6. If it be said that there is difference on account of the text; we say
no; on account of non-difference.
So far it has been shown that the non-difference of injunction, and so
on, establishes the unity of meditations, and that owing to the latter
the special features of meditation enjoined in different texts have to
be combined. Next, an enquiry is entered upon whether in the case of
certain particular meditations there actually exists, or not, that non-
difference of injunction which is the cause of meditations being
recognised as identical. A meditation on the Udgitha is enjoined in the
text of the Chandogas, as well as in that of the Vajasaneyins (Ch. Up. I,
2; Bri. Up. I, 3); and the question arises whether the two are to be
viewed as one meditation or not. The Purvapakshin maintains the former
alternative. For, he says, there is no difference of injunction, and so
on, since both texts enjoin as the object of meditation the Udgitha
viewed under the form of Prana; since there is the same reward promised
in both places, viz. mastering of one's enemies; since the form of
meditation is the same, the Udgitha being in both cases viewed under the
form of Prana; since the injunction is the same, being conveyed in both
cases by the same verbal root (vid, to know); and since both meditations
have the same technical name, viz. udgitha-vidya. The Sutra states this
view in the form of the refutation of an objection raised by the
advocate of the final view. We do not admit, the objector says, the
unity maintained by you, since the texts clearly show a difference of
form. The text of the Vajasaneyins represents as the object of
meditation that which is the agent in the act of singing out the Udgitha;
while the text of the Chandogas enjoins meditation on what is the object
of the action of singing out (i. e. the Udgitha itself). This
discrepancy establishes difference in the character of the meditation,
and as this implies difference of the object enjoined, the mere non-
difference of injunction, and so on, is of no force, and hence the two
meditations are separate ones.--This objection the Purvapakshin impugns,
'on account of non-difference.' For both texts, at the outset, declare
that the Udgitha is the means to bring about the conquest of enemies
(Let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgitha'
(Bri. Up.); 'The gods took the Udgitha, thinking they would with that
overcome the Asuras'--Ch. Up.). In order therefore not to stultify this
common beginning, we must assume that in the clause 'For them that
breath sang out' (Bri. Up.), the Udgitha, which really is the object of
the action of singing, is spoken of as the agent. Otherwise the term
udgitha in the introductory passage ('by means of the Udgitha') would
have to be taken as by implication denoting the agent (while directly it
indicates the instrument).--Hence there is oneness of the two vidyas.--
Of this view the next Sutra disposes.
7. Or not, on account of difference of subject-matter; as in the case of
the attribute of being higher than the high, and so on.
There is no unity of the two vidyas, since the subject-matter of the two
differs. For the tale in the Chandogya-text, which begins 'when the
Devas and the Asuras struggled together,' connects itself with the
pranava (the syllable Om) which is introduced as the object of
meditation in Chand. I, 1, 1, 'Let a man meditate on the syllable Om as
the Udgitha'; and the clause forming part of the tale,'they meditated on
that chief breath as Udgitha.' therefore refers to a meditation on the
pranava which is a part only of the Udgitha. In the text of the Vaja-
saneyins; on the other hand, there is nothing to correspond to the
introductory passage which in the Chandogya-text determines the subject-
matter, and the text clearly states that the meditation refers to the
whole Udgitha (not only the pranava). And this difference of leading
subject-matter implies difference of matter enjoined, and this again
difference of the character of meditation, and hence there is no unity
of vidyas. Thus the object of meditation for the Chandogas is the
pranava viewed under the form of Prana; while for the Vajasaneyins it is
the Udgatri (who sings the Udgitha), imaginatively identified with Prana.
Nor does there arise, on this latter account, a contradiction between
the later and the earlier part of the story of the Vajasaneyins. For as
a meditation on the Udgatri necessarily extends to the Udgitha, which is
the object of the activity of singing, the latter also helps to bring
about the result, viz. the mastering of enemies.--There is thus no unity
of vidya, although there may be non-difference of injunction, and so on.--
'As in the case of the attribute of being higher than the high,' &c. In
one and the same sakha there are two meditations, in each of which the
highest Self is enjoined to be viewed under the form of the pranava (Ch.
Up. I, 6; I, 9), and in so far the two vidyas are alike. But while the
former text enjoins that the pranava has to be viewed under the form of
a golden man, in the latter he has to be viewed as possessing the
attributes of being higher than the high, and owing to this difference
of attributes the two meditations must be held separate (a_ fortiori_,
then, those meditations are separate which have different objects of
meditation).
8. If that be declared on account of name; (we object, since) that is
also (where the objects of injunction differ).
