19. For this very reason (the individual soul is) a knower.
It has been shown that, different therein from Ether and the rest, the soul is not produced. This leads to the consideration of the soul's essential nature. Is that essential nature constituted by mere intelligence as Sugata and Kapila hold; or is the soul as Kanada thinks, essentially non-intelligent, comparable to a stone, while intelligence is merely an adventitious quality of it; or is it essentially a knowing subject?--The soul is mere intelligence, the Purvapakshin maintains; for the reason that Scripture declares it to be so. For in the antaryamin- brahmana the clause which in the Madhyandina-text runs as follows, 'he who abides in the Self,' is in the text of the Kanvas represented by the clause 'he who abides in knowledge.' Similarly the text 'knowledge performs the sacrifice and all sacred acts' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, I) shows that it is knowledge only which is the true nature of the active Self. And Smriti texts convey the same view, as e.g. 'it in reality is of the nature of absolutely spotless intelligence.' A second Purvapakshin denies the truth of this view. If, he says, we assume that the Self's essential nature consists either in mere knowledge or in its being a knowing subject, it follows that as the Self is omnipresent there must be consciousness at all places and at all times. On that doctrine we, further, could not account for the use of the instruments of cognition (i.e. the sense-organs, &c.); nor for the fact that in the states of deep sleep, swoon and so on, the Self although present is not observed to be conscious, while on the other hand consciousness is seen to arise as soon as the conditions of the waking state are realised. We therefore conclude that neither intelligence or consciousness, nor being a knowing agent, constitutes the essence of the soul, but that consciousness is a mere adventitious or occasional attribute. And the omnipresence of the Self must needs be admitted since its effects are perceived everywhere. Nor is there any valid reason for holding that the Self moves to any place; for as it is assumed to be present everywhere the actual accomplishment of effects (at certain places only) may be attributed to the moving of the body only.--Scripture also directly declares that in the state of deep sleep there is no consciousness, 'I do not indeed at the present moment know myself, so as to be able to say "that am I," nor do I know those beings.' Similarly Scripture declares the absence of consciousness in the state of final release, 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12); where the Self is spoken of as having knowledge for its essential nature, the meaning only is that knowledge constitutes its specific quality, and the expression is therefore not to be urged in its literal sense.
Against all this the Sutra declares 'for this very reason a knower.' This Self is essentially a knower, a knowing subject; not either mere knowledge or of non-sentient nature.--Why?--'For this very reason,' i.e. on account of Scripture itself. 'For this reason' refers back to the 'on account of Scripture' in the preceding Sutra. For in the Chandogya, where the condition of the released and the non-released soul is described, the text says 'He who knows, let me smell this, he is the Self--with the mind seeing those pleasures he rejoices-the devas who are in the world of Brahman--whose desires are true, whose purposes are true-- not remembering the body into which he was born' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 4-5; 1, 5; 12, 3). And elsewhere 'The seer does not see death' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). Similarly we read in the Vajasaneyaka, in reply to the question 'Who is that Self?'--'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7); 'By what should one know the knower?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That person knows.' And 'for he is the knower, the hearer, the smeller, the taster, the perceiver, the thinker, the agent--he the person whose Self is knowledge'; and 'thus these sixteen parts of that seer' (Pra. Up. IV, 9; VI, 5). To the objection that if being a cognising subject constituted the essential nature of the Self it would follow that as the Self is omnipresent, there would be consciousness always and everywhere, the next Sutra replies.
20. On account of (its) passing out, moving and returning.
The Self is not omnipresent, but on the contrary, of atomic size (anu).-- How is this known?--Since Scripture says that it passes out, goes and returns. Its passing out is described in the following passage 'by that light this Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2). Its going in the following text 'all those who pass away out of this world go to the moon,' and its returning in the text 'from that world he comes again into this world, for action.' All this going, and so on, cannot be reconciled with the soul being present everywhere.
