Death to choose three boons,
chooses for his first boon that his father should be well disposed
towards him--without which he could not hope for spiritual welfare. For
his second boon he chooses the knowledge of the Nakiketa-fire, which is
a means towards final Release. 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire-
sacrifice which leads to heaven; tell it to me, full of faith. Those who
live in the heaven-world reach Immortality--this I ask as my second boon.'
The term 'heaven-world' here denotes the highest aim of man, i.e.
Release, as appears from the declaration that those who live there enjoy
freedom from old age and death; from the fact that further on (I, 1, 26)
works leading to perishable results are disparaged; and from what Yama
says in reply to the second demand 'He who thrice performs this Nakiketa-
rite overcomes birth and death.' As his third boon he, in the form of a
question referring to final release, actually enquires about three
things, viz. 'the nature of the end to be reached, i.e. Release; the
nature of him who wishes to reach that end; and the nature of the means
to reach it, i.e. of meditation assisted by certain works. Yama, having
tested Nakiketas' fitness to receive the desired instruction, thereupon
begins to teach him. 'The Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has
entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the
abyss; having known him as God, by means of meditation on his Self, the
wise one leaves joy and sorrow behind.' Here the clause 'having known
the God,' points to the divine Being that is to be meditated upon; the
clause 'by means of meditation on his Self points to the attaining agent,
i.e. the individual soul as an object of knowledge; and the clause
'having known him the wise ones leave joy and sorrow behind' points to
the meditation through which Brahman is to be reached. Nakiketas,
pleased with the general instruction received, questions again in order
to receive clearer information on those three matters, 'What thou seest
as different from dharma and different from adharma, as different from
that, from that which is done and not done, as different from what is
past or future, tell me that'; a question referring to three things, viz.
an object to be effected, a means to effect it, and an effecting agent--
each of which is to be different from anything else past, present, or
future [FOOTNOTE 362:1]. Yama thereupon at first instructs him as to the
Pranava, 'That word which all the Vedas record, which all penances
proclaim, desiring which men become religious students; that word I tell
thee briefly--it is Om'--an instruction which implies praise of the
Pranava, and in a general way sets forth that which the Pranava
expresses, e.g. the nature of the object to be reached, the nature of
the person reaching it, and the means for reaching it, such means here
consisting in the word 'Om,' which denotes the object to be reached
[FOOTNOTE 362:2]. He then continues to glorify the Pranava (I, a,
16-17), and thereupon gives special information in the first place about
the nature of the attaining subject, i.e., the individual soul, 'The
knowing Self is not born, it dies not,' &c. Next he teaches Nakiketas as
to the true nature of the object to be attained, viz. the highest
Brahman or Vishnu, in the section beginning 'The Self smaller than
small,' and ending 'Who then knows where he is?' (I, 2, 20-25). Part of
this section, viz. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda,' &c., at the
same time teaches that the meditation through which Brahman is attained
is of the nature of devotion (bhakti). Next the sloka I, 3, 1 'There are
the two drinking their reward' shows that, as the object of devout
meditation and the devotee abide together, meditation is easily
performed. Then the section beginning 'Know the Self to be him who
drives in the chariot,' and ending 'the wise say the path is hard' (I,
3, 3-14), teaches the true mode of meditation, and how the devotee
reaches the highest abode of Vishnu; and then there is a final reference
to the object to be reached in I, 3,15, 'That which is without sound,
without touch,' &c. It thus appears that there are references and
questions regarding those three matters only; and hence the 'Un-evolved'
cannot mean the Pradhana of the Sankhyas.
[FOOTNOTE 362:1. The commentary proposes different ways of finding those
three objects of enquiry in the words of Nakiketas. According to the
first explanation, 'that which is different from dharma' is a means
differing from all ordinary means; 'adharma' 'not-dharma' is what is not
a means, but the result to be reached: hence 'that which is different
from adharma' is a result differing from all ordinary results. 'What is
different from that' is an agent different from 'that'; i.e. an ordinary
agent, and so on. (Sru. Prakas. p. 1226.)]
[FOOTNOTE 362:2. The syllable 'Om,' which denotes Brahman, is a means
towards meditation (Brahman being meditated upon under this form), and
thus indirectly a means towards reaching Brahman.]
7. And as in the case of the 'Great.'
In the case of the passage 'Higher than the intellect is the Great Self,'
we conclude from the co-ordination of 'the Great' with the Self that
what the text means is not the 'Great' principle of the Sankhyas;
analogously we conclude that the 'Unevolved,' which is said to be higher
than the Self, cannot be the Pradhana of Kapila's system.
8. On account of there being no special characteristic; as in the case
of the cup.
