2015년 1월 29일 목요일

Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja 8

Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja 8

A further objection will perhaps be raised, viz. that as experience
teaches that potters and so on direct their implements through the
mediation of their own bodies, we are not justified in holding that a
bodiless Supreme Lord directs the material and instrumental causes of
the universe.--But in reply to this we appeal to the fact of experience,
that evil demons possessing men's bodies, and also venom, are driven or
drawn out of those bodies by mere will power. Nor must you ask in what
way the volition of a bodiless Lord can put other bodies in motion; for
volition is not dependent on a body. The cause of volitions is not the
body but the internal organ (manas), and such an organ we ascribe to the
Lord also, since what proves the presence of an internal organ endowed
with power and knowledge is just the presence of effects.--But volitions,
even if directly springing from the internal organ, can belong to
embodied beings only, such only possessing internal organs!--This
objection also is founded on a mistaken generalization: the fact rather
is that the internal organ is permanent, and exists also in separation
from the body. The conclusion, therefore, is that--as the individual
souls with their limited capacities and knowledge, and their dependence
on merit and demerit, are incapable of giving rise to things so variously
and wonderfully made as worlds and animated bodies are--inference
directly leads us to the theory that there is a supreme intelligent
agent, called the Lord, who possesses unfathomable, unlimited powers and
wisdom, is capable of constructing the entire world, is without a body,
and through his mere volition brings about the infinite expanse of this
entire universe so variously and wonderfully planned. As Brahman may
thus be ascertained by means of knowledge other than revelation, the
text quoted under the preceding Sutra cannot be taken to convey
instruction as to Brahman. Since, moreover, experience demonstrates that
material and instrumental causes always are things absolutely distinct
from each other, as e.g. the clay and the potter with his implements;
and since, further, there are substances not made up of parts, as e.g.
ether, which therefore cannot be viewed as effects; we must object on
these grounds also to any attempt to represent the one Brahman as the
universal material and instrumental cause of the entire world.

Against all this we now argue as follows:--The Vedanta-text declaring
the origination, &c., of the world does teach that there is a Brahman
possessing the characteristics mentioned; since Scripture alone is a
means for the knowledge of Brahman. That the world is an effected thing
because it consists of parts; and that, as all effects are observed to
have for their antecedents certain appropriate agents competent to
produce them, we must infer a causal agent competent to plan and
construct the universe, and standing towards it in the relation of
material and operative cause--this would be a conclusion altogether
unjustified. There is no proof to show that the earth, oceans, &c.,
although things produced, were created at one time by one creator. Nor
can it be pleaded in favour of such a conclusion that all those things
have one uniform character of being effects, and thus are analogous to
one single jar; for we observe that various effects are distinguished by
difference of time of production, and difference of producers. Nor again
may you maintain the oneness of the creator on the ground that
individual souls are incapable of the creation of this wonderful
universe, and that if an additional principle be assumed to account for
the world--which manifestly is a product--it would be illegitimate to
assume more than one such principle. For we observe that individual
beings acquire more and more extraordinary powers in consequence of an
increase of religious merit; and as we may assume that through an
eventual supreme degree of merit they may in the end qualify themselves
for producing quite extraordinary effects, we have no right to assume a
highest soul of infinite merit, different from all individual souls. Nor
also can it be proved that all things are destroyed and produced all at
once; for no such thing is observed to take place, while it is, on the
other hand, observed that things are produced and destroyed in
succession; and if we infer that all things are produced and destroyed
because they are effects, there is no reason why this production and
destruction should not take place in a way agreeing with ordinary
experience. If, therefore, what it is desired to prove is the agency of
one intelligent being, we are met by the difficulty that the proving
reason (viz. the circumstance of something being an effect) is not
invariably connected with what it is desired to prove; there, further,
is the fault of qualities not met with in experience being attributed to
the subject about which something has to be proved; and lastly there is
the fault of the proving collateral instances being destitute of what
has to be proved--for experience does not exhibit to us one agent
capable of producing everything. If, on the other hand, what you wish to
prove is merely the existence of an intelligent creative agent, you
prove only what is proved already (not contested by any one).--Moreover,
if you use the attribute of being an effect (which belongs to the
totality of things) as a means to prove the existence of one omniscient
and omnipotent creator, do you view this attribute as belonging to all
things in so far as produced together, or in so far as produced in
succession? In the former case the attribute of being an effect is not
established (for experience does not show that all things are produced
together); and in the latter case the attribute would really prove what
is contrary to the hypothesis of one creator (for experience shows that
things produced in succession have different causes). In attempting to
prove the agency of one intelligent creative being only, we thus enter
into conflict with Perception and Inference, and we moreover contradict
Scripture, which says that 'the potter is born' and 'the cartwright is
born' (and thus declares a plurality of intelligent agents). Moreover,
as we observe that all effected things, such as living bodies and so on,
are connected with pleasure and the like, which are the effects of
sattva (goodness) and the other primary constituents of matter, we must
conclude that effected things have sattva and so on for their causes.
Sattva and so on--which constitute the distinctive elements of the
causal substance--are the causes of the various nature of the effects.
Now those effects can be connected with their causes only in so far as
the internal organ of a person possessing sattva and so on undergoes
modifications. And that a person possesses those qualities is due to
karman. Thus, in order to account for the origination of different
effects we must necessarily assume the connexion of an intelligent agent
with karman, whereby alone he can become the cause of effects; and
moreover the various character of knowledge and power (which the various
effects presuppose) has its reason in karman. And if it be said that it
is (not the various knowledge, &c., but) the mere wish of the agent that
causes the origination of effects, we point out that the wish, as being
specialised by its particular object, must be based on sattva and so on,
and hence is necessarily connected with karman. From all this it follows
that individual souls only can be causal agents: no legitimate inference
leads to a Lord different from them in nature.--This admits of various
expressions in technical form. 'Bodies, worlds, &c., are effects due to
the causal energy of individual souls, just as pots are'; 'the Lord is
not a causal agent, because he has no aims; just as the released souls
have none'; 'the Lord is not an agent, because he has no body; just as
the released souls have none.' (This last argumentation cannot be
objected to on the ground that individual souls take possession of
bodies; for in their case there exists a beginningless subtle body by
means of which they enter into gross bodies).--'Time is never devoid of
created worlds; because it is time, just like the present time (which
has its created world).'

