8. Should it be said that there is attainment of fruition (of pleasure
and pain); we reply, not so, on account of difference.
But, if the highest Brahman is assumed to dwell within bodies, like the
individual soul, it follows that, like the latter, it is subject to the
experience of pleasure and pain, such experience springing from
connexion with bodies!--Of this objection the Sutra disposes by
remarking 'not so, on account of difference (of reason).' For what is
the cause of experiences, pleasurable or painful, is not the mere
dwelling within a body, but rather the subjection to the influence of
good and evil deeds; and such subjection is impossible in the case of
the highest Self to which all evil is foreign. Compare the scriptural
text 'One of the two eats the sweet fruit, the other one looks on
without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).--Here finishes the adhikarana of
'what is known everywhere.'
Well then, if the highest Self is not an enjoyer, we must conclude that
wherever fruition is referred to, the embodied soul only is meant!--Of
this view the next adhikarana disposes.
9. The eater (is the highest Self) on account of there being taken all
that is movable and immovable.
We read in the Kathavalli (I, 3, 25), 'Who then knows where he is to
whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a
condiment?' A doubt here arises whether the 'eater', suggested by the
words 'food' and 'condiment,' is the individual soul or the highest Self.--
The individual soul, the Purvapakshin maintains; for all enjoyment
presupposes works, and works belong to the individual soul only.--Of
this view the Sutra disposes. The 'eater' can be the highest Self only,
because the taking, i. e. eating, of the whole aggregate of movable and
immovable things can be predicated of that Self only. 'Eating' does not
here mean fruition dependent on work, but rather the act of reabsorption
of the world on the part of the highest Brahman, i. e. Vishnu, who is
the cause of the origination, subsistence, and final destruction of the
universe. This appears from the fact that Vishnu is mentioned in the
same section, 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the
highest place of Vishnu' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 9). Moreover the clause 'to whom
death is a condiment' shows that by the Brahmans and Kshattriyas,
mentioned in the text, we have to understand the whole universe of
moving and non-moving things, viewed as things to be consumed by the
highest Self. For a condiment is a thing which, while itself being eaten,
causes other things to be eaten; the meaning of the passage, therefore,
is that while death itself is consumed, being a condiment as it were,
there is at the same time eaten whatever is flavoured or made palatable
by death, and that is the entire world of beings in which the Brahmans
and Kshattriyas hold the foremost place. Now such eating of course is
destruction or reabsorption, and hence such enjoyment--meaning general
reabsorption--can belong to the highest Self only.
10. And on account of the topic of the whole section.
Moreover the highest Brahman constitutes the topic of the entire section.
Cp. 'The wise who knows the Self as great and omnipresent does not
grieve' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 22); 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor
by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him
the Self can be gained; the Self chooses him as his own' (I, 2, 23).--
Moreover, the clause (forming part of the text under discussion),'Who
knows him (i.e. the being which constitutes the topic of the section)
where he is?' clearly shows that we have to recognise here the Self of
which it had previously been said that it is hard to know unless it
assists us with its grace.
To this conclusion a new objection presents itself.--Further on in the
same Upanishad (I, 3, 1) we meet with the following text: 'There are two,
drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the
cave, dwelling on the highest summit; those who know Brahman call them
shade and light, likewise those householders who perform the Trinakiketa-
sacrifice.' Now this text clearly refers to the individual soul which
enjoys the reward of its works, together with an associate coupled to it.
And this associate is either the vital breath, or the organ of knowledge
(buddhi). For the drinking of 'rita' is the enjoyment of the fruit of
works, and such enjoyment does not suit the highest Self. The buddhi, or
the vital breath, on the other hand, which are instruments of the
enjoying embodied soul, may somehow be brought into connexion with the
enjoyment of the fruit of works. As the text is thus seen to refer to
the embodied soul coupled with some associate, we infer, on the ground
of the two texts belonging to one section, that also the 'eater'
described in the former text is none other than the individual soul.--To
this objection the next Sutra replies.
11. The 'two entered into the cave' are the two Selfs; on account of
this being seen.
The two, entered into the cave and drinking their reward, are neither
the embodied soul together with the vital breath, nor the embodied soul
together with the buddhi; it is rather the embodied Self and the highest
Self which are designated by those terms. For this is seen, i.e. it is
seen that in that section the individual Self and the highest Self only
are spoken of as entered into the cave. To the highest Self there refers
I, 2, 12, 'The wise who by meditation on his Self recognises the Ancient
who is difficult to see, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in
the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and
sorrow far behind.' And to the individual soul there refers I, 4, 7,
'Who is together with the vital breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the
deities, who entering into the cave abides therein, who was born
variously through the elements.' Aditi here means the individual soul
which enjoys (atti) the fruits of its works; which is associated with
the vital breath; which is made of the deities, i.e. whose enjoyment is
dependent on the different sense-organs; which abides in the hollow of
the heart; and which, being connected with the elementary substances,
earth, and so on, is born in various forms--human, divine, &c.--That the
text speaks of the two Selfs as drinking their reward (while actually
the individual soul only does so) is to be understood in the same way as
the phrase 'there go the umbrella-bearers' (one of whom only carries the
umbrella). Or else we may account for this on the ground that both are
agents with regard to the drinking, in so far as the 'drinking'
individual soul is caused to drink by the highest Self.