If the oneness of the vidyas be maintained on the ground that both have
the same name, viz. udgitha-vidya, we point out that oneness is found
also where the objects enjoined are different. The term agnihotra is
applied equally to the permanent agnihotra and to that agnihotra which
forms part of the sacrifice called 'Kundapayinam ayanam'; and the term
udgitha is applied equally to the many different meditations described
in the first prapathaka of the Chandogya.
9. And (this is) appropriate, on account of the extension.
Since the pranava, which is a part of the udgitha, is introduced as the
subject of meditation in the first prapathaka of the Chandogya, and
extends over the later vidyas also, it is appropriate to assume that
also in the clause 'the gods took the udgitha'--which stands in the
middle--the term udgitha denotes the pranava. Expressions such as 'the
cloth is burned' show that frequently the whole denotes the part.--The
conclusion from all this is that in the Chandogya the object of
meditation is constituted by the pranava--there termed udgitha--viewed
under the form of prana; while in the Vajasaneyaka the term udgitha
denotes the whole udgitha, and the object of meditation is he who
produces the udgitha, i.e. the udgatri, viewed under the form of prana.
And this proves that the two vidyas are separate.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'difference.'
10. On account of non-difference of everything, those elsewhere.
The Chandogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike record a meditation on Prana;
the object of meditation being Prana as possessing the qualities of
being the oldest and the best, and also as possessing certain other
qualities such as being the richest, and so on (Ch. Up. V, 1; Bri. Up.
VI, 1). In the text of the Kaushitakins, on the other hand, there is a
meditation on Prana which mentions the former qualities ('being the
best' and 'being the oldest'), but not the latter ('being the richest,'
and so on). This, the Purvapakshin maintains, constitutes a difference
between the objects of meditation, and hence between the meditations
themselves.--This view the Sutra sets aside 'on account of non-
difference of everything, those elsewhere.' There is no difference of
meditation. Those qualities, viz. being the richest, and so on, are to
be meditated upon in the other place also, viz. in the meditation on
Prana of the Kaushitakins; 'since there is non-difference of everything,'
i.e. since the text of the Kaushitakins also exhibits the very same
method, in all its details, for proving what it is undertaken to prove,
viz. that Prana is the oldest and best. And for that proof it is
required that Prana should be viewed as possessing also the quality of
being the richest, and so on, and these qualities therefore have to be
comprised in the meditation of the Kaushitakins also. Hence there is no
difference of meditation.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-
difference of everything.'
In the same way as the meditation on Prana as the oldest and best cannot
be accomplished without Prana being also meditated upon as the richest,
and so on, and as hence these latter qualities have to be comprised in
the meditation on Prana of the Kaushitakins, although they are not
expressly mentioned there; thus those qualities of Brahman also, without
which the meditation on Brahman cannot be accomplished, must be included
in all meditations on Brahman--this is the point to be proved next.
11. Bliss and other qualities, as belonging to the subject of the
qualities.
The point to be decided here is whether, or not, the essential qualities
of Brahman are to be included in all meditations on the highest Brahman.--
Since there is no valid reason for including in a meditation those
qualities which are not expressly mentioned in the section containing
that meditation, only those qualities which are thus expressly mentioned
should be included!--This prima facie view is negatived by the Sutra.
The clause, 'on account of non-difference,' has to be carried on from
the preceding Sutra. As the 'subject of the qualities,' i.e. Brahman is
the same in all meditations, the qualities which do not exist apart from
their subject, viz. bliss, and so on, are to be comprised in all
meditations.--But for the same reason then such qualities as 'having joy
for its head' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) would also have to be included in all
meditations on Brahman!--This the next Sutra negatives.
12. Such qualities as having joy for its head, and so on, are not
established, for if there were difference (of members) there would be
increase and decrease.
The declaration that the essential qualities of Brahman are established
for all meditations, does not imply that such attributes as 'having joy
for its head' are equally established. For the latter are not qualities
of Brahman, since they are mere elements in a figurative representation
of Brahman under the form of an animal body. Otherwise, i.e. if Brahman
really possessed different members, such as head, wings, and so on, it
would be liable to increase and decrease, and this would be in conflict
with texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.'--But if
this reasoning holds good, then all the infinite qualities belonging to
Brahman such as lordly power, generosity, compassion, and so on--all of
which are incapable of existing apart from the subject to which they
belong-would have to be comprehended in all those meditations on Brahman
where they are not expressly mentioned; and this could not possibly be
done, as those qualities are infinite in number.--This difficulty the
next Sutra removes.
