Plurality is not unreal.
Next as to the assertion that all difference presented in our
cognition--as of jars, pieces of cloth and the like--is unreal because
such difference does not persist. This view, we maintain, is altogether
erroneous, springs in fact from the neglect of distinguishing between
persistence and non-persistence on the one hand, and the relation
between what sublates and what is sublated on the other hand. Where two
cognitions are mutually contradictory, there the latter relation holds
good, and there is non-persistence of what is sublated. But jars, pieces
of cloth and the like, do not contradict one another, since they are
separate in place and time. If on the other hand the non-existence of a
thing is cognised at the same time and the same place where and when its
existence is cognised, we have a mutual contradiction of two cognitions,
and then the stronger one sublates the other cognition which thus comes
to an end. But when of a thing that is perceived in connexion with some
place and time, the non-existence is perceived in connexion with some
other place and time, there arises no contradiction; how then should the
one cognition sublate the other? or how can it be said that of a thing
absent at one time and place there is absence at other times and places
also? In the case of the snake-rope, there arises a cognition of
non-existence in connexion with the given place and time; hence there is
contradiction, one judgment sublates the other and the sublated
cognition comes to an end. But the circumstance of something which is
seen at one time and in one place not persisting at another time and in
another place is not observed to be invariably accompanied by falsehood,
and hence mere non-persistence of this kind does not constitute a reason
for unreality. To say, on the other hand, that what is is real because
it persists, is to prove what is proved already, and requires no further
proof.
Being and consciousness are not one.
Hence mere Being does not alone constitute reality. And as the
distinction between consciousness and its objects--which rests just on
this relation of object and that for which the object is--is proved by
perception, the assertion that only consciousness has real existence is
also disposed of.
The true meaning of Svayamprakasatva.
We next take up the point as to the self-luminousness of consciousness
(above, p. 33). The contention that consciousness is not an object holds
good for the knowing Self at the time when it illumines (i.e.
constitutes as its objects) other things; but there is no absolute rule
as to all consciousness never being anything but self-luminous. For
common observation shows that the consciousness of one person may become
the object of the cognition of another, viz. of an inference founded on
the person's friendly or unfriendly appearance and the like, and again
that a person's own past states of consciousness become the object of
his own cognition--as appears from judgments such as 'At one time I knew.'
It cannot therefore be said 'If it is consciousness it is self-proved'
(above p. 33), nor that consciousness if becoming an object of
consciousness would no longer be consciousness; for from this it would
follow that one's own past states, and the conscious states of others--
because being objects of consciousness--are not themselves consciousness.
Moreover, unless it were admitted that there is inferential knowledge of
the thoughts of others, there would be no apprehension of the connexion
of words and meaning, and this would imply the absolute termination of
all human intercourse depending on speech. Nor also would it be possible
for pupils to attach themselves to a teacher of sacred lore, for the
reason that they had become aware of his wisdom and learning. The
general proposition that consciousness does not admit of being an object
is in fact quite untenable. The essential 'nature of consciousness or
knowledge--consists therein that it shines forth, or manifests itself,
through its own being to its own substrate at the present moment; or (to
give another definition) that it is instrumental in proving its own
object by its own being [FOOTNOTE 48:1].
Now these two characteristics are established by a person's own state of
consciousness and do not vanish when that consciousness becomes the
object of another state of consciousness; consciousness remains also in
the latter case what it is. Jars and similar things, on the other hand,
do not possess consciousness, not because they are objects of
consciousness but because they lack the two characteristics stated
above. If we made the presence of consciousness dependent on the absence
of its being an object of consciousness, we should arrive at the
conclusion that consciousness is not consciousness; for there are
things--e.g. sky-flowers--which are not objects of consciousness and at
the same time are not consciousness. You will perhaps reply to this that
a sky-flower's not being consciousness is due not to its not being an
object of consciousness, but to its non-existence!--Well then, we
rejoin, let us say analogously that the reason of jars and the like not
being contradictory to Nescience (i.e. of their being jada), is their
not being of the nature of consciousness, and let us not have recourse
to their being objects of consciousness!--But if consciousness is an
object of consciousness, we conclude that it also is non-contradictory
of Nescience, like a jar!--At this conclusion, we rejoin, you may arrive
even on the opposite assumption, reasoning as follows: 'Consciousness is
non-contradictory of Nescience, because it is not an object of
consciousness, like a sky-flower! All which shows that to maintain as a
general principle that something which is an object of consciousness
cannot itself be consciousness is simply ridiculous.'