12. And on account of distinctive qualities.
Everywhere in that section we meet with statements of distinctive
attributes of the two Selfs, the highest Self being represented as the
object of meditation and attainment, and the individual Self as the
meditating and attaining subject. The passage 'When he has known and
understood that which is born from Brahman, the intelligent, to be
divine and venerable, then he obtains everlasting peace' (I, 1, 17)
refers to the meditating individual soul which recognises itself as
being of the nature of Brahman. On the other hand, I, 3, 2, 'That which
is a bridge for sacrificers, the highest imperishable Brahman for those
who wish to cross over to the fearless shore, the Nakiketa, may we be
able to know that,' refers to the highest Self as the object of
meditation; 'Nakiketa' here meaning that which is to be reached through
the Nakiketa-rite. Again, the passage 'Know the Self to be sitting in
the chariot and the body to be the chariot' (I, 3, 3) refers to the
meditating individual soul; and the verse, I, 3, 9, 'But he who has
understanding for his charioteer, and holds the reins of the mind, he
reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vishnu.'
refers to the embodied and the highest Selfs as that which attains and
that which is to be attained. And in the text under discussion also (I,
3, 1), the two Selfs are distinctly designated as light and shade, the
one being all-knowing, the other devoid of knowledge.
But, a new objection is raised, the initial passage, I, 1, 20, 'That
doubt which there is when a man is dead--some saying, he is; others, he
is not,' clearly asks a question as to the true nature of the individual
soul, and we hence conclude that that soul forms the topic of the whole
chapter.--Not so, we reply. That question does not spring from any doubt
as to the existence or non-existence of the soul apart from the body;
for if this were so the two first boons chosen by Nakiketas would be
unsuitable. For the story runs as follows: When the sacrifice offered by
the father of Nakiketas--at which all the possessions of the sacrificer
were to be given to the priests--is drawing towards its close, the boy,
feeling afraid that some deficiency on the part of the gifts might
render the sacrifice unavailing, and dutifully wishing to render his
father's sacrifice complete by giving his own person also, repeatedly
asks his father, 'And to whom will you give me'? The father, irritated
by the boy's persistent questioning, gives an angry reply, and in
consequence of this the boy goes to the palace of Yama, and Yama being
absent, stays there for three days without eating. Yama on his return is
alarmed at this neglect of hospitality, and wishing to make up for it
allows him to choose three boons. Nakiketas, thereupon, full of faith
and piety, chooses as his first boon that his father should forgive him.
Now it is clear that conduct of this kind would not be possible in the
case of one not convinced of the soul having an existence independent of
the body. For his second boon, again, he chooses the knowledge of a
sacrificial fire, which has a result to be experienced only by a soul
that has departed from the body; and this choice also can clearly be
made only by one who knows that the soul is something different from the
body. When, therefore, he chooses for his third boon the clearing up of
his doubt as to the existence of the soul after death (as stated in v.