Consider the following point also. Does the Lord produce his effects,
with his body or apart from his body? Not the latter; for we do not
observe causal agency on the part of any bodiless being: even the
activities of the internal organ are found only in beings having a body,
and although the internal organ be eternal we do not know of its
producing any effects in the case of released disembodied souls. Nor
again is the former alternative admissible; for in that case the Lord's
body would either be permanent or non-permanent. The former alternative
would imply that something made up of parts is eternal; and if we once
admit this we may as well admit that the world itself is eternal, and
then there is no reason to infer a Lord. And the latter alternative is
inadmissible because in that case there would be no cause of the body,
different from it (which would account for the origination of the body).
Nor could the Lord himself be assumed as the cause of the body, since a
bodiless being cannot be the cause of a body. Nor could it be maintained
that the Lord can be assumed to be 'embodied' by means of some other
body; for this leads us into a _regressus in infinitum._--Should we,
moreover, represent to ourselves the Lord (when productive) as engaged
in effort or not?--The former is inadmissible, because he is without a
body. And the latter alternative is excluded because a being not making
an effort does not produce effects. And if it be said that the effect, i.
e. the world, has for its causal agent one whose activity consists in
mere desire, this would be to ascribe to the subject of the conclusion
(i.e. the world) qualities not known from experience; and moreover the
attribute to be proved would be absent in the case of the proving
instances (such as jars, &c., which are not the work of agents engaged
in mere wishing). Thus the inference of a creative Lord which claims to
be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning which itself is
in agreement with observation, and we hence conclude that Scripture is
the only source of knowledge with regard to a supreme soul that is the
Lord of all and constitutes the highest Brahman. What Scripture tells us
of is a being which comprehends within itself infinite, altogether
unsurpassable excellences such as omnipotence and so on, is antagonistic
to all evil, and totally different in character from whatever is
cognised by the other means of knowledge: that to such a being there
should attach even the slightest imperfection due to its similarity in
nature to the things known by the ordinary means of knowledge, is thus
altogether excluded.--The Purvapakshin had remarked that the oneness of
the instrumental and the material cause is neither matter of observation
nor capable of proof, and that the same holds good with regard to the
theory that certain non-composite substances such as ether are created
things; that these points also are in no way contrary to reason, we
shall show later on under Su. I, 4, 23, and Su. II, 3, 1.

The conclusion meanwhile is that, since Brahman does not fall within the
sphere of the other means of knowledge, and is the topic of Scripture
only, the text 'from whence these creatures,' &c., _does_ give
authoritative information as to a Brahman possessing the characteristic
qualities so often enumerated. Here terminates the adhikarana of
'Scripture being the source.'

A new objection here presents itself.--Brahman does not indeed fall
within the province of the other means of knowledge; but all the same
Scripture does not give authoritative information regarding it: for
Brahman is not something that has for its purport activity or cessation
from activity, but is something fully established and accomplished
within itself.--To this objection the following Sutra replies.

[FOOTNOTE 168:1. A certain potter may not possess the skill and
knowledge required to make chairs and beds; but some other potter may
possess both, and so on. We cannot therefore point to any definite want
of skill and knowledge as invariably accompanying the capability of
producing effects of some other kind.]




4. But that (i.e. the authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to
Brahman) exists on account of the connexion (of Scripture with the
highest aim of man).

The word 'but' is meant to rebut the objection raised. _That_, i.e. the
authoritativeness of Scripture with regard to Brahman, is possible, on
account of samanvaya, i.e. connexion with the highest aim of man--that
is to say because the scriptural texts are connected with, i.e. have for
their subject, Brahman, which constitutes the highest aim of man. For
such is the connected meaning of the whole aggregate of words which
constitutes the Upanishads--'That from whence these beings are
born'(Taitt. Up. III, 1, 1). 'Being only this was in the beginning, one,
without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2), &c. &c. And of aggregates of words
which are capable of giving information about accomplished things known
through the ordinary means of ascertaining the meaning of words, and
which connectedly refer to a Brahman which is the cause of the
origination, subsistence, and destruction of the entire world, is
antagonistic to all imperfection and so on, we have no right to say that,
owing to the absence of a purport in the form of activity or cessation
of activity, they really refer to something other than Brahman.

For all instruments of knowledge have their end in determining the
knowledge of their own special objects: their action does not adapt
itself to a final purpose, but the latter rather adapts itself to the
means of knowledge. Nor is it true that where there is no connexion with
activity or cessation of activity all aim is absent; for in such cases
we observe connexion with what constitutes the general aim, i.e. the
benefit of man. Statements of accomplished matter of fact--such as 'a
son is born to thee.' 'This is no snake'--evidently have an aim, viz. in
so far as they either give rise to joy or remove pain and fear.