[FOOTNOTE 48:1. The comment of the Sru. Pra. on the above definitions
runs, with a few additional explanations, as follows: The term
'anubhuti' here denotes knowledge in general, not only such knowledge as
is not remembrance (which limited meaning the term has sometimes). With
reference to the 'shining forth' it might be said that in this way jars
also and similar things know or are conscious because they also shine
forth' (viz. in so far as they are known); to exclude jars and the like
the text therefore adds 'to its own substrate' (the jar 'shines forth,'
not to itself, but to the knowing person). There are other attributes
of the Self, such as atomic extension, eternity, and so on, which are
revealed (not through themselves) but through an act of knowledge
different from them; to exclude those the text adds 'through its own
being.' In order to exclude past states of consciousness or acts of
knowledge, the text adds 'at the present moment.' A past state of
consciousness is indeed not revealed without another act of knowledge
(representing it), and would thus by itself be excluded; but the text
adds this specification (viz. 'at the present moment') on purpose, in
order to intimate that a past state of consciousness can be represented
by another state--a point denied by the opponent. 'At the present
moment' means 'the connexion with the object of knowledge belonging to
the present time.' Without the addition of 'to its own substrate' the
definition might imply that a state of consciousness is manifest to
another person also; to exclude this the clause is added. This first
definition might be objected to as acceptable only to those who maintain
the svayamprakasatva-theory (which need not be discussed here); hence a
second definition is given. The two clauses 'to its own substrate' and
'at the present moment' have to be supplied in this second definition
also. 'Instrumental in bringing about' would apply to staffs, wheels,
and such like implements also; hence the text adds 'its own object.'
(Staffs, wheels, &c. have no 'objects.') Knowledge depending on sight
does not bring about an object depending on hearing; to exclude this
notion of universal instrumentality the text specifies the object by the
words 'its own.' The clause 'through its own being' excludes the sense
organs, which reveal objects not by their own being, but in so far as
they give rise to knowledge. The two clauses 'at the present moment' and
'to its own substrate' have the same office in the second definition as
in the first.]
Consciousness is not eternal.
It was further maintained by the purvapakshin that as consciousness is
self-established it has no antecedent non-existence and so on, and that
this disproves its having an origin. But this is an attempt to prove
something not proved by something else that is equally unproved;
comparable to a man blind from birth undertaking to guide another blind
man! You have no right to maintain the non-existence of the antecedent
non-existence of consciousness on the ground that there is nothing to
make us apprehend that non-existence; for there is something to make us
apprehend it, viz. consciousness itself!--But how can consciousness at
the time when it is, make us apprehend its own previous non-existence
which is contradictorily opposed to it?--Consciousness, we rejoin, does
not necessarily constitute as its objects only what occupies the same
time with itself; were it so it would follow that neither the past nor
the future can be the object of consciousness. Or do you mean that there
is an absolute rule that the Antecedent non-existence of consciousness,
if proved, must be contemporaneous with consciousness? Have you then, we
ask, ever observed this so as to be able to assert an absolute rule? And
if it were observed, that would prove the existence of previous
non-existence, not its negation!--The fact, however, is that no person
in his senses will maintain the contemporaneous existence of
consciousness and its own antecedent non-existence. In the case of
perceptive knowledge originating from sensation, there is indeed this
limitation, that it causes the apprehension of such things only as are
actually present at the same time. But this limitation does not extend
to cognitions of all kinds, nor to all instruments of knowledge; for we
observe that remembrance, inference, and the magical perception of Yogis
apprehend such things also as are not present at the time of
apprehension. On this very point there rests the relation connecting the
means of knowledge with their objects, viz. that the former are not
without the latter. This does not mean that the instrument of knowledge
is connected with its object in that way that it is not without
something that is present at the time of cognition; but rather that the
instrument of knowledge is opposed to the falsehood of that special form
in which the object presents itself as connected with some place and
time.--This disposes also of the contention that remembrance has no
external object; for it is observed that remembrance is related to such
things also as have perished.--Possibly you will now argue as follows.
The antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be ascertained by
perception, for it is not something present at the time of perception.
It further cannot be ascertained by the other means of knowledge, since
there is no characteristic mark (linga) on which an inference could be
based: for we do not observe any characteristic mark invariably
accompanied by the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Nor do we
meet with any scriptural text referring to this antecedent
non-existence. Hence, in the absence of any valid instrument of
knowledge, the antecedent non-existence of consciousness cannot be
established at all.--If, we reply, you thus, altogether setting aside
the force of self-provedness (on which you had relied hitherto), take
your stand on the absence of valid means of knowledge, we again must
request you to give in; for there is a valid means of knowledge whereby
to prove the antecedent non-existence of consciousness, viz. valid
non-perception (anupalabdhi).
Moreover, we observe that perceptional knowledge proves its object, be
it a jar or something else, to exist only as long as it exists itself,
not at all times; we do not, through it, apprehend the antecedent or
subsequent existence of the jar. Now this absence of apprehension is due
to the fact that consciousness itself is limited in time. If that
consciousness which has a jar for its object were itself apprehended as
non-limited in time, the object also--the jar--would be apprehended
under the same form, i.e. it would be eternal. And if self-established
consciousness were eternal, it would be immediately cognised as eternal;
but this is not the case. Analogously, if inferential consciousness and
other forms of consciousness were apprehended as non-limited in time,
they would all of them reveal their objects also as non-limited, and
these objects would thus be eternal; for the objects are conform in
nature to their respective forms of consciousness.
There is no consciousness without object.
