In Professor Paulsen's "Introduction to Philosophy" (English
translation, N.Y., 1895), there is an interesting introductory chapter
on "The Nature and Import of Philosophy" (pp. 1-41). The author pleads
for the old notion of philosophy as universal knowledge, though he does
not, of course, mean that the philosopher must be familiar with all the
details of all the sciences.
Section 6. In justification of the meaning given to the word
"philosophy" in this section, I ask the reader to look over the list of
courses in philosophy advertised in the catalogues of our leading
universities at home and abroad. There is a certain consensus of
opinion as to what properly comes under the title, even among those who
differ widely as to what is the proper definition of philosophy.
CHAPTER II, sections 7-10. Read the chapter on "The Mind and the World
in Common Thought and in Science" (Chapter I) in my "System of
Metaphysics," N.Y., 1904.
One can be brought to a vivid realization of the fact that the sciences
proceed upon a basis of assumptions which they do not attempt to
analyze and justify, if one will take some elementary work on
arithmetic or geometry or psychology and examine the first few
chapters, bearing in mind what philosophical problems may be drawn from
the materials there treated. Section 11. The task of reflective
thought and its difficulties are treated in the chapter entitled "How
Things are Given in Consciousness" (Chapter III), in my "System of
Metaphysics."
CHAPTER III, sections 12-13. Read "The Inadequacy of the Psychological
Standpoint," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter II. I call especial
attention to the illustration of "the man in the cell" (pp. 18 ff.).
It would be a good thing to read these pages with the class, and to
impress upon the students the fact that those who have doubted or
denied the existence of the external material world have, if they have
fallen into error, fallen into a very natural error, and are not
without some excuse.
Section 14. See "The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange," "System
of Metaphysics," Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine is
examined at length, with quotations and references.
It is interesting to notice that a doubt of the external world has
always rested upon some sort of a "telephone exchange" argument;
naturally, it could not pass by that name before the invention of the
telephone, but the reasoning is the same. It puts the world at one
remove, shutting the mind up to the circle of its ideas; and then it
doubts or denies the world, or, at least, holds that its existence must
be proved in some roundabout way. Compare Descartes, "Of the Existence
of Material Things," "Meditations," VI.
CHAPTER IV, sections 15-18. See Chapters VI and VII, "What we mean by
the External World," and "Sensations and 'Things,'" in my "System of
Metaphysics." In that work the discussion of the distinction between
the objective order of experience and the subjective order is completed
in Chapter XXIII, "The Distinction between the World and the Mind."
This was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of
the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter.
As it is possible that the reader may be puzzled by differences of
expression which obtain in the two books, a word of explanation is not
out of place.
In the "Metaphysics," for example, it is said that sensations so
connect themselves together as to form what we call the system of
material things (p. 105). It is intimated in a footnote that this is a
provisional statement and the reader is referred to later chapters.
Now, in the present book (sections 16-17), it is taught that we may not
call material things groups of sensations.
The apparent contradiction is due to the fact that, in this volume, the
full meaning of the word "sensation" is exhibited at the outset, and
sensations, as phenomena of the subjective order, are distinguished
from the phenomena of the objective order which constitute the external
world. In the earlier work the word "sensation" was for a while used
loosely to cover all our experiences that do not belong to the class
called imaginary, and the distinction between the subjective and
objective in this realm was drawn later (Chapter XXIII).
I think the present arrangement is the better one, as it avoids from
the outset the suggestion that the real world is something
subjective--our sensations or ideas--and thus escapes the idealistic
flavor which almost inevitably attaches to the other treatment, until
the discussion is completed, at least.
CHAPTER V, sections 10-21. See Chapters VIII and IX, "System of
Metaphysics," "The Distinction between Appearance and Reality" and "The
Significance of the Distinction."
Section 22. See Chapter XXVI, "The World as Unperceived, and the
'Unknowable,'" where Spencer's doctrine is examined at length, and
references are given. I think it is very important that the student
should realize that the "Unknowable" is a perfectly useless assumption
in philosophy, and can serve no purpose whatever.
CHAPTER VI, sections 23-25. See Chapters X and XI, "System of
Metaphysics," "The Kantian Doctrine of Space" and "Difficulties
connected with the Kantian Doctrine of Space."
It would be an excellent thing for the student, after he has read the
above chapters, to take up Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and read
and analyze the argument of Antinomies I and II, with the Observations
appended. One can understand these arguments without being familiar
with the "Critique" as a whole; at any rate, the account of Kant's
philosophy contained in section 51 of this book will serve to explain
his use of certain terms, such as "the laws of our sensibility."