In the discussion of the following passages also we aim only at refuting
the system of the Sankhyas; not at disproving the existence and nature
of Prakriti, the 'great' principle, the ahamara, and so on, viewed as
dependent on Brahman. For that they exist in this latter relation is
proved by Scripture as well as Smriti.--A text of the followers of the
Atharvan runs as follows: 'Her who produces all effects, the non-knowing
one, the unborn one, wearing eight forms, the firm one--she is known (by
the Lord) and ruled by him, she is spread out and incited and ruled by
him, gives birth to the world for the benefit of the souls. A cow she is
without beginning and end, a mother producing all beings; white, black,
and red, milking all wishes for the Lord. Many babes unknown drink her.
the impartial one; but one God only, following his own will, drinks her
submitting to him. By his own thought and work the mighty God strongly
enjoys her, who is common to all, the milkgiver, who is pressed by the
sacrifices. The Non-evolved when being counted by twenty-four is called
the Evolved.' This passage evidently describes the nature of Prakriti,
and so on, and the same Upanishad also teaches the Supreme Person who
constitutes the Self of Prakriti, and so on. 'Him they call the twenty-
sixth or also the twenty-seventh; as the Person devoid of all qualities
of the Sankhyas he is known by the followers of the Atharvan [FOOTNOTE
364:1].'--Other followers of the Atharvan read in their text that there
are sixteen originating principles (prakriti) and eight effected things
(vikara; Garbha Up. 3).--The Svetasvataras again set forth the nature of
Prakriti, the soul and the Lord as follows. 'The Lord supports all this
together, the Perishable and the Imperishable, the Evolved and the
Unevolved; the other one is in bondage, since he is an enjoyer; but
having known the God he is free from all fetters. There are two unborn
ones, the one knowing and a Lord, the other without knowledge and lordly
power; there is the one unborn female on whom the enjoyment of all
enjoyers depends; and there is the infinite Self appearing in all shapes,
but itself inactive. When a man finds out these three, that is Brahman.
The Perishable is the Pradhana, the Immortal and Imperishable is Hara;
the one God rules the Perishable and the Self. From meditation on him,
from union with him, from becoming one with him there is in the end
cessation of all Maya' (Svet. Up. I, 8-10). And 'The sacred verses, the
offerings, the sacrifices, the vows, the past, the future, and all that
the Vcdas declare--from that the Ruler of Maya creates all this; and in
this the other one is bound up through Maya. Know then Prakriti to be
Maya and the great Lord the ruler of Maya; with his members this whole
world is filled' (Svet. Up. V, 9-10). And, further on, 'The master of
Pradhana and the soul, the lord of the gunas, the cause of the bondage,
existence, and release of worldly existence' (VI, 16). Thus likewise in
Smriti, 'Do thou know both Nature and the soul to be without beginning,
and know all effects and qualities to have sprung from Nature. Nature is
declared to be the cause of the activity of causes and effects, whilst
the soul is the cause of there being enjoyment of pleasure and pain. For
the soul abiding in Nature experiences the qualities derived from Nature,
the reason being its connexion with the qualities, in its births in good
and evil wombs' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 19-21). And 'Goodness, Passion, and
Darkness--these are the qualities which, issuing from nature, bind in
the body the embodied soul, the undecaying one' (XIV, 5). And 'All
beings at the end of a kalpa return into my Nature, and again, at the
beginning of a kalpa, do I send them forth. Presiding over my own nature
again and again do I send forth this vast body of beings which has no
freedom of its own, being subject to Nature.--With me as ruler Nature
brings forth all moving and non-moving things, and for this reason the
world does ever go round' (Bha. Gi. IX, 7, 8, 10). What we therefore
refuse to accept are a Prakriti, and so on, of the kind assumed by
Kapila, i.e. not having their Self in Brahman.--We now proceed to
explain the Sutra.
We read in the Svetasvatara-Upanishad 'There is one aja, red, white, and
black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. One aja loves
her and lies by her; another leaves her after having enjoyed her.' A
doubt arises here whether this mantra declares a mere Prakriti as
assumed in Kapila's system, or a Prakriti having its Self in Brahman.
The Purvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he points out,
the text refers to the non-originatedness of Prakriti, calling her aja,
i.e. unborn, and further says that she by herself independently produces
manifold offspring resembling herself. This view is rejected by the
Sutra, on the ground that there is no intimation of a special
circumstance determining the acceptance of the Prakriti as assumed by
the Sankhyas, i.e. independent of Brahman; for that she is aja, i. e.
not born, is not a sufficiently special characteristic. The case is
analogous to that of the 'cup.' In the mantra 'There is a cup having its
mouth below and its bottom above' (Bri. Up. II, 2, 3), the word kamasa
conveys to us only the idea of some implement used in eating, but we are
unable to see what special kind of kamasa is meant; for in the case of
words the meaning of which is ascertained on the ground of their
derivation (as 'kamasa' from 'kam,' to eat or drink), the special sense
of the word in any place cannot be ascertained without the help of
considerations of general possibility, general subject-matter, and so on.
