2015년 1월 29일 목요일

Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja 18

Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja 18

It is in this way that room is found for those texts also which proclaim
Brahman to be free from all imperfection and all change. It thus remains
a settled conclusion that Brahman by itself constitutes the material as
well as the operative cause of the world.




28. And because it is called the womb.

Brahman is the material as well as the operative cause of the world for
that reason also that certain texts call it the womb, 'the maker, the
Lord, the Person, Brahman, the womb' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); 'that which
the wise regard as the womb of all beings' (I, 1, 6). And that 'womb'
means as much as material cause, appears from the complementary passage
'As a spider sends forth and draws in its threads' (I, 1, 7)--




29. Herewith all (texts) are explained, explained.

Hereby, i.e. by the whole array of arguments set forth in the four padas
of the first adhyaya; all those particular passages of the Vedanta-texts
which give instruction as to the cause of the world, are explained as
meaning to set forth a Brahman all-wise, all-powerful, different in
nature from all beings intelligent and non-intelligent. The repetition
of the word 'explained' is meant to indicate the termination of the
adhyaya.




SECOND ADHYAYA

FIRST PADA.

1. If it be said that there would result the fault of there being no
room for (certain) Smritis: (we reply) 'no,' because there would result
the fault of want of room for other Smritis.

The first adhyaya has established the truth that what the Vedanta-texts
teach is a Supreme Brahman, which is something different as well from
non-sentient matter known through the ordinary means of proof, viz.
Perception and so on, as from the intelligent souls whether connected
with or separated from matter; which is free from even a shadow of
imperfection of any kind; which is an ocean as it were of auspicious
qualities and so on; which is the sole cause of the entire Universe;
which constitutes the inner Self of all things. The second adhyaya is
now begun for the purpose of proving that the view thus set forth cannot
be impugned by whatever arguments may possibly be brought forward. The
Sutrakara at first turns against those who maintain that the Vedanta-
texts do not establish the view indicated above, on the ground of that
view being contradicted by the Smriti of Kapila, i. e. the Sankhya-
system.

But how can it be maintained at all that Scripture does not set forth a
certain view because thereby it would enter into conflict with Smriti?
For that Smriti if contradicted by Scripture is to be held of no account,
is already settled in the Purva Mimamsa ('But where there is
contradiction Smriti is not to be regarded,' I, 3, 3).--Where, we reply,
a matter can be definitely settled on the basis of Scripture--as e.g. in
the case of the Vedic injunction, 'he is to sing, after having touched
the Udumbara branch' (which clearly contradicts the Smriti injunction
that the whole branch is to be covered up)--Smriti indeed need not be
regarded. But the topic with which the Vedanta-texts are concerned is
hard to understand, and hence, when a conflict arises between those
texts and a Smriti propounded by some great Rishi, the matter does not
admit of immediate decisive settlement: it is not therefore unreasonable
to undertake to prove by Smriti that Scripture does not set forth a
certain doctrine. That is to say--we possess a Smriti composed with a
view to teach men the nature and means of supreme happiness, by the
great Rishi Kapila to whom Scripture, Smriti, Itihasa and Purana alike
refer as a person worthy of all respect (compare e. g. 'the Rishi Kapila,'
Svet. Up. V, 2), and who moreover (unlike Brihaspati and other Smriti--
writers) fully acknowledges the validity of all the means of earthly
happiness which are set forth in the karmakanda of the Veda, such as the
daily oblations to the sacred fires, the New and Full Moon offerings and
the great Soma sacrifices. Now, as men having only an imperfect
knowledge of the Veda, and moreover naturally slow-minded, can hardly
ascertain the sense of the Vedanta-texts without the assistance of such
a Smriti, and as to be satisfied with that sense of the Vedanta which
discloses itself on a mere superficial study of the text would imply the
admission that the whole Sankhya Smriti, although composed by an able
and trustworthy person, really is useless; we see ourselves driven to
acknowledge that the doctrine of the Vedanta-texts cannot differ from
the one established by the Sankhyas. Nor must you object that to do so
would force on us another unacceptable conclusion, viz. that those
Smritis, that of Manu e.g., which maintain Brahman to be the universal
cause, are destitute of authority; for Manu and similar works inculcate
practical religious duty and thus have at any rate the uncontested
function of supporting the teaching of the karmakanda of the Veda. The
Sankhya Smriti, on the other hand, is entirely devoted to the setting
forth of theoretical truth (not of practical duty), and if it is not
accepted in that quality, it is of no use whatsoever.--On this ground
the Sutra sets forth the prima facie view, 'If it be said that there
results the fault of there being no room for certain Smritis.'

