32. (Brahman is) not (the cause); on account of (the world) having the
nature of what depends on a motive.
Although the Lord, who before creation is alone, is endowed with all
kinds of powers since he differs in nature from all other beings, and
hence is by himself capable of creating the world; we all the same
cannot ascribe to him actual causality with regard to the world; for
this manifold world displays the nature of a thing depending on a motive,
and the Lord has no motive to urge him to creation. In the case of all
those who enter on some activity after having formed an idea of the
effect to be accomplished, there exists a motive in the form of
something beneficial either to themselves or to others. Now Brahman, to
whose essential nature it belongs that all his wishes are eternally
fulfilled, does not attain through the creation of the world any object
not attained before. Nor again is the second alternative possible. For a
being, all whose wishes are fulfilled, could concern itself about others
only with a view to benefitting them. No merciful divinity would create
a world so full, as ours is, of evils of all kind--birth, old age, death,
hell, and so on;--if it created at all, pity would move it to create a
world altogether happy. Brahman thus having no possible motive cannot be
the cause of the world.--This prima facie view is disposed of in the
next Sutra.
33. But (it is) mere sport, as in ordinary life.
The motive which prompts Brahman--all whose wishes are fulfilled and who
is perfect in himself--to the creation of a world comprising all kinds
of sentient and non-sentient beings dependent on his volition, is
nothing else but sport, play. We see in ordinary life how some great
king, ruling this earth with its seven dvipas, and possessing perfect
strength, valour, and so on, has a game at balls, or the like, from no
other motive than to amuse himself; hence there is no objection to the
view that sport only is the motive prompting Brahman to the creation,
sustentation, and destruction of this world which is easily fashioned by
his mere will.
34. Not inequality and cruelty, on account of there being regard; for so
(Scripture) declares.
It must indeed be admitted that the Lord, who differs in nature from all
other beings, intelligent and non-intelligent, and hence possesses
powers unfathomable by thought, is capable of creating this manifold
world, although before creation he is one only and without parts. But
the assumption of his having actually created the world would lay him
open to the charge of partiality, in so far as the world contains beings
of high, middle, and low station--gods, men, animals, immovable beings;
and to that of cruelty, in so far as he would be instrumental in making
his creatures experience pain of the most dreadful kind.--The reply to
this is 'not so, on account of there being regard'; i.e. 'on account of
the inequality of creation depending on the deeds of the intelligent
beings, gods, and so on, about to be created.'--Sruti and Smriti alike
declare that the connexion of the individual souls with bodies of
different kinds--divine, human, animal, and so on--depends on the karman
of those souls; compare 'He who performs good works becomes good, he who
performs bad works becomes bad. He becomes pure by pure deeds, bad by
bad deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 5). In the same way the reverend Parasara
declares that what causes the difference in nature and status between
gods, men, and so on, is the power of the former deeds of the souls
about to enter into a new creation--'He (the Lord) is the operative
cause only in the creation of new beings; the material cause is
constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. The being
to be embodied requires nothing but an operative cause; it is its own
potentiality which leads its being into that condition of being (which
it is to occupy in the new creation).' Potentiality here means karman.
35. If it be said 'not so, on account of non-distinction of deeds'; we
say, 'not so, on account of beginninglessness'; this is reasonable, and
it is also observed.
But before creation the individual souls do not exist; since Scripture
teaches non-distinction 'Being only this was in the beginning.' And as
then the souls do not exist, no karman can exist, and it cannot
therefore be said that the inequality of creation depends on karman.--Of
this objection the Sutra disposes by saying 'on account of
beginninglessness,' i.e. although the individual souls and their deeds
form an eternal stream, without a beginning, yet non-distinction of them
'is reasonable' (i.e. may reasonably be asserted) in so far as, previous
to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle
condition, destitute of names and forms, and thus incapable of being
designated as something apart from Brahman, although in reality then
also they constitute Brahman's body only. If it were not admitted (that
the distinctions in the new creation are due to karman), it would
moreover follow that souls are requited for what they have not done, and
not requited for what they have done. The fact of the souls being
without a beginning is observed, viz., to be stated in Scripture,'The
intelligent one is not born and dies not' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18); so also
the fact of the flow of creation going on from all eternity, 'As the
creator formed sun and moon formerly.' Moreover, the text, 'Now all this
was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (Bri. Up. I,
4, 7), states merely that the names and forms of the souls were
developed, and this shows that the souls themselves existed from the
beginning. Smriti also says, 'Dost thou know both Prakriti and the soul
to be without beginning?' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 19.)--As Brahman thus differs
in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other
motive than sport, and arranges the diversity of the creation in
accordance with the different karman of the individual souls, Brahman
alone can be the universal cause.
36. And because all the attributes are proved (to be present in Brahman).
As all those attributes required to constitute causality which have been
or will be shown to be absent in the Pradhana, the atoms, and so on, can
be shown to be present in Brahman, it remains a settled conclusion that
Brahman only is the cause of the world. Here terminates the adhikarana
of 'that which has the nature of depending on a motive.'