Nor is there any consciousness devoid of objects; for nothing of this
kind is ever known. Moreover, the self-luminousness of consciousness has,
by our opponent himself, been proved on the ground that its essential
nature consists in illumining (revealing) objects; the self-luminousness
of consciousness not admitting of proof apart from its essential nature
which consists in the lighting up of objects. And as moreover, according
to our opponent, consciousness cannot be the object of another
consciousness, it would follow that (having neither an object nor itself
being an object) it is something altogether unreal, imaginary.
Nor are you justified in maintaining that in deep sleep, swoon,
senselessness and similar states, pure consciousness, devoid of any
object, manifests itself. This view is negatived by 'valid
non-perception' (see above, p. 52). If consciousness were present in
those states also, there would be remembrance of it at the time of
waking from sleep or recovery from swoon; but as a matter of fact there
is no such remembrance.--But it is not an absolute rule that something
of which we were conscious must be remembered; how then can the absence
of remembrance prove the absence of previous consciousness?--Unless, we
reply, there be some cause of overpowering strength which quite
obliterates all impressions--as e.g. the dissolution of the body--the
absence of remembrance does necessarily prove the absence of previous
consciousness. And, moreover, in the present case the absence of
consciousness does not only follow from absence of remembrance; it is
also proved by the thought presenting itself to the person risen from
sleep, 'For so long a time I was not conscious of anything.'--Nor may it
be said that even if there was consciousness, absence of remembrance
would necessarily follow from the absence (during deep sleep) of the
distinction of objects, and from the extinction of the consciousness of
the 'I'; for the non-consciousness of some one thing, and the absence of
some one thing cannot be the cause of the non-remembrance of some other
thing, of which there had been consciousness. And that in the states in
question the consciousness of the 'I' does persist, will moreover be
shown further on.
But, our opponent urges, have you not said yourself that even in deep
sleep and similar states there is consciousness marked by difference?--
True, we have said so. But that consciousness is consciousness of the
Self, and that this is affected by difference will be proved further on.
At present we are only interested in denying the existence of your pure
consciousness, devoid of all objects and without a substrate. Nor can we
admit that your pure consciousness could constitute what we call the
consciousness of the Self; for we shall prove that the latter has a
substrate.
It thus cannot be maintained that the antecedent non-existence of
consciousness does not admit of being proved, because consciousness
itself does not prove it. And as we have shown that consciousness itself
may be an object of consciousness, we have thereby disproved the alleged
impossibility of antecedent non-existence being proved by other means.
Herewith falls the assertion that the non-origination of consciousness
can be proved.
Consciousness is capable of change.
Against the assertion that the alleged non-origination of consciousness
at the same time proves that consciousness is not capable of any other
changes (p. 36), we remark that the general proposition on which this
conclusion rests is too wide: it would extend to antecedent
non-existence itself, of which it is evident that it comes to an end,
although it does not originate. In qualifying the changes as changes of
'Being,' you manifest great logical acumen indeed! For according to your
own view Nescience also (which is not 'Being') does not originate, is
the substrate of manifold changes, and comes to an end through the rise
of knowledge! Perhaps you will say that the changes of Nescience are all
unreal. But, do you then, we ask in reply, admit that any change is
real? You do not; and yet it is only this admission which would give a
sense to the distinction expressed by the word 'Being' [FOOTNOTE 54:1].
Nor is it true that consciousness does not admit of any division within
itself, because it has no beginning (p. 36). For the non-originated Self
is divided from the body, the senses, &c., and Nescience also, which is
avowedly without a beginning, must needs be admitted to be divided from
the Self. And if you say that the latter division is unreal, we ask
whether you have ever observed a real division invariably connected with
origination! Moreover, if the distinction of Nescience from the Self is
not real, it follows that Nescience and the Self are essentially one.
You further have yourself proved the difference of views by means of the
difference of the objects of knowledge as established by non-refuted
knowledge; an analogous case being furnished by the difference of acts
of cleaving, which results from the difference of objects to be cleft.
And if you assert that of this knowing--which is essentially knowing
only--nothing that is an object of knowledge can be an attribute, and
that these objects--just because they are objects of knowledge--cannot
be attributes of knowing; we point out that both these remarks would
apply also to eternity, self-luminousness, and the other attributes of
'knowing', which are acknowledged by yourself, and established by valid
means of proof. Nor may you urge against this that all these alleged
attributes are in reality mere 'consciousness' or 'knowing'; for they
are essentially distinct. By 'being conscious' or 'knowing', we
understand the illumining or manifesting of some object to its own
substrate (i.e. the substrate of knowledge), by its own existence (i.e.
the existence of knowledge) merely; by self-luminousness (or
'self-illuminatedness') we understand the shining forth or being
manifest by its own existence merely to its own substrate; the terms
'shining forth', 'illumining', 'being manifest' in both these
definitions meaning the capability of becoming an object of thought and
speech which is common to all things, whether intelligent or
non-intelligent. Eternity again means 'being present in all time';
oneness means 'being defined by the number one'. Even if you say that
these attributes are only negative ones, i.e. equal to the absence of
non-intelligence and so on, you still cannot avoid the admission that
they are attributes of consciousness. If, on the other hand, being of a
nature opposite to non-intelligence and so on, be not admitted as
attributes of consciousness--whether of a positive or a negative
kind--in addition to its essential nature; it is an altogether unmeaning
proceeding to deny to it such qualities, as non-intelligence and the
like.