The same Sutra replies 'no; because there would result the fault of want
of room for other Smritis.' For other Smritis, that of Manu e.g., teach
that Brahman is the universal cause. Thus Manu says, 'This (world)
existed in the shape of darkness, and so on. Then the divine Self
existent, indiscernible but making discernible all this, the great
elements and the rest, appeared with irresistible power, dispelling the
darkness. He, desiring to produce beings of many kinds from his own body,
first with a thought created the waters, and placed his seed in them'
(Manu I, 5-8). And the Bhagavad-gita, 'I am the origin and the
dissolution of the whole Universe' (VII, 6). 'I am the origin of all;
everything proceeds from me' (X, 8). Similarly, in the Mahabharata, to
the question 'Whence was created this whole world with its movable and
immovable beings?' the answer is given, 'Narayana assumes the form of
the world, he the infinite, eternal one'; and 'from him there originates
the Unevolved consisting of the three gunas'; and 'the Unevolved is
merged in the non-acting Person.' And Parasara says, 'From Vishnu there
sprang the world and in him it abides; he makes this world persist and
he rules it--he is the world.' Thus also Apastamba, 'The living beings
are the dwelling of him who lies in all caves, who is not killed, who is
spotless'; and 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he
is eternal, permanent.' (Dharmasu. I, 8, 22, 4; 23, 2).--If the question
as to the meaning of the Vedanta-texts were to be settled by means of
Kapila's Smriti, we should have to accept the extremely undesirable
conclusion that all the Smritis quoted are of no authority. It is true
that the Vedanta-texts are concerned with theoretical truth lying
outside the sphere of Perception and the other means of knowledge, and
that hence students possessing only a limited knowledge of the Veda
require some help in order fully to make out the meaning of the Vedanta.
But what must be avoided in this case is to give any opening for the
conclusion that the very numerous Smritis which closely follow the
doctrine of the Vedanta, are composed by the most competent and
trustworthy persons and aim at supporting that doctrine, are irrelevant;
and it is for this reason that Kapila's Smriti which contains a doctrine
opposed to Scripture must be disregarded. The support required is
elucidation of the sense conveyed by Scripture, and this clearly cannot
be effected by means of a Smriti contradicting Scripture. Nor is it of
any avail to plead, as the Purvapakshin does, that Manu and other
Smritis of the same kind fulfil in any case the function of elucidating
the acts of religious duty enjoined in the karmakanda. For if they
enjoin acts of religious duty as means to win the favour of the Supreme
Person but do not impress upon us the idea of that Supreme Person
himself who is to be pleased by those acts, they are also not capable of
impressing upon us the idea of those acts themselves. That it is the
character of all religious acts to win the favour of the Supreme Spirit,
Smriti distinctly declares, 'Man attains to perfection by worshipping
with his proper action Him from whom all Beings proceed; and by whom all
this is stretched out' (Bha. Gi. XVIII, 46); 'Let a man meditate on
Narayana, the divine one, at all works, such as bathing and the like; he
will then reach the world of Brahman and not return hither' (Daksha-
smriti); and 'Those men with whom, intent on their duties, thou art
pleased, O Lord, they pass beyond all this Maya and find Release for
their souls' (Vi. Pu.). Nor can it be said that Manu and similar Smritis
have a function in so far as setting forth works (not aiming at final
Release but) bringing about certain results included in transmigratory
existence, whether here on earth or in a heavenly world; for the
essential character of those works also is to please the highest Person.
As is said in the Bhagavad-gita (IX, 23, 24); 'Even they who devoted to
other gods worship them with faith, worship me, against ordinance. For I
am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices; but they know me not in
truth and hence they fall,' and 'Thou art ever worshipped by me with
sacrifices; thou alone, bearing the form of pitris and of gods, enjoyest
all the offerings made to either.' Nor finally can we admit the
contention that it is rational to interpret the Vedanta-texts in
accordance with Kapila's Smriti because Kapila, in the Svetasvatara text,
is referred to as a competent person. For from this it would follow that,
as Brihaspati is, in Sruti and Smriti, mentioned as a pattern of
consummate wisdom, Scripture should be interpreted in agreement with the
openly materialistic and atheistic Smriti composed by that authority.
But, it may here be said, the Vedanta-texts should after all be
interpreted in agreement with Kapila's Smriti, for the reason that
Kapila had through the power of his concentrated meditation (yoga)
arrived at an insight into truth.--To this objection the next Sutra
replies.




