Nor does the passage 'If there is some other (para) different (anya)
from me,' &c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 86) intimate the oneness of the Self; for
in that case the two words 'para' and 'anya' would express one meaning
only (viz. 'other' in the sense of 'distinct from'). The word 'para'
there denotes a Self distinct from that of one's own Self, and the word
'anya' is introduced to negative a character different from that of pure
intelligence: the sense of the passage thus is 'If there is some Self
distinct from mine, and of a character different from mine which is pure
knowledge, then it can be said that I am of such a character and he of a
different character'; but this is not the case, because all Selfs are
equal in as far as their nature consists of pure knowledge.--Also the
sloka beginning 'Owing to the difference of the holes of the flute' (Vi.
Pu. II, 14, 32) only declares that the inequality of the different Selfs
is owing not to their essential nature, but to their dwelling in
different material bodies; and does not teach the oneness of all Selfs.
The different portions of air, again, passing through the different
holes of the flute--to which the many Selfs are compared--are not said
to be one but only to be equal in character; they are one in character
in so far as all of them are of the nature of air, while the different
names of the successive notes of the musical scale are applied to them
because they pass out by the different holes of the instrument. For an
analogous reason the several Selfs are denominated by different names,
viz. gods and so on. Those material things also which are parts of the
substance fire, or water, or earth, are one in so far only as they
consist of one kind of substance; but are not absolutely one; those
different portions of air, therefore, which constitute the notes of the
scale are likewise not absolutely one. Where the Purana further says 'He
(or "that") I am and thou art He (or "that"); all this universe that has
Self for its true nature is He (or "that"); abandon the error of
distinction' (Vi. Pu. II, 16, 23); the word 'that' refers to the
intelligent character mentioned previously which is common to all Selfs,
and the co-ordination stated in the two clauses therefore intimates that
intelligence is the character of the beings denoted 'I' and 'Thou';
'abandon therefore,' the text goes on to say, 'the illusion that the
difference of outward form, divine and so on, causes a corresponding
difference in the Selfs.' If this explanation were not accepted (but
absolute non-difference insisted upon) there would be no room for the
references to difference which the passages quoted manifestly contain.
Accordingly the text goes on to say that the king acted on the
instruction he had received, 'he abandoned the view of difference,
having recognised the Real.'--But on what ground do we arrive at this
decision (viz. that the passage under discussion is not meant to teach
absolute non-duality)?--On the ground, we reply, that the proper topic
of the whole section is to teach the distinction of the Self and the
body--for this is evident from what is said in an early part of the
section, 'as the body of man, characterised by hands, feet, and the like,'
& c. (Vi. Pu. II, 13, 85).--For analogous reasons the sloka 'When that
knowledge which gives rise to distinction' &c. (Vi. Pu. VI, 7, 94)
teaches neither the essential unity of all Selfs nor the oneness of the
individual Self and the highest Self. And that the embodied soul and the
highest Self should be essentially one, is no more possible than that
the body and the Self should be one. In agreement herewith Scripture
says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of
them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up.
III, 1, 1). 'There are two drinking their reward in the world of their
own works, entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those
who know Brahman call them shade and light,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, 1). And
in this sastra also (i.e. the Vishnu Purana) there are passages of
analogous import; cp. the stanzas quoted above, 'He transcends the
causal matter, all effects, all imperfections such as the gunas' &c.
The Sutras also maintain the same doctrine, cp. I, 1, 17; I, 2, 21; II,
1, 22; and others. They therein follow Scripture, which in several
places refers to the highest and the individual soul as standing over
against each other, cp. e.g. 'He who dwells in the Self and within the
Self, whom the Self does not know, whose body the Self is, who rules the
Self from within' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent
Self (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self (IV, 3, 35).
Nor can the individual Self become one with the highest Self by freeing
itself from Nescience, with the help of the means of final Release; for
that which admits of being the abode of Nescience can never become quite
incapable of it. So the Purana says, 'It is false to maintain that the
individual Self and the highest Self enter into real union; for one
substance cannot pass over into the nature of another substance.'
Accordingly the Bhagavad Gita declares that the released soul attains
only the same attributes as the highest Self. 'Abiding by this knowledge,
they, attaining to an equality of attributes with me, do neither come
forth at the time of creation, nor are troubled at the time of general
destruction' (XIV, 2). Similarly our Purana says, 'That Brahman leads
him who meditates on it, and who is capable of change, towards its own
being (atmabhava), in the same way as the magnet attracts the iron' (Vi.
Pu. VI, 7, 30). Here the phrase 'leads him towards his own being' means
'imparts to him a nature like his own' (not 'completely identifies him
with itself'); for the attracted body does not become essentially one
with the body attracting.
The same view will be set forth by the Sutrakara in IV, 4, 17; 21, and I,
3, 2. The Vritti also says (with reference to Su. IV, 4, 17) 'with the
exception of the business of the world (the individual soul in the state
of release) is equal (to the highest Self) through light'; and the
author of the Dramidabhashya says, 'Owing to its equality (sayujya) with
the divinity the disembodied soul effects all things, like the divinity.'