Kant's reasonings are very curious and interesting in this part of his
book. It seems to be proved that the world must be endless in space
and without a beginning or end in time, and just as plausibly proved
that it cannot be either. It seems to be proved that finite spaces and
times are infinitely divisible, and at the same time that they cannot
be infinitely divisible. The situation is an amusing one, and rendered
not the less amusing by the seriousness with which the mutually
destructive arguments are taken.
When the student meets such a tangle in the writings of any
philosopher, I ask him to believe that it is not the human reason that
is at fault--at least, let him not assume that it is. The fault
probably lies with a human reason.
Section 26. See Chapter XII, "The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space," in my
"System of Metaphysics." The argument ought not to be difficult to one
who has mastered Chapter V of this volume.
CHAPTER VII, sections 27-29. Compare Chapter XIII, "System of
Metaphysics," "Of Time."
With the chapters on Space and Time it would be well for the student to
read Chapter XIV, "The Real World in Space and Time," where it is made
clear why we have no hesitation in declaring space and time to be
infinite, although we recognize that it seems to be an assumption of
knowledge to declare the material world infinite.
CHAPTER VIII, sections 30-32. Read, in the "System of Metaphysics,"
Chapters V and XVII, "The Self or Knower" and "The Atomic Self."
Section 33. The suggestions, touching the attitude of the psychologist
toward the mind, contained in the preface to Professor William James's
"Psychology" are very interesting and instructive.
CHAPTER IX, sections 35-36. For a strong argument in favor of
interactionism see James's "Psychology," Chapter V. I wish the student
would, in reading it, bear in mind what is said in my chapter on "The
Atomic Self," above referred to. The subject should be approached with
an open mind, and one should suspend judgment until both sides have
been heard from.
Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and
that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded
their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland."
Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended
it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral
product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the
steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He
made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of
Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton Theory: its Genesis."
We owe the doctrine of parallelism, in its original form, to Spinoza.
It was elaborated by W. K. Clifford, and to him the modern interest in
the subject is largely due. The whole subject is discussed at length
in my "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XIX-XXI. The titles are: "The
Automaton Theory: Parallelism," "What is Parallelism?" and "The Man and
the Candlestick." Clifford's doctrine is presented in a new form in
Professor Strong's recent brilliant work, "Why the Mind has a Body"
N.Y., 1903.
Section 38. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXIV, "The Time and
Place of Sensations and Ideas."
CHAPTER X, sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII
and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of
Minds."
Writers seem to be divided into three camps on this question of other
minds.
(1) I have treated our knowledge of other minds as due to an inference.
This is the position usually taken.
(2) We have seen that Huxley and Clifford cast doubts upon the validity
of the inference, but, nevertheless, made it. Professor Strong, in the
work mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, maintains that it
is not an inference, and that we do not directly perceive other minds,
but that we are assured of their existence just the same. He makes our
knowledge an "intuition" in the old-fashioned sense of the word, a
something to be accepted but not to be accounted for.
(3) Writers who have been influenced more or less by the Neo-Kantian or
Neo-Hegelian doctrine are apt to speak as though we had the same direct
evidence of the existence of other minds that we have of the existence
of our own. I have never seen a systematic and detailed exposition of
this doctrine. It appears rather in the form of hints dropped in
passing. A number of such are to be found in Taylor's "Elements of
Metaphysics."
Section 43. The "Mind-stuff" doctrine is examined at length and its
origin discussed in Chapter XXXI of the "System of Metaphysics,"
"Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus." It is well worth while for
the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay "On the Nature of
Things-in-themselves," even if he is pressed for time.
CHAPTER XI, section 44. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XV, "The
World as Mechanism."
Section 45. See Chapter XXXI, "The Place of Mind in Nature."
Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its
difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter
XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense
of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the
common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The
Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe."
Fatalism and Determinism are constantly confused, and much of the
opposition to Determinism is attributable to this confusion.
Section 47. See Chapter XXXII, "Mechanism and Teleology."
CHAPTER XII, section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in
point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of
Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is entitled "Of our
Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of
some of his sections:--
Section 1. "It is to be had only by sensation."
Section 2. "Instance whiteness of this paper."
Section 3. "This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be
called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us."
Locke's argument proceeds, as we have seen, on the assumption that we
perceive external things directly,--an assumption into which he slips
unawares,--and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly
what is external. This makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has
not absolute proof, after all. The section that closes the discussion
is entitled: "Folly to expect demonstration in everything."
Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers
would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's
"Principles of Human Knowledge" and his "Three Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous." Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation
of sentiment characterize them throughout.