SECOND PADA.
1. Not that which is inferred, on account of the impossibility of
construction, and on account of activity.
The Sutras have so far set forth the doctrine that the highest Brahman
is the cause of the origination and so on of the world, and have refuted
the objections raised by others. They now, in order to safeguard their
own position, proceed to demolish the positions held by those very
adversaries. For otherwise it might happen that some slow-witted persons,
unaware of those other views resting on mere fallacious arguments, would
imagine them possibly to be authoritative, and hence might be somewhat
shaken in their belief in the Vedic doctrine. Another pada therefore is
begun to the express end of refuting the theories of others. The
beginning is made with the theory of Kapila, because that theory has
several features, such as the view of the existence of the effect in the
cause, which are approved of by the followers of the Veda, and hence is
more likely, than others, to give rise to the erroneous view of its
being the true doctrine. The Sutras I, 1, 5 and ff. have proved only
that the Vedic texts do not set forth the Sankhya view, while the task
of the present pada is to demolish that view itself: the Sutras cannot
therefore be charged with needless reiteration.
The outline of the Sankhya doctrine is as follows. 'There is the
fundamental Prakriti, which is not an effect; there are the seven
effects of Prakriti, viz. the Mahat and so on, and the sixteen effects
of those effects; and there is the soul, which is neither Prakriti nor
effect'--such is the comprehensive statement of the principles. The
entity called 'fundamental Prakriti' is constituted by the three
substances called Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas, (when) in a state of
complete equipoise, none of the three being either in defect or in
excess; the essential nature of those three consists respectively in
pleasure, pain, and dullness; they have for their respective effects
lightness and illumination, excitement and mobility, heaviness and
obstruction; they are absolutely non-perceivable by means of the senses,
and to be defined and distinguished through their effects only. Prakriti,
consisting in the equipoise of Sattva, Rajas, and Tamas is one, itself
non-sentient but subserving the enjoyment and final release of the many
sentient beings, eternal, all-pervading, ever active, not the effect of
anything, but the one general cause. There are seven Principles which
are the effects of Prakriti and the causal substances of everything else;
these seven are the Mahat, the ahankara, the subtle matter (tanmatra) of
sound, the subtle matter of touch, the subtle matter of colour, the
subtle matter of taste, and the subtle matter of smell. The ahankara is
threefold, being either modified (vaikarika), or active (taijasa), or
the originator of the elements (bhutadi).
The vaikarika is of sattva-nature and the originator of the sense--
organs; the bhutadi is of tamas--nature, and the cause of those subtle
matters (tanmatra) which in their turn are the cause of the gross
elements; the taijasa is of the nature of ragas, and assists the other
two. The five gross elements are the ether and so on; the five
intellectual senses are hearing and so on; the five organs of action are
speech and so on. With the addition of the internal organ (manas) these
are the sixteen entities which are mere effects.--The soul, not being
capable of any change, is not either the causal matter or the effect of
anything. For the same reason it is without attributes, consisting of
mere intelligence, eternal, non-active, all-pervading, and different in
each body. Being incapable of change and non-active, it can neither be
an agent nor an enjoyer; but although this is so, men in their confusion
of mind, due to the closeness to each other of Prakriti and the soul,
erroneously attribute to Prakriti the intelligence of the soul, and to
the soul the activity of Prakriti--just as the redness of the rose
superimposes itself on the crystal near it,--and thus consider the soul
to be an 'I' and an enjoyer. Fruition thus results from ignorance, and
release from knowledge of the truth. This their theory the Sankhyas
prove by means of perception, inference, and authoritative tradition.
Now with regard to those matters which are proved by perception, we
Vedantins have no very special reason for dissenting from the Sankhyas;
and what they say about their authoritative tradition, claiming to be
founded on the knowledge of all-knowing persons such as Kapila, has been
pretty well disproved by us in the first adhyaya. If, now, we further
manage to refute the inference which leads them to assume the Pradhana
as the cause of the--world, we shall have disestablished their whole
theory. We therefore proceed to give this refutation.