21. And on account of the latter two (being effected) through the Self.
The 'and' has affirming power. The 'passing out' might somehow be reconciled with a non-moving Self (such as the omnipresent Self would be) if it were taken in the sense of the Self separating from the body; but for the going and returning no analogous explanation is possible. They, therefore, must be taken as effected by the Self itself (which, then, cannot be omnipresent and non-moving).
22. If it be said that (the soul) is not atomic, on account of scriptural statement of (what is) not that; we say no, on account of the other one being the topic.
The passage 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the person consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7) introduces as the topic of discussion the personal Self, and further on in the same chapter we read 'the unborn Self, the great one' (IV, 4, 22). The personal Self, being expressly called _great_, cannot, therefore, be atomic!--Not so, we reply. 'Since the other one is the topic.' In the second text quoted that Self which is other than the personal Self--i.e. the highest Self (prajna) constitutes the topic. In the beginning of the chapter, indeed, the individual Self is introduced, but later on, between the two texts quoted, the instruction begins to concern itself with the highest Self, 'he by whom there is known the Self of intelligence' (pratibuddha atma; IV, 4, 13). It is this latter Self which, in 22 is called _great_, not the individual Self.
23. And on account of the very word, and of measure.
Scripture directly applies the word 'anu' to the individual Self, 'By thought is to be known that atomic Self into which Breath has entered fivefold' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9).--By the term 'unmana' in the Sutra we have to understand measurement by selection of comparative instances. Scripture declares the minuteness of the individual Self by reference to things which are like atoms in size, 'The individual soul is to be known as part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundred times, and yet it is to be infinite' (Svet. Up. V, 9); 'that lower one is seen of the measure of the point of a goad' (V, 8). For these reasons also the individual Self must be viewed as atomic.--But this conflicts with the fact that sensation extends over the whole body!--This objection the next Sutra refutes by means of an analogous instance.
24. There is no contradiction, as in the case of sandal-ointment.
As a drop of sandal-ointment, although applied to one spot of the body only, yet produces a refreshing sensation extending over the whole body; thus the Self also, although dwelling in one part of the body only, is conscious of sensations taking place in any part of the body.
25. Should it be said (that this is not so) on account of specialisation of abode; we say no, on account of the acknowledgment (of a place of the Self), viz. in the heart.
There is a difference. The drop of ointment can produce its effect as at any rate it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But we know of no such part in the case of the soul!--Not so, we reply. Scripture informs us that the Self abides in a definite part of the body, viz. the heart. 'For that Self is in the heart, there are a hundred and one veins.' And in reply to the question 'What is that Self?' the text has 'He who is within the heart, surrounded by the Pranas, the Person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7).--The parallel case of the sandal-ointment is referred to in order to point out that the Self abides in some particular part of the body; while the ointment is not bound to any special place.--In the next Sutra the Sutrakara proceeds to state how, according to his own view, the Self, although abiding in one spot only, gives rise to effects extending over the whole body.
26. Or on account of its quality as light.
The 'or' is meant to set aside the view previously stated. The Self extends through the whole body by means of its quality, viz. knowledge or consciousness. 'As light.' As the light of things abiding in one place--such as gems, the sun, and so on--is seen to extend to many places, so the consciousness of the Self dwelling in the heart pervades the entire body. That the knowledge of the knowing subject may extend beyond its substrate, as the light of a luminous body does, we have already explained under the first Sutra.--But it has been said that the Self is _mere_ knowledge; how then can knowledge be said to be a quality-- which is something different from the essential nature of a thing?--This the next Sutra explains.
27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; and thus Scripture declares.
Just as smell, which is perceived as a quality of earth, is distinct from earth; thus knowledge of which we are conscious as the quality of a knowing subject--which relation expresses itself in judgments such as 'I know'--is different from the knowing subject. Scriptural texts also prove this relation, as e.g. 'This Person knows.'
28. On account of the separate statement.
Scripture even states quite directly that knowledge is something distinct from the knowing subject, viz. in the passage 'For there is not known any intermission of the knowing of the knower' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 30).--It has been said that in passages such as 'he who abiding in knowledge' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice' (Taitt. Up. II, 5, 1); 'having knowledge for its nature, absolutely free from stain,'Scripture speaks of the Self as being mere knowledge (not a knower). This point the next Sutra elucidates.
