27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the
senses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must
necessarily be accomplished.
The question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and
so on, or not. The Purvapakshin says he must not, since the performance
of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action,
and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.--This
view the Sutra sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in
outward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise
calmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by
Scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows
this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected,
should see the Self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). As calmness of mind
and the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration
of mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must
necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between
works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an
absolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application.
Activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of
works enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as
have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case
of works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are
impossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions
of the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by
Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence,
through his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions
obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of
mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on.
28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life;
on account of this being seen.
In the meditation on prana, according to the Vajasaneyins and the
Chandogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who
knows the prana. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri.
Up. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission
of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prana, in
all circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.--The
Purvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions
being stated in the text.--This the Sutra sets aside 'in the case of
danger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of
food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself--
the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prana--only when
their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how
Ushasta Kakrayana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once,
when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that
what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prana,
can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order
to preserve life.
29. And on account of non-sublation.
The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that
thus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin, for those who
know Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination
of knowledge of Brahman. Cp.' when the food is pure the mind becomes
pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2).
30. This is said in Smriti also.
That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of
food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, Smriti also
declares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is
stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'
31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according
to liking.
The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage
prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is
a passage in the Samhita of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brahmawa does not
drink spirituous liquor, thinking "may I not be stained by sin."'--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food.'
32. The works of the asramas also, on account of their being enjoined.
It has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the
knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be
performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his
asrama, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the
Purvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand
in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the
contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.--Of this view
the Sutra disposes, 'The works of the asramas also.' The works belonging
to each asrama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more
than to live according to the asrama; for they are specifically enjoined
by texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra';
this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same
works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears
from the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by
the study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next Sutra
declares.
33. And on account of co-operativeness.
These works are to be performed also on account of their being co-
operative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the
desire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose
does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the
Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and
another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.--Nor does this
imply a difference of works--this the next Sutra declares.
34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential
signs.
There is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i.e. whether
they be viewed as duties incumbent on the asrama or as auxiliary to
knowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For
Scripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the
same terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of
proof to establish difference of works.
35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.
Texts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that
sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being
overpowered,' i.e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed
by evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after
day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge
arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the
works are the same in either case.--Here terminates the adhikarana of
'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).
36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.
It has been declared that the members of the four asramas have a claim
to the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each
asrarna promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who,
on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the asramas are qualified
for the knowledge of Brahman, or rtot.--They are not, the Purvapakshin
holds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the
special duties of each asrama; while those who do not belong to an
asrama are not concerned with asrama duties.--This view the Sutra
rejects. Those also who do not stand within any asrama are qualified for
knowledge, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because the texts declare that
men such as Raikva, Bhishma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to
asrama were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no
means be maintained that it is asrama duties only that promote knowledge;
for the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (Bri. Up. IV,
4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which
are not confined to the asramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the
same way as in the case of those bound to chastity--who, as the texts
show, may possess the knowledge of Brahman--knowledge is promoted by
practices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so--it is concluded--in
the case of those also who do not belong to any abrama knowledge may be
promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any asrama,
such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so
on.
37. Smriti also states this.
Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an asrama grow in
knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brahmana
may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends
all creatures is called a Brahmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).
38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of
duty).
The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but
Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices
not exclusively prescribed for the asramas, 'By penance, abstinence,
faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).
39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential
mark.
Better than to be outside the asramas is the condition of standing
within an asrama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who
can should be within an asrama, which state is the more holy and
beneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for
Smriti says, 'A Brahmana is to remain outside the asramas not even for
one day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or
whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the
misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an asrama).--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'
40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that,
according to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from
the absence of the forms of that.
The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state
of life of a Naishthika, Vaikhanasa or Parivrajaka are qualified for the
knowledge of Brahman or not.--They are so, since in their case, no less
than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be
assisted by charity and other practices not confined to asramas.--This
prima facie view the Sutra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he
who has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot
become not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-asrama condition; since
scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c.,
state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the
discontinuance of the special duties of their asrama. Compare texts such
as 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence';
'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who
have lapsed from their asrama are not qualified for meditation on
Brahman. This view of his the Sutrakara strengthens by a reference to
the opinion of Jaimini.--But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin,
has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression
by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on
Brahman?--To this point the next Sutra refers.
41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of
qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring
to such lapse.
Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating
of qualification (Pu. Mi. Su. VI) are not possible in the case of him
who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations
do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such
lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika
lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any
expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony
referred to in the Purva Mimamsa therefore applies to the case of other
Brahmakarins only.
42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of
expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.
Some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of Naishthikas and
the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which
can be atoned for by expiatory observances; in the same way as in the
case of the eating of forbidden food the same prayaskitta may be used by
the ordinary Brahmakarin and by Naishthikas and the rest. This has been
stated by the Smriti writer, 'For the others also (i.e. the Naishthikas
and so on) the same (rules and practices as those for the Upakurvana)
hold good, in so far as not opposed to their asrama.'
43. But in either case (such men) stand outside; on account of Smriti
and custom.
Whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major
offence, in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of
those qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. For Smriti, i.e. the text
quoted above, 'I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of
Brahman as he is, could become pure again,' declares that expiations are
powerless to restore purity. And custom confirms the same conclusion;
for good men shun those Naishthikas who have lapsed, even after they
have performed prayaskittas, and do not impart to them the knowledge of
Brahman, The conclusion, therefore, is that such men are not qualified
for knowing Brahman.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who has
become that.'
44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture declares a fruit--
thus Atreya thinks.
A doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of
the sacrifice as the Udgitha, and so on, are to be performed by the
sacrificer (for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered), or by the
officiating priests. Atreya advocates the former view; on the ground of
Scripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the
small ether within the heart, fruit and meditation belong to the same
person, and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the
Udgitha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the
meditation also is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not
competent for such meditation, for the reason that like the godohana
vessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice (which latter
the priests only can perform). For the godohana vessel serves to bring
water, and this of course none else can do but the Adhvaryu; while a
meditation on the Udgitha as being the essence of all essences can very
well be performed by the Sacrificer--true though it be that the Udgitha
itself can be performed by the Udgatri priest only.--Against this view
the next Sutra declares itself.
45. (They are) the priest's work, Audulomi thinks; since for that he is
engaged.
The teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the Udgitha
and the like is the work of the priest, since it is he who is engaged
for the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit, i.e.
of the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts. Injunctions
referring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the
priests; he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire
sacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that hence all
activities comprised within it--mental as well as bodily--belong to the
priests. Capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion
in this case. For although the meditations in question aim directly at
the benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice), yet
since they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are
qualified for the sacrifice, and since the sacrifice with all its
subordinate elements has to be performed by the priests, and since the
text 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous'
declares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are
benefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those meditations also are
the exclusive duty of the priests. In the case of the meditations on the
small ether, &c., on the other hand, the text says nothing as to their
having to be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accordance
with the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer,'
that the agent there is the person to whom Scripture assigns the fruit.--
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord (of the sacrifice).'
46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as
in the case of injunction and so on; (the term _mauna_ denoting)
according to an alternative meaning a third something.
'Therefore let a Brahmana after he has done with learning wish to stand
by a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and
learning (he is) a Muni' (Bri. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this
text enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the
childlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established.--
The Purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as 'Muni-hood'
and 'learning' both connote knowledge, the word 'Muni' merely refers
back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done
with learning.' For the text presents no word of injunctive force with
regard to Muni-hood.--This view the Sutra controverts. 'For him who is
such,' i.e. for those who possess knowledge, 'there is an injunction of
a different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and
the rest.' By the _injunctions_ in the last clause we have to understand
the special duties of the different asramas, i.e. sacrifices and the
like, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like;
and by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the
sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the Sutra then is as
follows--in the same way as texts such as 'him Brahmanas seek to know
through the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so
on,' and 'Quiet, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices
and so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards
knowledge; and as texts such as 'the Self is to be heard, to be pondered
upon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) mention hearing and pondering as helpful
towards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a
childlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different
auxiliaries of knowledge.--'Muni-hood' does _not_ denote the same thing
as 'learning'--this the Sutra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a
third,' i.e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote
persons such as Vyasa distinguished by their power of profound
reflection (manana), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing
different from _learning_ and the 'childlike state.' Hence, although the
phrase 'then a Muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive
power, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz.