On this point the Sankhyas reason as follows. It must necessarily be
admitted that the entire world has one cause only; for if effects were
assumed to originate from several causes we should never arrive at an
ultimate cause. Assume that parts such as e.g. threads produce a whole
(i.e. in the case of threads, a piece of cloth) in the way of their
being joined together by means of their six sides, which are parts of
the threads. You must then further assume that the threads themselves
are in the same way produced by their parts, having a similar
constitution. And these parts again by their parts, until you reach the
atoms; these also must be assumed to produce their immediate effects by
being joined together with their six sides, for otherwise solid
extension (prathiman) could not be brought about. And then the atoms
also as being wholes, consisting of parts [FOOTNOTE 482:1], must be
viewed as produced by their parts, and these again by their parts and so
on, so that we never arrive at an ultimate cause. In order therefore to
establish such an ultimate cause we must have recourse to the hypothesis
of the general cause being constituted by one substance, which possesses
the power of transforming itself in various different ways, without at
the same time forfeiting its own essential nature, and which forms the
general substrate for an infinity of different effects, from the Mahat
downwards. This one general cause is the Pradhana constituted by the
equipoise of the three gunas. The reasons for the assumption of this
Pradhana are as follows:--'On account of the limitedness of particular
things; of connexion (anvaya); of activity proceeding from special power;
and of the difference and non-difference of cause and effect--the Non-
evolved (Pradhana) is the general cause of this many-natured Universe'
(vaisvarupya) (Sankhya Ka. I, 15; 16).--The term 'vaisvarupya' denotes
that which possesses all forms, i.e. the entire world with its variously
constituted parts--bodies, worlds, and so on. This world, which on
account of its variegated constitution must be held to be an effect, has
for its cause the Unevolved (avyakta = Prakriti), which is of the same
nature as the world. Why so? Because it is an effect; for we perceive
that every effect is different from its special cause--which has the
same nature as the effect--and at the same time is non-different. Such
effected things as e.g. a jar and a gold ornament are different from
their causes, i.e. clay and gold, which have the same nature as the
effects, and at the same time non-different. Hence the manifold-natured
world originates from the Pradhana which has the same nature, and is
again merged in it: the world thus has the Pradhana alone for its cause.
This Pradhana is constituted by the equipoise of the three gunas, and
thus is a cause possessing a nature equal to that of its effect, i.e.
the world; for the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dullness, which consist of sattva, rajas, and tamas respectively. The
case is analogous to that of a jar consisting of clay; of that also the
cause is none other than the substance clay. For in every case
observation shows that only such causal substances as are of the same
nature as the effects possess that power which is called the origination
of the effect. That the general cause can be found only in the unevolved
Pradhana, which consists of the three gunas in a state of equipoise and
is unlimited with regard to space as well as time, follows from the
limitedness of the particular things, viz. the Mahat, the ahankara, and
so on. These latter things are limited like jars and so on, and hence
incapable of originating the entire world. Hence it follows that this
world, consisting of the three gunas, has for its only cause the
Pradhana, which is constituted by those three gunas in a state of
equipoise.
Against this argumentation the Sutra says, 'Not that which is inferred,
on account of the impossibility of construction, and on account of
activity.'--'Inference' means 'that which is inferred,' i.e. the
Pradhana. The Pradhana postulated by you is not capable of constructing
this manifold-natured world, because while itself being non-intelligent
it is not guided by an intelligent being understanding its nature.
Whatever is of this latter kind is incapable of producing effects; as e.
g. wood and the like by themselves are not capable of constructing a
palace or a carriage. As it is matter of observation that non-
intelligent wood, not guided by an intelligent agent understanding its
nature, cannot produce effects; and as it is observed that if guided by
such an agent matter does enter on action so as to produce effects; the
Pradhana, which is not ruled by an intelligent agent, cannot be the
general cause. The 'and' in the Sutra is meant to add as a further
argument that 'presence' (anvaya) has no proving force. For whiteness
present in cows and so on is not invariably accompanied by the quality
of being the cause of the class characteristics of cows. Nor must it be
said that qualities such as whiteness, although present in the effect,
may not indeed be causes, but that substances such as gold and the like
which are present in certain effects are invariably accompanied by the
quality of being causes, and that hence also the substances called
sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are found present in all effects, are
proved to be the causes of all those effects. For sattva and so on are
attributes of substances, but not themselves substances. Sattva and so
on are the causes of the lightness, light, &c.. belonging to substances
such as earth and the like, and hence distinctive attributes of the
essential nature of those substances, but they are not observed to be
present in any effects in a substantial form, as clay, gold, and other
substances are. It is for this reason that they are known as 'gunas.'
You have further said that the world's having one cause only must be
postulated in order that an ultimate cause may be reached. But as the
sattva, rajas, and tamas are not one but three, you yourself do not
assume one cause, and hence do not manage to arrive at an ultimate cause.
For your Pradhana consists in the equipoise of the three gunas; there
are thus several causes, and you have no more an ultimate cause than
others. Nor can you say that this end is accomplished through the three
gunas being unlimited. For if the three gunas are all alike unlimited,
and therefore omnipresent, there is nowhere a plus or minus of any of
them, and as thus no inequality can result, effects cannot originate. In
order to explain the origination of results it is therefore necessary to
assume limitation of the gunas.
Nor is our view confirmed by those cases only in which it is clearly
perceived that matter produces effects only when guided by an
intelligent principle; other cases also (where the fact is not perceived
with equal clearness) are in favour of our view. This the next Sutra
declares.
[FOOTNOTE 482:1. As follows from their having six sides.]