29. But (the Self) is designated as that because it has that quality (viz. knowledge) for its essential quality; as in the case of the intelligent (prajna) Self.
The 'but' discards the objection. Because that quality, viz. the quality of knowledge, is the essential quality, therefore the Self is, in the passages quoted, designated as knowledge. For knowledge constitutes the essential quality of the Self. Similarly, the intelligent highest Self is occasionally called 'Bliss,' because bliss is its essential quality. Compare 'If that bliss existed not in the ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 1); 'He perceived that bliss is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 6, 1). That bliss is the essential attribute of Brahman is proved by texts such as 'That is one bliss of Brahman'; 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman is afraid of nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 4, 1).--Or else the analogous case to which the Sutra refers may be that of the intelligent Brahman being designated by the term 'knowledge,' in texts such as 'Truth, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). That knowledge is the essential quality of Brahman is known from passages such as 'together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9).
30. And there is no objection, since (the quality of knowledge) exists wherever the Self is; this being observed.
Since knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a Self is, there is no objection to the Self being designated by that attribute. Similarly we observe that special kinds of cows, as e.g. hornless ones, are designated by the term 'cow,' since the quality of possessing the generic character of cows is met with everywhere in connexion with the essential character of such animals with mutilated horns; since in fact that quality contributes to define their essential character. The 'and' of the Sutra is meant to suggest a further argument, viz. that to apply to the Self the term 'knowledge' is suitable for that reason also that like knowledge the Self is self-illuminated. The objection that knowledge or consciousness cannot be an attribute inseparably connected with the essential nature of the Self as there is no consciousness in deep sleep and similar states is taken up in the next Sutra.
31. Since there may be manifestation of that which exists; as in the case of virile power and so on.
The 'but' is meant to set the raised objection aside. The case may be that while consciousness is present also in deep sleep, and so on, it is manifested in the waking state only; whence there would be no objection to viewing consciousness as an essential attribute of the Self. 'As in the case of virile power and the like.' Special substances such as the virile element are indeed present in the male child already, but then are not manifest, while later on they manifest themselves with advancing youth; but all the same the possession of those substances is essential to the male being, not merely adventitious. For to be made up of seven elementary substances (viz. blood, humour, flesh, fat, marrow, bone, and semen) is an essential, property of the body. That even in deep sleep and similar states the 'I' shines forth we have explained above. Consciousness is always there, but only in the waking state and in dreams it is observed to relate itself to objects. And that to be a subject of cognition, and so on, are essential attributes of the Self, we have also proved before. The conclusion, therefore, is that to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the Self. And that Self is of atomic size. The text 'when he has departed there is no consciousness' (samjna; Bri. Up. II, 4, 12) does not declare that the released Self has no consciousness; but only that in the case of that Self there is absent that knowledge (experience) of birth, death, and so on, which in the Samsara state is caused by the connexion of the Self with the elements--as described in the preceding passage, 'that great being having risen from out these elements again perishes after them.' For the text as to the absence of samjna after death must be interpreted in harmony with other texts describing the condition of the released soul, such as 'the seeing one does not see death nor illness nor pain; the seeing one sees everything and obtains everything everywhere' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'not remembering that body into which he was born-- seeing these pleasures with the mind he rejoices' (VIII, 12, 3; 5).
The Sutras now proceed to refute the doctrine of the Self being (not a knower) but mere knowledge, and being omnipresent.
32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to either.
On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non- consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two, i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.--If the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as the cause of both--i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness--and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non- consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.--The view, finally (held by the Vaiseshikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending on its organs (mind, senses, &c.; while the omnipresent Self is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jada), results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and moreover it would follow that the adrishtas (due to the actions of the different bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the _knower_.'
33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of Scripture (thus) having a purport.