13. But the others, on account of equality with the thing.
Those other qualities which are 'equal to the thing,' i. e. which are
attributes determining the essential character of the thing, and
therefore necessarily entering into the idea of the thing, must be
included in all meditations, no less than the thing itself. To this
class belong qualities such as true being, knowledge, bliss, purity,
infinity, and so on. For of Brahman--which by texts such as 'that from
which all these beings,' &c. had been suggested as the cause of the
world--the essential definition is given in texts such as 'the True,
knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'bliss is Brahman,' and others; and
hence, in order that a true notion may be formed of Brahman as the
object of meditation, such qualities as true being, bliss, and so on,
have to be included in all meditations on Brahman. Such additional
qualities, on the other hand, as e.g. compassion, which indeed cannot
exist apart from the subject to which they belong, but are not necessary
elements of the idea of Brahman, are to be included in those meditations
only where they are specially mentioned.
But, an objection is raised, if 'having joy for its head' and the like
are not qualities of Brahman, but merely serve the purpose of a
figurative representation of Brahman, for what purpose then is this
representation introduced? For if something is represented as something
else, there must be some motive for doing so. Where, e.g. the sacred
text compares the meditating devotee to a charioteer, its body and
organs to a chariot, and so on, it does so for the purpose of assisting
the subjection to the Self of the means of meditation, i.e. the body,
the senses, and so on. But in the present case no such purpose is to be
discerned, and hence it must needs be admitted that having joy for its
head, and so on, are real qualities of Brahman.--The next Sutra disposes
of this difficulty.
14. For meditation, owing to the absence of purpose.
As no other purpose can be assigned, the text must be supposed to
represent Brahman as having joy for its head, and so on, for the purpose
of meditation. In order to accomplish the meditation on Brahman which is
enjoined in the text 'he who knows (i.e. meditates on) Brahman reaches
the Highest,' the text represents the Brahman consisting of bliss as
made up of joy, satisfaction, &c., and compares these to the head, the
wings, and so on. The Self of bliss, which is the inmost of all the
Selfs mentioned in the text, is by this means represented to the mind in
a definite shape; just as in the preceding sections the Self of food,
the Self of breath, and the rest had similarly been represented in
definite shapes, consisting of head, wings, and so on. As thus the
qualities of having joy for its head, &c. are merely secondary marks of
the Self of bliss, they are not necessarily included in each meditation
that involves the idea of that Self.
15. And on account of the term 'Self.'
That this is so further follows from the fact that in the clause
'different from this is the inner Self consisting of bliss' the term
'Self is used. For as the Self cannot really possess a head, wings, and
tail, its having joy for its head, and so on, can only be meant in a
metaphorical sense, for the sake of easier comprehension.--But, in the
preceding sections, the term _Self_ had been applied to what is _not_ of
the nature of Self--the text speaking of the Self of breath, the Self of
mind, and so on; how then are we able to determine that in the phrase
'the Self of bliss' the term Self denotes a true _Self_?--To this the
next Sutra replies.
16. There is reference to the Self, as in other places; on account of
the subsequent passage.
In the clause,'different from that is the Self of bliss,' the term Self
can refer to the highest Self only; 'as in other cases,' i.e. as in
other passages--'the Self only was this in the beginning; it thought,
let me send forth the worlds,' and similar ones--the term 'Self denotes
the highest Self only.--But whereby is this proved?--'By the subsequent
passagel, i.e. by the passage, 'he desired, may I be many, may I grow
forth,'--which refers to the Self of bliss.
17. If it be said 'on account of connexion'; it may be so, on account of
ascertainment.
But as in the preceding sections the term Self is seen to be connected
with what is not of the nature of the Self, such as the Self of breath,
and so on, it is not possible to draw a valid conclusion from the
subsequent passage!--It _is_ possible, the Sutra replies, 'on account of
ascertainment.' For the previous clause, 'from that Self there
originated the Ether,' settles in the mind the idea of the highest Self,
and that idea then is transferred in succession to the (so-called) Self
of breath, the Self of mind, and so on, until it finally finds rest in
the Self of bliss, beyond which there is no other Self; while at the
same time the subsequent clause 'he desired' confirms the idea of the
highest Self. The term Self thus connects itself from the beginning with
things which are not true Selfs, because the highest Self is as it were
viewed in them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'bliss and the rest.'
18. The new (thing is enjoined); on account of the statement of what has
to be done.