20), it is evident that his question is prompted by the desire to
acquire knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self--which
knowledge has the form of meditation on the highest Self--, and by means
thereof, knowledge of the true nature of final Release which consists in
obtaining the highest Brahman. The passage, therefore, is not concerned
merely with the problem as to the separation of the soul from the body,
but rather with the problem of the Self freeing itself from all bondage
whatever--the same problem, in fact, with which another scriptural
passage also is concerned, viz. 'When he has departed there is no more
knowledge' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 12). The full purport of Nakiketas' question,
therefore, is as follows: When a man qualified for Release has died and
thus freed himself from all bondage, there arises a doubt as to his
existence or non-existence--a doubt due to the disagreement of
philosophers as to the true nature of Release; in order to clear up this
doubt I wish to learn from thee the true nature of the state of Release.--
Philosophers, indeed, hold many widely differing opinions as to what
constitutes Release. Some hold that the Self is constituted by
consciousness only, and that Release consists in the total destruction
of this essential nature of the Self. Others, while holding the same
opinion as to the nature of the Self, define Release as the passing away
of Nescience (avidya). Others hold that the Self is in itself non-
sentient, like a stone, but possesses, in the state of bondage, certain
distinctive qualities, such as knowledge, and so on. Release then
consists in the total removal of all these qualities, the Self remaining
in a state of pure isolation (kaivalya). Others, again, who acknowledge
a highest Self free from all imperfection, maintain that through
connexion with limiting adjuncts that Self enters on the condition of an
individual soul; Release then means the pure existence of the highest
Self, consequent on the passing away of the limiting adjuncts. Those,
however, who understand the Vedanta, teach as follows: There is a
highest Brahman which is the sole cause of the entire universe, which is
antagonistic to all evil, whose essential nature is infinite knowledge
and blessedness, which comprises within itself numberless auspicious
qualities of supreme excellence, which is different in nature from all
other beings, and which constitutes the inner Self of all. Of this
Brahman, the individual souls--whose true nature is unlimited knowledge,
and whose only essential attribute is the intuition of the supreme Self--
are modes, in so far, namely, as they constitute its body. The true
nature of these souls is, however, obscured by Nescience, i.e. the
influence of the beginningless chain of works; and by _Release_ then we
have to understand that intuition of the highest Self, which is the
natural state of the individual souls, and which follows on the
destruction of Nescience.--When Nakiketas desires Yama graciously to
teach him the true nature of Release and the means to attain it, Yama at
first tests him by dwelling on the difficulty of comprehending Release,
and by tempting him with various worldly enjoyments. But having in this
way recognised the boy's thorough fitness, he in the end instructs him
as to the kind of meditation on the highest Self which constitutes
knowledge of the highest Reality, as to the nature of Release--which
consists in reaching the abode of the highest Self--, and as to all the
required details. This instruction begins, I, 2, 12, 'The Ancient one
who is difficult to see,' &c., and extends up to I, 3, 9. 'and that is
the highest place of Vishnu.'--It thus is an established conclusion that
the 'eater' is no other than the highest Self.--Here terminates the
adhikarana of 'the eater.'
13. (The Person) within the eye (is the highest Self) on account of
suitability.
The Chandogas have the following text: 'The Person that is seen within
the eye, that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is
Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1). The doubt here arises whether the person
that is here spoken of as abiding within the eye is the reflected Self,
or some divine being presiding over the sense of sight, or the embodied
Self, or the highest Self.--It is the reflected Self, the Purvapakshin
maintains; for the text refers to the person seen as something well
known, and the expression, 'is seen,' clearly refers to something
directly perceived. Or it may be the individual soul, for that also may
be referred to as something well known, as it is in special connexion
with the eye: people, by looking into the open eye of a person,
determine whether the living soul remains in him or is departing. Or
else we may assume that the Person seen within the eye is some
particular divine being, on the strength of the scriptural text, Bri. Up.
V, 5, 2, 'He (the person seen within the sun) rests with his rays in him
(the person within the eye).' Any of these beings may quite suitably be
referred to as something well known.--Of these alternatives the Sutra
disposes by declaring that the Person within the eye is the highest Self.
For the text goes on to say about the Person seen within the eye, 'They
call him Samyadvama, for all blessings go towards him. He is also Vamani,
for he leads all blessings. He is also Bhamani, for he shines in all
worlds.' And all these attributes can be reconciled with the highest
Self only.
14. And on account of the statement as to abode, and so on.
Abiding within the eye, ruling the eye, and so on are predicated by
scripture of the highest Self only, viz. in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18, 'He who
dwells within the eye, who rules the eye within.' We therefore recognise
that highest Self in the text, 'That Person which is seen within the eye.'
The argument founded on reference to 'something well known' thus suits
the highest Self very well; and also the clause which denotes immediate
perception ('is seen') appears quite suitable, since the highest Self is
directly intuited by persons practising mystic concentration of mind
(Yoga).
15. And on account of the text referring only to what is characterised
by pleasure.
The Person abiding within the eye is the highest Person, for the
following reason also. The topic of the whole section is Brahman
characterised by delight, as indicated in the passage 'Ka (pleasure) is
Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' (Ch. Up. IV,10, 5). To that same Brahman
the passage under discussion ('The Person that is seen in the eye')
refers for the purpose of enjoining first a place with which Brahman is
to be connected in meditation, and secondly some special qualities--such
as comprising and leading all blessings--to be attributed to Brahman in
meditation.--The word 'only' in the Sutra indicates the independence of
the argument set forth.
But--an objection is raised--between the Brahman introduced in the
passage 'Ka is Brahman,'&c., and the text under discussion there
intervenes the vidya of the Fires (Ch. Up. IV, 11-13), and hence Brahman
does not readily connect itself with our passage. For the text says that
after the Fires had taught Upakosala the knowledge of Brahman ('Breath
is Brahman, Ka is Brahman,' &c.), they taught him a meditation on
themselves ('After that the Garhapatya fire taught him,' &c., Ch. Up.