We moreover must admit the following alternative: consciousness is
either proved (established) or not. If it is proved it follows that it
possesses attributes; if it is not, it is something absolutely nugatory,
like a sky-flower, and similar purely imaginary things.
[FOOTNOTE 54:1. The Sankara is not entitled to refer to a distinction of
real and unreal division, because according to his theory all
distinction is unreal.]
Consciousness is the attribute of a permanent Conscious self.
Let it then be said that consciousness is proof (siddhih) itself. Proof
of what, we ask in reply, and to whom? If no definite answer can be
given to these two questions, consciousness cannot be defined as
'proof'; for 'proof' is a relative notion, like 'son.' You will perhaps
reply 'Proof to the Self'; and if we go on asking 'But what is that
Self'? you will say, 'Just consciousness as already said by us before.'
True, we reply, you said so; but it certainly was not well said. For if
it is the nature of consciousness to be 'proof' ('light,'
'enlightenment') on the part of a person with regard to something, how
can this consciousness which is thus connected with the person and the
thing be itself conscious of itself? To explain: the essential character
of consciousness or knowledge is that by its very existence it renders
things capable of becoming objects, to its own substrate, of thought and
speech. This consciousness (anubhuti), which is also termed jnana,
avagati, samvid, is a particular attribute belonging to a conscious Self
and related to an object: as such it is known to every one on the
testimony of his own Self--as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I
know the jar,' 'I understand this matter,' 'I am conscious of (the
presence of) this piece of cloth.' That such is the essential nature of
consciousness you yourself admit; for you have proved thereby its
self-luminousness. Of this consciousness which thus clearly presents
itself as the attribute of an agent and as related to an object, it
would be difficult indeed to prove that at the same time it is itself
the agent; as difficult as it would be to prove that the object of
action is the agent.
For we clearly see that this agent (the subject of consciousness) is
permanent (constant), while its attribute, i. e. consciousness, not
differing herein from joy, grief, and the like, rises, persists for some
time, and then comes to an end. The permanency of the conscious subject
is proved by the fact of recognition, 'This very same thing was formerly
apprehended by me.' The non-permanency of consciousness, on the other
hand, is proved by thought expressing itself in the following forms, 'I
know at present,' 'I knew at a time,' 'I, the knowing subject, no longer
have knowledge of this thing.' How then should consciousness and (the
conscious subject) be one? If consciousness which changes every moment
were admitted to constitute the conscious subject, it would be
impossible for us to recognise the thing seen to-day as the one we saw
yesterday; for what has been perceived by one cannot be recognised by
another. And even if consciousness were identified with the conscious
subject and acknowledged as permanent, this would no better account for
the fact of recognition. For recognition implies a conscious subject
persisting from the earlier to the later moment, and not merely
consciousness. Its expression is 'I myself perceived this thing on a
former occasion.' According to your view the quality of being a
conscious agent cannot at all belong to consciousness; for consciousness,
you say, is just consciousness and nothing more. And that there exists a
pure consciousness devoid of substrate and objects alike, we have
already refuted on the ground that of a thing of this kind we have
absolutely no knowledge. And that the consciousness admitted by both of
us should be the Self is refuted by immediate consciousness itself. And
we have also refuted the fallacious arguments brought forward to prove
that mere consciousness is the only reality.--But, another objection is
raised, should the relation of the Self and the 'I' not rather be
conceived as follows:--In self-consciousness which expresses itself in
the judgment 'I know,' that intelligent something which constitutes the
absolutely non-objective element, and is pure homogeneous light, is the
Self; the objective element (yushmad-artha) on the other hand, which is
established through its being illumined (revealed) by the Self is the
_I_--in 'I know'--and this is something different from pure
intelligence, something objective or external?
By no means, we reply; for this view contradicts the relation of
attribute and substrate of attribute of which we are directly conscious,
as implied in the thought 'I know.'
Consider also what follows.--'If the _I_ were not the Self, the
inwardness of the Self would not exist; for it is just the consciousness
of the _I_ which separates the inward from the outward.
'"May I, freeing myself from all pain, enter on free possession of
endless delight?" This is the thought which prompts the man desirous of
release to apply himself to the study of the sacred texts. Were it a
settled matter that release consists in the annihilation of the I, the
same man would move away as soon as release were only hinted at. "When I
myself have perished, there still persists some consciousness different
from me;" to bring this about nobody truly will exert himself.
'Moreover the very existence of consciousness, its being a consciousness
at all, and its being self-luminous, depend on its connexion with a Self;
when that connexion is dissolved, consciousness itself cannot be
established, not any more than the act of cutting can take place when
there is no person to cut and nothing to be cut. Hence it is certain
that the I, i.e. the knowing subject, is the inward Self.'
This scripture confirms when saying 'By what should he know the knower?'