It has been shown that the individual Self is a knowing subject and atomic. Now the question arises whether that Self is an agent or, being itself non-active, erroneously ascribes to itself the activity of the non-sentient gunas. The prima facie answer is that the individual Self is not an agent, since the sacred texts concerned with the Self declare that the Self does not act, while the gunas do act. Thus, e.g. in the Kathavalli, where the text at first denies of the individual Self all the attributes of Prakriti, such as being born, ageing and dying ('he is not born, he does not die'), and then also denies that the Self is the agent in acts such as killing and the like, 'If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain thinks that he is slain, they both do not understand; for this one does not slay, nor is that one slain' (I, 2, 19). This means--if one thinks the Self to be the slayer one does not know the Self. And the Lord himself teaches that non-agency is the essential nature of the individual soul, and that it is mere delusion on the Self's part to ascribe to itself agency. 'By the attributes (guna) of Prakriti, actions are wrought all round.' He who is deluded by self- conceit thinks 'I am the agent'; 'when the seer beholds no other agent than the gunas'; 'Prakriti is said to be the cause of all agency of causes and effects, whilst the soul is the cause of all enjoyment of pleasure and pain' (Bha. Gi. III, 27; XIV, 19; XIII, 20).--The soul, therefore, is an enjoyer only, while all agency belongs to Prakriti--To this the Sutra replies, 'an agent, on account of Scripture thus having a meaning.' The Self only is an agent, not the gunas, because thus only Scripture has a meaning. For the scriptural injunctions, such as 'he who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice,' 'He who desires Release is to meditate on Brahman,' and similar ones, enjoin action on him only who will enjoy the fruit of the action--whether the heavenly world, or Release, or anything else. If a non-sentient thing were the agent, the injunction would not be addressed to another being (viz. to an intelligent being--to which it actually is addressed). The term 'sastra' (scriptural injunction) moreover comes from sas, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. But scriptural injunctions impel to action through giving rise to a certain conception (in the mind of the being addressed), and the non-sentient Pradhana cannot be made to conceive anything. Scripture therefore has a sense only, if we admit that none but the intelligent enjoyer of the fruit of the action is at the same time the agent. Thus the Purva Mimamsa declares 'the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent' (III, 7, 18). The Purvapakshin had contended that the text 'if the slayer thinks, &c.,' proves the Self not to be the agent in the action of slaying; but what the text really means is only that the Self as being eternal cannot be killed. The text, from Smriti, which was alleged as proving that the gunas only possess active power, refers to the fact that in all activities lying within the sphere of the samsara, the activity of the Self is due not to its own nature but to its contact with the different gunas. The activity of the gunas, therefore, must be viewed not as permanent, but occasional only. In the same sense Smriti says 'the reason is the connexion of the soul with the guwas, in its births, in good and evil wombs' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 21). Similarly it is said there (XVIII, 16) that 'he who through an untrained understanding looks upon the isolated Self as an agent, that man of perverted mind does not see'; the meaning being that, since it appears from a previous passage that the activity of the Self depends on five factors (as enumerated in sl. 16), he who views the isolated Self to be an agent has no true insight.
34. On account of taking and the declaration as to its moving about.
The text beginning 'And as a great king,' &c., declares that 'the Self taking the pranas moves about in its own body, according to its pleasure' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 18), i.e. it teaches that the Self is active in taking to itself the pranas and moving about in the body.
35. And on account of the designation (of the Self as the agent) in actions. If not so, there would be change of grammatical expression.
Because in the text 'Knowledge performs the sacrifice, it performs all works' (Taitt. Up. II, 5) the Self is designated as the agent in all worldly and Vedic works, for this reason also the Self must be held to be an agent. And should it be said that the word 'knowledge' in that text denotes not the Self, but the internal organ or buddhi, we point out that in that case there would be a change of grammatical expression, that is to say, as the buddhi is the instrument of action, the text would exhibit the instrumental case instead of the nominative case 'by knowledge, and so on' (vijnanena instead of vijnanam).
36. (There would be) absence of definite rule, as in the case of consciousness.