Against this view the Purvapakshin now argues as follows. The Vedanta-
texts do not impart knowledge of Brahman; for unless related to activity
or the cessation of activity, Scripture would be unmeaning, devoid of
all purpose. Perception and the other means of knowledge indeed have
their aim and end in supplying knowledge of the nature of accomplished
things and facts; Scripture, on the other hand, must be supposed to aim
at some practical purpose. For neither in ordinary speech nor in the
Veda do we ever observe the employment of sentences devoid of a
practical purpose: the employment of sentences not having such a purpose
is in fact impossible. And what constitutes such purpose is the
attainment of a desired, or the avoidance of a non-desired object, to be
effected by some action or abstention from action. 'Let a man desirous
of wealth attach himself to the court of a prince'; 'a man with a weak
digestion must not drink much water'; 'let him who is desirous of the
heavenly world offer sacrifices'; and so on. With regard to the
assertion that such sentences also as refer to accomplished things--'a
son is born to thee' and so on--are connected with certain aims of man,
viz. joy or the cessation of fear, we ask whether in such cases the
attainment of man's purpose results from the thing or fact itself, as e.
g. the birth of a son, or from the knowledge of that thing or fact.--You
will reply that as a thing although actually existing is of no use to
man as long as it is not known to him, man's purpose is accomplished by
his knowledge of the thing.--It then appears, we rejoin, that man's
purpose is effected through mere knowledge, even if there is no actual
thing; and from this it follows that Scripture, although connected with
certain aims, is not a means of knowledge for the actual existence of
things. In all cases, therefore, sentences have a practical purpose;
they determine either some form of activity or cessation from activity,
or else some form of knowledge. No sentence, therefore, can have for its
purport an accomplished thing, and hence the Vedanta-texts do not convey
the knowledge of Brahman as such an accomplished entity.

At this point somebody propounds the following view. The Vedanta-texts
_are_ an authoritative means for the cognition of Brahman, because as a
matter of fact they also aim at something to be done. What they really
mean to teach is that Brahman, which in itself is pure homogeneous
knowledge, without a second, not connected with a world, but is, owing
to beginningless Nescience, viewed as connected with a world, should be
freed from this connexion. And it is through this process of dissolution
of the world that Brahman becomes the object of an injunction.--But
which texts embody this injunction, according to which Brahman in its
pure form is to be realised through the dissolution of this apparent
world with its distinction of knowing subjects and objects of
knowledge?--Texts such as the following: 'One should not see (i. e.
represent to oneself) the seer of seeing, one should not think the
thinker of thinking' (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2); for this means that we should
realise Brahman in the form of pure Seeing (knowledge), free from the
distinction of seeing agents and objects of sight. Brahman is indeed
accomplished through itself, but all the same it may constitute an
object to be accomplished, viz. in so far as it is being disengaged from
the apparent world.

This view (the Mimamsaka rejoins) is unfounded. He who maintains that
injunction constitutes the meaning of sentences must be able to assign
the injunction itself, the qualification of the person to whom the
injunction is addressed, the object of the injunction, the means to
carry it out, the special mode of the procedure, and the person carrying
out the injunction. Among these things the qualification of the person
to whom the injunction addresses itself is something not to be enjoined
(but existing previously to the injunction), and is of the nature either
of cause (nimitta) or a result aimed at (phala). We then have to decide
what, in the case under discussion (i.e. the alleged injunction set
forth by the antagonist), constitutes the qualification of the person to
whom the injunction addresses itself, and whether it be of the nature of
a cause or of a result.--Let it then be said that what constitutes the
qualification in our case is the intuition of the true nature of Brahman
(on the part of the person to whom the injunction is addressed).--This,
we rejoin, cannot be a cause, as it is not something previously
established; while in other cases the nimitta is something so
established, as e.g. 'life' is in the case of a person to whom the
following injunction is addressed, 'As long as his life lasts he is to
make the Agnihotra-oblation.' And if, after all, it were admitted to be
a cause, it would follow that, as the intuition of the true nature of
Brahman is something permanent, the object of the injunction would have
to be accomplished even subsequently to final release, in the same way
as the Agnihotra has to be performed permanently as long as life lasts.--
Nor again can the intuition of Brahman's true nature be a result; for
then, being the result of an action enjoined, it would be something non-
permanent, like the heavenly world.--What, in the next place, would be
the 'object to be accomplished' of the injunction? You may not reply
'Brahman'; for as Brahman is something permanent it is not something
that can be realised, and moreover it is not denoted by a verbal form
(such as denote actions that can be accomplished, as e.g. yaga,
sacrifice).--Let it then be said that what is to be realised is Brahman,
in so far as free from the world!--But, we rejoin, even if this be
accepted as a thing to be realised, it is not the object (vishaya) of
the injunction--that it cannot be for the second reason just stated--but
its final result (phala). What moreover is, on this last assumption, the
thing to be realised--Brahman, or the cessation of the apparent world?--
Not Brahman; for Brahman is something accomplished, and from your
assumption it would follow that it is not eternal.--Well then, the
dissolution of the world!--Not so, we reply; for then it would not be
Brahman that is realised.--Let it then be said that the dissolution of
the world only is the object of the injunction!--This, too, cannot be,
we rejoin; that dissolution is the result (phala) and cannot therefore
be the object of the injunction. For the dissolution of the world means
final release; and that is the result aimed at. Moreover, if the
dissolution of the world is taken as the object of the injunction, that
dissolution would follow from the injunction, and the injunction would
be carried out by the dissolution of the world; and this would be a case
of vicious mutual dependence.--We further ask--is the world, which is to
be put an end to, false or real?--If it is false, it is put an end to by
knowledge alone, and then the injunction is needless. Should you reply
to this that the injunction puts an end to the world in so far as it
gives rise to knowledge, we reply that knowledge springs of itself from
the texts which declare the highest truth: hence there is no need of
additional injunctions. As knowledge of the meaning of those texts
sublates the entire false world distinct from Brahman, the injunction
itself with all its adjuncts is seen to be something baseless.--If, on
the other hand, the world is true, we ask--is the injunction, which puts
an end to the world, Brahman itself or something different from Brahman?
If the former, the world cannot exist at all: for what terminates it,
viz. Brahman, is something eternal; and the injunction thus being
eternal itself Cannot be accomplished by means of certa n actions.--Let
then the latter alternative be accepted!--But in that case, the niyoga
being something which is accomplished by a set of performances the
function of which it is to put an end to the entire world, the
performing person himself perishes (with the rest of the world), and the
niyoga thus remains without a substrate. And if everything apart from
Brahman is put an end to by a performance the function of which it is to
put an end to the world, there remains no result to be effected by the
niyoga, consequently there is no release.