The Sutra discusses an additional question connected with the meditation
on breath. Both texts--the Chandogya as well as the Vajasaneyaka-declare
that water constitutes a dress for prana, and refer to the rinsing of
the mouth with water. The doubt here arises whether what the texts mean
to enjoin is the rinsing of the mouth, or a meditation on prana as
having water for its dress.--The Purvapakshin maintains the former view;
for, he says, the Vajasaneyaka uses the injunctive form 'he is to rinse,'
while there is no injunctive form referring to the meditation; and
what the text says in praise of the breath thus not being allowed to
remain naked may be taken as a mere glorification of the act of rinsing.
And as ordinary rinsing of the mouth, subsequent to eating, is already
established by Smriti and custom, we must conclude that the text means
to enjoin rinsing of the mouth of a different kind, viz. as auxiliary to
the meditation on prana.--To this the Sutra replies that what the text
enjoins is the new' thing, i.e. the previously non-established
meditation on water as forming the dress of prana. 'On account of the
statement of what has to be done,' i.e. on account of the statement of
what is not established--for only on the latter condition Scripture has
a meaning. The beginning as well as the end of the Vajasaneyaka-text
clearly refers to a meditation on the water used for rinsing as forming
a dress for prana; and as rinsing is already established by Smriti and
custom, we naturally infer that what the text enjoins is a meditation on
breath as having the water used in rinsing for its dress. This also
explains why the Chandogya-text does not mention the rinsing at all, but
merely the clothing of breath with water.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'the statement of what has to be done.'
19. And (the qualities) thus being equal, on account of non-difference.
In the book of the Vajasaneyaka, called Agnirahasya, we meet with a
meditation on Brahman called Sandilyavidya; and there is also a Sandilya-
vidya in the Brihadaranyaka. The Purvapakshin holds that these two
meditations are different since the latter text mentions qualities--such
as Brahman being the lord of all--which are not mentioned in the former;
the objects of meditation thus being different, the meditations
themselves are different.--This the Sutra negatives. The object of
meditation is 'equal,' for both texts state the same qualities, such as
'consisting of mind,' and so on; and the additional qualities stated in
the Brihad-aranyaka, such as the rulership of Brahman,'do not differ'
from those equally stated by both texts, such as Brahman realising all
its purposes, and so on. Thus the objects of meditation do not differ in
character.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what is equal.'
20. On account of connexion, thus elsewhere also.
In the Brihad-aranyaka (V, 5) it is said that Brahman is to be meditated
upon as abiding within the orb of the sun and within the right eye; and
then the text mentions two secret names of Brahman--_aham_ and _ahar_.
Here the Purvapakshin holds that both these names are to be comprehended
in each of the two meditations 'On account of connexion,' i.e. on
account of the object of meditation, i.e. Brahman being one only,
although connected with different abodes, it is 'thus elsewhere also,' i.
e. the same conclusion which had been arrived at in the case of the
Sandilya-vidyas, has to be accepted with regard to Brahman abiding in
the sun and in the eye. The meditation is one only, and hence the two
secret names apply to Brahman in both its abodes.--This view the next
Sutra negatives.
21. Or not so, on account of difference.
This is not so, for as Brahman is to be meditated upon in two different
abodes, the meditations are separate. In both the Sandilya-vidyas, on
the other hand, Brahman is to be meditated upon as abiding within the
heart.
22. The text also declares this.
That the qualities of that which abides within the sun and that which
abides in the eye are not to be combined, the text itself moreover shows
by specially stating that the characteristics of the one are those of
the other. For such a special transfer of qualities is needed only where
the qualities are not of themselves established, i.e. where the two
things are naturally different.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
'connexion,'
23. And for the same reason the holding together and the pervading the
sky.
In the Taittiriyaka and in the khilas of the Ranayaniyas we have the
following passage: 'Gathered together are the powers among which Brahman
is the oldest; Brahman as the oldest in the beginning stretched out the
sky. Brahman was born as the first of all beings; who may rival that
Brahman?' which declares that Brahman gathered together all the most
ancient powers, that it pervades the sky, and so on. And as these
attributes are not stated in connexion with any special meditation, we
must infer that they are to be included in all meditations whatever on
Brahman.--This prima facie view is controverted by the Sutra. The
holding together of all powers, &c., although not mentioned in connexion
with any special meditation, is not to be included in all meditations
whatever, but to be connected with particular meditations 'on the same
ground,' i.e. according to difference of place. _Where_ those qualities
have to be included must be decided on the ground of feasibility. The
attribute of pervading the whole heaven cannot be included in a
meditation on Brahman as abiding within a small place such as the heart,
and hence the other attributes also which are stated together with the
attribute mentioned cannot be included in those meditations. And when we
find that in meditations on Brahman as abiding within a small place it
is said that Brahman is greater than the earth, or that the ether within
the heart is as great as the universal ether, these attributes cannot be
taken in their literal sense and hence included in those meditations,
but must be viewed as merely meant to glorify the object proposed for
meditation.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of 'holding together.'