The Sutra points out a difficulty which arises on the view of the Self not being an agent. Sutra 32 has declared that if the Self were all- pervading it would follow that there would be no definite determination with regard to consciousness. Similarly, if the Self were not an agent but all activity belonged to Prakriti it would follow that as Prakriti is a common possession of all souls, all actions would result in enjoyment (experience) on the part of all souls, or else on the part of none; for as each Self is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of the Pradhana. For the same reason it could not be maintained that the distribution of results between the different souls depends on the different internal organs which are joined to the souls; for if the souls are omnipresent, no soul will be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ.
37. On account of the inversion of power.
If the internal organ were the agent, then--since it is impossible that a being other than the agent should be the enjoyer of the fruit of the action--the power of enjoyment also would belong to the internal organ, and would consequently have to be denied of the Self. But if this were so, there would be no longer any proof for the existence of the Self; for they expressly teach that 'the person (i.e. the soul) exists, on account of the fact of enjoyment.'
38. And on account of the absence of samadhi.
If the internal organ were the agent, it would be such even in that final state of meditation, called samadhi, which is the instrument of Release. But that state consists therein that the meditating being realises its difference from Prakriti, and this is a conception which Prakriti itself (of which the internal organ is only a modification) cannot form. The Self alone, therefore, is the agent. But this would imply that the activity of the Self is never at rest! Of this difficulty the next Sutra disposes.
39. And as the carpenter, in both ways.
The Self, although always provided with the instruments of action, such as the organ of speech, and so on, acts when it wishes to do so, and does not act when it does not wish to do so. Just as a carpenter, although having his axe and other implements ready at hand, works or does not work just as he pleases. If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would constantly be acting, since as a non- intelligent being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoyment.
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the agent.'
40. But from the highest, this being declared by Scripture.
Is the activity of the individual soul independent (free), or does it depend on the highest Self? It is free; for if it were dependent on the highest Self, the whole body of scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be unmeaning. For commandments can be addressed to such agents only as are capable of entering on action or refraining from action, according to their own thought and will.
This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. The activity of the individual soul proceeds from the highest Self as its cause. For Scripture teaches this. 'Entered within, the ruler of creatures, the Self of all'; 'who dwelling in the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the Self from within, he is thy Self, the inward ruler, the immortal one.' Smriti teaches the same, 'I dwell within the heart of all; memory and knowledge as well as their loss come from me'(Bha. Gi. XV, 15); 'The Lord, O Arjuna, dwells in the heart of all creatures, whirling, by his mysterious power, all creatures as if mounted on a machine' (Bha. Gi. XVIII, 61).--But this view implies the meaninglessness of all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions!--To this the next Sutra replies.
41. But with a view to the efforts made (the Lord makes the soul act) on account of the (thus resulting) non-meaninglessness of injunctions and prohibitions and the rest.
The inwardly ruling highest Self promotes action in so far as it regards in the case of any action the volitional effort made by the individual soul, and then aids that effort by granting its favour or permission (anumati); action is not possible without permission on the part of the highest Self. In this way (i.e. since the action primarily depends on the volitional effort of the soul) injunctions and prohibitions are not devoid of meaning. The 'and the rest' of the Sutra is meant to suggest the grace and punishments awarded by the Lord.--The case is analogous to that of property of which two men are joint owners. If one of these wishes to transfer that property to a third person he cannot do so without the permission of his partner, but that that permission is given is after all his own doing, and hence the fruit of the action (reward or anything) properly belongs to him only.--That, in the case of evil actions, allowance of the action on the part of one able to stop it does not necessarily prove hardheartedness, we have shown above when explaining the Sankhya doctrine.--But there is a scriptural text.--'He (the Lord) makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed, and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed' (Kau. Up. III, 8)--which means that the Lord himself causes men to do good and evil actions, and this does not agree with the partial independence claimed above for the soul.--The text quoted, we reply, does not apply to all agents, but means that the Lord, wishing to do a favour to those who are resolved on acting so as fully to please the highest Person, engenders in their minds a tendency towards highly virtuous actions, such as are means to attain to him; while on the other hand, in order to punish those who are resolved on lines of action altogether displeasing to him, he engenders in their minds a delight in such actions as have a downward tendency and are obstacles in the way of the attainment of the Lord. Thus the Lord himself says, 'I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me; knowing this the wise worship me with love. To them ever devoted, worshipping me in love, I give that means of wisdom by which they attain to me. In mercy only to them, dwelling in their hearts, do I destroy the darkness born of ignorance, with the brilliant light of knowledge' (Bha. Gi. X, 8; 10-11). And further on the Lord--after having described 'demoniac' people, in the passus beginning 'they declare the world to be without a Truth, without a resting-place, without a Ruler,' and ending 'malignantly hating me who abides in their own bodies and those of others'--declares, 'These evil and malign haters, most degraded of men, I hurl perpetually into transmigrations and into demoniac wombs' (XVI, 8- 19).
Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which depends on the Highest.'
42. (The soul is) a part, on account of the declarations of difference and otherwise; some also record (that Brahman is of) the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on.
The Sutras have declared that the individual soul is an agent, and as such dependent on the highest Person. The following question now arises-- Is the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman? or is it nothing else than Brahman itself in so far as under the influence of error? or is it Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct (upadhi)? or is it a part (amsa) of Brahman?--The doubt on this point is due to the disagreement of the scriptural texts.--But this whole matter has already been decided under Su. II, 1, 22.--True. But as a difficulty presents itself on the ground of the conflicting nature of the texts-- some asserting the difference and some the unity of the individual soul and Brahman--the matter is here more specially decided by its being proved that the soul is a part of Brahman. As long as this decision remains unsettled, the conclusions arrived at under the two Sutras referred to, viz. that the soul is non-different from Brahman and that Brahman is 'additional' to the soul, are without a proper basis.
Let it then first be said that the soul is absolutely different from Brahman, since texts such as 'There are two, the one knowing, the other not knowing, both unborn, the one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I, 9) declare their difference. Texts which maintain the non-difference of a being which is knowing and another which is not knowing, if taken literally, convey a contradiction--as if one were to say, 'Water the ground with fire'!-and must therefore be understood in some secondary metaphorical sense. To hold that the individual soul is a part of Brahman does not explain matters; for by a 'part' we understand that which constitutes part of the extension of something. If, then, the soul occupied part of the extension of Brahman, all its imperfections would belong to Brahman. Nor can the soul be a part of Brahman if we take 'part' to mean a _piece_ (khanda); for Brahman does not admit of being divided into pieces, and moreover, the difficulties connected with the former interpretation would present themselves here also. That something absolutely different from something else should yet be a part of the latter cannot in fact be proved.
Or else let it be said that the soul is Brahman affected by error (bhrama). For this is the teaching of texts such as 'Thou art that'; 'this Self is Brahman.' Those texts, on the other hand, which declare the difference of the two merely restate what is already established by perception and the other means of knowledge, and therefore are shown, by those texts the purport of which it is to teach non-duality not established by other means, to lie--like perception and the other means of knowledge themselves--within the sphere of Nescience.
Or let it be assumed, in the third place, that the individual soul is Brahman as determined by a beginningless limiting adjunct (upadhi). For it is on this ground that Scripture teaches the Self to be Brahman. And that upadhi must not be said to be a mere erroneous imagination, for on that view the distinction of bondage, release, and so on, would be impossible.