2. And on account of the non-perception (of truth on the part) of others.

The 'and' in the Sutra has the force of 'but,' being meant to dispel the
doubt raised. There are many other authors of Smritis, such as Manu, who
through the power of their meditation had attained insight into the
highest truth, and of whom it is known from Scripture that the purport
of their teaching was a salutary medicine to the whole world ('whatever
Manu said that was medicine'). Now, as these Rishis did not see truth in
the way of Kapila, we conclude that Kapila's view, which contradicts
Scripture, is founded on error, and cannot therefore be used to modify
the sense of the Vedanta-texts.--Here finishes the adhikarana treating
of 'Smriti.'




3. Hereby the Yoga is refuted.

By the above refutation of Kapila's Smriti the Yoga-smriti also is
refuted.--But a question arises, What further doubt arises here with
regard to the Yoga system, so as to render needful the formal extension
to the Yoga of the arguments previously set forth against the Sankhya?--
It might appear, we reply, that the Vedanta should be supported by the
Yoga-smriti, firstly, because the latter admits the existence of a Lord;
secondly, because the Vedanta-texts mention Yoga as a means to bring
about final Release; and thirdly, because Hiranyagarbha, who proclaimed
the Yoga-smriti is qualified for the promulgation of all Vedanta-texts.--
But these arguments refute themselves as follows. In the first place the
Yoga holds the Pradhana, which is independent of Brahman, to be the
general material cause, and hence the Lord acknowledged by it is a mere
operative cause. In the second place the nature of meditation, in which
Yoga consists, is determined by the nature of the object of meditation,
and as of its two objects, viz. the soul and the Lord, the former does
not have its Self in Brahman, and the latter is neither the cause of the
world nor endowed with the other auspicious qualities (which belong to
Brahman), the Yoga is not of Vedic character. And as to the third point,
Hiranyagarbha himself is only an individual soul, and hence liable to be
overpowered by the inferior gunas, i.e. passion and darkness; and hence
the Yoga-smriti is founded on error, no less than the Puranas,
promulgated by him, which are founded on rajas and tamas. The Yoga
cannot, therefore, be used for the support of the Vedanta.--Here
finishes the adhikarana of 'the refutation of the Yoga.'