Now in the case of the cup we are able to ascertain that the cup meant
is the head, because there is a complementary passage 'What is called
the cup with its mouth below and its bottom above is the head'; but if
we look out for a similar help to determine the special meaning of aja,
we find nothing to convince us that the aja, i. e. the 'unborn'
principle, is the Prakriti of the Sankhyas. Nor is there anything in the
text to convey the idea of that aja having the power of independent
creation; for the clause 'giving birth to manifold offspring' declares
only that she creates, not that she creates unaided. The mantra does not
therefore tell us about an 'unborn' principle independent of Brahman.--
There moreover is a special reason for understanding by the aja
something that depends on Brahman. This the following Sutra states.
[FOOTNOTE 364:1. These quotations are from the Kulika-Upanishad (transl.
by Deussen, Seventy Upanishads, p. 638 ff.) The translation as given
above follows the readings adopted by Ramanuja and explained in the--
Sruta-Prakasika.]
9. But she begins with light; for thus some read in their text.
The 'but' has assertory force. 'Light' in the Sutra means Brahman, in
accordance with the meaning of the term as known from texts such as 'On
him the gods meditate, the light of lights' (Bri. Up. X, 4, 16); 'That
light which shines beyond heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 7). 'She begins with
light' thus means 'she has Brahman for her cause.'--'For thus some read
in their text,' i.e. because the members of one Sakha, viz the
Taittiriyas read in their text that this 'aja' has Brahman for her cause.
The Mahanarayana-Upanishad (of the Taittiriyas) at first refers to
Brahman abiding in the hollow of the heart as the object of meditation.
'Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the Self placed in the
hollow of this creature'; next declares that all the worlds and Brahma
and the other gods originated from that Self; and then says that there
sprung from it also this aja which is the cause of all 'The one aja
(goat), red, white and black, which gives birth to numerous offspring of
the same shape, one aja (he-goat) loves and lies by her; another one
forsakes her after having enjoyed her.' The subject-matter of the entire
section evidently is to give instruction as to the whole aggregate of
things other than Brahman originating from Brahman and thus having its
Self in it; hence we conclude that also the aja which gives birth to
manifold creatures like her, and is enjoyed by the soul controlled by
karman, while she is abandoned by the soul possessing true knowledge is,
no less than vital airs, seas, mountains, &c., a creature of Brahman,
and hence has its Self in Brahman. We then apply to the interpretation
of the Svetasvatara-text the meaning of the analogous Mahanarayana-text,
as determined by the complementary passages, and thus arrive at the
conclusion that the aja in the former text also is a being having its
Self in Brahman. That this is so, moreover, appears from the
Svetasvatara itself. For in the early part of that Upanishad, we have
after the introductory question, 'Is Brahman the cause?' the passage
'The sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the person
whose Self is the divinity, hidden in its own qualities' (I, 1, 3);
which evidently refers to the aja as being of the nature of a power of
the highest Brahman. And as further on also (viz. in the passages 'From
that the Mayin creates all this, and in this the other is bound up
through Maya'; 'Know then Prakriti to be Maya and the Great Lord the
ruler of Maya'; and 'he who rules every place of birth,' V, 9-11) the
very same being is referred to, there remains not even a shadow of proof
for the assertion that the mantra under discussion refers to an
independent Prakriti as assumed by the Sankhyas.
But a further objection is raised, if the Prakriti denoted by aja begins
with, i.e. is caused by Brahman, how can it be called aja, i.e. the non-
produced one; or, if it is non-produced, how can it be originated by
Brahman? To this the next Sutra replies.
10. And on account of the teaching of formation (i.e. creation) there is
no contradiction; as in the case of the honey.
The 'and' expresses disposal of a doubt that had arisen. There is no
contradiction between the Prakriti being aja and originating from light.
On account of instruction being given about the formation (kalpana), i.e.
creation of the world. This interpretation of 'kalpana' is in agreement
with the use of the verb klip in the text, 'as formerly the creator made
(akalpayat) sun and moon.'
In our text the sloka 'from that the Lord of Maya creates all this'
gives instruction about the creation of the world. From that, i.e. from
matter in its subtle causal state when it is not yet divided, the Lord
of all creates the entire Universe. From this statement about creation
we understand that Prakriti exists in a twofold state according as it is
either cause or effect. During a pralaya it unites itself with Brahman
and abides in its subtle state, without any distinction of names and
forms; it then is called the 'Unevolved,' and by other similar names. At
the time of creation, on the other hand, there reveal themselves in
Prakriti Goodness and the other gunas, it divides itself according to
names and forms, and then is called the 'Evolved,' and so on, and,
transforming itself into fire, water, and earth, it appears as red,
white, and black. In its causal condition it is aja, i.e. unborn, in its
effected condition it is 'caused by light, i.e. Brahman'; hence there is
no contradiction. The case is analogous to that of the 'honey.' The sun
in his causal state is one only, but in his effected state the Lord
makes him into honey in so far namely as he then, for the purpose of
enjoyment on the part of the Vasus and other gods, is the abode of
nectar brought about by sacrificial works to be learned from the Rik and
the other Vedas; and further makes him to rise and to set. And between
these two conditions there is no contradiction. This is declared in the
Madhuvidya (Ch. Up. III), from 'The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas,'
down to 'when from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor
sets; being one he stands in the centre'--'one' here means 'of one
nature.'--The conclusion therefore is that the Svetasvatara mantra under
discussion refers to Prakriti as having her Self in Brahman, not to the
Prakriti assumed by the Sankhyas.