Against all these views the Sutra declares that the soul is a part of Brahman; since there are declarations of difference and also 'otherwise,' i.e. declarations of unity. To the former class belong all those texts which dwell on the distinction of the creator and the creature, the ruler and the ruled, the all-knowing and the ignorant, the independent and the dependent, the pure and the impure, that which is endowed with holy qualities and that which possesses qualities of an opposite kind, the lord and the dependent. To the latter class belong such texts as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman.' Some persons even record that Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishermen, and so on. The Atharvanikas, that is to say, have the following text,' Brahman are the slaves. Brahman are these fishers,' and so on; and as Brahman there is said to comprise within itself all individual souls, the passage teaches general non-difference of the Self. In order, then, that texts of both these classes may be taken in their primary, literal sense, we must admit that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Nor is it a fact that the declarations of difference refer to matters settled by other means of knowledge, such as perception and so on, and on that account are mere reiterations of something established otherwise (in consequence of which they would have no original proving force of their own, and would be sublated by the texts declaring non-duality). For the fact that the soul is created by Brahman, is ruled by it, constitutes its body, is subordinate to it, abides in it, is preserved by it, is absorbed by it, stands to it in the relation of a meditating devotee, and through its grace attains the different ends of man, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure and final release--all this and what is effected thereby, viz. the distinction of the soul and Brahman, does not fall within the cognisance of perception and the other means of proof, and hence is not established by something else. It is therefore not true that the texts declaring the creation of the world, and so on, are mere reiterations of differences established by other means of authoritative knowledge, and hence have for their purport to teach things that are false.--[Nor will it do to say that the texts declaring duality teach what indeed is not established by other means of knowledge but is erroneous.] 'Brahman conceives the thought of differentiating itself, forms the resolution of becoming many, and accordingly creates the ether and the other elements, enters into them as individual soul, evolves all the different forms and names, takes upon himself all the pleasures and pains which spring from experiencing the infinite multitude of objects thus constituted, abides within and inwardly rules all beings, recognises itself in its jiva- condition to be one with the universal causal Brahman, and finally accomplishes its release from the samsara and the body of sacred doctrine by which this release is effected'--all this the Veda indeed declares, but its real purport is that all this is only true of a Brahman under the influence of an illusion, and therefore is unreal!-- while at the same time Brahman is defined as that the essential nature of which is absolutely pure intelligence! Truly, if such were the purport of the Veda, what more would the Veda be than the idle talk of a person out of his mind!
Nor finally is there any good in the theory of the soul being Brahman in so far as determined by a limiting adjunct. For this view also is in conflict with the texts which distinguish Brahman as the ruling and the soul as the ruled principle, and so on. One and the same Devadatta does not become double as it were--a ruler on the one hand and a ruled subject on the other--because he is determined by the house in which he is, or by something else.
In order to be able to account for the twofold designations of the soul, we must therefore admit that the soul is a _part_ of Brahman.
43. And on account of the mantra.
'One part (quarter) of it are all beings, three feet (quarters) of it are the Immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6)--on account of this mantra also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman. For the word 'foot' denotes a part. As the individual souls are many the mantra uses the plural form 'all beings.' In the Sutra (42) the word 'part' is in the singular, with a view to denote the whole class. For the same reason in II, 3, 18 also the word 'atman' is in the singular. For that the individual Selfs are different from the Lord, and are many and eternal, is declared by texts such as 'He who, eternal and intelligent, fulfils the desires of many who likewise are eternal and intelligent' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13). Since thus the plurality of the eternal individual Selfs rests on good authority, those who have an insight into the true nature of Selfs will discern without difficulty different characteristics distinguishing the individual Selfs, although all Selfs are alike in so far as having intelligence for their essential nature. Moreover the Sutra II, 3, 48 directly states the plurality of the individual Selfs.
44. Moreover it is so stated in Smriti.
Smriti moreover declares the individual soul to be a part of the highest Person, 'An eternal part of myself becomes the individual soul (jiva) in the world of life' (Bha. Gi. XV, 7). For this reason also the soul must be held to be a part of Brahman.
But if the soul is a part of Brahman, all the imperfections of the soul are Brahman's also! To this objection the next Sutra replies.