24. And although (they both be) meditations on man; on account of others
not being recorded.
In the Taittiriyaka as well as the Chandogya we meet with a meditation
on man (purusha-vidya), in which parts of the sacrifice are fancifully
identified with the parts of the human body.--Here the Purvapakshin
maintains that these two meditations are identical; for, he says, both
meditations have the same name (purusha-vidya), and the same character
as stated above; and as the Taittiriyaka mentions no fruit of the
meditation, the fruit declared in the Chandogya holds good for the
Taittiriyaka also, and thus there is no difference of fruit.--This view
the Sutra negatives. Although both meditations are meditations on man,
yet they are separate 'on account of the others not being recorded,' i.e.
on account of the qualities recorded in one sakha not being recorded in
the other. For the Taittiriyaka mentions the three libations, while the
Chandogya does not, and so on. The character of the two meditations thus
differs. And there is a difference of result also. For an examination of
the context in the Taittiriyaka shows that the purusha-vidya is merely a
subordinate part of a meditation on Brahman, the fruit of which the text
declares to be that the devotee reaches the greatness of Brahman; while
the Chandogya meditation is an independent one, and has for its reward
the attainment of long life. The two meditations are thus separate, and
hence the details of one must not be included in the other.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'the meditation on man.'
25. On account of the difference of sense of piercing and so on.
The text of the Atharvanikas exhibits at the beginning of their
Upanishad some mantras, 'Pierce the sukra, pierce the heart.' The
followers of the Sama-veda read at the beginning of their rahasya-
brahmana 'O God Savitri, promote the sacrifice.' The Kathakas and the
Taittiriyakas have 'May Mitra be propitious to us, may Varuna be
propitious.' The Satyayanins have 'Thou art a white horse, a tawny and a
black one!' The Kaushitakins have a Brahmana referring to the Mahavrata-
ceremony, 'Indra having slain Vritra became great.' The Kaushitakins
also have a Mahavrata-brahmana. 'Prajapati is the year; his Self is that
Mahavrata.' The Vajasaneyins have a Brahmana referring to the Pravargya,
'The gods sat down for a sattra-celebration.' With reference to all this
a doubt arises whether these mantras and the sacrificial works referred
to in the Brahmana texts form parts of the meditations enjoined in the
Upanishads or not.--The Purvapakshin affirms this, on the ground that as
the mantras and works are mentioned in the immediate neighbourhood of
the meditations the idea of their forming parts of the latter naturally
presents itself. Such mantras as 'pierce the heart' and works such as
the pravargya may indeed--on the basis of direct statement (sruti),
inferential mark (linga), and syntactical connexion (vakya), which are
stronger than mere proximity--be understood to be connected with certain
actions; but, on the other hand, mantras such as 'May Varuna be
propitious' have no application elsewhere, and are suitable
introductions to meditations. We therefore take them to be parts of the
meditations, and hence hold that those mantras are to be included in all
meditations.--This view the Sutra sets aside 'on account of the
difference of sense of piercing, and so on.' The inferential marks
contained in texts such as 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'; 'I
shall speak the right, I shall speak the true,' show that the mantras
have an application in connexion with certain magical practices, or else
the study of the Veda, and the like, and do not therefore form part of
meditations. That is to say--in the same way as the mantra 'pierce the
heart' enables us to infer that also the mantra 'pierce the sukra'
belongs to some magical rite, so we infer from the special meaning of
mantras such as 'I shall speak the right,' &c., that also mantras such
as 'May Mitra be propitious' are connected with the study of the Veda,
and do not therefore form part of meditations. That mantras of this kind
and Brahmana passages relative to the Pravargya and the like are placed
at the beginning of Upanishads is owing to their having, like the latter,
to be studied in the forest.--Herewith terminates the adhikarana of
'piercing and the like.'
26. But in the case of the getting rid of (it has to be combined with
the obtaining), as it is supplementary to statements of obtaining; as in
the case of the kusas, the metres, the praise, and the singing. This has
been explained.
The Chandogas read in their text 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes
his hair, and shaking off the body as the moon frees herself from the
mouth of Rahu, I obtain the world of Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 13). The
Atharvanikas have 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil, free from
passion, reaches the highest oneness.' The Satyayanins have 'His sons
obtain his inheritance, his friends the good, his enemies the evil he
has done.' The Kaushitakins 'He shakes off his good and his evil deeds.