4. Not, on account of the difference of character of that; and its being
such (appears) from Scripture.

The same opponent who laid stress on the conflict between Scripture and
Smriti now again comes forward, relying this time (not on Smriti but) on
simple reasoning. Your doctrine, he says, as to the world being an
effect of Brahman which you attempted to prove by a refutation of the
Sankhya Smriti shows itself to be irrational for the following reason.
Perception and the other means of knowledge show this world with all its
sentient and non-sentient beings to be of a non-intelligent and impure
nature, to possess none of the qualities of the Lord, and to have pain
for its very essence; and such a world totally differs in nature from
the Brahman, postulated by you, which is said to be all-knowing, of
supreme lordly power, antagonistic to all evil, enjoying unbroken
uniform blessedness. This difference in character of the world from
Brahman is, moreover, not only known through Perception, and so on, but
is seen to be directly stated in Scripture itself; compare 'Knowledge
and non-knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6, 1); 'Thus are these objects placed
on the subjects, and the subjects on the prana' (Kau. Up. III, 9); 'On
the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own
impotence' (Svet. Up. IV, 7); 'The soul not being a Lord is bound
because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); and so on; all which texts
refer to the effect, i.e. the world as being non-intelligent, of the
essence of pain, and so on. The general rule is that an effect is non-
different in character from its cause; as e.g. pots and bracelets are
non-different in character from their material causes--clay and gold.
The world cannot, therefore, be the effect of Brahman from which it
differs in character, and we hence conclude that, in agreement with the
Sankhya Smriti, the Pradhana which resembles the actual world in
character must be assumed to be the general cause. Scripture, although
not dependent on anything else and concerned with super-sensuous objects,
must all the same come to terms with ratiocination (tarka); for all the
different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a
decisive conclusion, only if they are supported by ratiocination. For by
tarka we understand that kind of knowledge (intellectual activity) which
in the case of any given matter, by means of an investigation either
into the essential nature of that matter or into collateral (auxiliary)
factors, determines what possesses proving power, and what are the
special details of the matter under consideration: this kind of
cognitional activity is also called uha. All means of knowledge equally
stand in need of tarka; Scripture however, the authoritative character
of which specially depends on expectancy (akanksha), proximity
(sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyata), throughout requires to be
assisted by tarka. In accordance with this Manu says,'He who
investigates by means of reasoning, he only knows religious duty, and
none other.' It is with a view to such confirmation of the sense of
Scripture by means of Reasoning that the texts declare that certain
topics such as the Self must be 'reflected on' (mantavya).--Now here it
might possibly be said that as Brahman is ascertained from Scripture to
be the sole cause of the world, it must be admitted that intelligence
exists in the world also, which is an effect of Brahman. In the same way
as the consciousness of an intelligent being is not perceived when it is
in the states of deep sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligent nature of
jars and the like also is not observed, although it really exists; and
it is this very difference of manifestation and non-manifestation of
intelligence on which the distinction of intelligent and non-intelligent
beings depends.--But to this we reply that permanent non-perception of
intelligence proves its non-existence. This consideration also refutes
the hypothesis of things commonly called non-intelligent possessing the
power, or potentiality, of consciousness. For if you maintain that a
thing possesses the power of producing an effect while yet that effect
is never and nowhere _seen_ to be produced by it, you may as well
proclaim at a meeting of sons of barren women that their mothers possess
eminent procreative power! Moreover, to prove at first from the Vedanta-
texts that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and from this
that pots and the like possess potential consciousness, and therefrom
the existence of non-manifested consciousness; and then, on the other
hand, to start from the last principle as proved and to deduce therefrom
that the Vedanta-texts prove Brahman to be the material cause of the
world, is simply to argue in a circle; for that the relation of cause
and effect should exist between things different in character is just
what cannot be proved.--What sameness of character, again, of causal
substance and effects, have you in mind when you maintain that from the
absence of such sameness it follows that Brahman cannot be proved to be
the material cause of the world? It cannot be complete sameness of all
attributes, because in that case the relation of cause and effect (which
after all requires _some_ difference) could not be established. For we
do not observe that in pots and jars which are fashioned out of a lump
of clay there persists the quality of 'being a lump' which belongs to
the causal substance. And should you say that it suffices that there
should be equality in some or any attribute, we point out that such is
actually the case with regard to Brahman and the world, both of which
have the attribute of 'existence' and others. The true state of the case
rather is as follows. There is equality of nature between an effect and
a cause, in that sense that those essential characteristics by which the
causal substance distinguishes itself from other things persist in its
effects also: those characteristic features, e.g., which distinguish
gold from clay and other materials, persist also in things made of gold-
bracelets and the like. But applying this consideration to Brahman and
the world we find that Brahman's essential nature is to be antagonistic
to all evil, and to consist of knowledge, bliss and power, while the
world's essential nature is to be the opposite of all this. Brahman
cannot, therefore, be the material cause of the world.

But, it may be objected, we observe that even things of different
essential characteristics stand to each other in the relation of cause
and effect. From man, e.g., who is a sentient being, there spring nails,
teeth, and hair, which are non-sentient things; the sentient scorpion
springs from non-sentient dung; and non-sentient threads proceed from
the sentient spider.--This objection, we reply, is not valid; for in the
instances quoted the relation of cause and effect rests on the non-
sentient elements only (i.e. it is only the non-sentient matter of the
body which produces nails, &c.).

But, a further objection is raised, Scripture itself declares in many
places that things generally held to be non-sentient really possess
intelligence; compare 'to him the earth said'; 'the water desired'; 'the
pranas quarrelling among themselves as to their relative pre-eminence
went to Brahman.' And the writers of the Puranas ako attribute
consciousness to rivers, hills, the sea, and so on. Hence there is after
all no essential difference in nature between sentient and so-called non-
sentient beings.--To this objection the Purvapakshin replies in the next
Sutra.




5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account
of distinction and entering.

The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts
such as 'to him the earth said,' the terms 'earth' and so on, denote the
divinities presiding over earth and the rest.--How is this known?--'
Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by
the distinctive term 'divinities'; so e.g. 'Let me enter into those
three divinities' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are
called divinities; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with
each other as to pre-eminence,' and 'all these divinities having
recognised pre-eminence in prana.' The 'entering' of the Sutra refers to
Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered into the mouth;
Aditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c., where the text
declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs
as their superintendents.