Further, the dissolution of the world cannot constitute the instrument
(karana) in the action enjoined, because no mode of procedure
(itikartavyata) can be assigned for the instrument of the niyoga, and
unless assisted by a mode of procedure an instrument cannot operate,--
But why is there no 'mode of procedure'?--For the following reasons. A
mode of procedure is either of a positive or a negative kind. If
positive, it may be of two kinds, viz. either such as to bring about the
instrument or to assist it. Now in our case there is no room for either
of these alternatives. Not for the former; for there exists in our case
nothing analogous to the stroke of the pestle (which has the manifest
effect of separating the rice grains from the husks), whereby the
visible effect of the dissolution of the whole world could be brought
about. Nor, secondly, is there the possibility of anything assisting the
instrument, already existing independently, to bring about its effect;
for owing to the existence of such an assisting factor the instrument
itself, i.e. the cessation of the apparent world, cannot be established.
Nor must you say that it is the cognition of the non-duality of Brahman
that brings about the means for the dissolution of the world; for, as we
have already explained above, this cognition directly brings about final
Release, which is the same as the dissolution of the world, and thus
there is nothing left to be effected by special means.--And if finally
the mode of procedure is something purely negative, it can, owing to
this its nature, neither bring about nor in any way assist the
instrumental cause. From all this it follows that there is no
possibility of injunctions having for their object the realisation of
Brahman, in so far as free from the world.

Here another prima facie view of the question is set forth.--It must be
admitted that the Vedanta-texts are not means of authoritative knowledge,
since they refer to Brahman, which is an accomplished thing (not a thing
'to be accomplished'); nevertheless Brahman itself is established, viz.
by means of those passages which enjoin meditation (as something 'to be
done'). This is the purport of texts such as the following: 'The Self is
to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon' (Bri.
Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which is free from sin must be searched out'
(Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man meditate upon him as the Self' (Bri. Up.
I, 4, 7); 'Let a man meditate upon the Self as his world' (Bri. Up. I, 4,
15).--These injunctions have meditation for their object, and meditation
again is defined by its own object only, so that the injunctive word
immediately suggests an object of meditation; and as such an object
there presents itself, the 'Self' mentioned in the same sentence. Now
there arises the question, What are the characteristics of that Self?
and in reply to it there come in texts such as 'The True, knowledge,
infinite is Brahman'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one without
a second.' As these texts give the required special information, they
stand in a supplementary relation to the injunctions, and hence are
means of right knowledge; and in this way the purport of the Vedanta-
texts includes Brahman--as having a definite place in meditation which
is the object of injunction. Texts such as 'One only without a second'
(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'That is the true, that is the Self (Ch. Up. VI, 8,
7); 'There is here not any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19), teach that
there is one Reality only, viz. Brahman, and that everything else is
false. And as Perception and the other means of proof, as well as that
part of Scripture which refers to action and is based on the view of
plurality, convey the notion of plurality, and as there is contradiction
between plurality and absolute Unity, we form the conclusion that the
idea of plurality arises through beginningless avidya, while absolute
Unity alone is real. And thus it is through the injunction of meditation
on Brahman--which has for its result the intuition of Brahman--that man
reaches final release, i.e. becomes one with Brahman, which consists of
non-dual intelligence free of all the manifold distinctions that spring
from Nescience. Nor is this becoming one with Brahman to be accomplished
by the mere cognition of the sense of certain Vedanta-texts; for this is
not observed--the fact rather being that the view of plurality persists
even after the cognition of the sense of those texts--, and, moreover,
if it were so, the injunction by Scripture of hearing, reflecting, &c.,
would be purposeless.