'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something
previously established. Such munihood is also something different from
mere _reflection_ (manana); it is the reiterated representation before
the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus
becoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore
is as follows. A Brahmana is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he
is to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of
Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected
through the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the
Lord; for this Smriti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities,
and so on, can I be so seen--; but by devotion exclusive I may be known'
(Bha. Gi. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest
devotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by
the study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is
to be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a
childlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And
after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so
exclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of
knowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three
means reached true knowledge he--the text goes on to say--having done
with amauna and mauna is a Brahmana. Amauna, i.e. non-mauna, denotes all
the auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna: employing these and
mauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text
further says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become
such, i.e. a true Brahmana. The entire text thus evidently means to
enjoin on any one standing within any asrama learning, a childlike state,
and mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and
the other special duties of the asramas.--But, an objection is raised,
if knowledge, aided by panditya, and so on, and thus being auxiliary to
the action of the special duties of the asramas, is thus declared to be
the means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the
Chandogya's declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is
throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder [FOOTNOTE 711:
1]?--To this the next Sutra replies.
[FOOTNOTE 711:1. Ch. Up. VIII, 13.]
47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is
winding up with the householder.
As knowledge belongs to the members of all asramas it belongs to the
householder also, and for this reason the Upanishad winds up with the
latter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not
of the householder only, but) of the members of all asramas. Analogously
in the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the clause 'A Brahmana
having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the
desire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties
belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then
the subsequent clause 'therefore let a Brahmana having done with
learning,' &c., enjoins panditya, balya, and mauna (not as incumbent on
the parivrajaka only, but) as illustrating the duties of all asramas.--
This the next Sutra explicitly declares.
48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the
condition of the Muni.
The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of mauna
preceded by parivrajya (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to
illustrate the duties of all asramas. For the duties of the other
asramas are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the
householder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are
three branches of sacred duty--he who is founded on Brahman goes to
immortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members
of all asramas.--It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the
text under discussion enjoins panditya, balya, and mauna as being
auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the
asramas, such as sacrifices and the rest.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries.'
49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the connexion.
In the text discussed above we meet with the word 'balya,' which may
mean either 'being a child' or 'being and doing like a child.' The
former meaning is excluded, as that particular age which is called
childhood cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter meaning,
however, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text means to say that he who
aims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child, as e.g.
its wilful behaviour, or only its freedom from pride and the like.--The
former, the Purvapakshin maintains. For the text gives no specification,
and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on the man desirous
of knowledge) are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be
in all points like a child.--This view the Sutra disposes of. 'Not
manifesting itself.' That aspect of a child's nature which consists in
the child not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so
on), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own. 'On account of
connexion,' i.e. because thus only the 'balya' of the text gives a
possible sense. The other characteristic features of 'childhood' the
texts declare to be opposed to knowledge, 'He who has not turned away
from wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive, or whose mind is
not at peace, he can never attain the Self by knowledge' (Ka. Up. I, 2,
24); 'When food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26,
2), and so on.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-manifestation.'
50. What belongs to this world, there being no obstruction at hand; as
this is seen.
Knowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having for its fruit
either exaltation within the sphere of the Samsara, or final Release.
With regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only
immediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it
about; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such works or at some
later time.--The Purvapakshin holds the former view. A man reaches
knowledge through his good deeds only, as the Lord himself declares,
'Four kinds of men doing good works worship me,' &c.(Bha. Gi. VII, 16);
and when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the
result, i.e. knowledge, should be delayed.--This view the Sutra disposes
of. 'What is comprised in this world,' i.e. meditation, the result of
which is worldly exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to
which it is due, in case of there being no other works of greater
strength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if there is an
obstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs up later on only. 'For
this is seen,' i.e. Scripture acknowledges the effects of such
obstruction; for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge, with
faith, with the Upanishad that is more vigorous,' means that works
joined with the knowledge of the Udgitha, and so on, produce their
results without obstruction (which implies that the action of other
works is liable to be obstructed).--Here terminates the adhikarana of
'what belongs to this world.'
51. In the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has
Release for its result; that condition being ascertained, that condition
being ascertained.
So likewise in the case of the origination, through works of very great
merit, of such knowledge as has for its result final Release, the time
is not definitely fixed; for here also there is ascertained the same
condition, viz. the termination of the obstruction presented by other
works. A further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that
such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final Release are
stronger than all other works, and therefore not liable to obstruction.
But this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of
a man knowing Brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of
overpowering strength.--The repetition of the last words of the Sutra
indicates the completion of the adhyaya.--Here terminates the adhikarana
of 'what has Release for its result.'
FOURTH ADHYAYA
FIRST PADA.
1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more
than once).