His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil
he has done.' Two of these texts mention only the shaking off, on the
part of him who knows, of his good and evil works; one mentions only the
obtainment of these works, on the part of friends and enemies; and one
mentions both these occurrences.--Now both the occurrences, although
mentioned in several meditations, must be considered elements of all
meditations: for whoever, on the basis of a knowledge of Brahman,
reaches Brahman, necessarily leaves behind all his good and evil works,
and those works unless thus left behind cannot be obtained by others.
Meditation on those two matters therefore enters as an element into all
meditations. The doubtful point, however, is whether there is option
between the meditation on the abandonment of works, and that on the
obtainment of works by others, and that on both these events; or whether
in each case all these meditations are to be combined.--There is option,
the Purvapakshin holds; for the reason that the texts make different
declarations on this point. For, if the meditations had to be combined,
there would be in each case meditation on both the matters mentioned;
and as such double meditation is established by the Kaushitakin text, it
would follow that the statements of the other texts are without meaning.
Thus the only motive for the declarations made in different places can
be to allow option. Nor must this conclusion be controverted on the
ground that declarations of the same matter, made in different places,
are made with reference to the difference of students severally reading
the several texts; for this holds good in those cases only where
identical statements are made in different texts; while in the case
under discussion two sakhas mention the abandonment of works, and one
their passing over to other persons. Nor can you account for the
difference of statement on the ground of difference of vidyas; for you
yourself maintain that the meditations in question form part of all
meditations.--This view the Sutra impugns, 'but where the getting rid of
is mentioned,' &c. Where a text mentions either the abandonment only of
works or only their being obtained by others, both these matters must
necessarily be combined, since the statement as to the works being
obtained forms a supplement to the statement of their being abandoned.
For the former statement declares the place to which the good and evil
works, got rid of by him who knows Brahman, are transferred.--This
supplementary relation of two statements the Sutra illustrates by some
parallel cases. A clause in the text of the Satyayanins, 'the kusas are
the children of the udumbara tree,' forms a defining supplement to a
more general statement in the text of the Kaushitakins, 'the kusas are
the children of the tree.' The clause, 'the metres of the gods are prior,'
defines the order of the metres which in other texts mentioning 'the
metres of the gods and Asuras' had been left undefined, and therefore
forms a supplement to those texts. Analogous is the relation of the
clause, 'he assists the stotra of the shodasin when the sun has half
risen,' to the less definite statement 'he assists with gold the stotra
of the shodasin;' and the relation of the clause, 'the adhvaryu is not
to sing,' to the general injunction 'all the priests join in the singing.'
Unless we admit that one statement, which defines some other more
general statement, may stand to the latter in a supplementary relation,
we are driven to assume an optional proceeding, and this is
objectionable as long as there is any other way open; according to a
principle laid down in the Purva Mimamsa (X, 8, 15). As the clauses
referring to the abandonment of the works, and those referring to their
being taken up by others, thus form one connected whole, there is no
such thing as mere abandonment and mere taking up, and hence there can
be no option between the two. That the text of the Kaushitakins mentions
both thus explains itself, on the ground that the several declarations
of what is really only one and the same matter are directed to different
hearers.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'getting rid of.'
27. At departing; there being nothing to be reached. For thus others
(also declare).
The further question arises whether the putting off of all good and evil
deeds takes place only at the time when the soul leaves the body, or
also after it has departed and is on its journey to the world of Brahman.
The Purvapakshin holds the latter view, for, he says, the texts declare
both. The Kaushitakins say that the soul shakes off its good and evil
deeds when it crosses the river Viraja in the world of Brahman; while
the Tandins say 'Shaking off all evil, and shaking off the body,' &c.,
which shows that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul
leaves the body. And when the Satyayanaka says that 'his sons obtain his
inheritance, his friends his good deeds,' and so on, this also intimates
that the deeds are shaken off at the time when the soul leaves the body.
We therefore must conclude that a part of the deeds is left behind at
the moment of death, and the remainder on the journey to the world of
Brahman.--This view the Sutra controverts. All the good and evil deeds
of the dying man are left behind, without remainder, at the time when
the soul parts from the body. For after the soul of him who knows has
departed from the body, 'there is nothing to be reached,' i.e. there are
no further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and
evil deeds, different from the obtaining of Brahman, which is the fruit
of knowledge. Thus others 'also declare that, subsequently to the soul's
departure from the body, there is no enjoyment of any pain or pleasure
different from the obtaining of Brahman. 'But when he is free of the
body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him'; 'Thus does that
serene being, rising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as
it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1; 3); 'For him
there is delay only so long as he is not freed (from the body); then he
will be perfect' (VI, 14, 2).
