To this bhedabheda view the Purvapakshin now objects on the following grounds:--The whole aggregate of Vedanta-texts aims at enjoining meditation on a non-dual Brahman whose essence is reality, intelligence, and bliss, and thus sets forth the view of non-difference; while on the other hand the karma-section of the Veda, and likewise perception and the other means of knowledge, intimate the view of the difference of things. Now, as difference and non-difference are contradictory, and as the view of difference may be accounted for as resting on beginningless Nescience, we conclude that universal non-difference is what is real.-- The tenet that difference and non-difference are not contradictory because both are proved by our consciousness, cannot be upheld. If one thing has different characteristics from another there is distinction (bheda) of the two; the contrary condition of things constitutes non- distinction (abheda); who in his senses then would maintain that these two-suchness and non-suchness--can be found together? You have maintained that non-difference belongs to a thing viewed as cause and genus, and difference to the same viewed as effect and individual; and that, owing to this twofold aspect of things, non-difference and difference are not irreconcileable. But that this view also is untenable, a presentation of the question in definite alternatives will show. Do you mean to say that the difference lies in one aspect of the thing and the non-difference in the other? or that difference _and_ non-difference belong to the thing possessing two aspects?--On the former alternative the difference belongs to the individual and the non-difference to the genus; and this implies that there is no one thing with a double aspect. And should you say that the genus and individual together constitute one thing only, you abandon the view that it is difference of aspect which takes away the contradictoriness of difference and non-difference. We have moreover remarked already that difference in characteristics and its opposite are absolutely contradictory.--On the second alternative we have two aspects of different kind and an unknown thing supposed to be the substrate of those aspects; but this assumption of a triad of entities proves only their mutual difference of character, not their non- difference. Should you say that the non-contradictoriness of two aspects constitutes simultaneous difference and non-difference in the thing which is their substrate, we ask in return--How can two aspects which have a thing for their substrate, and thus are different from the thing, introduce into that thing a combination of two contradictory attributes (viz. difference and non-difference)? And much less even are they able to do so if they are viewed as non-different from the thing which is their substrate. If, moreover, the two aspects on the one hand, and the thing in which they inhere on the other, be admitted to be distinct entities, there will be required a further factor to bring about their difference and non-difference, and we shall thus be led into a _regressus in infinitum._--Nor is it a fact that the idea of a thing inclusive of its generic character bears the character of unity, in the same way as the admittedly uniform idea of an individual; for wherever a state of consciousness expresses itself in the form 'this is such and such' it implies the distinction of an attribute or mode, and that to which the attribute or mode belongs. In the case under discussion the genus constitutes the mode, and the individual that to which the mode belongs: the idea does not therefore possess the character of unity.
For these very reasons the individual soul cannot stand to Brahman in the bhedabheda-relation. And as the view of non-difference is founded on Scripture, we assume that the view of difference rests on beginningless Nescience.--But on this view want of knowledge and all the imperfections springing therefrom, such as birth, death, &c., would cling to Brahman itself, and this would contradict scriptural texts such as 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'That Self free from all evil' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5). Not so, we reply. For all those imperfections we consider to be unreal. On your view on the other hand, which admits nothing but Brahman and its limiting adjuncts, all the imperfections which spring from contact with those adjuncts must really belong to Brahman. For as Brahman is without parts, indivisible, the upadhis cannot divide or split it so as to connect themselves with a part only; but necessarily connect themselves with Brahman itself and produce their effects on it.-- Here the following explanation may possibly be attempted. Brahman determined by an upadhi constitutes the individual soul. This soul is of atomic size since what determines it, viz. the internal organ, is itself of atomic size; and the limitation itself is without beginning. All the imperfections therefore connect themselves only with that special place that is determined by the upadhi, and do not affect the highest Brahman which is not limited by the upadhi.--In reply to this we ask--Do you mean to say that what constitutes the atomic individual soul is a part of Brahman which is limited and cut off by the limiting adjunct; or some particular part of Brahman which, without being thereby divided off, is connected with an atomic upadhi; or Brahman in its totality as connected with an upadhi; or some other intelligent being connected with an upadhi, or finally the upadhi itself?--The first alternative is not possible, because Brahman cannot be divided; it would moreover imply that the individual soul has a beginning, for division means the making of one thing into two.--On the second alternative it would follow that, as a part of Brahman would be connected with the upadhi, all the imperfections due to the upadhis would adhere to that part. And further, if the upadhi would not possess the power of attracting to itself the particular part of Brahman with which it is connected, it would follow that when the upadhi moves the part with, which it is connected would constantly change; in other words, bondage and release would take place at every moment. If, on the contrary, the upadhi possessed the power of attraction, the whole Brahman--as not being capable of division--would be attracted and move with the upadhi. And should it be said that what is all-pervading and without parts cannot be attracted and move, well then the upadhi only moves, and we are again met by the difficulties stated above. Moreover, if all the upadhis were connected with the parts of Brahman viewed as one and undivided, all individual souls, being nothing but parts of Brahman, would be considered as non-distinct. And should it be said that they are not thus cognised as one because they are constituted by different parts of Brahman, it would follow that as soon as the upadhi of one individual soul is moving, the identity of that soul would be lost (for it would, in successive moments, be constituted by different parts of Brahman).--On the third alternative (the whole of) Brahman itself being connected with the upadhi enters into the condition of individual soul, and there remains no non- conditioned Brahman. And, moreover, the soul in all bodies will then be one only.--On the fourth alternative the individual soul is something altogether different from Brahman, and the difference of the soul from Brahman thus ceases to depend on the upadhis of Brahman.--And the fifth alternative means the embracing of the view of the Karvaka (who makes no distinction between soul and matter).--The conclusion from all this is that on the strength of the texts declaring non-difference we must admit that all difference is based on Nescience only. Hence, Scripture being an authoritative instrument of knowledge in so far only as it has for its end action and the cessation of action, the Vedanta-texts must be allowed to be a valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman's nature, in so far as they stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions of meditation.
