But this cannot be urged against the theory of the individual soul being
Brahman in so far as determined by real limiting adjuncts; for on that
view we may explain the difference of spheres of experience as due to
the beginningless adrishtas which are the cause of the difference of the
limiting adjuncts!--To this the next Sutra replies.
50. On account of the non-determination of the adrishtas.
As the adrishtas also which are the causes of the series of upadhis have
for their substrate Brahman itself, there is no reason for their
definite allotment (to definite individual souls), and hence again there
is no definite separation of the spheres of experience. For the limiting
adjuncts as well as the adrishtas cannot by their connexion with Brahman
split up Brahman itself which is essentially one.
51. And it is thus also in the case of purposes and so on.
For the same reason there can be no definite restriction in the case of
purposes and so on which are the causes of the, different adrishtas. (For
they also cannot introduce plurality into Brahman that is fundamentally
one.)
52. Should it be said (that that is possible) owing to the difference of
place; we deny this, on account of (all upadhis) being within (all
places).
Although Brahman is one only and not to be split by the several limiting
adjuncts with which it is connected, yet the separation of the spheres
of enjoyment is not impossible since the places of Brahman which are
connected with the upadhis are distinct.--This the Sutra negatives on
the ground that, as the upadhis move here and there and hence all places
enter into connexion with all upadhis, the mixing up of spheres of
enjoyment cannot be avoided. And even if the upadhis were connected with
different places, the pain connected with some particular place would
affect the whole of Brahman which is one only.--The two Sutras II, 3, 32
and 37 have stated an objection against those who, without taking their
stand on the Veda, held the view of an all-pervading soul. The Sutras II,
3, 50 and ff., on the other hand, combat the view of those who, while
basing their doctrine on the Veda, teach the absolute unity of the Self.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the part.'
FOURTH PADA.
1. Thus the pranas.
After having taught that Ether and all the other elements are effects,
and hence have originated, the Sutras had shown that the individual soul,
although likewise an effect, does not originate in the sense of
undergoing a change of essential nature; and had in connexion therewith
clearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists.
They now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the
instruments of the individual soul, viz. the organs and the vital breath.
The point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the
individual soul is an effect, or as ether and the other elements are. As
the soul is, thus the pranas are, the Purvapakshin maintains. That means--
as the soul is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced--For
the latter point no less than the former is directly stated in Scripture;
the wording of the Sutra 'thus the pranas' being meant to extend to the
case of the pranas also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse
was had in the case of the soul.--But what is the scriptural text you
mean?
'Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they say, what was
that? Those Rishis indeed were that Non-being, thus they say. And who
were those Rishis? The pranas indeed were those Rishis.' This is the
passage which declares that before the origination of the world the
Rishis existed. As 'pranah' is in the plural, we conclude that what is
meant is the organs and the vital air. Nor can this text be interpreted
to mean only that the pranas exist for a very long time (but are not
uncreated); as we may interpret the texts declaring Vayu and the
atmosphere (antariksha) to be immortal: 'Vayu and the atmosphere are
immortal'; 'Vayu is the deity that never sets' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 3; I, 5,
22). For the clause 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning'
declares that the pranas existed even at the time when the entire world
was in the pralaya state. Those texts, then, which speak of an
origination of the pranas must be explained somehow, just as we did with
the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.
To this the Siddhantin replies, 'the pranas also originate in the same
way as ether, and so on.'--Why?--Because we have scriptural texts
directly stating that before creation everything was one, 'Being only
this was in the beginning,' 'The Self only was this in the beginning.'
And moreover, the text 'from that there is produced the prana and the
mind and all organs'(Mu. Up. II, 3, 1) declares that the organs
originated; they therefore cannot have existed before creation. Nor is
it permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare
the origination of the sense-organs--as we may do in the case of the
texts declaring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts
directly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or affirming their
eternity, while we _have_ such texts in the case of the individual soul.
In the text quoted by the Purvapakshin, 'Non-being indeed was this in
the beginning,' &c., the word prana can denote the highest Self only;
for from texts such as 'All these beings indeed enter into breath alone,
and from breath they arise'(Ch. Up. I, 11, 5), the word prana is known
to be one of the designations of the highest Self. And as to the clause
'the pranas indeed are those Rishis,' we remark that the term Rishi may
properly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but not to the non-
intelligent organs.