To this reasoning the following objection might be raised.--We observe
that when a man is told that what he is afraid of is not a snake, but
only a rope, his fear comes to an end; and as bondage is as unreal as
the snake imagined in the rope it also admits of being sublated by
knowledge, and may therefore, apart from all injunction, be put an end
to by the simple comprehension of the sense of certain texts. If final
release were to be brought about by injunctions, it would follow that it
is not eternal--not any more than the heavenly world and the like; while
yet its eternity is admitted by every one. Acts of religious merit,
moreover (such as are prescribed by injunctions), can only be the causes
of certain results in so far as they give rise to a body capable of
experiencing those results, and thus necessarily produce the so-called
samsara-state (which is opposed to final release, and) which consists in
the connexion of the soul with some sort of body, high or low. Release,
therefore, is not something to be brought about by acts of religious
merit. In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'For the soul as long as it
is in the body, there is no release from pleasure and pain; when it is
free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touch it' (Ch. Up.
VIII, 12, 1). This passage declares that in the state of release, when
the soul is freed from the body, it is not touched by either pleasure or
pain--the effects of acts of religious merit or demerit; and from this
it follows that the disembodied state is not to be accomplished by acts
of religious merit. Nor may it be said that, as other special results
are accomplished by special injunctions, so the disembodied state is to
be accomplished by the injunction of meditation; for that state is
essentially something _not_ to be effected. Thus scriptural texts say,
'The wise man who knows the Self as bodiless among the bodies, as
persisting among non-persisting things, as great and all-pervading; he
does not grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That person is without breath,
without internal organ, pure, without contact' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2).--
Release which is a bodiless state is eternal, and cannot therefore be
accomplished through meritorious acts.

In agreement herewith Scripture says, 'That which thou seest apart from
merit (dharma) and non-merit, from what is done and not done, from what
exists and what has to be accomplished--tell me that' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14).--
Consider what follows also. When we speak of something being
accomplished (effected-sadhya) we mean one of four things, viz. its
being originated (utpatti), or obtained (prapti), or modified (vikriti),
or in some way or other (often purely ceremonial) made ready or fit
(samskriti). Now in neither of these four senses can final Release be
said to be accomplished. It cannot be originated, for being Brahman
itself it is eternal. It cannot be attained: for Brahman, being the Self,
is something eternally attained. It cannot be modified; for that would
imply that like sour milk and similar things (which are capable of
change) it is non-eternal. Nor finally can it be made 'ready' or 'fit.'
A thing is made ready or fit either by the removal of some imperfection
or by the addition of some perfection. Now Brahman cannot be freed from
any imperfection, for it is eternally faultless; nor can a perfection be
added to it, for it is absolutely perfect. Nor can it be improved in the
sense in which we speak of improving a mirror, viz. by polishing it; for
as it is absolutely changeless it cannot become the object of any action,
either of its own or of an outside agent. And, again, actions affecting
the body, such as bathing, do not 'purify' the Self (as might possibly
be maintained) but only the organ of Egoity (ahamkartri) which is the
product of avidya, and connected with the body; it is this same
ahamkartri also that enjoys the fruits springing from any action upon
the body. Nor must it be said that the Self _is_ the ahamkartri; for the
Self rather is that which is conscious of the ahamkartri. This is the
teaching of the mantras: 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other
looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); 'When he is in union with
the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise men call him the Enjoyer'
(Ka. Up. I, 3,4); 'The one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the
Self within all beings, watching over all works, dwelling in all beings,
the witness, the perceiver, the only one, free from qualities' (Svet. Up.
VI, 11); 'He encircled all, bright, bodiless, scatheless, without
muscles, pure, untouched by evil' (Isa. Up. 8).--All these texts
distinguish from the ahamkartri due to Nescience, the true Self,
absolutely perfect and pure, free from all change. Release therefore--
which _is_ the Self--cannot be brought about in any way.--But, if this
is so, what then is the use of the comprehension of the texts?--It is of
use, we reply, in so far as it puts an end to the obstacles in the way
of Release. Thus scriptural texts declare: 'You indeed are our father,
you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore' (Pra. Up. VI, 8);
'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes
grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine' (Ch. Up.
VII, 1, 3); 'To him whose faults had thus been rubbed out Sanatkumara
showed the other bank of Darkness' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2). This shows that
what is effected by the comprehension of the meaning of texts is merely
the cessation of impediments in the way of Release. This cessation
itself, although something effected, is of the nature of that kind of
nonexistence which results from the destruction of something existent,
and as such does not pass away.--Texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he
becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9); 'Having known him he passes beyond
death' (Svet. Up. III,8), declare that Release follows immediately on
the cognition of Brahman, and thus negative the intervention of
injunctions.--Nor can it be maintained that Brahman is related to action
in so far as constituting the object of the action either of knowledge
or of meditation; for scriptural texts deny its being an object in
either of these senses. Compare 'Different is this from what is known,
and from what is unknown' (Ke. Up. II, 4); 'By whom he knows all this,
whereby should he know him?' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'That do thou know as
Brahman, not that on which they meditate as being this' (Ke. Up. II, 4).
Nor does this view imply that the sacred texts have no object at all;
for it is their object to put an end to the view of difference springing
from avidya. Scripture does not objectivise Brahman in any definite form,
but rather teaches that its true nature is to be non-object, and thereby
puts an end to the distinction, fictitiously suggested by Nescience, of
knowing subjects, acts of knowledge, and objects of knowledge. Compare
the text 'You should not see a seer of seeing, you should not think a
thinker of thought,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 4, 2).--Nor, again, must it be
said that, if knowledge alone puts an end to bondage, the injunctions of
hearing and so on are purposeless; for their function is to cause the
origination of the comprehension of the texts, in so far as they divert
from all other alternatives the student who is naturally inclined to
yield to distractions.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that a
cessation of bondage through mere knowledge is never observed to take
place; for as bondage is something false (unreal) it cannot possibly
persist after the rise of knowledge. For the same reason it is a mistake
to maintain that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the
death of the body. In order that the fear inspired by the imagined snake
should come to an end, it is required only that the rope should be
recognised as what it is, not that a snake should be destroyed. If the
body were something real, its destruction would be necessary; but being
apart from Brahman it is unreal. He whose bondage does not come to an
end, in him true knowledge has not arisen; this we infer from the effect
of such knowledge not being observed in him. Whether the body persist or
not, he who has reached true knowledge is released from that very moment.--
The general conclusion of all this is that, as Release is not something
to be accomplished by injunctions of meditation, Brahman is not proved
to be something standing in a supplementary relation to such injunctions;
but is rather proved by (non-injunctory) texts, such as 'Thou art that';
'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'; 'This Self is Brahman.'