This view is finally combated by the Mimamsaka. Even if, he says, we allow the Vedanta-texts to have a purport in so far as they are supplementary to injunctions of meditation, they cannot be viewed as valid means of knowledge with regard to Brahman. Do the texts referring to Brahman, we ask, occupy the position of valid means of knowledge in so far as they form a syntactic whole with the injunctions of meditation, or as independent sentences? In the former case the purport of the syntactic whole is simply to enjoin meditation, and it cannot therefore aim at giving instruction about Brahman. If, on the other hand, the texts about Brahman are separate independent sentences, they cannot have the purport of prompting to action and are therefore devoid of instructive power. Nor must it be said that meditation is a kind of continued remembrance, and as such requires to be defined by the object remembered; and that the demand of the injunction of meditation for something to be remembered is satisfied by texts such as 'All this is that Self', 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' &c., which set forth the nature and attributes of Brahman and--forming a syntactic whole with the injunctions--are a valid means of knowledge with regard to the existence of the matter they convey. For the fact is that the demand on the part of an injunction of meditation for an object to be remembered may be satisfied even by something unreal (not true), as in the case of injunctions such as 'Let him meditate upon mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1): the real existence of the object of meditation is therefore not demanded.--The final conclusion arrived at in this purvapaksha is therefore as follows. As the Vedanta-texts do not aim at prompting to action or the cessation of action; as, even on the supposition of their being supplementary to injunctions of meditation, the only thing they effect is to set forth the nature of the object of meditation; and as, even if they are viewed as independent sentences, they accomplish the end of man (i.e. please, gratify) by knowledge merely--being thus comparable to tales with which we soothe children or sick persons; it does not lie within their province to establish the reality of an accomplished thing, and hence Scripture cannot be viewed as a valid means for the cognition of Brahman.
To this prima facie view the Sutrakara replies, 'But this on account of connexion.' 'Connexion' is here to be taken in an eminent sense, as 'connexion with the end of man.' That Brahman, which is measureless bliss and therefore constitutes the highest end of man, is connected with the texts as the topic set forth by them, proves Scripture to be a valid means for the cognition of Brahman. To maintain that the whole body of Vedanta-texts-which teach us that Brahman is the highest object to be attained, since it consists of supreme bliss free of all blemish whatsoever--is devoid of all use and purpose merely because it does not aim at action or the cessation of action; is no better than to say that a youth of royal descent is of no use because he does not belong to a community of low wretches living on the flesh of dogs!
The relation of the different texts is as follows. There are individual souls of numberless kinds-gods, Asuras, Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyadharas, Kinnaras, Kimpurushas, Yakshas, Rakshasas, Pisakas, men, beasts, birds, creeping animals, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and so on-- distinguished as male, female, or sexless, and having different sources of nourishment and support and different objects of enjoyment. Now all these souls are deficient in insight into the true nature of the highest reality, their understandings being obscured by Nescience operating in the form of beginningless karman; and hence those texts only are fully useful to them which teach that there exists a highest Brahman--which the souls in the state of release may cognise as non-different from themselves, and which then, through its own essential nature, qualities, power and energies, imparts to those souls bliss infinite and unsurpassable. When now the question arises--as it must arise--, as to how this Brahman is to be attained, there step in certain other Vedanta- texts--such as He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 1), and 'Let a man meditate on the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. 1, 4, 15)--and, by means of terms denoting 'knowing' and so on, enjoin meditation as the means of attaining Brahman. (We may illustrate this relation existing between the texts setting forth the nature of Brahman and those enjoining meditation by two comparisons.) The case is like that of a man who has been told 'There is a treasure hidden in your house'. He learns through this sentence the existence of the treasure, is satisfied, and then takes active steps to find it and make it his own.-- Or take the case of a young prince who, intent on some boyish play, leaves his father's palace and, losing his way, does not return. The king thinks his son is lost; the boy himself is received by some good Brahman who brings him up and teaches him without knowing who the boy's father is. When the boy has reached his sixteenth year and is accomplished in every way, some fully trustworthy person tells him, 'Your father is the ruler of all these lands, famous for the possession of all noble qualities, wisdom, generosity, kindness, courage, valour and so on, and he stays in his capital, longing to see you, his lost child. Hearing that his father is alive and a man so high and noble, the boy's heart is filled with supreme joy; and the king also, understanding that his son is alive, in good health, handsome and well instructed, considers himself to have attained all a man can wish for. He then takes steps to recover his son, and finally the two are reunited.
The assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished thing gratifies men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing, without being a means of knowledge with regard to its real existence--so that it would be comparable to the tales we tell to children and sick people--, can in no way be upheld. When it is ascertained that a thing has no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea of the thing does not gratify. The pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is due to the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true; if they were to find out that the matter present to their thought is untrue their pleasure would come to an end that very moment. And thus in the case of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we thought that these texts do not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahman, the mere idea of Brahman to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way.
The conclusion therefore is that texts such as 'That from whence these beings are born' &c. do convey valid instruction as to the existence of Brahman, i.e. that being which is the sole cause of the world, is free from all shadow of imperfection, comprises within itself all auspicious qualities, such as omniscience and so on, and is of the nature of supreme bliss.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'connexion'.
5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking) that which is not founded on Scripture (i.e. the Pradhana) is not (what is taught by the texts referring to the origination of the world).
We have maintained that what is taught by the texts relative to the origination of the world is Brahman, omniscient, and so on. The present Sutra and the following Sutras now add that those texts can in no way refer to the Pradhana and similar entities which rest on Inference only.
We read in the Chandogya, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one only, without a second.--It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.-- It sent forth fire' (VI, 2, 1 ff.)--Here a doubt arises whether the cause of the world denoted by the term 'Being' is the Pradhana. assumed by others, which rests on Inference, or Brahman as defined by us.
The Purvapakshin maintains that the Pradhana is meant. For he says, the Chandogya text quoted expresses the causal state of what is denoted by the word 'this', viz. the aggregate of things comprising manifold effects, such as ether, &c., consisting of the three elements of Goodness, Passion and Darkness, and forming the sphere of fruition of intelligent beings. By the 'effected' state we understand the assuming, on the part of the causal substance, of a different condition; whatever therefore constitutes the essential nature of a thing in its effected state the same constitutes its essential nature in the causal state also. Now the effect, in our case, is made up of the three elements Goodness, Passion and Darkness; hence the cause is the Pradhana which consists in an equipoise of those three elements. And as in this Pradhana all distinctions are merged, so that it is pure Being, the Chandogya text refers to it as 'Being, one only, without a second.' This establishes the non-difference of effect and cause, and in this way the promise that through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known admits of being fulfilled. Otherwise, moreover, there would be no analogy between the instance of the lump of clay and the things made of it, and the matter to be illustrated thereby. The texts speaking of the origination of the world therefore intimate the Pradhana taught by the great Sage Kapila. And as the Chandogya passage has, owing to the presence of an initial statement (pratijna) and a proving instance, the form of an inference, the term 'Being' means just that which rests on inference, viz. the Pradhana.
This prima facie view is set aside by the words of the Sutra. That which does not rest on Scripture, i.e. the Pradhana, which rests on Inference only, is not what is intimated by the texts referring to the origination of the world; for the text exhibits the root 'iksh'--which means 'to think'--as denoting a special activity on the part of what is termed 'Being.' 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.' 'Thinking' cannot possibly belong to the non-sentient Pradhana: the term 'Being' can therefore denote only the all-knowing highest Person who is capable of thought. In agreement with this we find that, in all sections which refer to creation, the act of creation is stated to be preceded by thought. 'He thought, shall I send forth worlds. He sent forth these worlds' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2); 'He thought he sent forth Prana' (Pr. Up. VI, 3); and others.--But it is a rule that as a cause we must assume only what corresponds to the effect!--Just so; and what corresponds to the total aggregate of effects is the highest Person, all-knowing, all- powerful, whose purposes realise themselves, who has minds and matter in their subtle state for his body. Compare the texts 'His high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'He of whom the Unevolved is the body, of whom the Imperishable is the body, of whom Death is the body, he is the inner Self of all things' (Subal. Up. VII).--This point (viz. as to the body of the highest Person) will be established under Su. II, 1, 4. The present Sutra declares that the texts treating of creation cannot refer to the Pradhana; the Sutra just mentioned will dispose of objections. Nor is the Purvapakshin right in maintaining that the Chandogya passage is of the nature of an Inference; for it does not state a reason (hetu--which is the essential thing in an Inference). The illustrative instance (of the lump of clay) is introduced merely in order to convince him who considers it impossible that all things should be known through one thing--as maintained in the passage 'through which that is heard which was not heard,' &c.,--that this _is_ possible after all. And the mention made in the text of 'seeing' clearly shows that there is absolutely no intention of setting forth an Inference.
Let us assume, then, the Purvapakshin resumes, that the 'seeing' of the text denotes not 'seeing' in its primary, direct sense--such as belongs to intelligent beings only; but 'seeing' in a secondary, figurative sense which there is ascribed to the Pradhana in the same way as in passages immediately following it is ascribed to fire and water--'the fire saw'; 'the water saw' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3). The transference, to non- existent things, of attributes properly belonging to sentient beings is quite common; as when we say 'the rice-fields look out for rain'; 'the rain delighted the seeds.'--This view is set aside by the next Sutra.
6. If it be said that (the word 'seeing') has a secondary (figurative) meaning; we deny this, on account of the word 'Self' (being applied to the cause of the world).