The following scriptural texts establish the same view, 'Those who
depart from hence, after having known the Self and those true desires,
for them there is freedom in all the worlds' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 6); 'He
who knows Brahman reaches the Highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He obtains
all desires together with the intelligent Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1);
'Having reached the Self which consists of bliss, he wanders about in
these worlds having as much food and assuming as many forms as he likes'
(Taitt. Up. III, 10, 5); 'There he moves about' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3);
'For he is flavour; for only after having perceived a flavour can any
one perceive pleasure' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); 'As the flowing rivers go to
their setting in the sea, losing name and form; thus he who knows, freed
from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is higher than the
high' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); 'He who knows, shaking off good and evil,
reaches the highest oneness, free from stain' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3).
The objects of meditation in all the vidyas which refer to the highest
Brahman, are Brahman viewed as having qualities, and the fruit of all
those meditations. For this reason the author of the Sutras declares
that there is option among the different vidyas--cp. Ve. Su. III, 3, II;
III., 3, 59. In the same way the Vakyakara teaches that the qualified
Brahman only is the object of meditation, and that there is option of
vidyas; where he says '(Brahman) connected (with qualities), since the
meditation refers to its qualities.' The same view is expressed by the
Bhashyakara in the passage beginning 'Although he who bases himself on
the knowledge of Being.'--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes
Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9) have the same purport, for they must be
taken in connexion with the other texts (referring to the fate of him
who knows) such as 'Freed from name and form he goes to the divine
Person who is higher than the high'; 'Free from stain he reaches the
highest oneness' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8; III, 1,3); 'Having approached the
highest light he manifests himself in his own shape' (Kh. Up. VIII, 3,
4). Of him who has freed himself from his ordinary name and form, and
all the distinctions founded thereon, and has assumed the uniform
character of intelligence, it may be said that he is of the character of
Brahman.--Our Purana also propounds the same view. The sloka (VI, 7, 91),
'Knowledge is the means to obtain what is to be obtained, viz. the
highest Brahman: the Self is to be obtained, freed from all kinds of
imagination,' states that that Self which through meditation on Brahman,
is freed from all imagination so as to be like Brahman, is the object to
be attained. (The three forms of imagination to be got rid of are so-
called karma-bhavana, brahma-bhavana and a combination of the two. See
Vi. Pu. VI, 7.) The text then goes on, 'The embodied Self is the user of
the instrument, knowledge is its instrument; having accomplished Release--
whereby his object is attained--he may leave off.' This means that the
Devotee is to practise meditation on the highest Brahman until it has
accomplished its end, viz. the attainment of the Self free from all
imagination.--The text continues, 'Having attained the being of its
being, then he is non-different from the highest Self; his difference is
founded on Nescience only.' This sloka describes the state of the
released soul. 'Its being' is the being, viz. the character or nature,
of Brahman; but this does not mean absolute oneness of nature; because
in this latter case the second 'being' would be out of place and the
sloka would contradict what had been said before. The meaning is: when
the soul has attained the nature of Brahman, i.e. when it has freed
itself from all false imagination, then it is non-different from the
highest Self. This non-difference is due to the soul, as well as the
highest Self, having the essential nature of uniform intelligence. The
difference of the soul--presenting itself as the soul of a god, a man,
& c.--from the highest Self is not due to its essential nature, but rests
on the basis of Nescience in the form of work: when through meditation
on Brahman this basis is destroyed, the difference due to it comes to an
end, and the soul no longer differs from the highest Self. So another
text says, 'The difference of things of one nature is due to the
investing agency of outward works; when the difference of gods, men,
& c., is destroyed, it has no longer any investing power' (Vi. Pu. II,
14, 33).--The text then adds a further explanation, 'when the knowledge
which gives rise to manifold difference is completely destroyed, who
then will produce difference that has no real existence?' The manifold
difference is the distinction of gods, men, animals, and inanimate
things: compare the saying of Saunaka:'this fourfold distinction is
founded on false knowledge.' The Self has knowledge for its essential
nature; when Nescience called work--which is the cause of the manifold
distinctions of gods, men, &c.--has been completely destroyed through
meditation on the highest Brahman, who then will bring about the
distinction of gods, & c., from the highest Self--a distinction which in
the absence of a cause cannot truly exist.--That Nescience is called
karman (work) is stated in the same chapter of the Purana (st.
61--avidya karmasamjna).
The passage in the Bhagavad Gita, 'Know me to be the kshetrajna' (XIII,
2), teaches the oneness of all in so far as the highest Self is the
inward ruler of all; taken in any other sense it would be in conflict
with other texts, such as 'All creatures are the Perishable, the
unchanging soul is the Imperishable; but another is the highest Person'
(Bha. Gi. XV, 16). In other places the Divine one declares that as
inward Ruler he is the Self of all: 'The Lord dwells in the heart of all
creatures' (XVIII, 61), and 'I dwell within the heart of all' (XV, 15).
and 'I am the Self which has its abode within all creatures' (X, 20).
The term 'creature' in these passages denotes the entire aggregate of
body, &c., up to the Self.--Because he is the Self of all, the text
expressly denies that among all the things constituting his body there
is any one separate from him,'There is not anything which is without me'
(X, 39). The place where this text occurs is the winding up of a
glorification of the Divine one, and the text has to be understood
accordingly. The passage immediately following is 'Whatever being there
is, powerful, beautiful, or glorious, even that know thou to have sprung
from a portion of my glory; pervading this entire Universe by a portion
of mine I do abide' (X, 41; 42).