This view (the holder of the dhyana-vidhi theory rejoins) is untenable;
since the cessation of bondage cannot possibly spring from the mere
comprehension of the meaning of texts. Even if bondage were something
unreal, and therefore capable of sublation by knowledge, yet being
something direct, immediate, it could not be sublated by the indirect
comprehension of the sense of texts. When a man directly conscious of a
snake before him is told by a competent by-stander that it is not a
snake but merely a rope, his fear is not dispelled by a mere cognition
contrary to that of a snake, and due to the information received; but
the information brings about the cessation of his fear in that way that
it rouses him to an activity aiming at the direct perception, by means
of his senses, of what the thing before him really is. Having at first
started back in fear of the imagined snake, he now proceeds to ascertain
by means of ocular perception the true nature of the thing, and having
accomplished this is freed from fear. It would not be correct to say
that in this case words (viz. of the person informing) produce this
perceptional knowledge; for words are not a sense-organ, and among the
means of knowledge it is the sense-organs only that give rise to direct
knowledge. Nor, again, can it be pleaded that in the special case of
Vedic texts sentences may give rise to direct knowledge, owing to the
fact that the person concerned has cleansed himself of all imperfection
through the performance of actions not aiming at immediate results, and
has been withdrawn from all outward objects by hearing, reflection, and
meditation; for in other cases also, where special impediments in the
way of knowledge are being removed, we never observe that the special
means of knowledge, such as the sense-organs and so on, operate outside
their proper limited sphere.--Nor, again, can it be maintained that
meditation acts as a means helpful towards the comprehension of texts;
for this leads to vicious reciprocal dependence--when the meaning of the
texts has been comprehended it becomes the object of meditation; and
when meditation has taken place there arises comprehension of the
meaning of the texts!--Nor can it be said that meditation and the
comprehension of the meaning of texts have different objects; for if
this were so the comprehension of the texts could not be a means helpful
towards meditation: meditation on one thing does not give rise to
eagerness with regard to another thing!--For meditation which consists
in uninterrupted remembrance of a thing cognised, the cognition of the
sense of texts, moreover, forms an indispensable prerequisite; for
knowledge of Brahman--the object of meditation--cannot originate from
any other source.--Nor can it be said that that knowledge on which
meditation is based is produced by one set of texts, while that
knowledge which puts an end to the world is produced by such texts as
'thou art that,' and the like. For, we ask, has the former knowledge the
same object as the latter, or a different one? On the former alternative
we are led to the same vicious reciprocal dependence which we noted
above; and on the latter alternative it cannot be shown that meditation
gives rise to eagerness with regard to the latter kind of knowledge.
Moreover, as meditation presupposes plurality comprising an object of
meditation, a meditating subject and so on, it really cannot in any
perceptible way be helpful towards the origination of the comprehension
of the sense of texts, the object of which is the oneness of a Brahman
free from all plurality: he, therefore, who maintains that Nescience
comes to an end through the mere comprehension of the meaning of texts
really implies that the injunctions of hearing, reflection, and
meditation are purposeless.