28. As it is desired; on account of there being no contradiction of
either.
The time when good and evil deeds are left behind thus having been
determined on the basis of the reason of the thing, the several words of
the passages must be construed as it is desired, i.e. so as not to
contradict either, i.e. either the declaration of scripture or the
reason of the thing. Thus in the text of the Kaushitakins the later
clause, 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds,' must be taken as coming
before the earlier passage 'having entered on that path of the gods.'--
Here the Purvapakshin raises a new objection.
29. There is meaning of the soul's going (only) on the twofold
hypothesis; for otherwise there is contradiction.
It is only on the hypothesis of a part of the good and evil works being
left behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body, and
another part later on, and the effacement of works thus taking place in
a double way, that a sense can be found in the scriptural declaration of
the soul proceeding on the path of the gods. For otherwise there would
be a contradiction. For if all the works perished at the time of the
soul's departure from the body, the subtle body also would perish, and
if this were so, no going on the part of the mere Self would be possible.
It is not therefore possible that at the time of the soul's departure
from the body all works should perish without a remainder.--To this the
next Sutra replies.
30. (That assumption) is justified; on account of the perception of
things which are marks of that; as in ordinary experience.
The assumption of all the works perishing at the time of 'departure'
involves no contradiction; since we perceive, in the sacred texts,
matters which are marks of connexion with a body even on the part of the
soul which has divested itself of all its works and become manifest in
its true nature. Compare 'Having approached the highest light he
manifests himself in his true form'; 'He moves about there laughing,
playing, and rejoicing'; 'He becomes a self-ruler, he moves about in all
worlds according to his will'; 'He becomes one, he becomes three,' &c.
(Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2). All these texts refer to the
soul's connexion with a body. The soul therefore, joined to the subtle
body, may proceed on the path of the gods, even after all its works have
passed away. But how can the subtle body persist, when the works which
originate it have passed away? Through the power of knowledge, we reply.
Knowledge does not indeed by itself originate the subtle body, but it
possesses the power of making that body persist, even after the gross
body--which is the instrument for the experience of all ordinary pains
and pleasures--and all works have passed away, so as thereby to make the
soul capable of moving on the path of the gods, and thus to obtain
Brahman which is the fruit of knowledge. 'As in ordinary life.' As in
ordinary life, a tank, which may have been made with a view to the
irrigation of rice-fields and the like, is maintained and used for the
purpose of drawing drinking-water, and so on, even after the intentions
which originally led to its being made have passed away.--Here an
objection is raised. It may be admitted, that at the time when a man
possessing true knowledge dies, all his works pass away without a
remainder, and that the subtle body only remains, enabling him to move
towards Brahman; but it cannot be held that the soul in that state does
not experience pain and pleasure; for we know from sacred tradition that
Vasishtha, Avantara-tamas, and others, who had reached intuition of the
highest truth, entered after death on other embodiments, and experienced
pain and pleasure due to the birth of sons, various calamities, and so
on.--To this the next Sutra replies.
31. Of those who have a certain office there is subsistence (of their
works) as long as the office lasts.
We do not maintain that all those who have reached true knowledge divest
themselves at the time of death of all their good and evil works; we
limit our view to those who immediately after death attain to moving on
the path, the first stage of which is light. Persons like Vasishtha, on
the other hand, who are entrusted with certain offices, do not
immediately after death attain to moving on the path beginning with
light, since the duties undertaken by them are not completely
accomplished. In the case of beings of this kind, who owing to
particular deeds have been appointed to particular offices, the effect
of the works which gave rise to the office does not pass away before
those offices are completely accomplished; for the effect of a work is
exhausted only through the complete enjoyment of its result. In the case
of those persons, therefore, the effects of the works which gave rise to
their office continue to exist as long as the office itself, and hence
they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'passing away.'
32. There is no restriction (since) all (have to go on that path).
(Thus) there is non-contradiction of sacred text and Smriti.
The question here is whether Brahman is to be reached on the path of the
gods by those only who take their stand on those meditations which, like
the Upakosala-vidya, describe that path, or by all who practise any of
the meditations on Brahman. The Purvapakshin holds the former view,
since there is no proof to show that in other vidyas the going on that
path is not mentioned, and since those other vidyas-such as the texts
'and those who in the forest meditate on faith and austerities,'and'
those who in the forest worship faith, the True' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1; Bri.