(Bri. Up. II, 4, 15); and Smriti also, 'Him who knows this they call the
knower of the body' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 1). And the Sutrakara also, in the
section beginning with 'Not the Self on account of scriptural statement'
(II, 3, 17), will say 'For this very reason (it is) a knower' (II, 3,
18); and from this it follows that the Self is not mere consciousness.
What is established by consciousness of the 'I' is the I itself, while
the not-I is given in the consciousness of the not-I; hence to say that
the knowing subject, which is established by the state of consciousness,
'I know,' is the not-I, is no better than to maintain that one's own
mother is a barren woman. Nor can it be said that this 'I,' the knowing
subject, is dependent on its light for something else. It rather is
self-luminous; for to be self-luminous means to have consciousness for
one's essential nature. And that which has light for its essential
nature does not depend for its light on something else. The case is
analogous to that of the flame of a lamp or candle. From the
circumstance that the lamp illumines with its light other things, it
does not follow either that it is not luminous, or that its luminousness
depends on something else; the fact rather is that the lamp being of
luminous nature shines itself and illumines with its light other things
also. To explain.--The one substance tejas, i.e. fire or heat, subsists
in a double form, viz. as light (prabha), and as luminous matter.
Although light is a quality of luminous substantial things, it is in
itself nothing but the substance tejas, not a mere quality like e.g.
whiteness; for it exists also apart from its substrates, and possesses
colour (which is a quality). Having thus attributes different from those
of qualities such as whiteness and so on, and possessing illumining
power, it is the substance tejas, not anything else (e.g. a quality).
Illumining power belongs to it, because it lights up itself and other
things. At the same time it is practically treated as a quality because
it always has the substance tejas for its substrate, and depends on it.
This must not be objected to on the ground that what is called light is
really nothing but dissolving particles of matter which proceed from the
substance tejas; for if this were so, shining gems and the sun would in
the end consume themselves completely. Moreover, if the flame of a lamp
consisted of dissolving particles of matter, it would never be
apprehended as a whole; for no reason can be stated why those particles
should regularly rise in an agglomerated form to the height of four
fingers breadth, and after that simultaneously disperse themselves
uniformly in all directions--upwards, sideways, and downwards. The fact
is that the flame of the lamp together with its light is produced anew
every moment and again vanishes every moment; as we may infer from the
successive combination of sufficient causes (viz. particles of oil and
wick) and from its coming to an end when those causes are completely
consumed.
Analogously to the lamp, the Self is essentially intelligent (kid-rupa),
and has intelligence (kaitanya) for its quality. And to be essentially
intelligent means to be self-luminous. There are many scriptural texts
declaring this, compare e.g. 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor
outside but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed that Self has
neither inside nor outside but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (Bri.
Up. IV, 5, 13); 'There that person becomes self-luminous, there is no
destruction of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 14; 30); 'He
who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4); 'Who
is that Self? That one who is made of knowledge, among the pranas,
within the heart, the light, the person' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'For it is
he who sees, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, considers, acts, the person
whose Self is knowledge' (Pr. Up. IV, 9); 'Whereby should one know the
knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15). 'This person knows,' 'The seer does not
see death nor illness nor pain' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2); 'That highest
person not remembering this body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII,
12, 3); 'Thus these sixteen parts of the spectator that go towards the
person; when they have readied the person, sink into him' (Pr. Up. VI,
5); 'From this consisting of mind, there is different an interior Self
consisting of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 4). And the Sutrakara also will
refer to the Self as a 'knower' in II, 3, 18. All which shows that the
self-luminous Self is a knower, i.e. a knowing subject, and not pure
light (non-personal intelligence). In general we may say that where
there is light it must belong to something, as shown by the light of a
lamp. The Self thus cannot be mere consciousness. The grammarians
moreover tell us that words such as 'consciousness,' 'knowledge,' &c.,
are relative; neither ordinary nor Vedic language uses expressions such
as 'he knows' without reference to an object known and an agent who
knows.
With reference to the assertion that consciousness constitutes the Self,
because it (consciousness) is not non-intelligent (jada), we ask what
you understand by this absence of non-intelligence.' If you reply
'luminousness due to the being of the thing itself (i.e. of the thing
which is ajada)'; we point out that this definition would wrongly
include lamps also, and similar things; and it would moreover give rise
to a contradiction, since you do not admit light as an attribute,
different from consciousness itself. Nor can we allow you to define
ajadatva as 'being of that nature that light is always present, without
any exception,' for this definition would extend also to pleasure, pain,
and similar states. Should you maintain that pleasure and so on,
although being throughout of the nature of light, are non-intelligent
for the reason that, like jars, &c., they shine forth (appear) to
something else and hence belong to the sphere of the not-Self; we ask in
reply: Do you mean then to say that knowledge appears to itself?
Knowledge no less than pleasure appears to some one else, viz. the 'I':
there is, in that respect, no difference between the judgment 'I know,'
and the judgment 'I am pleased.' Non-intelligence in the sense of
appearingness-to-itself is thus not proved for consciousness; and hence
it follows that what constitutes the Self is the non-jada 'I' which is
proved to itself by its very Being. That knowledge is of the nature of
light depends altogether on its connection with the knowing 'I': it is
due to the latter, that knowledge, like pleasure, manifests itself to
that conscious person who is its substrate, and not to anybody else. The
Self is thus not mere knowledge, but is the knowing 'I.'