All this clearly proves that the authoritative books do _not_ teach the
doctrine of one non-differenced substance; that they do _not_ teach that
the universe of things is false; and that they do _not_ deny the
essential distinction of intelligent beings, non-intelligent things, and
the Lord.
[FOOTNOTE 92:1. 'Pranamaya' is explained as meaning 'prana' only.]
[FOOTNOTE 94:1. The sense in which this sloka has to be taken is 'As in
ordinary life we ascribe to certain things (e.g. gems, mantras) certain
special powers because otherwise the effects they produce could not be
accounted for; so to Brahman also,' &c.]
The theory of Nescience cannot be proved.
We now proceed to the consideration of Nescience.--According to the view
of our opponent, this entire world, with all its endless distinctions of
Ruler, creatures ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain defect,
fictitiously superimposed upon the non-differenced, self-luminous
Reality; and what constitutes that defect is beginningless Nescience,
which invests the Reality, gives rise to manifold illusions, and cannot
be denned either as being or non-being. Such Nescience, he says, must
necessarily be admitted, firstly on the ground of scriptural texts, such
as 'Hidden by what is untrue' (Ch. Up. VIII, 3, 2), and secondly because
otherwise the oneness of the individual souls with Brahman--which is
taught by texts such as 'Thou are that'--cannot be established. This
Nescience is neither 'being,' because in that case it could not be the
object of erroneous cognition (bhrama) and sublation (badha); nor is it
'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the object of
apprehension and sublation [FOOTNOTE 102:1]. Hence orthodox Philosophers
declare that this Nescience falls under neither of these two opposite
categories.
Now this theory of Nescience is altogether untenable. In the first place
we ask, 'What is the substrate of this Nescience which gives rise to the
great error of plurality of existence?' You cannot reply 'the individual
soul'; for the individual soul itself exists in so far only as it is
fictitiously imagined through Nescience. Nor can you say 'Brahman'; for
Brahman is nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and hence
contradictory in nature to Nescience, which is avowedly sublated by
knowledge.
'The highest Brahman has knowledge for its essential nature: if
Nescience, which is essentially false and to be terminated by knowledge,
invests Brahman, who then will be strong enough to put an end to it?'
'What puts an end to Nescience is the knowledge that Brahman is pure
knowledge!'--'Not so, for that knowledge also is, like Brahman, of the
nature of light, and hence has no power to put an end to Nescience.--And
if there exists the knowledge that Brahman is knowledge, then Brahman is
an object of knowledge, and that, according to your own teaching,
implies that Brahman is not of the nature of consciousness.'
To explain the second of these slokas.--If you maintain that what
sublates Nescience is not that knowledge which constitutes Brahman's
essential nature, but rather that knowledge which has for its object the
truth of Brahman being of such a nature, we demur; for as both these
kinds of knowledge are of the same nature, viz. the nature of light,
which is just that which constitutes Brahman's nature, there is no
reason for making a distinction and saying that one knowledge is
contradictory of Nescience, and the other is not. Or, to put it
otherwise--that essential nature of Brahman which is apprehended through
the cognition that Brahman is knowledge, itself shines forth in
consequence of the self-luminous nature of Brahman, and hence we have no
right to make a distinction between that knowledge which constitutes
Brahman's nature, and that of which that nature is the object, and to
maintain that the latter only is antagonistic to Nescience.--Moreover
(and this explains the third sloka), according to your own view Brahman,
which is mere consciousness, cannot be the object of another
consciousness, and hence there is no knowledge which has Brahman for its
object. If, therefore, knowledge is contradictory to non-knowledge
(Nescience), Brahman itself must be contradictory to it, and hence
cannot be its substrate. Shells (mistaken for silver) and the like which
by themselves are incapable of throwing light upon their own true nature
are not contradictory to non-knowledge of themselves, and depend, for
the termination of that non-knowledge, on another knowledge (viz. on the
knowledge of an intelligent being); Brahman, on the other hand, whose
essential nature is established by its own consciousness, is
contradictorily opposed to non-knowledge of itself, and hence does not
depend, for the termination of that non-knowledge, on some other
knowledge.--If our opponent should argue that the knowledge of the
falsity of whatever is other than Brahman is contradictory to non-
knowledge, we ask whether this knowledge of the falsity of what is other
than Brahman is contradictory to the non-knowledge of the true nature of
Brahman, or to that non-knowledge which consists in the view of the
reality of the apparent world. The former alternative is inadmissible;
because the cognition of the falsity of what is other than Brahman has a
different object (from the non-knowledge of Brahman's true nature) and
therefore cannot be contradictory to it; for knowledge and non-knowledge
are contradictory in so far only as they refer to one and the same
object. And with regard to the latter alternative we point out that the
knowledge of the falsity of the world is contradictory to the non-
knowledge which consists in the view of the reality of the world; the
former knowledge therefore sublates the latter non-knowledge only, while
the non-knowledge of the true nature of Brahman is not touched by it.--
Against this it will perhaps be urged that what is here called the non-
knowledge of the true nature of Brahman, really is the view of Brahman
being dual in nature, and that this view is put an end to by the
cognition of the falsity of whatever is other than Brahman; while the
true nature of Brahman itself is established by its own consciousness.--
But this too we refuse to admit. If non-duality constitutes the true
nature of Brahman, and is proved by Brahman's own consciousness, there
is room neither for what is contradictory to it, viz. that non-knowledge
which consists in the view of duality, nor for the sublation of that non-
knowledge.--Let then non-duality be taken for an attribute (not the
essential nature) of Brahman!--This too we refuse to admit; for you
yourself have proved that Brahman, which is pure Consciousness, is free
from attributes which are objects of Consciousness.--From all this it
follows that Brahman, whose essential nature is knowledge, cannot be the
substrate of Nescience: the theory, in fact, involves a flat
contradiction.