The contention that, because, in passages standing close by, the word 'seeing' is used in a secondary sense, the 'seeing' predicated of the Sat ('Being') is also to be taken in a secondary sense, viz. as denoting (not real thought but) a certain condition previous to creation, cannot be upheld; for in other texts met with in the same section (viz. 'All this has that for its Self; that is the True, that is the Self', Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7), that which first had been spoken of as Sat is called the 'Self'. The designation 'Self' which in this passage is applied to the Sat in its relation to the entire world, sentient or non-sentient, is in no way appropriate to the Pradhana. We therefore conclude that, as the highest Self is the Self of fire, water, and earth also, the words fire, & c. (in the passages stating that fire, &c. thought) denote the highest Self only. This conclusion agrees with the text 'Let me enter into these three beings with this living Self, and evolve names and forms', for this text implies that fire, water, &c. possess substantial being and definite names only through the highest Self having entered into them. The thought ascribed in the text to fire, water, &c. hence is thought in the proper sense, and the hypothesis that, owing to its connexion with these latter texts, the thought predicated of 'Being' ('it thought,' &c. ) should be thought in a figurative sense only thus lapses altogether.
The next following Sutra confirms the same view.
7. Because release is taught of him who takes his stand on it.
Svetaketu, who is desirous of final release, is at first--by means of the clause 'Thou art that'--instructed to meditate on himself as having his Self in that which truly is; and thereupon the passage 'for him there is delay' only as long as 'I shall not be released, then I shall be united' teaches that for a man taking his stand upon that teaching there will be Release, i.e. union with Brahman--which is delayed only until this mortal body falls away. If, on the other hand, the text would teach that the non-intelligent Pradhana is the general cause, it could not possibly teach that meditation on this Pradhana being a man's Self is the means towards his Release. A man taking his stand on such meditation rather would on death be united with a non-sentient principle, according to the scriptural saying, 'According as his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). And Scripture, which is more loving than even a thousand parents, cannot possibly teach such union with the Non-sentient, which is acknowledged to be the cause of all the assaults of suffering in its threefold form. Moreover, those who hold the theory of the Pradhana being the cause of the world do not themselves maintain that he who takes his stand upon the Pradhana attains final release.
The Pradhana is not the cause of the world for the following reason also:
8. And because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.
If the word 'Sat' denoted the Pradhana as the cause of the world, we should expect the text to teach that the idea of having his Self in that 'Sat' should be set aside by Svetaketu as desirous of Release; for that idea would be contrary to Release. So far from teaching this, the text, however, directly inculcates that notion in the words 'Thou art that.'-- The next Sutra adds a further reason.
9. And on account of the contradiction of the initial statement.
The Pradhana's being the cause of the world would imply a contradiction of the initial statement, viz. that through the knowledge of one thing all things are to be known. Now, on the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, this initial statement can only be fulfilled in that way that through the knowledge of the 'Sat', which is the cause, there is known the entire world, whether sentient or non-sentient, which constitutes the effect. But if the Pradhana were the cause, the aggregate of sentient beings could not be known through it--for sentient beings are not the effect of a non-sentient principle, and there would thus arise a contradiction.--The next Sutra supplies a further reason.
10. On account of (the individual soul) going to the Self.
With reference to the 'Sat' the text says, 'Learn from me the true nature of sleep. When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say he sleeps (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (sva-apita)' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1). This text designates the soul in the state of deep sleep as having entered into, or being merged or reabsorbed in, the Self. By reabsorption we understand something being merged in its cause. Now the non-intelligent Pradhana cannot be the cause of the intelligent soul; hence the soul's going to its Self can only mean its going to _the_, i.e. the universal, Self. The term 'individual soul' (jiva) denotes Brahman in so far as having an intelligent substance for its body, Brahman itself constituting the Self; as we learn from the text referring to the distinction of names and forms. This Brahman, thus called jiva., is in the state of deep sleep, no less than in that of a general pralaya, free from the investment of names and forms, and is then designated as mere 'Being' (sat); as the text says, 'he is then united with the Sat'. As the soul is in the state of deep sleep free from the investment of name and form, and invested by the intelligent Self only, another text says with reference to the same state,' Embraced by the intelligent Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21). Up to the time of final release there arise in the soul invested by name and form the cognitions of objects different from itself. During deep sleep the souls divest themselves of names and forms, and are embraced by the 'Sat' only; but in the waking state they again invest themselves with names and forms, and thus bear corresponding distinctive names and forms. This, other scriptural texts also distinctly declare, 'When a man lying in deep sleep sees no dream whatever, he becomes one with that prana alone;--from that Self the pranas proceed, each towards its place' (Kau. Up. 111,3); 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf or a boar or a gnat or a mosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 3).--Hence the term 'Sat' denotes the highest Brahman, the all-knowing highest Lord, the highest Person. Thus the Vrittikara also says, 'Then he becomes united with the Sat--this is proved by (all creatures) entering into it and coming back out of it.' And Scripture also says, 'Embraced by the intelligent Self.'--The next Sutra gives an additional reason.