Others, however, are of opinion that the one aja of which the mantra
speaks has for its characteristics light, water, and earth. To them we
address the following questions. Do you mean that by what the text
speaks of as an aja, consisting of fire, water, and earth, we have to
understand those three elements only; or Brahman in the form of those
three elements; or some power or principle which is the cause of the
three elements? The first alternative is in conflict with the
circumstance that, while fire, water, and earth are several things, the
text explicitly refers to _one_ Aja. Nor may it be urged that fire,
water, and earth, although several, become one, by being made tripartite
(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3); for this making them tripartite, does not take away
their being several; the text clearly showing that each several element
becomes tripartite, 'Let me make each of these three divine beings
tripartite.'--The second alternative again divides itself into two
alternatives. Is the one aja Brahman in so far as having passed over
into fire, water, and earth; or Brahman in so far as abiding within
itself and not passing over into effects? The former alternative is
excluded by the consideration that it does not remove plurality (which
cannot be reconciled with the _one_ aja). The second alternative is
contradicted by the text calling that aja red, white, and black; and
moreover Brahman viewed as abiding within itself cannot be characterised
by fire, water, and earth. On the third alternative it has to be assumed
that the text denotes by the term 'aja' the three elements, and that on
this basis there is imagined a causal condition of these elements; but
better than this assumption it evidently is to accept the term 'aja' as
directly denoting the causal state of those three elements as known from
scripture.
Nor can we admit the contention that the term 'aja' is meant to teach
that Prakriti should metaphorically be viewed as a she-goat; for such a
view would be altogether purposeless. Where--in the passage 'Know the
Self to be him who drives in the chariot'--the body, and so on, are
compared to a chariot, and so on, the object is to set forth the means
of attaining Brahman; where the sun is compared to honey, the object is
to illustrate the enjoyment of the Vasus and other gods; but what
similar object could possibly be attained by directing us to view
Prakriti as a goat? Such a metaphorical view would in fact be not merely
useless; it would be downright irrational. Prakriti is a non-intelligent
principle, the causal substance of the entire material Universe, and
constituting the means for the experience of pleasure and pain, and for
the final release, of all intelligent souls which are connected with it
from all eternity. Now it would be simply contrary to good sense,
metaphorically to transfer to Prakriti such as described the nature of a
she-goat--which is a sentient being that gives birth to very few
creatures only, enters only occasionally into connexion with others, is
of small use only, is not the cause of herself being abandoned by others,
and is capable of abandoning those connected with her. Nor does it
recommend itself to take the word aja (understood to mean 'she-goat')
in a sense different from that in which we understand the term 'aja'
which occurs twice in the same mantra.--Let then all three terms be
taken in the same metaphorical sense (aja meaning he-goat).--It would be
altogether senseless, we reply, to compare the soul which absolutely
dissociates itself from Prakriti ('Another aja leaves her after having
enjoyed her') to a he-goat which is able to enter again into connexion
with what he has abandoned, or with anything else.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'the cup.'
11. Not from the mention of the number even, on account of the diversity
and of the excess.
The Vajasaneyins read in their text 'He in whom the five "five-people"
and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I, who know,
believe him to be Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17). The doubt here arises
whether this text be meant to set forth the categories as established in
Kapila's doctrine, or not.--The Purvapakshin maintains the former view,
on the ground that the word 'five-people,' qualified by the word 'five,'
intimates the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas. The compound 'five-
people' (pankajanah) denotes groups of five beings, just as the term
panka-pulyah denotes aggregates of five bundles of grass. And as we want
to know how many such groups there are, the additional qualification
'five' intimates that there are five such groups; just as if it were
said 'five five-bundles, i. e. five aggregates consisting of five
bundles each.' We thus understand that the 'five five-people' are twenty-
five things, and as the mantra in which the term is met with refers to
final release, we recognise the twenty-five categories known from the
Sankhya-smriti which are here referred to as objects to be known by
persons desirous of release. For the followers of Kapila teach that
'there is the fundamental causal substance which is not an effect. There
are seven things, viz. the Mahat, and so on, which are causal substances
as well as effects. There are sixteen effects. The soul is neither a
causal substance nor an effect' (San. Ka. 3). The mantra therefore is
meant to intimate the categories known from the Sankhya.--To this the
Sutra replies that from the mention of the number twenty-five supposed
to be implied in the expression 'the five five-people,' it does not
follow that the categories of the Sankhyas are meant. 'On account of the
diversity,' i.e. on account of the five-people further qualified by the
number five being different from the categories of the Sankhyas. For in
the text 'in whom the five five-people and the ether rest,' the 'in
whom' shows the five-people to have their abode, and hence their Self,
in Brahman; and in the continuation of the text, 'him I believe the Self,'
the 'him' connecting itself with the preceding 'in whom' is recognised
to be Brahman. The five five-people must therefore be different from the
categories of the Sankhya-system. 'And on account of the excess.'