Up. VI, 2, 15)--suggest to the mind the idea of the knowledge of Brahman.
This the Sutra negatives. There is no restriction to that limited class
of devotees, since all who carry on meditations have to go on that path.
For on this latter assumption only text and inference, i.e. scripture
and authoritative tradition, are not contradicted. As to scripture, the
Chandogya and the Vajasaneyaka alike, in the Pankagni-vidya, declare
that all those who practise meditation go on that path. In the
Vajasaneyaka the words 'who know this' refer to those who practise the
meditation on the five fires, while the following words 'those who in
the forest meditate on faith and the True' refer to those who meditate
on Brahman; and the text then goes on to say that all those devotees go
to Brahman, on the path of the gods. Texts such as 'the True, knowledge,
infinite is Brahman,' and 'the True must be enquired into,' prove that
the term 'the True' denotes Brahman; and as in the Chandogya the term
'tapas' occurs in the corresponding place, we conclude that both these
terms, viz. _the True_ and tapas, denote nothing else but Brahman.
Meditation on Brahman, preceded by faith, is mentioned elsewhere also;
in the text which begins 'The True must be enquired into' we read
further on 'Faith must be enquired into' (Ch. Up. VII, 18, 16; 19).
Smriti also declares that all those who know Brahman proceed on the path
of the gods, 'Fire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six
months of the sun's northern progress--proceeding by that road those who
know Brahman go to Brahman' (Bha. Gi. VIII, 24). And there are many
other Sruti and Smriti passages of this kind. The conclusion therefore
is that the Upakosalavidya and similar texts merely refer to that going
of the soul which is common to all vidyas.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'non-restriction.'
33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable are to be comprised (in all
meditations). There being equality (of the Brahman to be meditated on)
and (those conceptions) existing (in Brahman); as in the case of what
belongs to the upasad. This has been explained.
We read in the Brihad-aranyaka (III, 8, 9),'O Gargi, the Brahmanas call
that the Akshara. It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. And in the
Atharvana (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5) we have 'The higher knowledge is that by
which the Akshara is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,'
& c. The doubt here arises whether all the qualities there predicated of
Brahman--called akshara, i.e. the Imperishable--and constituting
something contrary in nature to the apparent world, are to be included
in all meditations on Brahman, or only those where the text specially
mentions them. The Purvapakshin advocates the latter view; for, he says,
there is no authority for holding that the qualities which characterise
one meditation are characteristic of other meditations also; and such
negative attributes as are mentioned in those two texts do not--as
positive qualities such as bliss do--contribute to the apprehension of
the true nature of Brahman. What those two texts do is merely to deny of
Brahman, previously apprehended as having bliss, and so on, for its
essential qualities, certain qualities belonging to the empirical world,
such as grossness, and so on; for all negation must refer to an
established basis.--This view the Sutra refutes. The ideas of absence of
grossness, and so on, which are connected with Brahman viewed as the
Akshara, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman. For the
imperishable (akshara) Brahman is the same in all meditations, and
qualities such as non-grossness enter into the conception of its
essential nature. The apprehension of a thing means the apprehension of
its specific character. But mere bliss, and so on, does not suggest the
specific character of Brahman, since those qualities belong also to the
individual soul. What is specifically characteristic of Brahman is bliss,
and so on, in so far as fundamentally opposed to all evil and
imperfection. The individual soul, on the other hand, although
fundamentally free from evil, yet is capable of connexion with evil. Now
being fundamentally opposed to evil implies having a character the
opposite of grossness and all similar qualities which belong to the
empirical world, material and mental. He therefore who thinks of Brahman
must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge,
and so on, in so far as distinguished by absence of grossness and the
like, and those qualities, being no less essential than bliss, and so on,
must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman.--The Sutra
gives an instance illustrating the principle that qualities (secondary
matters) follow the principal matter to which they belong. As the mantra
'Agnir vai hotram vetu,' although given in the Sama-veda, yet has to be
recited in the Yajur-veda style, with a subdued voice, because it stands
in a subordinate relation to the upasad-offerings prescribed for the
four-days 'sacrifice called Jamadagnya; those offerings are the
principal matter to which the subordinate matter--the mantra--has to
conform. This point is explained in the first section, i.e. in the Purva
Mimamsa-sutras III, 3, 9.--But this being admitted, it would follow that
as Brahman is the principal matter in all meditations on Brahman, and
secondary matters have to follow the principal matter, also such
qualities as 'doing all works, enjoying all odours and the like,' which
are mentioned in connexion with special meditations only, would
indiscriminately have to be included in all meditations.--With reference to this the next Sutra says. |
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