2. If it be said--like milk or water; there also (intelligence guides).
What has been said--the Sankhya rejoins--as to the impossibility of the
Pradhana not guided by an intelligent principle constructing this
variously constituted world, is unfounded; for the Pradhana may be
supposed to act in the same way as milk and water do. Milk, when turning
into sour milk, is capable of going by itself through a series of
changes: it does not therefore depend on anything else. In the same way
we observe that the homogeneous water discharged from the clouds
spontaneously proceeds to transform itself into the various saps and
juices of different plants, such as palm trees, mango trees, wood-apple
trees, lime trees, tamarind trees, and so on. In the same way the
Pradhana, of whose essential nature it is to change, may, without being
guided by another agent, abide in the interval between two creations in
a state of homogeneousness, and then when the time for creation comes
modify itself into many various effects due to the loss of equilibrium
on the part of the gunas. As has been said '(the Pradhana acts), owing
to modification, as water according to the difference of the abodes of
the several gunas' (Sankhya Ka. I, 16). In this way the Unevolved acts
independently of anything else.
To this reasoning the Sutra replies 'there also.' Also, in the instances
of milk and water, activity is not possible in the absence of an
intelligent principle, for these very cases have already been referred
to as proving our position. The Sutra II, 1, 24 (where the change of
milk into sour milk is instanced) meant to prove only that a being
destitute of other visible instruments of action is able to produce its
own special effect, but not to disprove the view of all agency
presupposing an intelligent principle. That even in water and so on an
intelligent principle is present is proved by scriptural texts, 'he who
dwells in water' and so on.
3. And because from the independence (of the Pradhana) there would
follow the non-existence of what is different (from creation, i.e. of
the pralaya condition).
That the Pradhana which is not guided by an intelligent principle is not
the universal cause is proved also by the fact that, if we ascribe to it
a power for change independent of the guidance of a Lord capable of
realising all his purposes, it would follow that the pralaya state,
which is different from the state of creation, would not exist; while on
the other hand the guidance of the Pradhana by a Lord explains the
alternating states of creation and pralaya as the effects of his
purposes. Nor can the Sankhya retort that our view gives rise to similar
difficulties in so far, namely, as the Lord, all whose wishes are
eternally accomplished, who is free from all imperfection, &c. &c.,
cannot be the originator of either creation or pralaya, and as the
creation of an unequal world would lay him open to the charge of
mercilessness. For, as explained before, even a being perfect and
complete may enter on activity for the sake of sport; and as the reason
for a particular creation on the part of an all-knowing Lord may be his
recognition of Prakriti having reached a certain special state, it is
the deeds of the individual souls which bring about the inequalities in
the new creation.--But if this is so, all difference of states is caused
exclusively by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls; and what
position remains then for a ruling Lord? Prakriti, impressed by the good
and evil deeds of the souls, will by herself modify herself on such
lines as correspond to the deserts of the individual souls; in the same
way as we observe that food and drink, if either vitiated by poison or
reinforced by medicinal herbs and juices, enter into new states which
render them the causes of either pleasure or pain. Hence all the
differences between states of creation and pralaya, as also the
inequalities among created beings such as gods, men, and so on, and
finally the souls reaching the condition of Release, may be credited to
the Pradhana, possessing as it does the capability of modifying itself
into all possible forms!--You do not, we reply, appear to know anything
about the nature of good and evil works; for this is a matter to be
learned from the Sastra. The Sastra is constituted by the aggregate of
words called Veda, which is handed on by an endless unbroken succession
of pupils learning from qualified teachers, and raised above all
suspicion of imperfections such as spring from mistake and the like. It
is the Veda which gives information as to good and evil deeds, the
essence of which consists in their pleasing or displeasing the Supreme
Person, and as to their results, viz. pleasure and pain, which depend on
the grace or wrath of the Lord. In agreement herewith the Dramidakarya
says, 'From the wish of giving rise to fruits they seek to please the
Self with works; he being pleased is able to bestow fruits, this is the
purport of the Sastra.' Thus Sruti also says, 'Sacrifices and pious
works which are performed in many forms, all that he bears (i.e. he
takes to himself); be the navel of the Universe' (Mahanar. Up. I, 6).
And in the same spirit the Lord himself declares,'From whom there
proceed all beings, by whom all this is pervaded--worshipping him with
the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. Gi. XVIII, 46); and
'These evil and malign haters, lowest of men, I hurl perpetually into
transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (Bha. Gi. XVI, 19). The divine
Supreme Person, all whose wishes are eternally fulfilled, who is all-
knowing and the ruler of all, whose every purpose is immediately
realised, having engaged in sport befitting his might and greatness and
having settled that work is of a twofold nature, such and such works
being good and such and such being evil, and having bestowed on all
individual souls bodies and sense-organs capacitating them for entering
on such work and the power of ruling those bodies and organs; and having
himself entered into those souls as their inner Self abides within them,
controlling them as an animating and cheering principle. The souls, on
their side, endowed with all the powers imparted to them by the Lord and
with bodies and organs bestowed by him, and forming abodes in which he
dwells, apply themselves on their own part, and in accordance with their
own wishes, to works either good or evil. The Lord, then, recognising
him who performs good actions as one who obeys his commands, blesses him
with piety, riches, worldly pleasures, and final release; while him who
transgresses his commands he causes to experience the opposites of all
these. There is thus no room whatever for objections founded on
deficiency, on the Lord's part, of independence in his dealings with men,
and the like. Nor can he be arraigned with being pitiless or merciless.