Moreover there is, in the text under discussion, an excess over and
above the Sankhya categories, consisting in the Self denoted by the
relative pronoun 'in whom,' and in the specially mentioned Ether. What
the text designates therefore is the Supreme Person who is the Universal
Lord in whom all things abide--such as he is described in the text
quoted above, 'Therefore some call him the twenty-sixth, and others the
twenty-seventh.' The 'even' in the Sutra is meant to intimate that the
'five five-people' can in no way mean the twenty-five categories, since
there is no pentad of groups consisting of five each. For in the case of
the categories of the Sankhyas there are no generic characteristics or
the like which could determine the arrangement of those categories in
fives. Nor must it be urged against this that there is a determining
reason for such an arrangement in so far as the tattvas of the Sankhyas
form natural groups comprising firstly, the five organs of action;
secondly, the five sense-organs; thirdly, the five gross elements;
fourthly, the subtle parts of those elements; and fifthly, the five
remaining tattvas; for as the text under discussion mentions the ether
by itself, the possibility of a group consisting of the five gross
elements is precluded. We cannot therefore take the compound 'five
people' as denoting a group consisting of five constituent members, but,
in agreement with Pan. II, 1, 50, as merely being a special name. There
are certain beings the special name of which is 'five-people,' and of
these beings the additional word 'panka' predicates that they are five
in number. The expression is thus analogous to the term 'the seven seven-
rishis' (where the term 'seven-rishis' is to be understood as the name of
a certain class of rishis only).--Who then are the beings called 'five-
people?'--To this question the next Sutra replies.
12. The breath, and so on, on the ground of the complementary passage.
We see from a complementary passage, viz. 'They who know the breath of
breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the
mind of mind,' that the 'five-people' are the breath, and eye, and so on,
all of which have their abode in Brahman.
But, an objection is raised, while the mantra 'in whom the five five-
people,' &c., is common to the Kanvas and the Madhyandinas, the
complementary passage 'they who know the breath of breath,' &c., in the
text of the former makes no mention of food, and hence we have no reason
to say that the 'five-people' in their text are the breath, eye, and so
on.
To this objection the next Sutra replies.
13. By light, food not being (mentioned in the text) of some.
In the text of some, viz. the Kanvas, where food is not mentioned, the
five-people are recognised to be the five senses, owing to the phrase
'of lights' which is met with in another complementary passage. In the
mantra, 'him the gods worship as the light of lights,' which precedes
the mantra about the 'five-people,' Brahman is spoken of as the light of
lights, and this suggests the idea of certain lights the activity of
which depends on Brahman. The mantra leaves it undetermined what these
lights are; but from what follows about the 'five-people,' &c., we learn
that what is meant are the senses which light up as it were their
respective objects. In 'the breath of breath' the second 'breath' (in
the genitive case) denotes the sense-organ of touch, as that organ is
connected with air, and as the vital breath (which would otherwise
suggest itself as the most obvious explanation of prana) does not
harmonise with the metaphorical term 'light.' 'Of the eye' refers to the
organ of sight; 'of the ear' to the organ of hearing. 'Of food'
comprises the senses of smell and taste together: it denotes the sense
of smell on the ground that that sense is connected with earth, which
may be 'food,' and the sense of taste in so far as 'anna' may be also
explained as that by means of which eating goes on (adyate). 'Of mind'
denotes mind, i. e. the so-called internal organ. Taste and smell thus
being taken in combination, we have the required number of five, and we
thus explain the 'five-people' as the sense-organs which throw light on
their objects, together with the internal organ, i.e. mind. The meaning
of the clause about the 'five-people' therefore is that the senses--
called 'five-people'--and the elements, represented by the Ether, have
their basis in Brahman; and as thus all beings are declared to abide in
Brahman, the five 'five-people' can in no way be the twenty-five
categories assumed by the Sankhyas.--The general Conclusion is that the
Vedanta-texts, whether referring to numbers or not, nowhere set forth
the categories established in Kapila's system.
14. And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the
cause with regard to Ether, and so on.