The "Principles" is a systematic treatise. If one has not time to read
it all, one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the
first forty-one sections. For brief readings in class, to illustrate
Berkeley's reasoning, one may take sections 1-3, 14, 18-20, and 38.
The "Dialogues" is a more popular work. As the etymology of the names
in the title suggests, we have in it a dispute between a man who pins
his faith to matter and an idealist. The aim of the book is to confute
skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism.
For Hume's treatment of the external world, see his "Treatise of Human
Nature," Part IV, section 2. For his treatment of the mind, see Part
IV, section 6.
Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us
asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument
by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good
exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his
"Inquiry" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of
Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20).
Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see
Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation,
N.Y., 1893). Compare with this the accounts in the histories of
philosophy by Ueberweg and Hoffding (English translation of the latter,
London, 1900). Full bibliographies are to be found especially in
Ueberweg.
It is well to look at the philosophy of Kant through more than one pair
of eyes. Thus, if one reads Morris's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"
(Chicago, 1882), one should read also Sidgwick's "Lectures on the
Philosophy of Kant" (N.Y., 1905).
CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could
regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him).
See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his
doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know
directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer
all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only
relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing."
Whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of "hypothetical
realism" described in the text? Perhaps we may put the plain man, who
has not begun to reflect, in the first class. John Locke is a good
representative of the second; see the "Essay concerning Human
Understanding," Book II, Chapter VIII. Herbert Spencer belonged to the
third while he wrote Chapter V of his "First Principles of Philosophy."
Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes
on Chapter XII. As a good illustration of objective idealism in one of
its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address,
"The Conception of God" (N.Y., 1902).
Mr. Bradley's doctrine is criticised in Chapter XXXIV (entitled "Of
God"), "System of Metaphysics."
CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI,
"The Insufficiency of Materialism."
Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, "Why the Mind has a Body"
(N.Y., 1903), advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It
is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on "The Nature of
Things-in-themselves," ought to give one a good idea of the
considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists.
Section 57. The pantheistic monism of Spinoza is of such importance
historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its
meaning. I have discussed this at length in two earlier works: "The
Philosophy of Spinoza" (N.Y., 1894) and "On Spinozistic Immortality."
The student is referred to the account of Spinoza's "God or Substance"
contained in these. See, especially, the "Introductory Note" in the
back of the first-mentioned volume.
Professor Royce is a good illustration of the idealistic monist; see
the volume referred to in the note above (section 53). His "Absolute,"
or God, is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite
minds are parts.
Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his
"Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII. He writes: "Mind and matter, as known
or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities;
as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these
two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere.
The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are
compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the
distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming
incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one."
CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced
in the "Meditations." In I, we have his sweeping doubt; in II, his
doctrine as to the mind; in III, the existence of God is established;
in VI, he gets around to the existence of the external world. We find
a good deal of the "natural light" in the first part of his "Principles
of Philosophy."
Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency
in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his
treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV,
section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are
not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class.
Section 62. See the note to section 51.
Section 64. I write this note (in 1908) to give the reader some idea
of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism. There has
been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three
years, but I am not able to say even yet that we have to do with "a
clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been
worked out in detail." Hence, I prefer to leave section 64 as I first
wrote it, merely supplementing it here.
We may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to
be Professor William James, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Professor John
Dewey. The first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume
entitled "Pragmatism" (London, 1907); the second, who calls his
doctrine "Humanism," but declares himself a pragmatist, and in
essential agreement with Professor James, has published two volumes of
philosophical essays entitled "Humanism" (London, 1903) and "Studies in
Humanism" (London, 1907); the third has developed his position in the
first four chapters of the "Studies in Logical Theory" (Chicago, 1903).
Professor James, in his "Pragmatism" (Lecture II), says that
pragmatism, at the outset, at least, stands for no particular results.
It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. This method means:
"The attitude of looking away from first things, principles,
'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things,
fruits, consequences, facts." He remarks further, however, that
pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense, as signifying a
certain theory of truth (pp. 54-55). This theory is brought forward in
Lecture VI.
The theory maintains that: "True ideas are those that we can
assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those
that we can not" (p. 201). This sounds as though Professor James
abandoned his doctrine touching the Turk and the Christian mentioned in
section 64.
But what do the words "verification" and "validation" pragmatically
mean? We are told that they signify certain practical consequences of
the verified and validated idea. Our ideas may be said to "agree" with
reality when they lead us, through acts and other ideas which they
instigate, up to or towards other parts of experience with which we
feel that the original ideas remain in agreement. "The connections and
transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive,
harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what
we mean by an idea's verification" (p. 202).
Thus, we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in
which the word has usually been employed heretofore. The tendency to
take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned.