11. On account of the uniformity of view.
'In the beginning the Self was all this; there was nothing else whatsoever thinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); 'From that Self sprang ether, from ether air, from air fire, from fire water, from water earth' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'From this great Being were breathed forth the Rig-veda,' &c.-- These and similar texts referring to the creation have all the same purport: they all teach us that the Supreme Lord is the cause of the world. We therefore conclude that in the Ch. passage also the Sat, which is said to be the cause of the world, is the Supreme Lord.
12. And because it is directly stated in Scripture.
The text of the same Upanishad directly declares that the being denoted by the word 'Sat' evolves, as the universal Self, names and forms; is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-embracing; is free from all evil, &c.; realises all its wishes and purposes. 'Let me, entering those beings with this living; Self, evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'All these creatures have their root in the Sat, they dwell in the Sat, they rest in the Sat' (VI, 8, 4); 'All this has that for its Self; it is the True, it is the Self (VI, 8, 7); 'Whatever there is of him here in the world, and whatever is not, all that is contained within it' (VIII, 1, 3); 'In it all desires are contained. It is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose wishes come true, whose purposes come true' (VIII, 1, 5).--And analogously other scriptural texts, 'Of him there is no master in the world, no ruler; not even a sign of him. He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 9). 'The wise one who, having created all forms and having given them names, is calling them by those names' (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who entered within is the ruler of all beings, the Self of all' (Taitt. Ar. III, 24); 'The Self of all, the refuge, the ruler of all, the Lord of the souls' (Mahanar. Up. XI); 'Whatsoever is seen or heard in this world, inside or outside, pervading that all Narayana abides' (Mahanar. Up. XI); 'He is the inner Self of all beings, free from all evil, the divine, the only god Narayana.'--These and other texts which declare the world to have sprung from the highest Lord, can in no way be taken as establishing the Pradhana. Hence it remains a settled conclusion that the highest Person, Narayana, free from all shadow of imperfection, &c., is the single cause of the whole Universe, and is that Brahman which these Sutras point out as the object of enquiry.
For the same reasons the theory of a Brahman, which is nothing but non- differenced intelligence, must also be considered as refuted by the Sutrakara, with the help of the scriptural texts quoted; for those texts prove that the Brahman, which forms the object of enquiry, possesses attributes such as thinking, and so on, in their real literal sense. On the theory, on the other hand, of a Brahman that is nothing but distinctionless intelligence even the witnessing function of consciousness would be unreal. The Sutras propose as the object of enquiry Brahman as known from the Vedanta-texts, and thereupon teach that Brahman is intelligent (Su. I, 1, 5 ff.) To be intelligent means to possess the quality of intelligence: a being devoid of the quality of thought would not differ in nature from the Pradhana. Further, on the theory of Brahman being mere non-differenced light it would be difficult to prove that Brahman is self-luminous. For by light we understand that particular thing which renders itself, as well as other things, capable of becoming the object of ordinary thought and speech; but as a thing devoid of all difference does not, of course, possess these two characteristics it follows that it is as devoid of intelligence as a pot may be.--Let it then be assumed that although a thing devoid of all distinction does not actually possess these characteristics, yet it has the potentiality of possessing them!--But if it possesses the attribute of potentiality, it is clear that you abandon your entire theory of a substance devoid of all distinction!--Let us then admit, on the authority of Scripture, that the universal substance possesses this one distinguishing attribute of self-luminousness.--Well, in that case you must of course admit, on the same authority, all those other qualities also which Scripture vouches for, such as all-knowingness, the possession of all powers, and so on.--Moreover, potentiality means capability to produce certain special effects, and hence can be determined on the ground of those special effects only. But if there are no means of knowing these particular effects, there are also no means of cognising potentiality.--And those who hold the theory of a substance devoid of all difference, have not even means of proof for their substance; for as we have shown before, Perception, Inference, Scripture, and one's own consciousness, are all alike in so far as having for their objects things marked by difference.--It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the Brahman to be known is nothing else but the highest Person capable of the thought 'of becoming many' by manifesting himself in a world comprising manifold sentient and non-sentient creatures.-- Here terminates the adhikarana of 'seeing'.
So far the Sutras have declared that the Brahman which forms the object of enquiry is different from the non-intelligent Pradhana, which is merely an object of fruition for intelligent beings. They now proceed to show that Brahman--which is antagonistic to all evil and constituted by supreme bliss--is different from the individual soul, which is subject to karman, whether that soul be in its purified state or in the impure state that is due to its immersion in the ocean of manifold and endless sufferings, springing from the soul's contact with Prakriti (Pradhana).