We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non-
intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman,
cannot be the effect of Brahman; and that therefore, in agreement with
Smriti confirmed by reasoning, the Vedanta-texts must be held to teach
that the Pradhana is the universal material cause. This prima facie view
is met by the following Sutra.




6. But it is seen.

The 'but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sutra).
The assertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world
because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded;
since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature
stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is
observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms
and other little animals.--But it has been said above that in those
cases there is sameness of nature, in so far as the relation of cause
and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both!--
This assertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that
equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view.
For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in
some point or other only it would follow that, as all things have
certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from
anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for
the relation of cause and effect is constituted by the persistence, in
the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause
from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not
hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from
honey and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable to assume that the
world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate
from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey,
scorpions from dung, &c., we do _not_ observe--what indeed we _do_
observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made
of gold--that the special characteristics distinguishing the causal
substance from other things persist in the effects also.




7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing; we say no, there
being a mere denial.

But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature
from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are
separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i.
e. Brahman; and this again implies that the world originates from what
has no existence!--Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sutra has
laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause
and effect should be of the same nature; it was not asserted that the
effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We
by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so
as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. For
such is the case with the honey and the worms also. There is difference
of characteristics, but--as in the case of gold and golden bracelets--
there is oneness of substance.--An objection is raised.




8. On account of such consequences in reabsorption (the Vedanta-texts
would be) inappropriate.

The term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of
Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on--among which it is the first
as appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states
'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'The Self only was this in the
beginning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of
cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the world all being
in Brahman, the different states of the world would connect themselves
with Brahman, and the latter would thus be affected by all the
imperfections of its effect; in the same way as all the attributes of
the bracelet are present in the gold also. And the undesirable
consequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated
in different Vedanta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the
same substance; cp. 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'Free
from sin, free from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Of him
there is known neither cause nor effect' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of these
two one eats the sweet fruit' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self that is not a
Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); 'On account of
his impotence he laments, bewildered' (Svet. Up. IV, 7).--Nor can we
accept the explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its
effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body;
and as all imperfections inhere in that body only, they do not touch
Brahman in either its causal or effected state. For it is not possible
that the world and Brahman should stand to each other in the relation of
effect and cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to
connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. It is not, we
say, possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together
should constitute the body of Brahman. For a body is a particular
aggregate of earth and the other elements, depending for its subsistence
on vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an abode to
the sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain
retributive of former works: such is in Vedic and worldly speech the
sense connected with the term 'body.' But numerous Vedic texts--'Free
from sin, from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1); 'Without eating the
other one looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'Grasping without hands, hasting
without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' (Svet. Up.
III, 19); 'Without breath, without mind' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)--declare
that the highest Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its
fruits, is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, and has
no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that he cannot have a
body constituted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings. Nor can
either non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as grass,
trees, &c., or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state
be viewed as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot
constitute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle state combined
into earth and the other gross elements (which again would be required
for a body). And sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are
of course incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to constitute a
body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the
abode of fruition, and that Brahman may possess a body in this latter
sense; for there are abodes of fruition, such as palaces and the like,
which are not considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the
last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly
abiding in which a being enjoys pain and pleasure; for if a soul enters
a body other than its own, that body is indeed the abode in which it
enjoys the pains and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted
to be in the proper sense of the word the _body_ of the soul thus
entered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, who is in the
enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss, it can in no way be
maintained that he must be joined to a body, consisting of all sentient
and non-sentient beings, for the purpose of enjoyment.--That view also
according to which a 'body' means no more than a _means_ of enjoyment is
refuted hereby.

You will now possibly try another definition, viz. that the body of a
being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of
which depend on the will of that being, and that hence a body may be
ascribed to the Lord in so far as the essential nature, subsistence, and
activity of all depend on him.--But this also is objectionable; since in
the first place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on
the will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further, an
injured body does not obey in its movements the will of its possessor;
and since the persistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul
that tenanted it. Dancing puppets and the like, on the other hand, are
things the nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the will
of intelligent beings, but we do not on that account consider them to be
the bodies of those beings. As, moreover, the nature of an eternal
intelligent soul does not depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be
its body under the present definition.--Nor again can it be said that
the body of a being is constituted by that which is exclusively ruled
and supported by that being and stands towards it in an exclusive
subservient relation (sesha); for this definition would include actions
also. And finally it is a fact that several texts definitely declare
that the Lord is without a body, 'Without hands and feet he grasps and
hastens' &c.