The conclusion that, since direct knowledge cannot spring from texts,
Nescience is not terminated by the comprehension of the meaning of texts,
disposes at the same time of the hypothesis of the so-called 'Release in
this life' (jivanmukti). For what definition, we ask, can be given of
this 'Release in this life'?--'Release of a soul while yet joined to a
body'!--You might as well say, we reply, that your mother never had any
children! You have yourself proved by scriptural passages that 'bondage'
means the being joined to a body, and 'release' being free from a body!--
Let us then define jivanmukti as the cessation of embodiedness, in that
sense that a person, while the appearance of embodiedness persists, is
conscious of the unreality of that appearance.--But, we rejoin, if the
consciousness of the unreality of the body puts an end to embodiedness,
how can you say that jivanmukti means release of a soul while joined to
a body? On this explanation there remains no difference whatsoever
between 'Release in this life' and Release after death; for the latter
also can only be defined as cessation of the false appearance of
embodiedness.--Let us then say that a person is 'jivanmukta' when the
appearance of embodiedness, although sublated by true knowledge, yet
persists in the same way as the appearance of the moon being double
persists (even after it has been recognised as false).--This too we
cannot allow. As the sublating act of cognition on which Release depends
extends to everything with the exception of Brahman, it sublates the
general defect due to causal Nescience, inclusive of the particular
erroneous appearance of embodiedness: the latter being sublated in this
way cannot persist. In the case of the double moon, on the other hand,
the defect of vision on which the erroneous appearance depends is _not_
the object of the sublative art of cognition, i.e. the cognition of the
oneness of the moon, and it therefore remains non-sublated; hence the
false appearance of a double moon may persist.--Moreover, the text 'For
him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body; then
he will be released' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2), teaches that he who takes his
stand on the knowledge of the Real requires for his Release the putting
off of the body only: the text thus negatives jivanmukti. Apastamba also
rejects the view of jivanmukti, 'Abandoning the Vedas, this world and
the next, he (the Samnyasin) is to seek the Self. (Some say that) he
obtains salvation when he knows (the Self). This opinion is contradicted
by the sastras. (For) if Salvation were obtained when the Self is known,
he should not feel any pain even in this world. Hereby that which
follows is explained' (Dh. Su. II, 9, 13-17).--This refutes also the
view that Release is obtained through mere knowledge.--The conclusion to
be drawn from all this is that Release, which consists in the cessation
of all Plurality, cannot take place as long as a man lives. And we
therefore adhere to our view that Bondage is to be terminated only by
means of the injunctions of meditation, the result of which is direct
knowledge of Brahman. Nor must this be objected to on the ground that
Release, if brought about by injunctions, must therefore be something
non-eternal; for what is effected is not Release itself, but only the
cessation of what impedes it. Moreover, the injunction does not directly
produce the cessation of Bondage, but only through the mediation of the
direct cognition of Brahman as consisting of pure knowledge, and not
connected with a world. It is this knowledge only which the injunction
produces.--But how can an injunction cause the origination of knowledge?--
How, we ask in return, can, on your view, works not aiming at some
immediate result cause the origination of knowledge?--You will perhaps
reply 'by means of purifying the mind' (manas); but this reply may be
given by me also.--But (the objector resumes) there is a difference. On
my view Scripture produces knowledge in the mind purified by works;
while on your view we must assume that in the purified mind the means of
knowledge are produced by injunction.--The mind itself, we reply,
purified by knowledge, constitutes this means.--How do you know this?
our opponent questions.--How, we ask in return, do you know that the
mind is purified by works, and that, in the mind so purified of a person
withdrawn from all other objects by hearing, reflection and meditation,
Scripture produces that knowledge which destroys bondage?--Through
certain texts such as the following: 'They seek to know him by sacrifice,
by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); 'He is to be
heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5); 'He
knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9).--Well, we reply,
in the same way our view--viz. that through the injunction of meditation
the mind is cleared, and that a clear mind gives rise to direct
knowledge of Brahman--is confirmed by scriptural texts such as 'He is to
be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated on' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5);
'He who knows Brahman reaches the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1, 1); 'He is
not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8); 'But by a
pure mind' (?); 'He is apprehended by the heart, by wisdom, by the mind'
(Ka. Up. II, 6, 9). Nor can it be said that the text 'not that which
they meditate upon as this' (Ke. Up. I, 4) negatives meditation; it does
not forbid meditation on Brahman, but merely declares that Brahman is
different from the world. The mantra is to be explained as follows:
'What men meditate upon as this world, that is not Brahman; know Brahman
to be that which is not uttered by speech, but through which speech is
uttered.' On a different explanation the clause 'know that to be
Brahman' would be irrational, and the injunctions of meditation on the
Self would--be meaningless.--The outcome of all this is that unreal
Bondage which appears in the form of a plurality of knowing subjects,
objects of knowledge, &c., is put an end to by the injunctions of
meditation, the fruit of which is direct intuitive knowledge of Brahman.

Nor can we approve of the doctrine held by some that there is no
contradiction between difference and non-difference; for difference and
non-difference cannot co-exist in one thing, any more than coldness and
heat, or light and darkness.--Let us first hear in detail what the
holder of this so-called bhedabheda view has to say. The whole universe
of things must be ordered in agreement with our cognitions. Now we are
conscious of all things as different and non-different at the same time:
they are non-different in their causal and generic aspects, and
different in so far as viewed as effects and individuals. There indeed
is a contradiction between light and darkness and so on; for these
cannot possibly exist together, and they are actually met with in
different abodes. Such contradictoriness is not, on the other hand,
observed in the case of cause and effect, and genus and individual; on
the contrary we here distinctly apprehend one thing as having two
aspects--'this jar is clay', 'this cow is short-horned.' The fact is
that experience does not show us anything that has one aspect only. Nor
can it be said that in these cases there is absence of contradiction
because as fire consumes grass so non-difference absorbs difference; for
the same thing which exists as clay, or gold, or cow, or horse, &c., at
the same time exists as jar or diadem, or short-horned cow or mare.
There is no command of the Lord to the effect that one aspect only
should belong to each thing, non-difference to what is non-different,
and difference to what is different.--But one aspect only belongs to
each thing, because it is thus that things are perceived!--On the
contrary, we reply, things have twofold aspects, just because it is _thus_
that they are perceived. No man, however wide he may open his eyes, is
able to distinguish in an object--e.g. a jar or a cow--placed before him
which part is the clay and which the jar, or which part is the generic
character of the cow and which the individual cow. On the contrary, his
thought finds its true expression in the following judgments: 'this jar
is clay'; 'this cow is short-horned.' Nor can it be maintained that he
makes a distinction between the cause and genus as objects of the idea
of persistence, and the effect and individual as objects of the idea of
discontinuance (difference); for as a matter of fact there is no
perception of these two elements in separation. A man may look ever so
close at a thing placed before him, he--will not be able to perceive a
difference of aspect and to point out 'this is the persisting, general,
element in the thing, and that the non-persistent, individual, element.'
Just as an effect and an individual give rise to the idea of one thing,
so the effect plus cause, and the individual _plus_ generic character,
also give rise to the idea of one thing only. This very circumstance
makes it possible for us to recognise each individual thing, placed as
it is among a multitude of things differing in place, time, and
character.--Each thing thus being cognised as endowed with a twofold
aspect, the theory of cause and effect, and generic character and
individual, being absolutely different, is clearly refuted by perception.