13. The Self consisting of Bliss (is the highest Self) on account of multiplication.
We read in the text of the Taittiriyas, 'Different from this Self, which consists of Understanding, is the other inner Self which consists of bliss' (Taitt. Up. II, 5).--Here the doubt arises whether the Self consisting of bliss be the highest Self, which is different from the inner Self subject to bondage and release, and termed 'jiva.' (i.e. living self or individual soul), or whether it be that very inner Self, i.e. the jiva.--It _is_ that inner Self, the Purvapakshin contends. For the text says 'of that this, i.e. the Self consisting of bliss, is the sarira Self'; and sarira means that which is joined to a body, in other words, the so-called jiva.--But, an objection is raised, the text enumerates the different Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of bliss, to the end that man may obtain the bliss of Brahman, which was, at the outset, stated to be the cause of the world (II, 1), and in the end teaches that the Self consisting of bliss is the cause of the world (II, 6). And that the cause of the world is the all-knowing Lord, since Scripture says of him that 'he thought,' we have already explained.-- That cause of the world, the Purvapakshin rejoins, is not different from the jiva; for in the text of the Chandogyas that Being which first is described as the creator of the world is exhibited, in two passages, in co-ordination with the jiva ('having entered into them with that living Self' and 'Thou art that, O Svetaketu'). And the purport of co- ordination is to express oneness of being, as when we say, 'This person here is that Devadatta we knew before.' And creation preceded by thought can very well be ascribed to an intelligent jiva. The connexion of the whole Taittiriya-text then is as follows. In the introductory clause, 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest,' the true nature of the jiva, free from all connexion with matter, is referred to as something to be attained; and of this nature a definition is given in the words, 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman.' The attainment of the jiva in this form is what constitutes Release, in agreement with the text, 'So long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain; but when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). This true nature of the Self, free from all avidya, which the text begins by presenting as an object to be attained, is thereupon declared to be the Self consisting of bliss. In order to lead up to this--just as a man points out to another the moon by first pointing out the branch of a tree near which the moon is to be seen--the text at first refers to the body ('Man consists of food'); next to the vital breath with its five modifications which is within the body and supports it; then to the manas within the vital breath; then to the buddhi within the manas--'the Self consisting of breath'; 'the Self consisting of mind' (manas); 'the Self consisting of understanding' (vijnana). Having thus gradually led up to the jiva, the text finally points out the latter, which is the innermost of all ('Different from that is the inner Self which consists of bliss'), and thus completes the series of Selfs one inside the other. We hence conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is that same jiva-self which was at the outset pointed out as the Brahman to be attained.--But the clause immediately following, 'Brahman is the tail, the support (of the Self of bliss'), indicates that Brahman is something different from the Self of bliss!-- By no means (the Purvapakshin rejoins). Brahman is, owing to its different characteristics, there compared to an animal body, and head, wings, and tail are ascribed to it, just as in a preceding clause the body consisting of food had also been imagined as having head, wings, and tail--these members not being something different from the body, but the body itself. Joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss, are imagined as the members, non-different from it, of Brahman consisting of bliss, and of them all the unmixed bliss-constituted Brahman is said to be the tail or support. If Brahman were something different from the Self consisting of bliss, the text would have continued, 'Different from this Self consisting of bliss is the other inner Self--Brahman.' But there is no such continuation. The connexion of the different clauses stands as follows: After Brahman has been introduced as the topic of the section ('He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'), and defined as different in nature from everything else ('The True, knowledge'), the text designates it by the term 'Self,' &c. ('From that Self sprang ether'), and then, in order to make it clear that Brahman is the innermost Self of all, enumerates the pranamaya and so on--designating them in succession as more and more inward Selfs--, and finally leads up to the anandamaya as the innermost Self('Different from this, &c., is the Self consisting of bliss'). From all which it appears that the term 'Self' up to the end denotes the Brahman mentioned at the beginning.-- But, in immediate continuation of the clause, 'Brahman is the tail, the support,' the text exhibits the following sloka: 'Non-existing becomes he who views Brahman as non-existing; who knows Brahman as existing, him we know as himself existing.' Here the existence and non-existence of the Self are declared to depend on the knowledge and non-knowledge of Brahman, not of the Self consisting of bliss. Now no doubt can possibly arise as to the existence or non-existence of this latter Self, which, in the form of joy, satisfaction, &c., is known to every one. Hence the sloka cannot refer to that Self, and hence Brahman is different from that Self.--This objection, the Purvapakshin rejoins, is unfounded. In the earlier parts of the chapter we have corresponding slokas, each of them following on a preceding clause that refers to the tail or support of a particular Self: in the case, e.g. of the Self consisting of food, we read, 'This is the tail, the support,' and then comes the sloka, 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c. Now it is evident that all these slokas are meant to set forth not only what had been called 'tail,' but the entire Self concerned (Self of food, Self of breath, &c.); and from this it follows that also the sloka, 'Non-existing becomes he,' does not refer to the 'tail' only as something other than the Self of bliss, but to the entire Self of bliss. And there may very well be a doubt with regard to the knowledge or non-knowledge of the existence of that Self consisting of unlimited bliss. On your view also the circumstance of Brahman which forms the tail not being known is due to its being of the nature of limitless bliss. And should it be said that the Self of bliss cannot be Brahman because Brahman does not possess a head and other members; the answer is that Brahman also does not possess the quality of being a tail or support, and that hence Brahman cannot be a tail.--Let it then be said that the expression, 'Brahman is the tail,' is merely figurative, in so far as Brahman is the substrate of all things imagined through avidya!--But, the Purvapakshin rejoins, we may as well assume that the ascription to Brahman of joy, as its head and so on, is also merely figurative, meant to illustrate the nature of Brahman, i.e. the Self of bliss as free from all pain. To speak of Brahman or the Self as consisting of bliss has thus the purpose of separating from all pain and grief that which in a preceding clause ('The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman') had already been separated from all changeful material things. As applied to Brahman (or the Self), whose nature is nothing but absolute bliss, the term 'anandamaya' therefore has to be interpreted as meaning nothing more than 'ananda'; just as pranamaya means prana.