When, in the next place, you maintain that Brahman, whose nature is
homogeneous intelligence, is invested and hidden by Nescience, you
thereby assert the destruction of Brahman's essential nature. Causing
light to disappear means either obstructing the origination of light, or
else destroying light that exists. And as you teach that light
(consciousness) cannot originate, the 'hiding' or 'making to disappear'
of light can only mean its destruction.--Consider the following point
also. Your theory is that self-luminous consciousness, which is without
object and without substrate, becomes, through the influence of an
imperfection residing within itself, conscious of itself as connected
with innumerous substrata and innumerous objects.--Is then, we ask, that
imperfection residing within consciousness something real or something
unreal?--The former alternative is excluded, as not being admitted by
yourself. Nor can we accept the latter alternative; for if we did we
should have to view that imperfection as being either a knowing subject,
or an object of knowledge, or Knowing itself. Now it cannot be 'Knowing,'
as you deny that there is any distinction in the nature of knowing;
and that 'Knowing,' which is the substrate of the imperfection, cannot
be held to be unreal, because that would involve the acceptance of the
Madhyamika doctrine, viz. of a general void [FOOTNOTE 106:1].
And if knowers, objects of knowledge and knowing as determined by those
two are fictitious, i.e. unreal, we have to assume another fundamental
imperfection, and are thus driven into a _regressuss in infinitum_.--To
avoid this difficulty, it might now be said that real consciousness
itself, which constitutes Brahman's nature, is that imperfection.--But
if Brahman itself constitutes the imperfection, then Brahman is the
basis of the appearance of a world, and it is gratuitous to assume an
additional avidya to account for the vorld. Moreover, as Brahman is
eternal, it would follow from this hypothesis that no release could ever
take place. Unless, therefore, you admit a real imperfection apart from
Brahman, you are unable to account for the great world-error.
What, to come to the next point, do you understand by the
inexplicability (anirvakaniyata) of Nescience? Its difference in nature
from that which _is_, as well as that which _is not_! A thing of such
kind would be inexplicable indeed; for none of the means of knowledge
apply to it. That is to say--the whole world of objects must be ordered
according to our states of consciousness, and every state of
consciousness presents itself in the form, either of something existing
or of something non-existing. If, therefore, we should assume that of
states of consciousness which are limited to this double form, the
object can be something which is neither existing nor non-existing, then
anything whatever might be the object of any state of consciousness
whatever.
Against this our opponent may now argue as follows:--There is, after all,
something, called avidya, or ajnana, or by some other name, which is a
positive entity (bhava), different from the antecedent non-existence of
knowledge; which effects the obscuration of the Real; which is the
material cause of the erroneous superimposition on the Real, of manifold
external and internal things; and which is terminated by the cognition
of the true nature of the one substance which constitutes Reality. For
this avidya is apprehended through Perception as well as Inference.
Brahman, in so far as limited by this avidya, is the material cause of
the erroneous superimposition--upon the inward Self, which in itself is
changeless pure intelligence, but has its true nature obscured by this
superimposition--of that plurality which comprises the ahamkara, all
acts of knowledge and all objects of knowledge. Through special forms of
this defect (i.e. avidya) there are produced, in this world superimposed
upon Reality, the manifold special superimpositions presenting
themselves in the form of things and cognitions of things--such as
snakes (superimposed upon ropes), silver (superimposed on shells), and
the like. Avidya constitutes the material cause of this entire false
world; since for a false thing we must needs infer a false cause. That
this avidya or ajnana (non-knowledge) is an object of internal
Perception, follows from the fact that judgments such as 'I do not know',
'I do not know either myself or others,' directly present themselves to
the mind. A mental state of this kind has for its object not that non-
knowledge which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge--for such
absence of knowledge is ascertained by the sixth means of proof
(anupalabdhi); it rather is a state which presents its object directly,
and thus is of the same kind as the state expressed in the judgment 'I
am experiencing pleasure.' Even if we admit that 'absence of something'
(abhava) can be the object of perception, the state of consciousness
under discussion cannot have absence of knowledge in the Self for its
object. For at the very moment of such consciousness knowledge exists;
or if it does not exist there can be no consciousness of the absence of
knowledge. To explain. When I am conscious that I am non-knowing, is
there or is there not apprehension of the Self as having non-existence
of knowledge for its attribute, and of knowledge as the counterentity of
non-knowledge? In the former case there can be no consciousness of the
absence of knowledge, for that would imply a contradiction. In the
latter case, such consciousness can all the less exist, for it
presupposes knowledge of that to which absence of knowledge belongs as
an attribute (viz. the Self) and of its own counterentity, viz.