For by pity we understand the inability, on somebody's part, to bear the
pain of others, coupled with a disregard of his own advantage. When pity
has the effect of bringing about the transgression of law on the part of
the pitying person, it is in no way to his credit; it rather implies the
charge of unmanliness (weakness), and it is creditable to control and
subdue it. For otherwise it would follow that to subdue and chastise
one's enemies is something to be blamed. What the Lord himself aims at
is ever to increase happiness to the highest degree, and to this end it
is instrumental that he should reprove and reject the infinite and
intolerable mass of sins which accumulates in the course of beginning
and endless aeons, and thus check the tendency on the part of individual
beings to transgress his laws. For thus he says: 'To them ever devoted,
worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain
to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the
darkness born of ignorance with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha.
Gi. X, 10, 11).--It thus remains a settled conclusion that the Pradhana,
which is not guided by an intelligent principle, cannot be the general
cause.--Here a further objection is raised. Although Prakriti, as not
being ruled by an intelligent principle, is not capable of that kind of
activity which springs from effort, she may yet be capable of that kind
of activity which consists in mere transformation. For we observe
parallel cases; the grass and water e.g. which are consumed by a cow
change on their own account into milk. In the same way, then, Prakriti
may on her own account transform herself into the world.--To this the
next Sutra replies.
4. Nor like grass and so on; because (milk) does not exist elsewhere.
This argumentation does not hold good; for as grass and the like do not
transform themselves without the guidance of an intelligent principle,
your proving instance is not established.--But why is it not established?--
'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' If grass, water and so on changed
into milk even when consumed by a bull or when not consumed at all, then
indeed it might be held that they change without the guidance of an
intelligent principle. But nothing of the kind takes place, and hence we
conclude that it is the intelligent principle only which turns the grass
eaten by the cow into milk.--This point has been set forth above under
Sutra 3; the present Sutra is meant to emphasise and particularise it.
5. And if you say--as the man and the stone; thus also.
Here the following view might be urged. Although the soul consists of
mere intelligence and is inactive, while the Pradhana is destitute of
all power of thought; yet the non-sentient Pradhana may begin to act
owing to the mere nearness of the soul. For we observe parallel
instances. A man blind but capable of motion may act in some way, owing
to the nearness to him of some lame man who has no power of motion but
possesses good eyesight and assists the blind man with his intelligence.
And through the nearness of the magnetic stone iron moves. In the same
way the creation of the world may result from the connexion of Prakriti
and the soul. As has been said, 'In order that the soul may know the
Pradhana and become isolated, the connexion of the two takes place like
that of the lame and the blind; and thence creation springs' (Sankhya Ka.
21). This means--to the end that the soul may experience the Pradhana,
and for the sake of the soul's emancipation, the Pradhana enters on
action at the beginning of creation, owing to the nearness of the soul.
To this the Sutra replies 'thus also.' This means--the inability of the
Pradhana to act remains the same, in spite of these instances. The lame
man is indeed incapable of walking, but he possesses various other
powers--he can see the road and give instructions regarding it; and the
blind man, being an intelligent being, understands those instructions
and directs his steps accordingly. The magnet again possesses the
attribute of moving towards the iron and so on. The soul on the other
hand, which is absolutely inactive, is incapable of all such changes. As,
moreover, the mere nearness of the soul to the Pradhana is something
eternal, it would follow that the creation also is eternal. If, on the
other hand, the soul is held to be eternally free, then there can be no
bondage and no release.
6. And on account of the impossibility of the relation of principal (and
subordinate) matter.
You Sankhyas maintain that the origination of the world results from a
certain relation between principal and subordinate entities which
depends on the relative inferiority and superiority of the gunas--
'according to the difference of the abodes of the several gunas'
(Sankhya Ka. I, 16).
But, as in the pralaya state the three gunas are in a state of equipoise,
none of them being superior or inferior to the others, that relation of
superiority and subordination cannot then exist, and hence the world
cannot originate. Should it, on the other hand, be maintained that even
in the pralaya state there is a certain inequality, it would follow
therefrom that creation is eternal.
7. And if another inference be made (the result remains unchanged), on
account of (the Pradhana) being destitute of the power of a knowing
subject.
Even if the Pradhana were inferred by some reasoning different from the
arguments so far refuted by us, our objections would remain in force
because, anyhow, the Pradhana is devoid of the power of a cognising
subject. The Pradhana thus cannot be established by any mode of
inference.