The third adhyaya was concerned with the consideration of meditation,
together with its means. The Sutras now enter on a consideration of the
results of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the
nature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of
knowledge of Brahman inculcated in Vedanta-texts, such as 'He who knows
Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond
death,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of
Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once.--
Once suffices, the Purvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins
nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the
act. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of
beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a
visible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must,
like the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for
knowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the
Jyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the Vedanta-texts
are alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through
whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz.
religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown
under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by
performing the act of knowledge once only, as the Jyotishtoma is
performed once.--This view the Sutra sets aside. The meaning of
Scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of
teaching,' i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed by means
of the term 'knowing' (vedana), which is synonymous with meditating
(dhyana, upasana). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the
fact that the verbs vid, upas, dhyai are in one and the same text used
with reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e.
g. 'Let him meditate (upasita) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he
who knows (veda) this shines, warms,' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 18). In the same
way the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to by means of vid, 'He
who knows (veda) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on
by means of upas,'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV,
1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who
knows Brahman reaches the Highest'--viz. 'the Self should be seen, be
heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhyasitavya)'--'Then he
sees him meditating (dhyayamana) on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III,
1, 8), and others--use the verb dhyai to express the meaning of vid. Now
dhyai means to think of something not in the way of mere representation
(smriti), but in the way of _continued_ representation. And upas has the
same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with
uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore
conclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhyai and
upas, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows
Brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.
2. And on account of an inferential mark.
Inferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that
knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued
representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'
3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the
texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).
The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be
meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as
the Self of the latter?--The Purvapakshin holds the former view. For, he
says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has
been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be
meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an
unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according
to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is
in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up.
III, 14, 1). This view the Sutra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be
meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the
meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest
Brahman is the Self of the individual soul--this is the proper form of
meditation.--Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged
this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am
indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'--But how can the Devotees
claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?--Because
the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from
contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the
Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who
rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the
immortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have
their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;--in that all
that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman'
(Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)--all these texts teach that all sentient and non-
sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through
him, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of
all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that
the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a
Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god--I am a
man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self
justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On
the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence
all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such
statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and
thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and
highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently
contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative
the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a
man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I
another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon
Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from
the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those
texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being
different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as
different'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference
in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it
implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the
highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the
latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of
the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is
different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul
constitutes the body of Brahman.--It thus remains a settled conclusion
that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the
meditating Devotee.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under
the aspect of Self.'
4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of
the Devotee).
'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who
meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)--with regard to these
and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratika) of Brahman there
arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as
of the nature of Self or not. The Purvapakshin holds the former view.
For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other
injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen,
constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.--This view the Sutra
sets aside. A pratika cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of
Self; for the pratika is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What,
in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratika only, not
Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its
aspect. For by a meditation on a pratika we understand a meditation in
which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of
Brahman, and as the pratika--the object of meditation--is not the Self
of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.--But an objection is
raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation;
for where Brahman _may_ be viewed as the object of meditation, it is
inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power
such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is
Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.--This objection the
next Sutra disposes of.
5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.
The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the
like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is
something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to
Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be
lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is
exalting.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'
6. And the ideas of Aditya and the rest on the member; on account of
this being rational.
'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udgitha' (Ch.
Up. I, 3, 1).--With regard to this and similar meditations connected
with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the
doubt whether the idea of Aditya and so on has to be superimposed on the
subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgitha, or vice versa (i.
e. whether Aditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the
Udgitha, or vice versa).--The Purvapakshin holds the former view. For
the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the
aspect of the higher, and the Udgitha and so on, which are parts of the
sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to
the divinities who do not accomplish any result.--Of this view the Sutra
disposes. The ideas of Aditya and so on are to be superimposed on the
'members,' i.e. the Udgitha and so on, which are constituent members of
the sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established.
For it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are
capable of bringing about their results. The Udgitha and the rest
therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of Aditya and so on.--Here
terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of Aditya and so on.'
7. Sitting; on account of possibility.
It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which
the Vedanta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release
and which is called meditation (dhyana; upasana) has to be frequently
repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question
now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.--There being
no special restrictive rule, the Purvapakshin holds that the Devotee may
carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.--This
view the Sutra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee
in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful
concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort,
and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on
some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.
8. And on account of meditation.
Since, as intimated by the text,'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the
mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires
as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is
understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the
ideas of other things.
9. And with reference to immobility.
And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other
inanimate things--the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains--may be
spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyayati) as it were,' and so
on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating
person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only. |
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