knowledge. The same difficulty arises if we view the absence of
knowledge as either the object of Inference, or as the object of the
special means of proof called 'abhava' (i.e. anupalabdhi). If, on the
other hand, non-knowledge is viewed (not as a merely negative, but) as a
positive entity, there arises no contradiction even if there is (as
there is in fact) at the same time knowledge of the Self as qualified by
non-knowledge, and of knowledge as the counterentity of non-knowledge;
and we therefore must accept the conclusion that the state of
consciousness expressed by 'I am non-knowing,' has for its object a non-
knowledge which is a positive entity.--But, a Nescience which is a
positive entity, contradicts the witnessing consciousness, whose nature
consists in the lighting up of the truth of things! Not so, we reply.
Witnessing consciousness has for its object not the true nature of
things, but Nescience; for otherwise the lighting up (i.e. the
consciousness) of false things could not take place. Knowledge which has
for its object non-knowledge (Nescience), does not put an end to that
non-knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction (between kaitanya and
ajnana).--But, a new objection is raised, this positive entity,
Nescience, becomes an object of witnessing Consciousness, only in so far
as it (Nescience) is defined by some particular object (viz. the
particular thing which is not known), and such objects depend for their
proof on the different means of knowledge. How then can that Nescience,
which is defined by the 'I' (as expressed e. g. in the judgment, 'I do
not know myself'), become the object of witnessing Consciousness?--There
is no difficulty here, we reply. All things whatsoever are objects of
Consciousness, either as things known or as things not known. But while
the mediation of the means of knowledge is required in the case of all
those things which, as being non-intelligent (jada), can be proved only
in so far as being objects known (through some means of knowledge), such
mediation is not required in the case of the intelligent (ajada) inner
Self which proves itself. Consciousness of Nescience is thus possible in
all cases (including the case 'I do not know myself'), since witnessing
Consciousness always gives definition to Nescience.--From all this it
follows that, through Perception confirmed by Reasoning, we apprehend
Nescience as a positive entity. This Nescience, viewed as a positive
entity, is also proved by Inference, viz. in the following form: All
knowledge established by one of the different means of proof is preceded
by something else, which is different from the mere antecedent non-
existence of knowledge; which hides the object of knowledge; which is
terminated by knowledge; and which exists in the same place as knowledge;
because knowledge possesses the property of illumining things not
illumined before;--just as the light of a lamp lit in the dark illumines
things.--Nor must you object to this inference on the ground that
darkness is not a substance, but rather the mere absence of light, or
else the absence of visual perception of form and colour, and that hence
darkness cannot be brought forward as a similar instance proving
Nescience to be a positive entity. For that Darkness must be considered
a positive substance follows, firstly, from its being more or less dense,
and secondly, from its being perceived as having colour.
To all this we make the following reply. Neither Perception alone, nor
Perception aided by Reasoning, reveals to us a positive entity,
Nescience, as implied in judgments such as 'I am non-knowing,' 'I know
neither myself nor others.' The contradiction which was urged above
against the view of non-knowledge being the antecedent non-existence of
knowledge, presents itself equally in connexion with non-knowledge
viewed as a positive entity. For here the following alternative presents
itself--the inner Reality is either known or not known as that which
gives definition to Nescience by being either its object or its
substrate. If it be thus known, then there is in it no room for
Nescience which is said to be that which is put an end to by the
cognition of the true nature of the Inner Reality. If, on the other hand,
it be not thus known, how should there be a consciousness of Nescience
in the absence of that which defines it, viz. knowledge of the substrate
or of the object of Nescience?--Let it then be said that what is
contradictory to non-knowledge is the clear presentation of the nature
of the inner Self, and that (while there is consciousness of ajnana) we
have only an obscure presentation of the nature of the Self; things
being thus, there is no contradiction between the cognition of the
substrate and object of Nescience on the one side, and the consciousness
of ajnana on the other.--Well, we reply, all this holds good on our side
also. Even if ajnana means antecedent non-existence of knowledge, we can
say that knowledge of the substrate and object of non-knowledge has for
its object the Self presented obscurely only; and thus there is no
difference between our views--unless you choose to be obstinate!
Whether we view non-knowledge as a positive entity or as the antecedent
non-existence of knowledge, in either case it comes out as what the word
indicates, viz. non-knowledge. Non-knowledge means either absence of
knowledge, or that which is other than knowledge, or that which is
contradictory to knowledge; and in any of these cases we have to admit
that non-knowledge presupposes the cognition of the nature of knowledge.
Even though the cognition of the nature of darkness should not require
the knowledge of the nature of light, yet when darkness is considered
under the aspect of being contrary to light, this presupposes the
cognition of light. And the non-knowledge held by you is never known in
its own nature but merely as 'non-knowledge,' and it therefore
presupposes the cognition of knowledge no less than our view does,
according to which non-knowledge is simply the negation of knowledge.
Now antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and
is an undoubted object of consciousness; the right conclusion therefore
is that what we are conscious of in such judgments as 'I am non-knowing,'
& c., is this very antecedent non-existence of knowledge which we both
admit.