8. And even if it be admitted; on account of the absence of a purpose.
Even if it were admitted that the Pradhana is established by Inference,
the Sankhya theory could not be accepted for the reason that the
Pradhana is without a purpose. For, according to the view expressed in
the passage, 'In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become
isolated' (Sankhya Ka. I, 21), the purpose of the Pradhana is fruition
and final release on the part of the soul; but both these are impossible.
For, as the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless,
and spotless, and hence eternally emancipated, it is capable neither of
fruition which consists in consciousness of Prakriti, nor of Release
which consists in separation from Prakriti. If, on the other hand, it be
held that the soul constituted as described is, owing to the mere
nearness of Prakriti, capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of
pleasure and pain, which are special modifications of Prakriti, it
follows that, as Prakriti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish
emancipation.
9. And (it is) objectionable on account of the contradictions.
The Sankhya-system, moreover, labours from many internal contradictions.--
The Sankhyas hold that while Prakriti is for the sake of another and the
object of knowledge and fruition, the soul is independent, an enjoying
and knowing agent, and conscious of Prakriti; that the soul reaches
isolation through the instrumentality of Prakriti only, and that as its
nature is pure, permanent, unchanging consciousness, absence of all
activity and isolation belong to that nature; that for this reason the
accomplishing of the means of bondage and release and of release belong
to Prakriti only; and that, owing to Prakriti's proximity to the
unchanging non-active soul, Prakriti, by a process of mutual
superimposition (adhyasa), works towards the creation of a world and
subserves the purposes of the soul's fruition and emancipation.--'Since
the aggregate of things is for the sake of another; since there is an
opposite of the three gunas and the rest; since there is superintendence;
since there is an experiencing subject; and since there is activity for
the sake of isolation; the soul exists' (Sankhya Ka. 17); 'And from that
contrast the soul is proved to be a witness, isolated, neutral,
cognising and inactive' (18).--And after having stated that the activity
of the Pradhana is for the purpose of the release of the Self, the text
says, 'therefore no (soul) is either bound or released, nor does it
migrate; it is Prakriti which, abiding in various beings, is bound and
released and migrates' (62). And 'From this connexion therewith (i.e.
with the soul) the non-intelligent appears as intelligent; and although
all agency belongs to the gunas, the indifferent (soul) becomes an agent.
In order that the soul may know the Pradhana and become isolated, the
connexion of the two takes place like that of the lame and the blind;
and thence creation springs' (20, 21).--Now to that which is eternally
unchanging, non-active and isolated, the attributes of being a witness
and an enjoying and cognising agent can in no way belong. Nor also can
such a being be subject to error resting on superimposition; for error
and superimposition both are of the nature of change. And, on the other
hand, they also cannot belong to Prakriti, since they are attributes of
intelligent beings. For by superimposition we understand the attribution,
on the part of an intelligent being, of the qualities of one thing to
another thing; and this is the doing of an intelligent being, and
moreover a change. Nor is it possible that superimposition and the like
should take place in the soul only if it is in approximation to Prakriti.--
They may take place just on account of the non-changing nature of the
soul!--Then, we reply, they would take place permanently. And that mere
proximity has no effective power we have already shown under II, 1, 4.
And if it is maintained that it is Prakriti only that migrates, is bound
and released, how then can she be said to benefit the soul, which is
eternally released? That she does so the Sankhyas distinctly assert, 'By
manifold means Prakriti, helpful and endowed with the gunas, without any
benefit to herself, accomplishes the purpose of the soul, which is
thankless and not composed of the gunas' (Sankhya Ka. 60).--The Sankhyas
further teach that Prakriti, on being seen by any soul in her true
nature, at once retires from that soul--'As a dancer having exhibited
herself on the stage withdraws from the soul, so Prakriti withdraws from
the soul when she has manifested herself to it' (59); 'My opinion is
that there exists nothing more sensitive than Prakriti, who knowing "I
have been seen" does not again show itself to the soul' (61). But this
doctrine also is inappropriate. For, as the soul is eternally released
and above all change, it never sees Prakriti, nor does it attribute to
itself her qualities; and Prakriti herself does not see herself since
she is of non-intelligent nature; nor can she wrongly impute to herself
the soul's seeing of itself as her own seeing of herself, for she
herself is non-intelligent and the soul is incapable of that change
which consists in seeing or knowing.--Let it then be said that the
'seeing' means nothing more than the proximity of Prakriti to the soul!--
But this also does not help you; for, as said above, from that there
would follow eternal seeing, since the two are in eternal proximity.