The outcome of all this is that the term 'anandamaya' denotes the true essential nature--which is nothing but absolute uniform bliss--of the jiva that appears as distinguished by all the manifold individualising forms which are the figments of Nescience. The Self of bliss is the jiva or pratyag-atman, i.e. the individual soul.
Against this prima facie view the Sutrakara contends that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self 'on account of multiplication.'-- The section which begins with the words,'This is an examination of bliss,' and terminates with the sloka, 'from whence all speech turns back' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), arrives at bliss, supreme and not to be surpassed, by successively multiplying inferior stages of bliss by a hundred; now such supreme bliss cannot possibly belong to the individual soul which enjoys only a small share of very limited happiness, mixed with endless pain and grief; and therefore clearly indicates, as its abode, the highest Self, which differs from all other Selfs in so far as being radically opposed to all evil and of an unmixed blessed nature. The text says, 'Different from this Self consisting of understanding (vijnana) there is the inner Self consisting of bliss'. Now that which consists of understanding (vijnana) is the individual soul (jiva), not the internal organ (buddhi) only; for the formative element, 'maya,' ('consisting of'; in vijnanamaya) indicates a difference (between vijnana and vijnanamaya). The term 'prana-maya' ('consisting of breath') we explain to mean 'prana' only, because no other explanation is possible; but as vijnanamaya may be explained as,--jiva, we have no right to neglect 'maya' as unmeaning. And this interpretation is quite suitable, as the soul in the states of bondage and release alike is a 'knowing' subject. That moreover even in 'pranamaya', and so on, the affix 'maya' may be taken as having a meaning will be shown further on.--But how is it then that in the sloka which refers to the vijnanamaya, 'Understanding (vijnana) performs the sacrifice', the term 'vijnana' only is used?--The essential nature, we reply, of the knowing subject is suitably called 'knowledge', and this term is transferred to the knowing subject itself which is defined as possessing that nature. For we generally see that words which denote attributes defining the essential nature of a thing also convey the notion of the essential nature of the thing itself. This also accounts for the fact that the sloka ('Vijnana performs the sacrifice, it performs all sacred acts') speaks of vijnana as being the agent in sacrifices and so on; the buddhi alone could not be called an agent. For this reason the text does not ascribe agency to the other Selfs (the pranamaya and so on) which are mentioned before the vijnanamaya; for they are non-intelligent instruments of intelligence, and the latter only can be an agent. With the same view the text further on (II, 6), distinguishing the intelligent and the non-intelligent by means of their different characteristic attributes, says in the end 'knowledge and non-knowledge,' meaning thereby that which possesses the attribute of knowledge and that which does not. An analogous case is met with in the so-called antaryami-brahmana (Bri. Up. III. 7). There the Kanvas read, 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vijnana; III, 7, 16), but instead of this the Madhyandinas read 'he who dwells in the Self,' and so make clear that what the Kanvas designate as 'knowledge' really is the knowing Self.--That the word vijnana, although denoting the knowing Self, yet has a neuter termination, is meant to denote it as something substantial. We hence conclude that he who is different from the Self consisting of knowledge, i.e. the individual Self, is the highest Self which consists of bliss.
It is true indeed that the sloka, 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, 'directly mentions knowledge only, not the knowing Self; all the same we have to understand that what is meant is the latter, who is referred to in the clause, 'different from this is the inner Self which consists of knowledge.' This conclusion is supported by the sloka referring to the Self which consists of food (II, 2); for that sloka refers to food only, 'From food are produced all creatures,' &c., all the same the preceding clause 'this man consists of the essence of food' does not refer to food, but to an effect of it which consists of food. Considering all this the Sutrakara himself in a subsequent Sutra (I, 1, 18) bases his view on the declaration, in the scriptural text, of difference.--We now turn to the assertion, made by the Purvapakshin, that the cause of the world is not different from the individual soul because in two Chandogya passages it is exhibited in co-ordination with the latter ('having entered into them with this living Self,' 'Thou art that'); and that hence the introductory clause of the Taitt. passage ('He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest') refers to the individual soul--which further on is called 'consisting of bliss,' because it is free from all that is not pleasure.-- This view cannot be upheld; for although the individual soul is intelligent, it is incapable of producing through its volition this infinite and wonderful Universe--a process described in texts such as 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth.--It sent forth fire,' &c. That even the released soul is unequal to such 'world business' as creation, two later Sutras will expressly declare. But, if you deny that Brahman, the cause of the world, is identical with the individual soul, how then do you account for the co-ordination in which the two appear in the Chandogya texts?--How, we ask in return, can Brahman, the cause of all, free from all shadow of imperfection, omniscient, omnipotent, &c. & c., be one with the individual soul, all whose activities--whether it be thinking, or winking of an eye, or anything else--depend on karman, which implies endless suffering of various kind?--If you reply that this is possible if one of two things is unreal, we ask--which then do you mean to be unreal? Brahman's connexion with what is evil?--or its essential nature, owing to which it is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil?--You will perhaps reply that, owing to the fact of Brahman, which is absolutely good and antagonistic to all evil, being the substrate of beginningless Nescience, there presents itself the false appearance of its being connected with evil. But there you maintain what is contradictory. On the one side there is Brahman's absolute perfection and antagonism to all evil; on the other it is the substrate of Nescience, and thereby the substrate of a false appearance which is involved in endless pain; for to be connected with evil means to be the substrate of Nescience and the appearance of suffering which is produced thereby. Now it is a contradiction to say that Brahman is connected with all this and at the same time antagonistic to it!--Nor can we allow you to say that there is no real contradiction because that appearance is something false. For whatever is false belongs to that group of things contrary to man's true interest, for the destruction of which the Vedanta-texts are studied. To be connected with what is hurtful to man, and to be absolutely perfect and antagonistic to all evil is self- contradictory.--But, our adversary now rejoins, what after all are we to do? The holy text at first clearly promises that through the cognition of one thing everything will be known ('by which that which is not heard _is_ heard,' &c., Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3); thereupon declares that Brahman is the sole cause of the world ('Being only this was in the beginning'), and possesses exalted qualities such as the power of realising its intentions ('it thought, may I be many'); and then finally, by means of the co-ordination, 'Thou art that' intimates that Brahman is one with the individual soul, which we know to be subject to endless suffering! Nothing therefore is left to us but the hypothesis that Brahman is the substrate of Nescience and all that springs from it!--Not even for the purpose, we reply, of making sense of Scripture may we assume what in itself is senseless and contradictory!--Let us then say that Brahman's connexion with evil is real, and its absolute perfection unreal!-- Scripture, we reply, aims at comforting the soul afflicted by the assaults of threefold pain, and now, according to you, it teaches that the assaults of suffering are real, while its essential perfection and happiness are unreal figments, due to error! This is excellent comfort indeed!--To avoid these difficulties let us then assume that both aspects of Brahman--viz. on the one hand its entering into the distressful condition of individual souls other than non-differenced intelligence, and on the other its being the cause of the world, endowed with all perfections, &c.--are alike unreal!--Well, we reply, we do not exactly admire the depth of your insight into the connected meaning of texts. The promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything will be known can certainly not be fulfilled if everything is false, for in that case there exists nothing that could be known. In so far as the cognition of one thing has something real for its object, and the cognition of all things is of the same kind, and moreover is comprised in the cognition of one thing; in so far it can be said that everything is known through one thing being known. Through the cognition of the real shell we do not cognise the unreal silver of which the shell is the substrate.--Well, our adversary resumes, let it then be said that the meaning of the declaration that through the cognition of one thing everything is to be known is that only non-differenced Being is real, while everything else is unreal.--If this were so, we rejoin, the text would not say, 'by which the non-heard is heard, the non-known is known'; for the meaning of this is, 'by which when heard and known' (not 'known as false') 'the non-heard is heard,' &c. Moreover, if the meaning were that only the one non-differenced substance understood to be the cause of the world is real, the illustrative instance, 'As by one lump of clay everything made of clay is known,' would not be suitable; for what is meant there is that through the cognition of the (real) lump of clay its (real) effects are known. Nor must 'you say that in the illustrative instance also the unreality of the effect is set forth; for as the person to be informed is not in any way convinced at the outset that things made of clay are unreal, like the snake imagined in the rope, it is impossible that such unreality should be referred to as if it were something well known (and the clause, 'as by one lump of clay,' & c., undoubtedly _does_ refer to something well known), in order to render the initial assertion plausible. And we are not aware of any means of knowledge--assisted or non-assisted by ratiocination--that would prove the non-reality of things effected, previous to the cognition produced by texts such as 'That art thou'; a point which will be discussed at length under II, 1.--'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self and evolve names and forms'; 'All these creatures, my son, have their root in the True, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True,' &c.; these passages declare in succession that that which really is is the Self of this world; that previous to creation there is no distinction of names and forms; that for the creation of the world Brahman, termed 'the True' (or 'Real'), requires no other operative cause but itself; that at the time of creation it forms a resolution, possible to itself only, of making itself manifold in the form of endless movable and immovable things; that in accordance with this resolution there takes place a creation, proceeding in a particular order, of an infinite number of manifold beings; that by Brahman entering into all non-intelligent beings with the living soul--which has its Self in Brahman--there takes place an evolution, infinite in extent, of all their particular names and forms; and that everything different from Brahman has its root and abode in that, is moved by that, lives by that, rests on that. All the different points--to be learned from Scripture only--which are here set forth agree with what numerous other scriptural texts teach about Brahman, viz. that it is free from all evil, devoid of all imperfection, all-knowing, all-powerful; that all its wishes and purposes realise themselves; that it is the cause of all bliss; that it enjoys bliss not to be surpassed. To maintain then that the word 'that,' which refers back to the Brahman mentioned before, i.e. a Brahman possessing infinite attributes, should aim at conveying instruction about a substance devoid of all attributes, is as unmeaning as the incoherent talk of a madman. |
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