It, moreover, is impossible to ascribe to Brahman, whose nature is
constituted by eternal free self-luminous intelligence, the
consciousness of Nescience; for what constitutes its essence is
consciousness of itself. If against this you urge that Brahman, although
having consciousness of Self for its essential nature, yet is conscious
of non-knowledge in so far as its (Brahman's) nature is hidden; we ask
in return what we have to understand by Brahman's nature being hidden.
You will perhaps say 'the fact of its not being illumined.' But how, we
ask, can there be absence of illumination of the nature of that whose
very nature consists in consciousness of Self, i.e. self-illumination?
If you reply that even that whose nature is consciousness of Self may be
in the state of its nature not being illumined by an outside agency, we
point out that as according to you light cannot be considered us an
attribute, but constitutes the very nature of Brahman, it would--
illumination coming from an external agency--follow that the very nature
of Brahman can be destroyed from the outside. This we have already
remarked.--Further, your view implies on the one hand that this non-
knowledge which is the cause of the concealment of Brahman's nature
hides Brahman in so far as Brahman is conscious of it, and on the other
hand that having hidden Brahman, it becomes the object of consciousness
on the part of Brahman; and this evidently constitutes a logical see-saw.
You will perhaps say [FOOTNOTE 111:1] that it hides Brahman in so far
only as Brahman is conscious of it. But, we point out, if the
consciousness of ajnana takes place on the part of a Brahman whose
nature is not hidden, the whole hypothesis of the 'hiding' of Brahman's
nature loses its purport, and with it the fundamental hypothesis as to
the nature of ajnana; for if Brahman may be conscious of ajnana (without
a previous obscuration of its nature by ajnana) it may as well be held
to be in the same way conscious of the world, which, by you, is
considered to be an effect of ajnana.
How, further, do you conceive this consciousness of ajnana on Brahman's
part? Is it due to Brahman itself, or to something else? In the former
case this consciousness would result from Brahman's essential nature,
and hence there would never be any Release. Or else, consciousness of
ajnana constituting the nature of Brahman, which is admittedly pure
consciousness, in the same way as the consciousness of false silver is
terminated by that cognition which sublates the silver, so some
terminating act of cognition would eventually put an end to Brahman's
essential nature itself.--On the second alternative we ask what that
something else should be. If you reply 'another ajnana,' we are led into
a _regressus in infinitum_.--Let it then be said [FOOTNOTE 112:1] that
ajnana having first hidden Brahman then becomes the object of its
consciousness. This, we rejoin, would imply that ajnana acting like a
defect of the eye by its very essential being hides Brahman, and then
ajnana could not be sublated by knowledge. Let us then put the case as
follows:--Ajnana, which is by itself beginningless, at the very same
time effects Brahman's witnessing it (being conscious of it), and
Brahman's nature being hidden; in this way the _regressus in infinitum_
and other difficulties will be avoided.--But this also we cannot admit;
for Brahman is essentially consciousness of Self, and cannot become a
witnessing principle unless its nature be previously hidden.--Let then
Brahman be hidden by some other cause!--This, we rejoin, would take away
from ajnana its alleged beginninglessness, and further would also lead
to an infinite regress. And if Brahman were assumed to become a witness,
without its essential nature being hidden, it could not possess--what
yet it is maintained to possess--the uniform character of consciousness
of Self.--If, moreover, Brahman is hidden by avidya, does it then not
shine forth at all, or does it shine forth to some extent? On the former
alternative the not shining forth of Brahman--whose nature is mere light--
reduces it to an absolute non-entity. Regarding the latter alternative
we ask, 'of Brahman, which is of an absolutely homogeneous nature, which
part do you consider to be concealed, and which to shine forth?' To that
substance which is pure light, free from all division and distinction,
there cannot belong two modes of being, and hence obscuration and light
cannot abide in it together.--Let us then say that Brahman, which is
homogeneous being, intelligence, bliss, has its nature obscured by
avidya, and hence is seen indistinctly as it were.--But how, we ask, are
we to conceive the distinctness or indistinctness of that whose nature
is pure light? When an object of light which has parts and
distinguishing attributes appears in its totality, we say that it
appears distinctly; while we say that its appearance is indistinct when
some of its attributes do not appear. Now in those aspects of the thing
which do not appear, light (illumination) is absent altogether, and
hence we cannot there speak of indistinctness of light; in those parts
on the other hand which do appear, the light of which they are the
object is distinct. Indistinctness is thus not possible at all where
there is light. In the case of such things as are apprehended as objects,
indistinctness may take place, viz. in so far as some of their
distinguishing attributes are not apprehended. But in Brahman, which is
not an object, without any distinguishing attributes, pure light, the
essential nature of which it is to shine forth, indistinctness which
consists in the non-apprehension of certain attributes can in no way be
conceived, and hence not be explained as the effect of avidya.
We, moreover, must ask the following question: 'Is this indistinctness
which you consider an effect of avidya put an end to by the rise of true
knowledge or not?' On the latter alternative there would be no final
release. In the former case we have to ask of what nature Reality is.