Moreover, the ever unchanging soul is not capable of an approximation
which does not form an element of its unchanging nature.--Moreover, if
you define the seeing as mere proximity and declare this to be the cause
of Release, we point out that it equally is the cause of bondage--so
that bondage and release would both be permanent.--Let it then be said
that what causes bondage is wrong seeing--while intuition of the true
nature of things is the cause of Release!--But as both these kinds of
seeing are nothing but proximity, it would follow that both take place
permanently. And if, on the other hand, the proximity of Soul and
Prakriti were held not to be permanent, then the cause of such proximity
would have to be assigned, and again the cause of that, and so on _ad
infinitum_.--Let us then, to escape from these difficulties, define
proximity as nothing more than the true nature of soul and Prakriti!--As
the true nature is permanent, we reply, it would follow therefrom that
bondage and release would be alike permanent.--On account of all these
contradictory views the system of the Sankhyas is untenable.
We finally remark that the arguments here set forth by us at the same
time prove the untenableness of the view of those who teach that there
is an eternally unchanging Brahman whose nature is pure, non-differenced
intelligence, and which by being conscious of Nescience experiences
unreal bondage and release. For those philosophers can show no more than
the Sankhyas do how their Brahman can be conscious of Nescience, can be
subject to adhyasa, and so on. There is, however, the following
difference between the two theories. The Sankhyas, in order to account
for the definite individual distribution of birth, death, and so on,
assume a plurality of souls. The Vedantins, on the other hand, do not
allow even so much, and their doctrine is thus all the more irrational.
The assertion that there is a difference (in favour of the Vedantins)
between the two doctrines, in so far as the Vedantins hold Prakriti to
be something unreal, while the Sankhyas consider it to be real, is
unfounded; for pure, homogeneous intelligence, eternally non-changing,
cannot possibly be conscious of anything different from itself, whether
it be unreal or real. And if that thing is held to be unreal, there
arise further difficulties, owing to its having to be viewed as the
object of knowledge, of refutation, and so on.
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the impossibility of construction.'
10. Or in the same way as the big and long from the short and the atomic.
We have shown that the theory of the Pradhana being the universal cause
is untenable, since it rests on fallacious arguments, and suffers from
inner contradictions. We shall now prove that the view of atoms
constituting the universal cause is untenable likewise. 'Or in the same
way as the big and long from the short and the atomic' 'Is untenable'
must be supplied from the preceding Sutra; 'or' has to be taken in the
sense of 'and.' The sense of the Sutra is--in the same way as the big
and long, i.e. as the theory of ternary compounds originating from the
short and the atomic, i.e. from binary compounds and simple atoms is
untenable, so everything else which they (the Vaiseshikas) maintain is
untenable; or, in other words--as the theory of the world originating
from atoms through binary compounds is untenable, so everything else is
likewise untenable.--Things consisting of parts, as e.g. a piece of
cloth, are produced by their parts, e.g. threads, being joined by means
of the six sides which are parts of those parts. Analogously the atoms
also must be held to originate binary compounds in the way of combining
by means of their six sides; for if the atoms possessed no distinction
of parts (and hence filled no space), a group of even a thousand atoms
would not differ in extension from a single atom, and the different
kinds of extension--minuteness, shortness, bigness, length, &c.--would
never emerge. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the atoms also
have distinct sides, they have parts and are made up of those parts, and
those parts again are made up of their parts, and so on in infinitum.--
But, the Vaiseshika may object, the difference between a mustard seed
and a mountain is due to the paucity of the constituent parts on the one
hand, and their multitude on the other. If, now, it be held that the
atom itself contains an infinity of parts, the mustard seed and the
mountain alike will contain an infinity of parts, and thus their
inequality cannot be accounted for. We must therefore assume that there
is a limit of subdivision (i.e. that there are real atoms which do not
themselves consist of parts).--Not so, we reply. If the atoms did not
possess distinct parts, there could originate no extension greater than
the extension of one atom (as already shown), and thus neither mustard
seed nor mountain would ever be brought about.--But what, then, are we
to do to get out of this dilemma?--You have only to accept the Vedic
doctrine of the origination of the world.
Others explain the above Sutra as meant to refute an objection against
the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause. But this does not suit
the arrangement of the Sutras, and would imply a meaningless iteration.
The objections raised by some against the doctrine of Brahman have been
disposed of in the preceding pada, and the present pada is devoted to
the refutation of other theories. And that the world admits of being
viewed as springing from an intelligent principle such as Brahman was
shown at length under II, 1, 4. The sense of the Sutra, therefore, is
none other than what we stated above.--But what are those other
untenable views to which the Sutra refers?--To this question the next
Sutra replies.
11. On both assumptions also there is no motion, and thence non-being
(of the origination of the world).