Here the philosopher who holds the Pradhana to be the general cause
comes forward with another objection. The Vedanta-texts, he says, do not
teach that creation proceeds from one and the same agent only, and you
therefore have no right to hold that Brahman is the sole cause of the
world. In one place it is said that our world proceeded from 'Being',
'Being only this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1). In other
places the world is said to have sprung from 'Non-being', 'Non-being
indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, i); and 'Non-being
only was this in the beginning; it became Being' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1).
As the Vedanta-texts are thus not consequent in their statements
regarding the creator, we cannot conclude from them that Brahman is the
sole cause of the world. On the other hand, those texts do enable us to
conclude that the Pradhana only is the universal cause. For the text
'Now all this was then undeveloped' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7) teaches that the
world was merged in the undeveloped Pradhana. and the subsequent clause,
'That developed itself by form and name,' that from that Undeveloped
there resulted the creation of the world. For the Undeveloped is that
which is not distinguished by names and forms, and this is none other
than the Pradhana. And as this Pradhana is at the same time eternal, as
far as its essential nature is concerned, and the substrate of all
change, there is nothing contradictory in the different accounts of
creation calling it sometimes 'Being' and sometimes 'Non-being'; while,
on the other hand, these terms cannot, without contradiction, both be
applied to Brahman. The causality of the Undeveloped having thus been
ascertained, such expressions as 'it _thought_, may I be many,' must be
interpreted as meaning its being about to proceed to creation. The terms
'Self' and 'Brahman' also may be applied to the Pradhana in so far as it
is all-pervading (atman from apnoti), and preeminently great (brihat).
We therefore conclude that the only cause of the world about which the
Vedanta-texts give information is the Pradhana.
This view is set aside by the Sutra. The word _and_ is used in the sense
of _but_. It is possible to ascertain from the Vedanta-texts that the
world springs from none other than the highest Brahman, which is all-
knowing, lord of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, capable of
absolutely realising its purposes, and so on; since scripture declares
Brahman as described to be the cause of Ether, and so on. By 'Brahman as
described' is meant 'Brahman distinguished by omniscience and other
qualities, as described in the Sutra "that from which the origination,
and so on, of the world proceed," and in other places.' That Brahman
only is declared by scripture to be the cause of Ether, and so on, i.e.
the being which is declared to be the cause in passages such as 'From
that Self sprang Ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'that sent forth fire'(Ch.
Up. VI, 2, 3), is none other than Brahman possessing omniscience and
similar qualities. For the former of these texts follows on the passage
'The True, intelligence, infinite is Brahman; he reaches all desires
together with the intelligent Brahman,' which introduces Brahman as the
general subject-matter--that Brahman being then referred to by means of
the connecting words 'from that.' In the same way the 'that' (in 'that
sent forth fire') refers back to the omniscient Brahman introduced in
the clause 'that thought, may I be many.' This view is confirmed by a
consideration of all the accounts of creation, and we hence conclude
that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--But the text 'Non-being
indeed this was in the beginning' calls the general cause 'something
that is not'; how then can you say that we infer from the Vedanta-texts
as the general cause of the world a Brahman that is all-knowing,
absolutely realises its purposes, and so on?--To this question the next
Sutra replies.
15. From connexion.
The fact is that Brahman intelligent, consisting of bliss, &c., connects
itself also with the passage 'Non-being was this in the beginning'
(Taitt. Up. II, 7). For the section of the text which precedes that
passage (viz. 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding is
the Self consisting of Bliss;--he wished, may I be many;--he created all
whatever there is. Having created he entered into it; having entered it
he became sat and tyat') clearly refers to Brahman consisting of Bliss,
which realises its purposes, creates all beings, and entering into them
is the Self of all. When, therefore, after this we meet with the sloka
('Non-being this was in the beginning') introduced by the words 'On this
there is also this sloka'--which shows that the sloka is meant to throw
light on what precedes; and when further or we have the passage 'From
fear of it the wind blows' &c., which, referring to the same Brahman,
predicates of it universal rulership, bliss of nature, and so on; we
conclude with certainty that the sloka about 'Non-being' also refers to
Brahman. As during a pralaya the distinction of names and forms does not
exist, and Brahman also then does not exist in so far as connected with
names and forms, the text applies to Brahman the term 'Non-being.' The
text 'Non-being only this was in the beginning' explains itself in the
same way.--Nor can we admit the contention that the text 'Now all this
was then undeveloped 'refers to the Pradhana as the cause of the world;
for the Undeveloped there spoken of is nothing else but Brahman in so
far as its body is not yet evolved. For the text continues 'That same
being entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails;' 'When
seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by
name;' 'Let men meditate upon him as Self;' where the introductory words
'that same being' refer back to the Undeveloped--which thus is said to
enter into all things and thereby to become their ruler. And it is known
from another text also (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2) that it is the all-creative
highest Brahman which enters into its creation and evolves names and
forms. The text 'Having entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self
of all' moreover shows that the creative principle enters into its
creatures for the purpose of ruling them, and such entering again cannot
be attributed to the non-sentient Pradhana. The Undeveloped therefore is
Brahman in that state where its body is not yet developed; and when the
text continues 'it developed itself by names and forms' the meaning is
that Brahman developed itself in so far as names and forms were
distinguished in the world that constitutes Brahman's body. On this
explanation of the texts relating to creation we further are enabled to
take the thought, purpose, &c., attributed to the creative principle, in
their primary literal sense. And, we finally remark, neither the term
'Brahman' nor the term 'Self in any way suits the Pradhana, which is
neither absolutely great nor pervading in the sense of entering into
things created with a view to ruling them. It thus remains a settled
conclusion that Brahman is the sole cause of the world.--Here terminates
the adhikarana of '(Brahman's) causality.'