The view that the conscious subject is something unreal, due to the
ahamkara, cannot be maintained.
We turn to a further point. You maintain that consciousness which is in
reality devoid alike of objects and substrate presents itself, owing to
error, in the form of a knowing subject, just as mother o' pearl appears
as silver; (consciousness itself being viewed as a real substrate of an
erroneous imputation), because an erroneous imputation cannot take place
apart from a substrate. But this theory is indefensible. If things were
as you describe them, the conscious 'I' would be cognised as co-ordinate
with the state of consciousness 'I am consciousness,' just as the
shining thing presenting itself to our eyes is judged to be silver. But
the fact is that the state of consciousness presents itself as something
apart, constituting a distinguishing attribute of the I, just as the
stick is an attribute of Devadatta who carries it. The judgment 'I am
conscious' reveals an 'I' distinguished by consciousness; and to declare
that it refers only to a state of consciousness--which is a mere
attribute--is no better than to say that the judgment 'Devadatta carries
a stick' is about the stick only. Nor are you right in saying that the
idea of the Self being a knowing agent, presents itself to the mind of
him only who erroneously identifies the Self and the body, an error
expressing itself in judgments such as 'I am stout,' and is on that
account false; for from this it would follow that the consciousness
which is erroneously imagined as a Self is also false; for it presents
itself to the mind of the same person. You will perhaps rejoin that
consciousness is not false because it (alone) is not sublatcd by that
cognition which sublates everything else. Well, we reply, then the
knowership of the Self also is not false; for that also is not sublatcd.
You further maintain that the character of being a knower, i.e. the
agent in the action of knowing, does not become the non-changing Self;
that being a knower is something implying change, of a non-intelligent
kind (jada), and residing in the ahamkara which is the abode of change
and a mere effect of the Unevolved (the Prakriti); that being an agent
and so on is like colour and other qualities, an attribute of what is
objective; and that if we admit the Self to be an agent and the object
of the notion of the 'I,' it also follows that the Self is, like the
body, not a real Self but something external and non-intelligent. But
all this is unfounded, since the internal organ is, like the body,
non-intelligent, an effect of Prakriti, an object of knowledge,
something outward and for the sake of others merely; while being a
knowing subject constitutes the special essential nature of intelligent
beings. To explain. Just as the body, through its objectiveness,
outwardness, and similar causes, is distinguished from what possesses
the opposite attributes of subjectiveness, inwardness, and so on; for
the same reason the ahamkara also--which is of the same substantial
nature as the body--is similarly distinguished. Hence the ahamkara is
no more a knower than it is something subjective; otherwise there would
be an evident contradiction. As knowing cannot be attributed to the
ahamkara, which is an object of knowledge, so knowership also cannot be
ascribed to it; for of that also it is the object. Nor can it be
maintained that to be a knower is something essentially changing. For to
be a knower is to be the substrate of the quality of knowledge, and as
the knowing Self is eternal, knowledge which is an essential quality of
the Self is also eternal. That the Self is eternal will be declared in
the Sutra, II, 3, 17; and in II, 3, 18 the term 'jna' (knower) will show
that it is an essential quality of the Self to be the abode of
knowledge. That a Self whose essential nature is knowledge should be the
substrate of the (quality of) knowledge--just as gems and the like are
the substrate of light--gives rise to no contradiction whatever.
Knowledge (the quality) which is in itself unlimited, is capable of
contraction and expansion, as we shall show later on. In the so-called
kshetrajna--condition of the Self, knowledge is, owing to the influence
of work (karman), of a contracted nature, as it more or less adapts
itself to work of different kinds, and is variously determined by the
different senses. With reference to this various flow of knowledge as
due to the senses, it is spoken of as rising and setting, and the Self
possesses the quality of an agent. As this quality is not, however,
essential, but originated by action, the Self is essentially unchanging.
This changeful quality of being a knower can belong only to the Self
whose essential nature is knowledge; not possibly to the non-intelligent
ahamkara. But, you will perhaps say, the ahamkara, although of non-
intelligent nature, may become a knower in so far as by approximation to
intelligence it becomes a reflection of the latter. How, we ask in
return, is this becoming a reflection of intelligence imagined to take
place? Does consciousness become a reflection of the ahamkara, or does
the ahamkara become a reflection of consciousness? The former
alternative is inadmissible, since you will not allow to consciousness
the quality of being a knower; and so is the latter since, as explained
above, the non-intelligent ahamkara can never become a knower. Moreover,
neither consciousness nor the ahamkara are objects of visual perception.