But how then is the plural form 'the Rishis are the pranas' to be
accounted for? This the next Sutra explains.
2. (The scriptural statement of the plural) is secondary, on account of
impossibility; and since (the highest Self) is declared before that.
The plural form exhibited by the text must be taken (not in its literal,
but) in a secondary figurative sense, since there is no room there for a
plurality of things. For Scripture declares that previous to creation
the highest Self only exists.
3. On account of speech having for its antecedent that.
For the following reason also the word 'prana,' in the text quoted, can
denote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the names which have for their object
all things apart from Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire
universe of things--ether, and so on--which is the object of speech. But,
as according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated; it was
thereupon differentiated by names and forms,' then (i.e. before the
differentiation of individual things), no things having name and form
existed, there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of
action and sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs
themselves existed.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the origination
of the pranas.'
4. (They are seven) on account of the going of the seven and of
specification.
The question here arises whether those organs are seven only, or eleven--
the doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of
scriptural texts.--The Purvapakshin maintains the former alternative.--
On what grounds?--'On account of going, and of specification.' For the
text refers to the 'going,' i.e. to the moving about in the different
worlds, together with the soul when being born or dying, of seven pranas
only, 'seven are these worlds in which the pranas move which rest in the
cave, being placed there as seven and seven' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)--where
the repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to
which the pranas are attached. Moreover those moving pranas are
distinctly specified in the following text, 'when the five instruments
of knowledge stand still, together with the mind (manas), and when the
buddhi does not move, that they call the highest "going"' (gati--Ka. Up.
II, 6, 10). The 'highest going' here means the moving towards Release,
all movement within the body having come to an end. As thus the text
declares that at the time of birth and death seven pranas only accompany
the soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concentration,
those pranas are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge (jnanani),
we conclude that the pranas are the seven following instruments of the
soul--the organs of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the
buddhi and the manas. In various other passages indeed, which refer to
the pranas, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up to fourteen, speech,
the hands, the feet, the anus, the organ of generation, the ahankara and
the kitta being added to those mentioned above; cp. e.g. 'there are
eight grahas' (Bri. Up. III, 2, i); 'Seven are the pranas of the head,
two the lower ones '(Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 5). But as the text says
nothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul, we assume
that they are called pranas in a metaphorical sense only, since they all,
more or less, assist the soul.--This view the next Sutra sets aside.
5. But the hands and so on also; (since they assist the soul) abiding
(in the body). Hence (it is) not so.
The organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the hands and the rest
also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides
in the body, i.e. the soul, and have their separate offices, such as
seizing, and so on. Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that
the hands and the rest are not organs. Buddhi, ahankara and kitta, on
the other hand, are (not independent organs but) mere designations of the
manas, according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding
(adhyavasaya), or misconception (abhimana), or thinking (kinta). The
organs therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in the passage
'Ten are these pranas in man, and Atman is the eleventh' (Bri. Up. II, 4,
ii), the word Atman denotes the manas. The number _eleven_ is confirmed
by scriptural and Smriti passages, cp. 'the ten organs and the one' (Bha.
Gi. XIII, 5); 'ten are the vaikarika beings, the manas is the eleventh,'
and others. Where more organs are mentioned, the different functions of
the manas are meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected
with special effects of the organs, such as accompanying the soul, and
the like.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the going of the seven.'
6. And (they are) minute.
As the text 'these are all alike, all infinite' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 13),
declares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we conclude that the
pranas are all-pervading.--To this the Sutra replies, that they are
minute; for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body, all
the pranas pass out after it' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2), proves those pranas to
be of limited size, and as when passing out they are not perceived by
bystanders, they must be of minute size--The text which speaks of them
as infinite is a text enjoining meditation ('he who meditates on them as
infinite'), and infinity there means only that abundance of activities
which is an attribute of the prana to be meditated on.