As thus the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between
Brahman and the world, and as if it did subsist, all the imperfections
of the world would cling to Brahman; the Vedanta--texts are wrong in
teaching that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

To this prima facie view the next Sutra replies.




9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

The teaching of the Vedanta-texts is not inappropriate, since there are
instances of good and bad qualities being separate in the case of one
thing connected with two different states. The 'but' in the Sutra
indicates the impossibility of Brahman being connected with even a
shadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows. As Brahman has all
sentient and non-sentient things for its body, and constitutes the Self
of that body, there is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being
connected with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential
characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand and contraction
on the other; for this expansion and contraction belong (not to Brahman
itself, but) to the sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections
adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good qualities
belonging to the Self do not extend to the body; in the same way as
youth, childhood, and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings,
such as gods or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self;
while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self only,
not to the body. On this understanding there is no objection to
expressions such as 'he is born as a god or as a man' and 'the same
person is a child, and then a youth, and then an old man' That the
character of a god or man belongs to the individual soul only in so far
as it has a body, will be shown under III, 1, 1.

The assertion made by the Purvapakshin as to the impossibility of the
world, comprising matter and souls and being either in its subtle or its
gross condition, standing to Brahman in the relation of a body, we
declare to be the vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing
from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully considered the
meaning of the whole body of Vedanta-texts as supported by legitimate
argumentation. For as a matter of fact all Vedanta-texts distinctly
declare that the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual,
stands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare e.g.the
antaryamin-brahmana, in the Kanva as well as the Madhyandina-text, where
it is said first of non-sentient things ('he who dwells within the earth,
whose body the earth is' &c.), and afterwards separately of the
intelligent soul ('he who dwells in understanding,' according to the
Kanvas; 'he who dwells within the Self,' according to the Madhyandinas)
that they constitute the body of the highest Self. Similarly the Subala-
Upanishad declares that matter and souls in all their states constitute
the body of the highest Self ('He who dwells within the earth' &c.), and
concludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those beings ('He
is the inner Self of all' &c.). Similarly Smriti, 'The whole world is
thy body'; 'Water is the body of Vishnu'; 'All this is the body of Hari';
'All these things are his body'; 'He having reflected sent forth from
his body'--where the 'body' means the elements in their subtle state. In
ordinary language the word 'body' is not, like words such as _jar_,
limited in its denotation to things of one definite make or character,
but is observed to be applied directly (not only secondarily or
metaphorically) to things of altogether different make and
characteristics--such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed
animals, and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition of the
word that is in agreement with general use. The definitions given by the
Purvapakshin--'a body is that which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of
actions' &c.--do not fulfil this requirement; for they do not take in
such things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be the body
of the Lord. And further they do not take in those bodily forms which
the Lord assumes according to his wish, nor the bodily forms released
souls may assume, according to 'He is one' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 36, 2); for
none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the results of
actions. And further, the bodily forms which the Supreme Person assumes
at wish are not special combinations of earth and the other elements;
for Smriti says, 'The body of that highest Self is not made from a
combination of the elements.' It thus appears that it is also too narrow
a definition to say that a body is a combination of the different
elements. Again, to say that a body is that, the life of which depends
on the vital breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz
in respect of plants; for although vital air is present in plants, it
does not in them support the body by appearing in five special forms.
Nor again does it answer to define a body as either the abode of the
sense-organs or as the cause of pleasure and pain; for neither of these
definitions takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on
Ahalya and other persons in accordance with their deeds. We are thus led
to adopt the following definition--Any substance which a sentient soul
is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes,
and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the
body of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed, &c.,
control and so on are not actually perceived because the power of
control, although existing, is obstructed; in the same way as, owing to
some obstruction, the powers of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually
perceived. A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment in which
the soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved shortly after; it
(thus strictly speaking is not a body at all but) is spoken of as a body
because it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously
constituted a body. In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient
beings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are
completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are
absolutely subordinate to him. Texts which speak of the highest Self as
'bodiless among bodies' (e.g. Ka. Up. I. 2, 22), only mean to deny of
the Self a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture declares
that the Universe is his body. This point will be fully established in
subsequent adhikaranas also. The two preceding Sutras (8 and 9) merely
suggest the matter proved in the adhikarana beginning with II, 1, 21.