IV, 11, 1). And this knowledge of the Fires cannot be considered a mere
subordinate part of the knowledge of Brahman, for the text declares that
it has special fruits of its own--viz. the attainment of a ripe old age
and prosperous descendants, &c.--which are not comprised in the results
of the knowledge of Brahman, but rather opposed to them in nature.--To
this we make the following reply. As both passages (viz. IV, 10, 5,
'Breath is Brahman,' &c.; and IV, 15, 1, 'this is Brahman') contain the
word Brahman, and as from the words of the Fires, 'the teacher will tell
you the way,' it follows that the knowledge of Brahman is not complete
before that way has been taught, we determine that the knowledge of the
Fires which stands between the two sections of the knowledge of Brahman
is a mere subordinate member of the latter. This also appears from the
fact that the Garhapatya fire begins to instruct Upakosala only after he
has been introduced into the knowledge of Brahman. Upakosala moreover
complains that he is full of sorrows (I, 10, 3), and thus shows himself
to be conscious of all the sufferings incidental to human life-birth,
old age, death, &c.--which result from man being troubled by manifold
desires for objects other than the attainment of Brahman; when therefore
the Fires conclude their instruction by combining in saying, 'This, O
friend, is the knowledge of us and the knowledge of the Self which we
impart to thee,' it is evident that the vidya of the Fires has to be
taken as a subordinate member of the knowledge of the Self whose only
fruit is Release. And from this it follows that the statement of the
results of the Agnividya has to be taken (not as an injunction of
results-phalavidhi--but) merely as an arthavada (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 3,
1). It, moreover, is by no means true that the text mentions such fruits
of the Agnividya as would be opposed to final Release; all the fruits
mentioned suit very well the case of a person qualified for Release. 'He
destroys sin' (Ch. Up. IV, 11, 2; 12, 2; 13, 2), i.e. he destroys all
evil works standing in the way of the attainment of Brahman. 'He obtains
the world,' i. e. all impeding evil works having been destroyed he
obtains the world of Brahman. 'He reaches his full age,' i.e. he fully
reaches that age which is required for the completion of meditation on
Brahman. 'He lives long,' i.e. he lives unassailed by afflictions until
he reaches Brahman. 'His descendants do not perish,' i.e. his pupils,
and their pupils, as well as his sons, grandsons, &c., do not perish; i.
e. they are all knowers of Brahman, in agreement with what another text
declares to be the reward of knowledge of Brahman--'In his family no one
is born ignorant of Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). 'We guard him in this
world and the other,' i.e. we Fires guard him from all troubles until he
reaches Brahman.--The Agnividya thus being a member of the Brahmavidya,
there is no reason why the Brahman introduced in the earlier part of the
Brahmavidya should not be connected with the latter part--the function
of this latter part being to enjoin a place of meditation (Brahman being
meditated on as the Person within the eye), and some special qualities
of Brahman to be included in the meditation.--But (an objection is
raised) as the Fires tell Upakosala 'the teacher will tell you the way,'
we conclude that the teacher has to give information as to the way to
Brahman only; how then can his teaching refer to the place of meditation
and the special qualities of Brahman?--We have to consider, we reply, in
what connexion the Fires address those words to Upakosala. His teacher
having gone on a journey without having imparted to him the knowledge of
Brahman, and Upakosala being dejected on that account, the sacred fires
of his teacher, well pleased with the way in which Upakosala had tended
them, and wishing to cheer him up, impart to him the general knowledge
of the nature of Brahman and the subsidiary knowledge of the Fires. But
remembering that, as scripture says, 'the knowledge acquired from a
teacher is best,' and hence considering it advisable that the teacher
himself should instruct Upakosala as to the attributes of the highest
Brahman, the place with which it is to be connected in meditation and
the way leading to it, they tell him 'the teacher will tell you the way,'
the 'way' connoting everything that remains to be taught by the
teacher. In agreement herewith the teacher--having first said, 'I will
tell you this; and as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil
clings to one who knows it'--instructs him about Brahman as possessing
certain auspicious attributes, and to be meditated upon as abiding
within the eye, and about the way leading to Brahman.--It is thus a
settled conclusion that the text under discussion refers to that Brahman
which was introduced in the passage 'Ka is Brahman,' and that hence the
Person abiding within the eye is the highest Self.
But--an objection is raised--how do you know that the passage 'Ka
(pleasure) is Brahman, Kha (ether) is Brahman' really refers to the
highest Brahman, so as to be able to interpret on that basis the text
about the Person within the eye? It is a more obvious interpretation to
take the passage about Ka and Kha as enjoining a meditation on Brahman
viewed under the form of elemental ether and of ordinary worldly
pleasure. This interpretation would, moreover, be in agreement with
other similarly worded texts (which are generally understood to enjoin
meditation on Brahman in a definite form), such as 'Name is Brahman',
'Mind is Brahman.'