7. And the best.
By 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air (mukhya prana),
which, in the colloquy of the pranas, is determined to be the best
because it is the cause of the preservation of the body. This chief
vital air the Purvapakshin maintains to be something non-created, since
Scripture (Ri. Samh. V, 129, 2), 'By its own law the One was breathing
without wind,' shows that an effect of it, viz. the act of breathing,
existed even previously to creation, at the time of a great pralaya; and
because texts declaring it to have been created--such as 'from him is
born breath' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)--may be interpreted in the same way as
the texts declaring that the soul is something created (sec p. 540 ff.).--
To this the reply is that, since this view contradicts scriptural
statements as to the oneness of all, previous to creation; and since the
Mundaka-text declares the prana to have been created in the same way as
earth and the other elements; and since there are no texts plainly
denying its createdness, the chief vital air also must be held to have
been created. The words 'the One was breathing without wind' by no means
refer to the vital breath of living creatures, but intimate the
existence of the highest Brahman, alone by itself; as indeed appears
from the qualification 'without wind.'--That the vital breath, although
really disposed of in the preceding Sutras, is specially mentioned in
the present Sutra, is with a view to the question next raised for
consideration.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the
pranas.'
8. Neither air nor function, on account of its being stated separately.
Is this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second of the
elements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or is it air that has
assumed some special condition?--The first alternative may be adopted,
on account of the text 'prana is air.'--Or, since mere air is not called
breath, while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which
consists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold that breath is a
motion of air.--Of both these views the Sutra disposes by declaring 'not
so, on account of separate statement.' For in the passage 'From him
there is produced breath, mind, and all sense-organs, ether and air,' &c,
breath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For the same reason
breath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air; for the text
does not mention any functions of fire and the other elements, side by
side with these elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath
also cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function of air).
The text 'prana is air,' on the other hand, intimates (not that breath
is identical with air, but) that breath is air having assumed a special
form, not a thing altogether different from it, like fire. In ordinary
language, moreover, the word _breath_ does not mean a mere motion but a
substance to which motion belongs; we say,'the breath moves to and fro
in inhalation and exhalation.'
Is breath, which we thus know to be a modification of air, to be
considered as a kind of elementary substance, like fire, earth, and so
on? Not so, the next Sutra replies.
9. But like the eye and the rest, on account of being taught with them,
and for other reasons.
Breath is not an element, but like sight and the rest, a special
instrument of the soul. This appears from the fact that the texts
mention it together with the recognised organs of the soul, the eye, and
so on; so e.g. in the colloquy of the pranas. And such common mention is
suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class.--The
'and for other reasons' of the Sutra refers to the circumstance of the
principal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised
under the term 'prana'; cp. 'that principal breath' (Ch. Up. I, 2, 7);
'that central breath' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21).--But if the chief breath is,
like the eye and the other organs, an instrument of the soul, there must
be some special form of activity through which it assists the soul, as
the eye e.g. assists the soul by seeing. But no such activity is
perceived, and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category
as the organs of sensation and action!--To this objection the next Sutra
replies.
10. And there is no objection on account of its not having an activity
(karana); for (Scripture) thus declares.
The karana of the Sutra means kriya, action. The objection raised on the
ground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity
helpful to the soul, is without force, since as a matter of fact
Scripture declares that there is such an activity, in so far as the
vital breath supports the body with all its organs. For the text (Ch. Up.
V, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure of speech, and so
on, the body and the other organs maintained their strength, while on
the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once
became weak and powerless.--The conclusion therefore is that the breath,
in its fivefold form of prana, apana, and so on, subserves the purposes
of the individual soul, and thus occupies the position of an instrument,
no less than the eye and the other organs.
But as those five forms of breath, viz. prana, udana, &c., have
different names and functions they must be separate principles (and
hence there is not _one_ principal breath)! To this the next Sutra
replies.
11. It is designated as having five functions like mind.
As desire, and so on, are not principles different from mind, although
they are different functions and produce different effects--according to
the text, 'Desire, purpose, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness,
absence of firmness, shame, reflection, fear--all this is mind' (Bri. Up.