16. Because it denotes the world.
The Sankhya comes forward with a further objection. Although the
Vedanta-texts teach an intelligent principle to be the cause of the
world, they do not present to us as objects of knowledge anything that
could be the cause of the world, apart from the Pradhana and the soul as
established by the Sankhya-system. For the Kaushitakins declare in their
text, in the dialogue of Balaki and Ajatasatru, that none but the
enjoying (individual) soul is to be known as the cause of the world,
'Shall I tell you Brahman? He who is the maker of those persons and of
whom this is the work (or "to whom this work belongs") he indeed is to
be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). Balaki at the outset proposes Brahman as
the object of instruction, and when he is found himself not to know
Brahman, Ajatasatru instructs him about it, 'he indeed is to be known.'
But from the relative clause 'to whom this work belongs,' which connects
the being to be known with work, we infer that by Brahman we have here
to understand the enjoying soul which is the ruler of Prakriti, not any
other being. For no other being is connected with work; work, whether
meritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. Nor
must you contest this conclusion on the ground that 'work' is here to be
explained as meaning the object of activity, so that the sense of the
clause would be 'he of whom this entire world, as presented by
perception and the other means of knowledge, is the work.' For in that
case the separate statements made in the two clauses, 'who is the maker
of those persons' and 'of whom this is the work,' would be devoid of
purport (the latter implying the former). Moreover, the generally
accepted meaning of the word 'karman,' both in Vedic and worldly speech,
is work in the sense of good and evil actions. And as the origination of
the world is caused by actions of the various individual souls, the
designation of 'maker of those persons' also suits only the individual
soul. The meaning of the whole passage therefore is 'He who is the cause
of the different persons that have their abode in the disc of the sun,
and so on, and are instrumental towards the retributive experiences of
the individual souls; and to whom there belongs karman, good and evil,
to which there is due his becoming such a cause; _he_ indeed is to be
known, _his_ essential nature is to be cognised in distinction from
Prakriti.' And also in what follows, 'The two came to a person who was
asleep. He pushed him with a stick,' &c., what is said about the
sleeping man being pushed, roused, &c., all points only to the
individual soul being the topic of instruction. Further on also the text
treats of the individual soul only, 'As the master feeds with his
people, nay as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious
Self feed with the other Selfs.' We must consider also the following
passage--which contains the explanation given by Ajatasatru to Balaki,
who had been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep
sleep--' There are the arteries called Hitas. In these the person is;
when sleeping he sees no dream, then he (or that, i.e. the aggregate of
the sense-organs) becomes one with this prana alone. Then speech goes to
him with all names, &c., the mind with all thoughts. And when he awakes,
then, as from a burning fire sparks proceed in all directions, thus from
that Self the pranas proceed each towards its place, from the pranas the
gods, from the gods the worlds.' The individual soul which passes
through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking, and is that into
which there are merged and from which there proceed speech and all the
other organs, is here declared to be the abode of deep sleep 'then it
(viz. the aggregate of the organs) becomes one in that prana.' Prana
here means the individual soul in so far as supporting life; for the
text continues 'when _that_ one awakes' and neither the vital breath nor
the Lord (both of whom might be proposed as explanations of prana) can
be said to be asleep and to wake. Or else 'asmin prane' might be
explained as 'in the vital breath (which abides) in the individual
soul,' the meaning of the clause being 'all the organs, speech and so
on, become one in the vital breath which itself abides in this soul.'
The word 'prana' would thus be taken in its primary literal sense; yet
all the same the soul constitutes the topic of the section, the vital
breath being a mere instrument of the soul. The Brahman mentioned at the
outset therefore is none other than the individual soul, and there is
nothing to prove a lord different from it. And as the attributes which
the texts ascribe to the general cause, viz. thought and so on, are
attributes of intelligent beings only, we arrive at the conclusion that
what constitutes the cause of the world is the non-intelligent Pradhana
guided by the intelligent soul.