'It is of an essentially clear and distinct nature.' Does this nature
then exist previously (to the cessation of indistinctness), or not? If
it does, there is no room whatever either for indistinctness the effect
of avidya, or for its cessation. If it does not previously exist, then
Release discloses itself as something to be effected, and therefore non-
eternal.--And that such non-knowledge is impossible because there is no
definable substrate for it we have shown above.--He, moreover, who holds
the theory of error resting on a non-real defect, will find it difficult
to prove the impossibility of error being without any substrate; for, if
the cause of error may be unreal, error may be supposed to take place
even in case of its substrate being unreal. And the consequence of this
would be the theory of a general Void.
The assertion, again, that non-knowledge as a positive entity is proved
by Inference, also is groundless. But the inference was actually set
forth!--True; but it was set forth badly. For the reason you employed
for proving ajnana is a so-called contradictory one (i.e. it proves the
contrary of what it is meant to prove), in so far as it proves what is
not desired and what is different from ajnana (for what it proves is
that there is a certain _knowledge_, viz. that all knowledge resting on
valid means of proof has non-knowledge for its antecedent). (And with
regard to this knowledge again we must ask whether it also has non-
knowledge for its antecedent.) If the reason (relied on in all this
argumentation) does not prove, in this case also, the antecedent
existence of positive non-knowledge, it is too general (and hence not to
be trusted in any case). If, on the other hand, it does prove antecedent
non-knowledge, then this latter non-knowledge stands in the way of the
non-knowledge (which you try to prove by inference) being an object of
consciousness, and thus the whole supposition of ajnana as an entity
becomes useless.
The proving instance, moreover, adduced by our opponent, has no proving
power; for the light of a lamp does not possess the property of
illumining things not illumined before. Everywhere illumining power
belongs to knowledge only; there may be light, but if there is not also
Knowledge there is no lighting up of objects. The senses also are only
causes of the origination of knowledge, and possess no illumining power.
The function of the light of the lamp on the other hand is a merely
auxiliary one, in so far as it dispels the darkness antagonistic to the
organ of sight which gives rise to knowledge; and it is only with a view
to this auxiliary action that illumining power is conventionally
ascribed to the lamp.--But in using the light of the lamp as a proving
instance, we did not mean to maintain that it possesses illumining power
equal to that of light; we introduced it merely with reference to the
illumining power of knowledge, in so far as preceded by the removal of
what obscures its object!--We refuse to accept this explanation.
Illumining power does not only mean the dispelling of what is
antagonistic to it, but also the defining of things, i.e. the rendering
them capable of being objects of empirical thought and speech; and this
belongs to knowledge only (not to the light of the lamp). If you allow
the power of illumining what was not illumined, to auxiliary factors
also, you must first of all allow it to the senses which are the most
eminent factors of that kind; and as in their case there exists no
different thing to be terminated by their activity, (i.e. nothing
analogous to the ajnana to be terminated by knowledge), this whole
argumentation is beside the point.
There are also formal inferences, opposed to the conclusion of the
purvapakshin.--Of the ajnana under discussion, Brahman, which is mere
knowledge, is not the substrate, just because it is ajnana; as shown by
the case of the non-knowledge of the shell (mistaken for silver) and
similar cases; for such non-knowledge abides within the knowing subject.--
The ajnana under discussion does not obscure knowledge, just because it
is ajnana; as shown by the cases of the shell, &c.; for such non-
knowledge hides the object.--Ajnana is not terminated by knowledge,
because it does not hide the object of knowledge; whatever non-knowledge
is terminated by knowledge, is such as to hide the object of knowledge;
as e.g. the non-knowledge of the shell.--Brahman is not the substrate of
ajnana, because it is devoid of the character of knowing subject; like
jars and similar things.--Brahman is not hidden by ajnana, because it is
not the object of knowledge; whatever is hidden by non-knowledge is the
object of knowledge; so e.g. shells and similar things.--Brahman is not
connected with non-knowledge to be terminated by knowledge, because it
is not the object of knowledge; whatever is connected with non-knowledge
to be terminated by knowledge is an object of knowledge; as e.g. shells
and the like. Knowledge based on valid means of proof, has not for its
antecedent, non-knowledge other than the antecedent non-existence of
knowledge; just because it is knowledge based on valid proof; like that
valid knowledge which proves the ajnana maintained by you.--Knowledge
does not destroy a real thing, because it is knowledge in the absence of
some specific power strengthening it; whatever is capable of destroying
things is--whether it be knowledge or ajnana--strengthened by some
specific power; as e.g. the knowledge of the Lord and of Yogins; and as
the ajnana consisting in a pestle (the blow of which destroys the pot).
Ajnana which has the character of a positive entity cannot be destroyed
by knowledge; just because it is a positive entity, like jars and
similar things.