I, 5, 3); so, on the ground of the text, 'prana, apana, vyana, udana,
samana--all this is prana' (ibid.), apana and the rest must be held to
be different functions of prana only, not independent principles.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of what is 'a modification of air.'
12. And (it is) minute.
This prana also is minute, since as before (i.e. as in the case of the
organs) the text declares it to pass out of the body, to move, and so on,
'him when he passes out the prana follows after' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). A
further doubt arises, in the case of prana, owing to the fact that in
other texts it is spoken of as of large extent, 'It is equal to these
three worlds, equal to this Universe' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22); 'On prana
everything is founded'; 'For all this is shut up in prana.' But as the
texts declaring the passing out, and so on, of the prana, prove it to be
of limited size, the all-embracingness ascribed to prana in those other
texts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and
breathing creatures depends on breath.--Here terminates the adhikarana
of 'the minuteness of the best.'
13. But the rule (over the pranas) on the part of Fire and the rest,
together with him to whom the prana belong (i.e. the soul), is owing to
the thinking of that (viz. the highest Self); on account of scriptural
statement.
It has been shown that the pranas, together with the main prana,
originate from Brahman, and have a limited size. That the pranas are
guided by Agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a
previous occasion, viz. under Su. II, 1, 5. And it is known from
ordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul,
which uses them as means of experience and fruition. And this is also
established by scriptural texts, such as 'Having taken these pranas he
(i.e. the soul) moves about in his own body, according to his
pleasure'(Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). The question now arises whether the rule
of the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the pranas depends
on them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some other being.--
On them only, since they depend on no one else!--Not so, the Sutra
declares. The rule which light, and so on, i.e. Agni and the other
divinities, together with him to whom the pranas belong i.e. the soul,
exercise over the pranas, proceeds from the thinking of that, i.e. from
the will of the highest Self.--How is this known?--'From scriptural
statement.' For Scripture teaches that the organs, together with their
guiding divinities and the individual soul, depend in all their doings
on the thought of the highest Person. 'He, who abiding within Fire,
rules Fire from within.--He, who abiding within the air--within the Self--
within the eye, and so on' (Bri. Up III, 7); 'From fear of it the wind
blows, from fear of it the sun rises, from fear of it Agni and Indra,
yea Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of
that Imperishable one, sun and moon stand, held apart'(Bri Up III, 8, 9).
14. And on account of the eternity of this.
As the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by the highest
Self, is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his
essential nature, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the
soul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the
highest Self. The text, 'Having sent forth this he entered into it,
having entered into it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), shows
that the entering on the part of the highest Person into all things, so
as to be their ruler, is connected with his essential nature. Similarly
Smriti says, 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do
abide' (Bha. Gi. X, 42).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the rule of
Fire and the rest.'
15. They, with the exception of the best, are organs, on account of
being so designated.
Are all principles called pranas to be considered as 'organs'
(indriyani), or is the 'best,' i.e. the chief prana, to be excepted?--
All of them, without exception, are organs; for they all are called
pranas equally, and they all are instruments of the soul.--Not so, the
Sutra replies. The 'best' one is to be excepted, since only the prawas
other than the best are designated as organs. Texts such as 'the organs
are ten and one' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 5) apply the term 'organ' only to the
senses of sight and the rest, and the internal organ.
16. On account of scriptural statement of difference, and on account of
difference of characteristics.
Texts such as 'from him is born prana, and the internal organ, and all
organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital breath separately from the
organs, and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs. The
passage indeed mentions the internal organ (manas) also as something
separate; but in other passages the manas is formally included in the
organs, 'the (five) organs with mind as the sixth' (Bha. Gi. XV, 7).
That the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the
rest, is a matter of observation. For in the state of deep sleep the
function of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and so
on, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive of the manas,
is to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of
breath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for the reason that
the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs
themselves are called pranas. Thus Scripture says, 'they all became the
form of that (breath), and therefore they are called after him pranas'
(Bri. Up. I, 5, 21). 'They became its form' means--they became its body,
their activity depended on it.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the
_organs_.'
17. But the making of names and forms (belongs) to him who renders
tripartite, on account of scriptural teaching.