10. And on account of the objections to his view.

The theory of Brahman being the universal cause has to be accepted not
only because it is itself free from objections, but also because the
pradhana theory is open to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For
on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted
for. The Sankhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to
Prakriti the attributes of the latter are fictitiously superimposed upon
the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free
from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the
empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of
that approximation or nearness of Prakriti which causes the
superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakriti.
Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakriti or some change
in Prakriti? or does it mean some change in the soul?--Not the latter;
for the soul is assumed to be incapable of change.--Nor again a change
in Prakriti; for changes in Prakriti are supposed, in the system, to be
the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And
if, finally, the nearness of Prakriti means no more than its existence,
it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that
superimposition (for Prakriti exists always).--The Sankhya is thus
unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This
same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special
refutation of the Sankhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)




11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.

The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause
must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhana must be abandoned,
because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved
by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kanada, Akshapada,
Jina, Kapila and Patanjali respectively are all mutually contradictory.




12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different
way; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is
not got rid of.

Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth
by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the
same we may arrive at the Pradhana theory through other lines of
reasoning by which the objections raised against the theory are refuted.--
But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests
exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other
time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more
skilful than you in reasoning; and thus there is no getting over the
objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The
conclusion from all this is that, with regard to supersensuous matters,
Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied
only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, 'He
who supports the teaching of the Rishis and the doctrine as to sacred
duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows
sacred duty' (Manu XII, 106). The teaching of the Sankhyas which
conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of
confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda.--Here finishes the
section treating of 'difference of nature.'




13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised
(within the Veda) are explained.

Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised
within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sutra means to say that by the
demolition given above of the Sankhya doctrine which is not comprised
within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position,
viz. the theories of Kanada, Akshapada, Jina, and Buddha, must likewise
be considered as demolished.

Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that,
since all these theories agree in the view of atoms constituting the
general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal
substance is ill-founded.--They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that
extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and
they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms
which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or
non-void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence,
being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the
reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those
theories to be ill-founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.--Here
finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non-comprised (within
the Veda).'




14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows
non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul); we reply--it may
be as in ordinary life.

The Sankhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he
says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an
effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings
in either their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the
difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such
difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes
an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing
a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to
embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does.--But we have, under
I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lord's being liable to experiences of
pleasure and pain!--By no means! There you have shown only that the
Lord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to constitute the
object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure
and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like
an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that,
like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we
observe that embodied souls, although not capable of participating in
the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c., yet
experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal
condition of the matter constituting the body. In agreement with this
Scripture says, 'As long as he possesses a body there is for him no
escape from pleasure and pain; but when he is free of the body then
neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus,
the theory of an embodied Brahman constituting the universal cause does
not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual
soul; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely
homogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode
of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a
lump of clay or gold participates in the imperfections of the thing
fashioned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhana being
the general cause is the more valid one.

To this objection the Sutra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in
ordinary life.' The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and
the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences
pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due
to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form
of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers
to that body only which is originated by karman; for other texts ('He is
onefold, he is threefold'; 'If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He
moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII,
2, 1; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage
of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a
shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which
is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its
gross and its subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected
with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind.--'As in
ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either
observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or
pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does
not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he
himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or
transgression of his commands. The author of the Dramida-bhashya gives
expression to the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although
staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of
discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his
body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort,
rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all
possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the Lord of
creation, to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were, is
not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of
Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy
all possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should undergo
changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts
declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection.--Others
give a different explanation of this Sutra. According to them it refutes
the purvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the
distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be
accounted for--proving the possibility of such distinction by means of
the analogous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But
this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that
creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or
a limiting adjunct (upadhi) no such prima facie view can arise. For on
their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the
power or Nescience or upadhi inhering in the causal substance, and the
power or Nescience or upadhi is the object of enjoyment; and as the two
are of different nature, they cannot pass over into each other. The view
of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that prima
facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those
philosophers; for Sutra II, 1, 35 teaches that the individual souls and
their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the
distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal).
But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt
as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not
arise; for the distinction of the two groups will, on that view, be
analogous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the
one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fashioned out of
the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a
change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman
(which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to
transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects of enjoyment.

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