45. But as in the case of light and so on. Not so is the highest.
The 'but' discards the objection. 'Like light and so on.' The individual soul is a part of the highest Self; as the light issuing from a luminous thing such as fire or the sun is a part of that body; or as the generic characteristics of a cow or horse, and the white or black colour of things so coloured, are attributes and hence parts of the things in which those attributes inhere; or as the body is a part of an embodied being. For by a part we understand that which constitutes one place (desa) of some thing, and hence a distinguishing attribute (viseshna) is a part of the thing distinguished by that attribute. Hence those analysing a thing of that kind discriminate between the _distinguishing_ clement or part of it, and the _distinguished_ element or part. Now although the distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished thereby stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, yet we observe them to differ in essential character. Hence there is no contradiction between the individual and the highest Self--the former of which is a viseshana of the latter--standing to each other in the relation of part and whole, and their being at the same time of essentially different nature. This the Sutra declares 'not so is the highest,' i.e. the highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. For as the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, thus the highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. It is this difference of character--due to the individual soul being the distinguishing clement and the highest Self being the substance distinguished thereby--to which all those texts refer which declare difference. Those texts, on the other hand, which declare non-difference are based on the circumstance that attributes which are incapable of separate existence are ultimately bound to the substance which they distinguish, and hence are fundamentally valid. That in declarations such as 'Thou art that' and 'this Self is Brahman,' the words _thou_ and _Self_, no less than the words _that_ and _Brahman_, denote Brahman in so far as having the individual souls for its body, and that thus the two sets of words denote fundamentally one and the same thing, has been explained previously.
46. And Smriti texts declare this.
That the world and Brahman stand to each other in the relation of part and whole, the former being like the light and the latter like the luminous body, or the former being like the power and the latter like that in which the power inheres, or the former being like the body and the latter like the soul; this Parasara also and other Smriti writers declare, 'As the light of a fire which abides in one place only spreads all around, thus this whole world is the power (sakti) of the highest Brahman.' The 'and' in the Sutra implies that scriptural texts also ('of whom the Self is the body' and others) declare that the individual Self is a part of Brahman in so far as it is its body.
But if all individual souls are equal in so far as being alike parts of Brahman, alike actuated by Brahman, and alike knowing subjects, what is the reason that, as Scripture teaches, some of them are allowed to read the Veda and act according to its injunctions, while others are excluded therefrom; and again that some are to see, feel, and so on, while others are excluded from these privileges?--This question is answered by the next Sutra.
47. Permission and exclusion (result) from connexion with a body; as in the case of light and so on.
Although all souls are essentially of the same nature in so far as they are parts of Brahman, knowing subjects and so on, the permissions and exclusions referred to are possible for the reason that each individual soul is joined to some particular body, pure or impure, whether of a Brahmana or Kshattriya or Vaisya or Sudra, and so on. 'As in the case of fire and so on.' All fire is of the same kind, and yet one willingly fetches fire from the house of a Brahmana, while one shuns fire from a place where dead bodies are burnt. And from a Brahmana one accepts food without any objection, while one refuses food from a low person.
48. And on account of non-connectedness there is no confusion.
Although the souls, as being parts of Brahman and so on, are of essentially the same character, they are actually separate, for each of them is of atomic size and resides in a separate body. For this reason there is no confusion or mixing up of the individual spheres of enjoyment and experience. The Sutrakara introduces this reference to an advantage of his own view of things, in order to intimate that the views of the soul being Brahman deluded or else Brahman affected by a limiting adjunct are on their part incapable of explaining how it is that the experiences of the individual Self and the highest Self, and of the several individual Selfs, are not mixed up.
But may not, on the view of the soul being Brahman deluded, the distinction of the several spheres of experience be explained by means of the difference of the limiting adjuncts presented by Nescience?--This the next Sutra negatives.
49. And it is a mere apparent argument.
The argumentation by which it is sought to prove that that being whose nature is constituted by absolutely uniform light, i.e. intelligence, is differentiated by limiting adjuncts which presuppose an obscuration of that essential nature, is a mere apparent (fallacious) one. For, as we have shown before, obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light.--If we accept as the reading of the Sutra 'abhasah' (in plural) the meaning is that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all of them fallacious. The 'and' of the Sutra is meant to point out that that doctrine, moreover, is in conflict with texts such as 'thinking himself to be different from the Mover'(Svet. Up. I, 6); 'there are two unborn ones, one a ruler, the other not a ruler' (I, 9); 'of those two one eats the sweet fruit' (V, 6); and others. For even if difference is due to upadhis which are the figment of Nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion that the spheres of experience must be mixed up, since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only. |
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