But, an objection is raised, if on account of grammatical co-ordination
and the resulting idea of oneness, the judgment 'this pot is clay' is
taken to express the relation of difference, _plus_ non-difference, we
shall have analogously to infer from judgments such as 'I am a man', 'I
am a divine being' that the Self and the body also stand in the
bhedabheda-relation; the theory of the co-existence of difference and
non-difference will thus act like a fire which a man has lit on his
hearth, and which in the end consumes the entire house!--This, we reply,
is the baseless idea of a person who has not duly considered the true
nature of co-ordination as establishing the bhedabheda-relation. The
correct principle is that all reality is determined by states of
consciousness not sublated by valid means of proof. The imagination,
however, of the identity of the Self and the body is sublated by all the
means of proof which apply to the Self: it is in fact no more valid than
the imagination of the snake in the rope, and does not therefore prove
the non-difference of the two. The co-ordination, on the other hand,
which is expressed in the judgment 'the cow is short-horned' is never
observed to be refuted in any way, and hence establishes the bhedabheda-
relation.

For the same reasons the individual soul (jiva) is not absolutely
different from Brahman, but stands to it in the bhedabheda-relation in
so far as it is a part (amsa) of Brahman. Its non-difference from
Brahman is essential (svabhavika); its difference is due to limiting
adjuncts (aupadhika). This we know, in the first place, from those
scriptural texts which declare non-difference--such as 'Thou art that'
(Ch. Up. VI); 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 7, 23);
'This Self is Brahman' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19); and the passage from the
Brahmasukta in the Samhitopanishad of the Atharvanas which, after having
said that Brahman is Heaven and Earth, continues, 'The fishermen are
Brahman, the slaves are Brahman, Brahman are these gamblers; man and
woman are born from Brahman; women are Brahman and so are men.' And, in
the second place, from those texts which declare difference: 'He who,
one, eternal, intelligent, fulfils the desires of many non-eternal
intelligent beings' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 13); 'There are two unborn, one
knowing, the other not-knowing; one strong, the other weak' (Svet. Up. I,
9); 'Being the cause of their connexion with him, through the qualities
of action and the qualities of the Self, he is seen as another' (Svet.
Up. V, 12); 'The Lord of nature and the souls, the ruler of the
qualities, the cause of the bondage, the existence and the release of
the samsara' (Svet. Up. VI, 16); 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords
of the organs' (Svet. Up. VI, 9); 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit,
without eating the other looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'He who dwelling
in the Self (Bri. Up. III, 7, 22); 'Embraced by the intelligent Self he
knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
21); 'Mounted by the intelligent Self he goes groaning' (Bri. Up. IV, 3,
35); 'Having known him he passes beyond death' (Svet. Up. III, 8).--On
the ground of these two sets of passages the individual and the highest
Self must needs be assumed to stand in the bhedabheda-relation. And
texts such as 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9),
which teach that in the state of Release the individual soul enters into
Brahman itself; and again texts such as 'But when the Self has become
all for him, whereby should he see another' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 13), which
forbid us to view, in the state of Release, the Lord as something
different (from the individual soul), show that non-difference is
essential (while difference is merely aupadhika).

But, an objection is raised, the text 'He reaches all desires together
in the wise Brahman,' in using the word 'together' shows that even in
the state of Release the soul is different from Brahman, and the same
view is expressed in two of the Sutras, viz. IV, 4, 17; 21.--This is not
so, we reply; for the text, 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up.
III, 7, 23), and many similar texts distinctly negative all plurality in
the Self. The Taittiriya-text quoted by you means that man reaches
Brahman with all desires, i.e. Brahman comprising within itself all
objects of desire; if it were understood differently, it would follow
that Brahman holds a subordinate position only. And if the Sutra IV, 4,
17 meant that the released soul is separate from Brahman it would follow
that it is deficient in lordly power; and if this were so the Sutra
would be in conflict with other Sutras such as IV, 4, 1.--For these
reasons, non-difference is the essential condition; while the
distinction of the souls from Brahman and from each other is due to
their limiting adjuncts, i.e. the internal organ, the sense-organs, and
the body. Brahman indeed is without parts and omnipresent; but through
its adjuncts it becomes capable of division just as ether is divided by
jars and the like. Nor must it be said that this leads to a
reprehensible mutual dependence--Brahman in so far as divided entering
into conjunction with its adjuncts, and again the division in Brahman
being caused by its conjunction with its adjuncts; for these adjuncts
and Brahman's connexion with them are due to action (karman), and the
stream of action is without a beginning. The limiting adjuncts to which
a soul is joined spring from the soul as connected with previous works,
and work again springs from the soul as joined to its adjuncts: and as
this connexion with works and adjuncts is without a beginning in time,
no fault can be found with our theory.--The non-difference of the souls
from each other and Brahman is thus essential, while their difference is
due to the Upadhis. These Upadhis, on the other hand, are at the same
time essentially non-distinct and essentially distinct from each other
and Brahman; for there are no other Upadhis (to account for their
distinction if non-essential), and if we admitted such, we should again
have to assume further Upadhis, and so on _in infinitum_. We therefore
hold that the Upadhis are produced, in accordance with the actions of
the individual souls, as essentially non-different and different from Brahman.

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