The Sutras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in
their collective aspect (samashti) and the activity of the individual
souls proceed from the highest Self; and they have also further
confirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their
organs depends on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to
the creation of the world in its discrete aspect (vyashti), which
consists in the differentiation of names and forms (i.e. of individual
beings). Is this latter creation the work of Hiranyagarbha only, who
represents the collective aggregate of all individual souls; or,
fundamentally, the work of the highest Brahman having Hiranyagarbha for
its body--just as the creation of water e.g. is the work of the highest
Brahman having sire for its body?--The Purvapakshin maintains the former
alternative. For, he says, the text 'Having entered with this living-
soul-self (anena jivenat-mana), let me differentiate names and forms'
(Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), declares the jiva-soul to be the agent in
differentiation. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed, not
in the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself (svena
rupena), but 'by this soul-self,' i.e. by a part of the highest Self, in
the form of the individual soul.--But on this interpretation the first
person in 'vyakaravani' (let me enter), and the grammatical form of
'having entered,' which indicates the agent, could not be taken in their
literal, but only in an implied, sense--as is the case in a sentence
such as 'Having entered the hostile army by means of a spy, I will
estimate its strength' (where the real agent is not the king, who is the
speaker, but the spy).--The cases are not analogous, the Purvapakshin
replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence
the king is agent by implication only. But in the case under discussion
the soul is a part, and hence contributes to constitute the essential
nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and
differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the
instrumental case ('with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of
association ('together with this soul-self'); for if a case can be taken
in its primary sense, it is not proper to understand it in a sense which
has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case,
jivena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that
of the instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts
of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most
suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the
_instrumental_ case--karana--on this basis). Nor can it be said that the
activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the
differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past
participle (pravisya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that
the two actions--of entering and differentiating--belong to the same
agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares
in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the
text by means of the clause 'with _that_ living Self refers to it as
something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the
action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hiranyagarbha.
Smriti texts also ascribe to him this activity; cp.'he in the beginning
made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the
gods and the rest, and of actions.'
Against this view the Sutra declares itself. The differentiation of
names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i.e. the highest
Brahman; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the
text 'That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings
with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms--let me make
each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned
have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong
to Brahma (Hiranyagarbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that
egg itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these
elements have been rendered tripartite; and Smriti says that Brahma
himself originated in that egg, 'in that egg there originated Brahma,
the grandfather of all the worlds.' As thus the action of rendering
tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation
of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's
only.--But how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in?--
The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self,' shows that the term
'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body;
just as in the clauses 'that fire thought'; 'it sent forth water';
'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having
fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names
and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body
Hiranyagarbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this
view the first person (in 'let me differentiate') and the agency
(conveyed by the form of 'pravisya') may, without any difficulty, be
taken in their primary literal senses; and the common agency, implied in
the connexion of pravisya and vyakaravani, is accounted for. The view
here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hiranyagarbha also
explains how the accounts of Hiranyagarbha's (Brahma's) creative
activity can say that he differentiated names and forms.
The whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought,' therefore has the
following meaning--'Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire,
Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul
(as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e.
let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and
give them names; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not
yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to
particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit
them for creation.'--The settled conclusion then is, that the
differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman
only.
But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentiation of names
and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite,
does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For
the rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul. For
the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a process of
tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by
Brahma. 'Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached
man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of
in three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion
flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the
preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes
on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to
the world created by Brahma, 'the red colour of burning fire is the
colour of fire,' &c. And the text moreover states the original
tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and
forms: 'That divinity having entered into these three beings
differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered
tripartite.'--To this objection the next Sutra replies.
18. Flesh is of earthy nature; in the case of the two others also
according to the text.
The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage
'each of these he made tripartite,' refers to a time subsequent to the
creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahma, cannot be
upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage 'earth
when eaten is disposed of in three ways,' &c., flesh is declared to be
more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be
assumed--in agreement with the nature of the causal substance--that
flesh is made of water and manas of fire [FOOTNOTE 581:1]. And similarly
we should have to assume that urine--which is the grossest part of
water drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)--is of the nature of earth, and breath, which
is its subtlest part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible;
for as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of
in three ways, flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy
nature. In the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two
others,' i.e. water and fire, 'according to the text.' That means--the
three parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be taken to
be all of them modifications of water, and the three parts of fire when
consumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire. Thus
feces, flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth; urine, blood
and breath transformations of water; bones, marrow and speech
transformations of fire.