16. For that very reason that (ether) is Brahman.
Because the clause 'What is Ka the same is Kha' speaks of ether as
characterised by pleasure, the ether which is denoted by 'Kha' is no
other than the highest Brahman. To explain. On the Fires declaring
'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upakosala says, 'I
understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand Ka and Kha.'
The meaning of this is as follows. The Fires cannot speak of meditation
on Brahman under the form of breath and so on, because they are engaged
in giving instruction to me, who am afraid of birth, old age, death, &c.,
and desirous of final Release. What they declare to me therefore is
meditation on Brahman itself. Now here Brahman is exhibited in co-
ordination with certain well-known things, breath and so on. That
Brahman should be qualified by co-ordination with breath is suitable,
either from the point of view of Brahman having the attribute of
supporting the world, or on account of Brahman being the ruler of breath,
which stands to it in the relation of a body. Hence Upakosala says, 'I
understand that breath is Brahman.' With regard to pleasure and ether,
on the other hand, there arises the question whether they are exhibited
in the relation of qualifying attributes of Brahman on the ground of
their forming the body of Brahman, and hence being ruled by it, or
whether the two terms are meant to determine each other, and thus to
convey a notion of the true nature of Brahman being constituted by
supreme delight. On the former alternative the declaration of the Fires
would only state that Brahman is the ruler of the elemental ether and of
all delight depending on the sense-organs, and this would give no notion
of Brahman's true nature; on the latter alternative the Fires would
declare that unlimited delight constitutes Brahman's true nature. In
order to ascertain which of the two meanings has to be taken, Upakosala
therefore says, 'I do not understand Ka and Kha.' The Fires,
comprehending what is in his mind, thereupon reply, 'What is Ka the same
is Kha, what is Kha the same is Ka,' which means that the bliss which
constitutes Brahman's nature is unlimited. The same Brahman therefore
which has breath for its attribute because breath constitutes its body,
is of the nature of unlimited bliss; the text therefore adds, 'They
taught him that (viz. Brahman) as breath and as ether.' What the text,
'Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' teaches thus is Brahman as consisting
of unlimited bliss, and this Brahman is resumed in the subsequent text
about the Person seen within the eye. That Person therefore is the
highest Self.
17. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the
Upanishads.
Other scriptural texts give an account of the way--the first station of
which is light--that leads up to the highest Person, without any
subsequent return, the soul of him who has read the Upanishads, and has
thus acquired a knowledge of the true nature of the highest Self. Now
this same way is described by the teacher to Upakosala in connexion with
the instruction as to the Person in the eye, 'They go to light, from
light to day,' &c. This also proves that the Person within the eye is
the highest Self.
18. Not any other, on account of non-permanency of abode, and of
impossibility.
As the reflected Self and the other Selfs mentioned by the Purvapakshin
do not necessarily abide within the eye, and as conditionless
immortality and the other qualities (ascribed in the text to the Person
within the eye) cannot possibly belong to them, the Person within the
eye cannot be any Self other than the highest Self. Of the reflected
Self it cannot be said that it permanently abides within the eye, for
its presence there depends on the nearness to the eye of another person.
The embodied Self again has its seat within the heart, which is the root
of all sense-organs, so as to assist thereby the activities of the
different senses; it cannot therefore abide within the eye. And with
regard to the divinity the text says that 'he rests with his rays in him,
i.e. the eye': this implies that the divine being may preside over the
organ of sight although itself abiding in another place; it does not
therefore abide in the eye. Moreover, non-conditioned immortality and
similar qualities cannot belong to any of these three Selfs. The Person
seen within the eye therefore is the highest Self.
We have, under Su. I, 2, 14, assumed as proved that the abiding within
the eye and ruling the eye, which is referred to in Bri. Up. III, 7, 18
('He who dwells in the eye,' &c.), can belong to the highest Self only,
and have on that basis proved that the Self within the eye is the
highest Self.--Here terminates the adhikarana of that 'within.'--The
next Sutra now proceeds to prove that assumption.
19. The internal Ruler (referred to) in the clauses with respect to the
gods, with respect to the worlds, &c. (is the highest Self), because the
attributes of that are designated.
The Vajasaneyins, of the Kanwa as well as the Madhyandina branch, have
the following text: 'He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth,
whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the
earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the Immortal.' The text
thereupon extends this teaching as to a being that dwells in things, is
within them, is not known by them, has them for its body and rules them;
in the first place to all divine beings, viz. water, fire, sky, air, sun,
the regions, moon, stars, ether, darkness, light; and next to all
material beings, viz. breath, speech, eye, ear, mind, skin, knowledge,
seed--closing each section with the words, 'He is thy Self, the ruler
within, the Immortal.' The Madhyandinas, however, have three additional
sections, viz. 'He who dwells in all worlds,' &c.; 'he who dwells in all
Vedas,' &c.; 'He who dwells in all sacrifices'; and, moreover, in place
of 'He who dwells in knowledge' (vijnana) they read 'He who dwells in
the Self.'--A doubt here arises whether the inward Ruler of these texts
be the individual Self or the highest Self.