But, it now may be said, we observe that fear and other affections,
which are positive entities and produced by previous cognitions, are
destroyed by sublative acts of cognition!--Not so, we reply. Those
affections are not destroyed by knowledge; they rather pass away by
themselves, being of a momentary (temporary) nature only, and on the
cessation of their cause they do not arise again. That they are of a
momentary nature only, follows from their being observed only in
immediate connexion with the causes of their origination, and not
otherwise. If they were not of a temporary nature, each element of the
stream of cognitions, which are the cause of fear and the like, would
give rise to a separate feeling of fear, and the result would be that
there would be consciousness of many distinct feelings of fear (and this
we know not to be the case).--In conclusion we remark that in defining
right knowledge as 'that which has for its antecedent another entity,
different from its own antecedent non-existence,' you do not give proof
of very eminent logical acuteness; for what sense has it to predicate of
an entity that it is different from nonentity?--For all these reasons
Inference also does not prove an ajnana which is a positive entity. And
that it is not proved by Scripture and arthapatti, will be shown later
on. And the reasoning under Su. II, 1, 4. will dispose of the argument
which maintains that of a false thing the substantial cause also must be
false.
We thus see that there is no cognition of any kind which has for its
object a Nescience of 'inexplicable' nature.--Nor can such an
inexplicable entity be admitted on the ground of apprehension, erroneous
apprehension and sublation (cp. above, p. 102). For that only which is
actually apprehended, can be the object of apprehension, error and
sublation, and we have no right to assume, as an object of these states
of consciousness, something which is apprehended neither by them nor any
other state of consciousness.--'But in the case of the shell, &c.,
silver is actually apprehended, and at the same time there arises the
sublating consciousness "this silver is not real," and it is not
possible that one thing should appear as another; we therefore are
driven to the hypothesis that owing to some defect, we actually
apprehend silver of an altogether peculiar kind, viz. such as can be
defined neither as real nor as unreal.'--This also we cannot allow,
since this very assumption necessarily implies that one thing appears as
another. For apprehension, activity, sublation, and erroneous cognition,
all result only from one thing appearing as another, and it is not
reasonable to assume something altogether non-perceived and groundless.
The silver, when apprehended, is not apprehended as something
'inexplicable,' but as something real; were it apprehended under the
former aspect it could be the object neither of erroneous nor of
sublative cognition, nor would the apprehending person endeavour to
seize it. For these reasons you (the anirva-kaniyatva-vadin) also must
admit that the actual process is that of one thing appearing as another.
Those also who hold other theories as to the kind of cognition under
discussion (of which the shell, mistaken for silver, is an instance)
must--whatsoever effort they may make to avoid it--admit that their
theory finally implies the appearing of one thing as another. The so-
called asatkhyati-view implies that the non-existing appears as existing;
the atmakhyati-view, that the Self--which here means 'cognition'--
appears as a thing; and the akhyati-view, that the attribute of one
thing appears as that of another, that two acts of cognition appear as
one, and--on the view of the non-existence of the object--that the non-
existing appears as existing [FOOTNOTE 118:1].
Moreover, if you say that there is originated silver of a totally new
inexplicable kind, you are bound to assign the cause of this origination.
This cause cannot be the perception of the silver; for the perception
has the silver for its object, and hence has no existence before the
origination of the silver. And should you say that the perception,
having arisen without an object, produces the silver and thereupon makes
it its object, we truly do not know what to say to such excellent
reasoning!--Let it then be said that the cause is some defect in the
sense-organ.--This, too, is inadmissible; for a defect abiding in the
percipient person cannot produce an objective effect.--Nor can the
organs of sense (apart from defects) give rise to the silver; for they
are causes of cognitions only (not of things cognised). Nor, again, the
sense-organs in so far as modified by some defect; for they also can
only produce modifications in what is effected by them, i.e. cognition.
And the hypothesis of a beginningless, false ajnana constituting the
general material cause of all erroneous cognitions has been refuted
above.
How is it, moreover, that this new and inexplicable thing (which you
assume to account for the silver perceived on the shell) becomes to us
the object of the idea and word 'silver,' and not of some other idea and
term, e.g. of a jar?--If you reply that this is due to its similarity to
silver, we point out that in that case the idea and the word presenting
themselves to our mind should be that of 'something resembling silver.'
Should you, on the other hand, say that we apprehend the thing as silver
because it possesses the generic characteristics of silver, we ask
whether these generic characteristics are real or unreal. The former
alternative is impossible, because something real cannot belong to what
is unreal; and the latter is impossible because something unreal cannot
belong to what is real.
But we need not extend any further this refutation of an altogether ill-
founded theory.
[FOOTNOTE 102:1. 'Nescience' is sublated (refuted) by the cognition of
Brahman, and thereby shown to have been the object of erroneous
cognition: it thus cannot be 'being,' i.e. real. Nor can it be
altogether unreal, 'non-being,' because in that case it could not be the
object either of mental apprehension or of sublation.]
[FOOTNOTE 106:1. If the imperfection inhering in Consciousness is itself
of the nature of consciousness, and at the same time unreal, we should
have to distinguish two kinds of Consciousness--which is contrary to the
fundamental doctrine of the oneness of Consciousness. And if, on the
other hand, we should say that the Consciousness in which the
imperfection inheres is of the same nature as the latter, i.e. unreal,
we are landed in the view of universal unreality.]
[FOOTNOTE 111:1. Allowing the former view of the question only.]
[FOOTNOTE 112:1. Adopting the latter view only; see preceding note.]
[FOOTNOTE 118:1. For a full explanation of the nature of these 'khyatis,'
see A. Venis' translation of the Vedanta Siddhanta Muktavali (Reprint from the Pandit, p. 130 ff.).] |
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