Only things seen by the eye have reflections.--Let it then be said that
as an iron ball is heated by contact with fire, so the consciousness of
being a knower is imparted to the ahamkara through its contact with
Intelligence.--This view too is inadmissible; for as you do not allow
real knowership to Intelligence, knowership or the consciousness of
knowership cannot be imparted to the ahamkara by contact with
Intelligence; and much less even can knowership or the consciousness of
it be imparted to Intelligence by contact with the essentially non-
intelligent ahamkara. Nor can we accept what you say about
'manifestation.' Neither the ahamkara, you say, nor Intelligence is
really a knowing subject, but the ahamkara manifests consciousness
abiding within itself (within the ahamkara), as the mirror manifests the
image abiding within it. But the essentially non-intelligent ahamkara
evidently cannot 'manifest' the self-luminous Self. As has been said
'That the non-intelligent ahamkara should manifest the self-luminous
Self, has no more sense than to say that a spent coal manifests the Sun.'
The truth is that all things depend for their proof on self-luminous
consciousness; and now you maintain that one of these things, viz. the
non-intelligent ahamkara--which itself depends for its light on
consciousness--manifests consciousness, whose essential light never
rises or sets, and which is the cause that proves everything! Whoever
knows the nature of the Self will justly deride such a view! The
relation of 'manifestation' cannot hold good between consciousness and
the ahamkara for the further reason also that there is a contradiction
in nature between the two, and because it would imply consciousness not
to be consciousness. As has been said, 'One cannot manifest the other,
owing to contradictoriness; and if the Self were something to be
manifested, that would imply its being non-intelligent like a jar.' Nor
is the matter improved by your introducing the hand and the sunbeams
(above, p. 38), and to say that as the sunbeams while manifesting the
hand, are at the same time manifested by the hand, so consciousness,
while manifesting the ahamkara, is at the same time itself manifested by
the latter. The sunbeams are in reality not manifested by the hand at
all. What takes place is that the motion of the sunbeams is reversed
(reflected) by the opposed hand; they thus become more numerous, and
hence are perceived more clearly; but this is due altogether to the
multitude of beams, not to any manifesting power on the part of the hand.
What could, moreover, be the nature of that 'manifestation' of the Self
consisting of Intelligence, which would be effected through the ahamkara?
It cannot be origination; for you acknowledge that what is self-
established cannot be originated by anything else. Nor can it be
'illumination' (making to shine forth), since consciousness cannot--
according to you--be the object of another consciousness. For the same
reason it cannot be any action assisting the means of being conscious of
consciousness. For such helpful action could be of two kinds only. It
would either be such as to cause the connexion of the object to be known
with the sense-organs; as e.g. any action which, in the case of the
apprehension of a species or of one's own face, causes connexion between
the organ of sight and an individual of the species, or a looking-glass.
Or it would be such as to remove some obstructive impurity in the mind
of the knowing person; of this kind is the action of calmness and self-
restraint with reference to scripture which is the means of apprehending
the highest reality. Moreover, even if it were admitted that
consciousness may be an object of consciousness, it could not be
maintained that the 'I' assists the means whereby that consciousness is
effected. For if it did so, it could only be in the way of removing any
obstacles impeding the origination of such consciousness; analogous to
the way in which a lamp assists the eye by dispelling the darkness which
impedes the origination of the apprehension of colour. But in the case
under discussion we are unable to imagine such obstacles. There is
nothing pertaining to consciousness which obstructs the origination of
the knowledge of consciousness and which could be removed by the
ahamkara.--There is something, you will perhaps reply, viz. Nescience!
Not so, we reply. That Nescience is removed by the ahamkara cannot be
admitted; knowledge alone can put an end to Nescience. Nor can
consciousness be the abode of Nescience, because in that case Nescience
would have the same abode and the same object as knowledge.
In pure knowledge where there is no knowing subject and no object of
knowledge--the so-called 'witnessing' principle (sakshin)--Nescience
cannot exist. Jars and similar things cannot be the abode of Nescience
because there is no possibility of their being the abode of knowledge,
and for the same reason pure knowledge also cannot be the abode of
Nescience. And even if consciousness were admitted to be the abode of
Nescience, it could not be the object of knowledge; for consciousness
being viewed as the Self cannot be the object of knowledge, and hence
knowledge cannot terminate the Nescience abiding within consciousness.
For knowledge puts an end to Nescience only with regard to its own
objects, as in the case of the snake-rope. And the consequence of this
would be that the Nescience attached to consciousness could never be
destroyed by any one.--If Nescience, we further remark, is viewed as
that which can be defined neither as Being nor non-Being, we shall show
later on that such Nescience is something quite incomprehensible.--On
the other hand, Nescience, if understood to be the antecedent non-
existence of knowledge, is not opposed in nature to the origination of
knowledge, and hence the dispelling of Nescience cannot be viewed as
promoting the means of the knowledge of the Self.--From all this it
follows that the ahamkara cannot effect in any way 'manifestation of
consciousness.'
Nor (to finish up this point) can it be said that it is the essential
nature of manifesting agents to manifest things in so far as the latter
have their abode in the former; for such a relation is not observed in
the case of lamps and the like (which manifest what lies outside them).