The individual Self, the Purvapakshin maintains. For in the
supplementary passage (which follows upon the text considered so far)
the internal Ruler is called the 'seer' and 'hearer,' i.e. his knowledge
is said to depend on the sense-organs, and this implies the view that
the 'seer' only (i.e. the individual soul only) is the inward Ruler; and
further the clause 'There is no other seer but he' negatives any other
seer.
This view is set aside by the Sutra. The Ruler within, who is spoken of
in the clauses marked in the text by the terms 'with respect of the gods,'
'with respect of the worlds,' &c., is the highest Self free from all
evil, Narayana. The Sutra purposely joins the two terms 'with respect to
the gods' and 'with respect to the worlds' in order to intimate that, in
addition to the clauses referring to the gods and beings (bhuta)
exhibited by the Kanva-text, the Madhyandina-text contains additional
clauses referring to the worlds, Vedas, &c. The inward Ruler spoken of
in both these sets of passages is the highest Self; for attributes of
that Self are declared in the text. For it is a clear attribute of the
highest Self that being one only it rules all worlds, all Vedas, all
divine beings, and so on. Uddalaka asks, 'Dost thou know that Ruler
within who within rules this world and the other world and all beings?
& c.--tell now that Ruler within'; and Yajnavalkya replies with the long
passus, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c., describing the Ruler within
as him who, abiding within all worlds, all beings, all divinities, all
Vedas, and all sacrifices, rules them from within and constitutes their
Self, they in turn constituting his body. Now this is a position which
can belong to none else but the highest Person, who is all-knowing, and
all whose purposes immediately realise themselves. That it is the
highest Self only which rules over all and is the Self of all, other
Upanishad-texts also declare; cp. e.g. 'Entered within, the ruler of
creatures, the Self of all'; 'Having sent forth this he entered into it.
Having entered it he became sat and tyat,' &c. (Taitt. Up. II, 6).
Similarly the text from the Subala-Up., which begins, 'there was not
anything here in the beginning,' and extends up to 'the one God,
Narayana,' shows that it is the highest Brahman only which rules all, is
the Self of all, and has all beings for its body. Moreover, essential
immortality (which the text ascribes to the Ruler within) is an
attribute of the highest Self only.--Nor must it be thought that the
power of seeing and so on that belongs to the highest Self is dependent
on sense-organs; it rather results immediately from its essential
nature, since its omniscience and power to realise its purposes are due
to its own being only. In agreement herewith scripture says, 'He sees
without eyes, he hears without ears, without hands and feet he grasps
and hastes' (Svet. Up. III, 19). What terms such as 'seeing' and
'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as produced by the
eye and ear, but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound. In the
case of the individual soul, whose essentially intelligising nature is
obscured by karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the
mediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the highest Self, on the
other hand, it springs from its own nature.--Again, the clause 'there is
no other seer but he' means that there is no seer other than the seer
and ruler described in the preceding clauses. To explain. The clauses
'whom the earth does not know,' &c., up to 'whom the Self does not know'
mean to say that the Ruler within rules without being perceived by the
earth, Self, and the other beings which he rules. This is confirmed by
the subsequent clauses, 'unseen but a seer', 'unheard but a hearer,' &c.
And the next clauses, 'there is no other seer but he,' &c., then mean to
negative that there is any other being which could be viewed as the
ruler of that Ruler. Moreover, the clauses 'that is the Self of thee,'
'He is the Self of thee' exhibit the individual Self in the genitive
form ('of thee'), and thus distinguish it from the Ruler within, who is
declared to be their Self.
20. And not that which Smriti assumes, on account of the declaration of
qualities not belonging to that; nor the embodied one.
'That which Smriti assumes' is the Pradhana; the 'embodied one' is the
individual soul. Neither of these can be the Ruler within, since the
text states attributes which cannot possibly belong to either. For there
is not even the shadow of a possibility that essential capability of
seeing and ruling all things, and being the Self of all, and immortality
should belong either to the non-sentient Pradhana or to the individual
soul.--The last two Sutras have declared that the mentioned qualities
belong to the highest Self, while they do not belong to the individual
soul. The next Sutra supplies a new, independent argument.
21. For both also speak of it as something different.
Both, i.e. the Madhyandinas as well as the Kanvas, distinguish in their
texts the embodied soul, together with speech and other non-intelligent
things, from the Ruler within, representing it as an object of his rule.