This moreover agrees with the subsequent statement (VI, 5, 4), 'For,
truly, mind consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire.' The
process of tripartition referred to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the
same as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of
food when eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) assumption
made, and were it thence concluded that mind, breath and speech--as
being the subtlest created things--are made of fire, this would flatly
contradict the complementary text quoted above ('mind consists of earth,'
& c.). When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when eaten,
are transformed in a threefold way, it refers to elements which had
already been rendered tripartite; the process of tripartition must
therefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg.
Without such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise
to any effects; such capability they acquire only by being mutually
conjoined, and that is just the process of tripartition. In agreement
herewith Smriti says, 'Separate from each other, without connexion,
those elements with their various powers were incapable of producing
creatures. Bul having combined completely, entered into mutual
conjunction, abiding one within the other, the principles--from the
highest Mahat down to individual things--produced the mundane egg.'--
When the text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) 'The divinity having entered
into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and
forms; he made each of these tripartite,' the order in which the text
mentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted
by the order demanded by the sense [FOOTNOTE 583:1].--The text then
proceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition, by means of burning
fire, the sun and lightning, which indeed are things contained within
the mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took place
before the egg, with all its contents, was created); but this is done
for the information of Svetaketu, who himself is a being within the
mundane egg, and has to be taught with reference to things he knows.
But, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the matter the
elements--earth, water and fire--which are eaten and drunk, are already
tripartite, each of them containing portions of all, and thus are of a
threefold nature, how can they be designated each of them by a simple
term--_earth_, _water_, _fire_?--To this the next Sutra replies.
[FOOTNOTE 581:1. I.e. if the tripartition of earth (i. e. solid food)
when eaten, which is described in VI, 5, 1, were the same tripartition
which is described in VI, 3, 3-4, we should have to conclude that the
former tripartition consists, like the latter, in an admixture to earth
of water and fire.]
[FOOTNOTE 583:1. That means--in reality the tripartition of the elements
came first, and after that the creation of individual beings.]
19. But on account of their distinctive nature there is that designation,
that designation.
Each element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to the primary
tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails--
so that each element has a distinctive character of its own--a definite
designation is given to each.--The repetition (of 'that designation') in
the Sutra indicates the completion of the adhyaya.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'the fashioning of names and forms.'
THIRD ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.
1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped, (as appears) from
question and explanation.
That the Vedanta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation, on
the part of all men desirous of Release, the highest Brahman, which is
the only cause of the entire world, which is not touched by even a
shadow of imperfection, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely
exalted qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other
beings--this is the point proved in the two previous adhyayas; there
being given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised
against the Vedanta doctrine on the basis of Smriti and reasoning, to
refute the views held by other schools, to show that the different
Vedanta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove that the Self
is the object of activities (enjoined in injunctions of meditation, and
so on). In short, those two adhyayas have set forth the essential nature
of Brahman. The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to
enquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together with the means
of attainment. The third adhyaya is concerned with an enquiry into
meditation--which is the means of attaining to Brahman; and as the
motive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all
desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained, and by the
desire for that thing, the points first to be enquired into are the
imperfections of the individual soul--moving about in the different
worlds, whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in
the state of swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brahman
is raised above all these imperfections. These are the topics of the
first and second padas of the adhyaya.
The first question to be considered is whether the soul, when moving
from one body into another, is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of
the elements from which the new body is produced, or not. The
Purvapakshin maintains the latter alternative; for, he says, wherever
the soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments.
Other reasons supporting this prima facie view will be mentioned and
refuted further on.--The Sutra states the view finally accepted, 'In
obtaining another "of that" it goes enveloped.' The 'of that' refers
back to the form, i.e. body, mentioned in II, 4, 17. The soul when
moving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the
elements. This is known 'from question and explanation,' i.e. answer.