The atomic theory teaches that the world is produced by the successive
formation of compounds, binary, ternary, and so on, due to the
aggregation of atoms--such aggregation resulting from the motion of the
atoms. The primary motion of the atoms--which are the cause of the
origination of the entire world--is assumed to be brought about by the
unseen principle (adrishta), 'The upward flickering of fire, the sideway
motion of air, the primary motion on the part of atoms and of the manas
are caused by the unseen principle.'--Is then, we ask, this primary
motion of the atoms caused by an adrishta residing in them, or by an
adrishta residing in the souls? Neither alternative is possible. For the
unseen principle which is originated by the good and evil deeds of the
individual souls cannot possibly reside in the atoms; and if it could,
the consequence would be that the atoms would constantly produce the
world. Nor again can the adrishta residing in the souls be the cause of
motion originating in the atoms.--Let it then be assumed that motion
originates in the atoms, owing to their being in contact with the souls
in which the adrishta abides!--If this were so, we reply, it would
follow that the world would be permanently created, for the adrishta, of
the souls forms an eternal stream.-But the adrishta requires to be
matured in order to produce results. The adrishtas of some souls come to
maturity in the same state of existence in which the deeds were
performed; others become mature in a subsequent state of existence only;
and others again do not become mature before a new Kalpa has begun. It
is owing to this dependence on the maturation of the adrishtas that the
origination of the world does not take place at all times.--But this
reasoning also we cannot admit. For there is nothing whatever to
establish the conclusion that all the different adrishtas which spring
from the manifold actions performed at different times, without any
previous agreement, by the infinite multitude of individual Selfs should
reach a state of uniform maturation at one and the same moment of time
(so as to give rise to a new creation). Nor does this view of yours
account for the fact of the entire world being destroyed at the same
time, and remaining in a state of non-maturation for the period of a
dviparardha.--Nor can you say that the motion of the atoms is due to
their conjunction with (souls whose) adrishta possesses certain specific
qualities imparted to them by the will of the Lord; for by mere
inference the existence of a Lord cannot be proved, as we have shown
under I, 1. The origin of the world cannot, therefore, be due to any
action on the part of the atoms.
12. And because owing to the acknowledgment of samavaya, there results a
_regressus in infinitum_ from equality.
The Vaiseshika doctrine is further untenable on account of the
acknowledgment of samavaya.--Why so?--Because the samavaya also, like
part, quality, and generic characteristics, requires something else to
establish it, and that something else again requires some further thing
to establish it--from which there arises an infinite regress. To explain.
The Vaiseshikas assume the so-called samavaya relation, defining it as
'that connexion which is the cause of the idea "this is here," in the
case of things permanently and inseparably connected, and standing to
each other in the relation of abode and thing abiding in the abode.' Now,
if such a samavaya relation is assumed in order to account for the fact
that things observed to be inseparably connected--as, e.g., class
characteristics are inseparably connected with the individuals to which
they belong--are such, i.e. inseparably connected, a reason has also to
be searched for why the samavaya, which is of the same nature as those
things (in so far, namely, as it is also inseparably connected with the
things connected by it), is such; and for that reason, again, a further
reason has to be postulated, and so on, _in infinitum_. Nor can it be
said that inseparable connexion must be assumed to constitute the
essential nature of samavaya (so that no further reason need be demanded
for its inseparable connexion); for on this reasoning you would have to
assume the same essential nature for class characteristics, qualities,
and so on (which would render the assumption of a samavaya needless for
them also). Nor is it a legitimate proceeding to postulate an unseen
entity such as the samavaya is, and then to assume for it such and such
an essential nature.--These objections apply to the samavaya whether it
be viewed as eternal or non-eternal. The next Sutra urges a further
objection against it if viewed as eternal.
13. And because (the world also) would thus be eternal.
The samavaya is a relation, and if that relation is eternal that to
which the relation belongs must also be eternal, so that we would arrive
at the unacceptable conclusion that the world is eternal.
14. And on account of (the atoms) having colour and so on, the reverse
(takes place); as it is observed.
From the view that the atoms of four kinds--viz. of earth or water or
fire or air--possess colour, taste, smell, and touch, it would follow
that the atoms are non-eternal, gross, and made up of parts--and this is
the reverse of what the Vaiseshikas actually teach as to their atoms,
viz. that they are eternal, subtle, and not made up of parts. For things
possessing colour, e.g. jars, are non-eternal, because it is observed
that they are produced from other causes of the same, i.e. non-eternal
nature, and so on. To a non-perceived thing which is assumed in
accordance with what is actually perceived, we may not ascribe any
attributes that would be convenient to us; and it is in accordance with
actual experience that you Vaiseshikas assume the atoms to possess
colour and other qualities. Hence your theory is untenable.--Let it then,
in order to avoid this difficulty, be assumed that the atoms do not
possess colour and other sensible qualities. To this alternative the
next Sutra refers.
15. And as there are objections in both cases.
A difficulty arises not only on the view of the atoms having colour and
other sensible qualities, but also on the view of their being destitute
of those qualities. For as the qualities of effected things depend on
the qualities of their causes, earth, water, and so on, would in that
case be destitute of qualities. And if to avoid this difficulty, it be
held that the atoms do possess qualities, we are again met by the difficulty stated in the preceding Sutra. Objections thus arising in both cases, the theory of the atoms is untenable. |
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