The Madhyandinas read, 'He who dwells in the Self, whom the Self does
not know,' &c.; the Kanvas, 'He who dwells within understanding', &c.
The declaration of the individual Self being ruled by the Ruler within
implies of course the declaration of the former being different from the
latter.
The conclusion from all this is that the Ruler within is a being
different from the individual soul, viz. the highest Self free from all
evil, Narayana.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the internal Ruler'.
22. That which possesses the qualities of invisibility, &c., on account
of the declaration of attributes.
The Atharvanikas read in their text, 'The higher knowledge is that by
which that Indestructible is apprehended. That which is invisible,
unseizable, without origin and qualities, &c., that it is which the wise
regard as the source of all beings'; and further on, 'That which is
higher than the high Imperishable' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5, 6; II, 1, 2). The
doubt here arises whether the Indestructible, possessing the qualities
of imperceptibility, &c., and that which is higher than the
Indestructible, should be taken to denote the Pradhana and the soul of
the Sankhyas, or whether both denote the highest Self.--The Purvapakshin
maintains the former alternative. For, he says, while in the text last
discussed there is mentioned a special attribute of an intelligent being,
viz. in the clause 'unseen but a seer', no similar attribute is stated
in the former of the two texts under discussion, and the latter text
clearly describes the collective individual soul, which is higher than
the imperishable Pradhana, which itself is higher than all its effects.
The reasons for this decision are as follows:--Colour and so on reside
in the gross forms of non-intelligent matter, viz. the elements, earth,
and so on. When, therefore, visibility and so on are expressly negatived,
such negation suggests a non-sentient thing cognate to earth, &c., but
of a subtle kind, and such a thing is no other than the Pradhana. And as
something higher than this Pradhana there are known the collective souls
only, under whose guidance the Pradhana gives birth to all its effects,
from the so-called Mahat downwards to individual things. This
interpretation is confirmed by the comparisons set forth in the next
sloka, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads, as plants
spring from the earth, as hair grows on the head and body of the living
man, thus does everything arise here from the Indestructible.' The
section therefore is concerned only with the Pradhana and the individual
soul.
This prima facie view is set aside by the Sutra. That which possesses
invisibility and the other qualities stated in the text, and that which
is higher than the high Indestructible, is no other than the highest
Self. For the text declares attributes which belong to the highest Self
only, viz. in I, 1, 9, 'He who knows all, cognises all,' &c. Let us
shortly consider the connexion of the text. The passage beginning 'the
higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended'
declares an indestructible being possessing the attributes of
invisibility and so on. The clause 'everything arises here from the
Indestructible' next declares that from that being all things originate.
Next the sloka, 'He who knows all and cognises all,' predicates of that
Indestructible which is the source of all beings, omniscience, and
similar qualities. And finally the text, 'That which is higher than the
high Indestructible,' characterises that same being--which previously
had been called invisible, the source of beings, indestructible, all-
knowing, &c.--as the highest of all. Hence it is evident that in the
text 'higher than the high Indestructible' the term 'Indestructible'
does not denote the invisible, &c. Indestructible, which is the chief
topic of the entire section; for there can of course be nothing higher
than that which, as being all-knowing, the source of all, &c., is itself
higher than anything else. The 'Indestructible' in that text therefore
denotes the elements in their subtle condition.
23. Not the two others, on account of distinction and statement of
difference.
The section distinguishes the indestructible being, which is the source
of all, &c., from the Pradhana as well as the individual soul, in so far,
namely, as it undertakes to prove that by the cognition of one thing
everything is known; and it moreover, in passages such as 'higher than
the high Indestructible,' explicitly states the difference of the
indestructible being from those other two.--The text first relates that
Brahma told the knowledge of Brahman, which is the foundation of the
knowledge of all, to his eldest son Atharvan: this introduces the
knowledge of Brahman as the topic of the section. Then, the text
proceeds, in order to obtain this knowledge of Brahman, which had been
handed down through a succession of teachers to Angiras, Saunaka
approached Angiras respectfully and asked him: 'What is that through
which, if known, all this is known?' i.e. since all knowledge is founded
on the knowledge of Brahman, he enquires after the nature of Brahman.
Angiras replies that he who wishes to attain Brahman must acquire two
kinds of knowledge, both of them having Brahman for their object: an
indirect one which springs from the study of the sastras, viz. the Veda,
Siksha, Kalpa, and so on, and a direct one which springs from
concentrated meditation (yoga). The latter kind of knowledge is the
means of obtaining Brahman, and it is of the nature of devout meditation
(bhakti), as characterised in the text 'He whom the Self chooses, by him
the Self can be gained' (III, 2, 3). The means again towards this kind
of knowledge is such knowledge as is gained from sacred tradition,
assisted by abstention and the other six auxiliary means (sec above, p.