This prima facie view the Sutra disposes of, by saying 'because (the
work) denotes the world.' It is not the insignificant individual soul--
which is under the influence of its good and evil works, and by
erroneously imputing to itself the attributes of Prakriti becomes the
cause of the effects of the latter--that is the topic of our text; but
rather the Supreme Person who is free from all shadow of imperfection
such as Nescience and the like, who is a treasure of all possible
auspicious qualities in their highest degree of perfection, who is the
sole cause of this entire world. This is proved by the circumstance that
the term 'work' connected with 'this' (in 'of whom this (is) the work')
denotes the Universe which is an effect of the Supreme Person. For the
word 'this' must, on account of its sense, the general topic of the
section and so on, be taken in a non-limited meaning, and hence denotes
the entire world, as presented by Perception and the other means of
knowledge, with all its sentient and non-sentient beings. That the term
'work' does not here denote good and evil actions, appears from the
following consideration of the context. Balaki at first offers to teach
Brahman ('Shall I tell you Brahman?') and thereupon holds forth on
various persons abiding in the sun, and so on, as being Brahman.
Ajatasatru however refuses to accept this instruction as not setting
forth Brahman, and finally, in order to enlighten Balaki, addresses him
'He, O Balaki, who is the maker of those persons,' &c. Now as the
different personal souls abiding in the sun, &c., and connected with
karman in the form of good and evil actions, are known already by Balaki,
the term 'karman'--met with in the next clause--is clearly meant to
throw light on some Person so far not known to Balaki, and therefore
must be taken to mean not good and evil deeds or action in general, but
rather the entire Universe in so far as being the outcome of activity.
On this interpretation only the passage gives instruction about
something not known before. Should it be said that this would be the
case also if the subject to which the instruction refers were the true
essential nature of the soul, indicated here by its connexion with
karman, we reply that this would involve the (objectionable) assumption
of so-called implication (lakshana), in so far namely as what the clause
would directly intimate is (not the essential nature of the soul as free
from karman but rather) the connexion of the soul with karman. Moreover
if the intention of the passage were this, viz. to give instruction as
to the soul, the latter being pointed at by means of the reference to
karman, the intention would be fully accomplished by saying 'to whom
karman belongs, he is to be known;' while in the text as it actually
stands 'of whom this is the karman' the 'this' would be unmeaning. The
meaning of the two separate clauses 'who is the maker of those persons'
and 'of whom this is the work' is as follows. He who is the creator of
those persons whom you called Brahman, and of whom those persons are the
creatures; he of whom this entire world is the effect, and before whom
all things sentient and non-sentient are equal in so far as being
produced by him; he, the highest and universal cause, the Supreme Person,
is the object to be known. The meaning implied here is--although the
origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of individual
souls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for
their own retributive experience, but experience only what the Lord has
created to that end in agreement with their works. The individual soul,
hence, cannot stand in creative relation to those persons.--What the
text under discussion inculcates as the object of knowledge therefore is
the highest Brahman which is known from all Vedanta-texts as the
universal cause.
17. Should it be said that this is not so on account of the inferential
marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that this
has been explained before.
With reference to the plea urged by the Purvapakshin that, owing to
inferential marks pointing to the individual soul, and the circumstance
of mention being made of the chief vital air, we must decide that the
section treats of the enjoying individual soul and not of the highest
Self, the Sutra remarks that this argumentation has already been
disposed of, viz. in connexion with the Pratardana vidya. For there it
was shown that when a text is ascertained, on the ground of a
comprehensive survey of initial and concluding clauses, to refer to
Brahman, all inferential marks which point to other topics must be
interpreted so as to fall in with the principal topic. Now in our text
Brahman is introduced at the outset 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' it is
further mentioned in the middle of the section, for the clause 'of whom
this is the work' does not refer to the soul in general but to the
highest Person who is the cause of the whole world; and at the end again
we hear of a reward which connects itself only with meditations on
Brahman, viz. supreme sovereignty preceded by the conquest of all evil.
'Having overcome all evil he obtains pre-eminence among all beings,
sovereignty and supremacy--yea, he who knows this.' The section thus
being concerned with Brahman, the references to the individual soul and
to the chief vital air must also be interpreted so as to fall in with
Brahman. In the same way it was shown above that the references to the
individual soul and the chief vital air which are met with in the
Pratardana vidya really explain themselves in connexion with a threefold
meditation on Brahman. As in the passage 'Then with this prana alone he
becomes one' the two words 'this' and 'prana' may be taken as co-
ordinated and it hence would be inappropriate to separate them (and to
explain 'in the prana which abides in this soul'), and as the word
'prana' is ascertained to mean Brahman also, we must understand the
mention of prana to be made with a view to meditation on Brahman in so
far as having the prana for its body. But how can the references to the
individual soul be put in connexion with Brahman?--This point is taken up by the next Sutra. |
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