The essential nature of manifesting agents rather lies therein that they
promote the knowledge of things as they really are, and this is also the
nature of whatever promotes knowledge and the means thereof. Nor is it
even true that the mirror manifests the face. The mirror is only the
cause of a certain irregularity, viz. the reversion of the ocular rays
of light, and to this irregularity there is due the appearance of the
face within the mirror; but the manifesting agent is the light only. And
it is evident that the ahamkara is not capable of producing an
irregularity (analogous to that produced by the mirror) in consciousness
which is self-luminous.--And--with regard to the second analogous
instance alleged by you--the fact is that the species is known through
the individual because the latter is its substrate (as expressed in the
general principle, 'the species is the form of the individual'), but not
because the individual 'manifests' the species. Thus there is no reason,
either real or springing from some imperfection, why the consciousness
of consciousness should be brought about by its abiding in the ahamkara,
and the attribute of being the knowing agent or the consciousness of
that cannot therefore belong to the ahamkara. Hence, what constitutes
the inward Self is not pure consciousness but the 'I' which proves
itself as the knowing subject. In the absence of egoity, 'inwardness'
could not be established for consciousness.
The conscious subject persists in deep sleep.
We now come to the question as to the nature of deep sleep. In deep
sleep the quality of darkness prevails in the mind and there is no
consciousness of outward things, and thus there is no distinct and clear
presentation of the 'I'; but all the same the Self somehow presents
itself up to the time of waking in the one form of the 'I,' and the
latter cannot therefore be said to be absent. Pure consciousness assumed
by you (to manifest itself in deep sleep) is really in no better case;
for a person risen from deep sleep never represents to himself his
state of consciousness during sleep in the form, 'I was pure
consciousness free from all egoity and opposed in nature to everything
else, witnessing Nescience'; what he thinks is only 'I slept well.' From
this form of reflection it appears that even during sleep the Self. i.e.
the 'I,' was a knowing subject and perceptive of pleasure. Nor must you
urge against this that the reflection has the following form: 'As now I
feel pleasure, so I slept then also'; for the reflection is distinctly
_not_ of that kind. [FOOTNOTE 68:1] Nor must you say that owing to the
non-permanency of the 'I' its perception of pleasure during sleep
cannot connect itself with the waking state. For (the 'I' is permanent
as appears from the fact that) the person who has risen from sleep
recalls things of which he was conscious before his sleep, 'I did such
and such a thing,' 'I observed this or that,' 'I said so or so.'--But,
you will perhaps say, he also reflects, 'For such and such a time I was
conscious of nothing!'--'And what does this imply?' we ask.--'It implies
a negation of everything!'--By no means, we rejoin. The words 'I was
conscious' show that the knowing 'I' persisted, and that hence what is
negated is only the objects of knowledge. If the negation implied in 'of
nothing' included everything, it would also negative the pure
consciousness which you hold to persist in deep sleep. In the judgment
'I was conscious of nothing,' the word 'I' clearly refers to the 'I,' i.
e. the knowing Self which persists even during deep sleep, while the
words 'was conscious of nothing' negative all knowledge on the part of
that 'I'; if, now, in the face of this, you undertake to prove by means
of this very judgment that knowledge--which is expressly denied--existed
at the time, and that the persisting knowing Self did not exist, you may
address your proof to the patient gods who give no reply!--But--our
opponent goes on to urge--I form the following judgment also: 'I then
was not conscious of myself,' and from this I understand that the 'I'
did not persist during deep sleep!--You do not know, we rejoin, that
this denial of the persistence of the 'I' flatly contradicts the state
of consciousness expressed in the judgment 'I was not conscious of
myself' and the verbal form of the judgment itself!--But what then is
denied by the words 'of myself?--This, we admit, is a reasonable
question. Let us consider the point. What is negatived in that judgment
is not the knowing 'I' itself, but merely the distinctions of caste,
condition of life, &c. which belong to the 'I' at the time of waking. We
must distinguish the objects of the several parts of the judgment under
discussion. The object of the '(me) myself' is the 'I' distinguished by
class characteristics as it presents itself in the waking state; the
object of the word 'I' (in the judgment) is that 'I' which consists of a
uniform flow of self-consciousness which persists in sleep also, but is
then not quite distinct. The judgment 'I did not know myself' therefore
means that the sleeper was not conscious of the place where he slept, of
his special characteristics, and so on.--It is, moreover, your own view
that in deep sleep the Self occupies the position of a witnessing
principle with regard to Nescience. But by a witness (sakshin) we
understand some one who knows about something by personal observation
(sakshat); a person who does not know cannot be a witness. Accordingly,
in scripture as well as in ordinary language a knowing subject only, not
mere knowledge, is spoken of as a witness; and with this the Reverend
Panini also agrees when teaching that the word 'sakshin' means one who
knows in person (Pa. Su. V, 2, 91). Now this witness is nothing else but
the 'I' which is apprehended in the judgment 'I know'; and how then
should this 'I' not be apprehended in the state of sleep? That which
itself appears to the Self appears as the 'I,' and it thus follows that
also in deep sleep and similar states the Self which then shines forth
appears as the 'I.'
[FOOTNOTE 68:1. I. e. the reflection as to the perception of pleasure
refers to the past state of sleep only, not to the present moment of reflection.] |
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