17); in agreement with the text, 'Him the Brahmattas seek to know by the
study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting' (Bri.
Up. IV, 4, 22).--Thus the Reverend Parasara also says, 'The cause of
attaining him is knowledge and work, and knowledge is twofold, according
as it is based on sacred tradition or springs from discrimination.' The
Mundaka-text refers to the inferior kind of knowledge in the passage
'the lower knowledge is the Rig-veda,' &c., up to 'and the dharma-
sastras'; this knowledge is the means towards the intuition of Brahman;
while the higher kind of knowledge, which is called 'upasana,' has the
character of devout meditation (bhakti), and consists in direct
intuition of Brahman, is referred to in the clause 'the higher knowledge
is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' The text next
following, 'That which is invisible, &c., then sets forth the nature of
the highest Brahman, which is the object of the two kinds of knowledge
previously described. After this the passage 'As the spider sends forth
and draws in its thread' declares that from that indestructible highest
Brahman, as characterised before, there originates the whole universe of
things, sentient and non-sentient. The next soka (tapasa kiyate, &c.)
states particulars about this origination of the universe from Brahman.
'Brahman swells through brooding'; through brooding, i.e. thought--in
agreement with a later text, 'brooding consists of thought'--Brahman
swells, i.e. through thought in the form of an intention, viz. 'may I
become many,' Brahman becomes ready for creation. From it there springs
first 'anna,' i.e. that which is the object of fruition on the part of
all enjoying agents, viz. the non-evolved subtle principles of all
elements. From this 'anna' there spring successively breath, mind, and
all other effected things up to work, which is the means of producing
reward in the form of the heavenly world, and Release. The last sloka of
the first chapter thereupon first states the qualities, such as
omniscience and so on, which capacitate the highest Brahman for creation,
and then declares that from the indestructible highest Brahman there
springs the effected (karya) Brahman, distinguished by name and form,
and comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment.--The
first sloka of the second chapter declares first that the highest
Brahman is absolutely real ('That is true'), and then admonishes those
who desire to reach the indestructible highest Self, which possesses all
the blessed qualities stated before and exists through itself, to turn
away from other rewards and to perform all those sacrificial works
depending on the three sacred fires which were seen and revealed by
poets in the four Vedas and are incumbent on men according to caste and
asrama. The section 'this is your path' (I, 2, 1) up to 'this is the
holy Brahma-world gained by your good works' (I, 2, 6) next states the
particular mode of performing those works, and declares that an omission
of one of the successive works enjoined in Druti and Smriti involves
fruitlessness of the works actually performed, and that something not
performed in the proper way is as good as not performed at all. Stanzas
7 and ff. ('But frail in truth are those boats') declare that those who
perform this lower class of works have to return again and again into
the Samsara, because they aim at worldly results and are deficient in
true knowledge. Stanza 8 ('but those who practise penance and faith')
then proclaims that works performed by a man possessing true knowledge,
and hence not aiming at worldly rewards, result in the attainment of
Brahman; and stanzas 12 a, 13 ('having examined all these worlds')
enjoin knowledge, strengthened by due works, on the part of a man who
has turned away from _mere_ works, as the means of reaching Brahman; and
due recourse to a teacher on the part of him who is desirous of such
knowledge.--The first chapter of the second section of the Upanishad (II,
1)then clearly teaches how the imperishable highest Brahman, i.e. the
highest Self--as constituting the Self of all things and having all
things for its body--has all things for its outward form and emits all
things from itself. The remainder of the Upanishad ('Manifest, near,' &c.
) teaches how this highest Brahman, which is imperishable and higher
than the soul, which itself is higher than the Unevolved; which dwells
in the highest Heaven; and which is of the nature of supreme bliss, is
to be meditated upon as within the hollow of the heart; how this
meditation has the character of devout faith (bhakti); and how the
devotee, freeing himself from Nescience, obtains for his reward
intuition of Brahman, which renders him like Brahman.
It thus clearly appears that 'on account of distinction and statement of
difference' the Upanishad does not treat of the Pradhana and the soul.
For that the highest Brahman is different from those two is declared in
passages such as 'That heavenly Person is without body; he is both
without and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure,
higher than what is higher than the Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); for the
last words mean 'that imperishable highest Self possessing invisibility
and similar qualities, which is higher than the aggregate of individual
souls, which itself is higher than the non-evolved subtle elements.' The
term 'akshara' (imperishable) is to be etymologically explained either
as that which pervades (asnute) or that which does not pass away (a-
ksharati), and is on either of these explanations applicable to the
highest Self, either because that Self pervades all its effects or
because it is like the so-called Mahat (which is also called akshara),
free from all passing away or decaying.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'invisibility and so on.' |
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