Question and answer are recorded in the 'Knowledge of the five fires'
(Ch. Up. V, 3-10), where Pravahana, after having addressed to Svetaketu
several other questions, finally asks 'Do you know why in the fifth
libation water is called man?' In answer to this last question the text
then explains how the Devas, i.e. the pranas attached to the soul, offer
into the heavenly world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation
called sraddha; how this sraddha changes itself into a body con sisting
of amrita, which body is called moon; how the same pranas offer this
body of amrita in Parjanya, imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so
offered becomes rain; how the same pranas throw that rain on to the
earth, also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes food;
how this food is then offered into man, also compared to fire, where it
becomes seed; and how, finally, this seed is offered into woman, also
compared to a fire, and there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on,
'Thus in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavakas,' i.e. to be
designated by the term _man_. And this means that the water which, in a
subtle form, was throughout present in the previous oblations also, now,
in that fifth oblation, assumes the form of a man.--From this question
and answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment,
together with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs.--But
the words, 'water becomes purushavakas,' only intimate that water
assumes the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only invests
the soul during its wanderings; how then can it be held that the soul
moves invested by the rudiments of all elements?--To this question the
next Sutra replies.
2. But on account of (water) consisting of the three elements; on
account of predominance.
Water alone could not produce a new body; for the text Ch. Up. VI, 3, 4,
'Each of these he made tripartite,' shows that all the elements were'
made tripartite to the end of producing bodies. That the text under
discussion mentions water only, is due to the predominance of water; and
that among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates, we
infer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the
predominating element in the body.
3. And on account of the going of the pranas.
That the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements
follows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said
to be followed by the pranas, 'when he thus passes out, the chief prana
follows after him,' &c. (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). Compare also Smriti: 'It
draws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the sixth. When
the Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and passes out of another, he takes
with him those organs and then moves on, as the wind takes the odours
from their abodes (the flowers)' (Bha. Gi. XV, 8). But the pranas cannot
move without a substrate, and hence we must admit that the rudiments of
the elements--which are their substrate--are also moving.
4. If it be said (that it is not so) on account of scriptural statement
as to going to Agni and the rest; we say no, on account of the secondary
nature (of the statement).
But the text, 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire,' &c.
(Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). declares that when a person dies his organs go
into fire, and so on; they cannot therefore accompany the soul. Hence
the text which asserts the latter point must be explained in some other
way!--Not so, the Sutra replies. The text stating that the organs go to
fire, and so on, cannot be taken in its literal sense; for it continues,
'the hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hair of the head into
trees' (which manifestly is not true, in its literal sense). The going
of speech, the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean that
the different organs approach the divinities (Agni and the rest) who
preside over them.
5. Should it be said, on account of absence of mention in the first
(reply); we say no, for just that (is meant), on the ground of fitness.
An objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under III, 1, 1; on
the ground that in the first oblation, described in Ch. Up. V, 4, 2, as
being made into the heavenly world, water is not mentioned at all as the
thing offered. The text says, 'on that altar the gods offer sraddha';
and by sraddha (belief) everybody understands a certain activity of mind.
Water therefore is not the thing offered.--Not so, we reply. It is
nothing else but water, which there is called sraddha. For thus only
question and answer have a sense. For the question is, 'Do you know why
in the fifth libation water is called man?' and at the outset of the
reply sraddha is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the
heavenly world viewed as a fire. If here the word sraddha did not denote
water, question and answer would refer to different topics, and there
would be no connexion. The form in which the final statement is
introduced (iti tu pankamyam, &c., 'but thus in the fifth oblation,' &c.),
moreover, also intimates that sraddha means water. The word 'iti,'
_thus_, here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the
question, 'Do you know _how_?' &c. Sraddha becomes moon, rain, food,
seed, embryo in succession, and _thus_ the water comes to be called man.
Moreover, the word sraddha is actually used in the Veda in the sense of
'water'; 'he carries water, sraddha indeed is water' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6,
8, 1). Aad what the text says as to king Soma (the moon) originating
from sraddha when offered, also shows that sraddha must mean water. |
|
댓글 없음:
댓글 쓰기