That Professor James does not really leave his Turk in the lurch
becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively and note
his reasons for taking the various pragmatic attitudes which he does
take. See, for example, his pragmatic argument for "free-will." The
doctrine is simply assumed as a doctrine of "relief" (pp. 110-121).
Briefly stated, Dr. Schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made,
and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them. It
is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I
shall not dwell upon it. Dr. Schiller's essays are very entertainingly
written.
Professor Dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from
the above to merit another title. In the "Journal of Philosophy,
Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey
brings out the distinction between his own position and that of
Professor James.
To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail.
Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the
"Philosophical Review," Volume XVII, No. 1. See, on the other side,
Professor Perry, in the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and
Scientific Methods," Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben,
"Philosophical Review," XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, "The Monist," July,
1908.
CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded
their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal
Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge"
(London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y.,
1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898),
Preface.
Professor Aikins writes: "Thus, in so far as logic tries to make us
reason correctly by giving us correct conceptions of things and the way
in which their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple
metaphysics studied for a practical end."
Professor Creighton says, "Although in treating the syllogistic logic I
have followed to a large extent the ordinary mode of presentation, I
have both here, and when dealing with the inductive methods, endeavored
to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical way, and to
prepare for the theoretical discussions of the third part of the book."
John Stuart Mill tried not to be metaphysical; but let the reader
examine, say, his third chapter, "Of the Things denoted by Names," or
look over Book VI, in his "System of Logic."
Professor Sigwart's great work, "Logik" (Freiburg, 2d edition, Volume
I, 1889, Volume II, 1893), may almost be called a philosophy of logic.
CHAPTER XVII, section 69. Compare with Professor James's account of
the scope of psychology the following from Professor Baldwin: "The
question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics, over which a
fierce warfare has been waged in recent years, is now fairly settled by
the adjustment of mutual claims. . . . The terms of the adjustment of
which I speak are briefly these: on the one hand, empirical
investigation must precede rational interpretation, and this empirical
investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and
preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be
equally free in its own province, since progress from the individual to
the general, from the detached fact to its universal meaning, can be
secured only by the judicious use of hypotheses, both metaphysical and
speculative. Starting from the empirical we run out at every step into
the metempirical." "Handbook of Psychology," Preface, pp. iii and iv.
CHAPTER XVIII, section 71. The teacher might very profitably take
extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's "Elements of Morality"
referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is
significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us
advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the
cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual
conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide
us.
Section 72. Wundt, in his volume "The Facts of the Moral Life" (N.Y.,
1897), tries to develop an empirical science of ethics independent of
metaphysics; see the Preface.
Compare with this: Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory" (London,
1885), Preface; T. H. Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," Introduction;
Muirhead's "The Elements of Ethics" (N.Y., 1892); Mackenzie's "A Manual
of Ethics" (London, 1893); Jodl's "Gesduchte der Ethik" (Stuttgart,
1882), Preface. I give but a few references, but they will serve to
illustrate how close, in the opinion of ethical writers, is the
relation between ethics and philosophy.
CHAPTER XIX, section 74. The student who turns over the pages of
several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial
similarity that is apt to obtain among them. One sees the field mapped
out into Ontology (the science of Being or Reality), Rational
Cosmology, and Rational Psychology. These titles are mediaeval
landmarks which have been left standing. I may as well warn the reader
that two men who discourse of Ontology may not be talking about the
same thing at all. Bear in mind what was said in section 57 of the
different ways of conceiving the "One Substance"; and bear in mind also
what was said in Chapter V of the proper meaning of the word "reality."
I have discarded the above titles in my "System of Metaphysics,"
because I think it is better and less misleading to use plain and
unambiguous language.
Section 75. See the note to Chapter XVI.
CHAPTER XX, sections 76-77. One can get an idea of the problems with
which the philosophy of religion has to deal by turning to my "System
of Metaphysics" and reading the two chapters entitled "Of God," at the
close of the book. It would be interesting to read and criticise in
class some of the theistic arguments that philosophers have brought
forward. Quotations and references are given in Chapter XXXIV.
CHAPTER XXI, sections 78-79. What is said of the science of logic, in
Chapter XVI, has, of course, a bearing upon these sections. I suggest
that the student examine a few chapters of "The Grammar of Science";
the book is very readable.
CHAPTER XXII, sections 80-82. The reader will find in lectures I and
II in Sir William Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics" a discussion of
the utility of philosophy. It has a pleasant, old-fashioned flavor,
and contains some good thoughts. What is said in Chapters XVI-XXI of
the present volume has a good deal of bearing upon the subject. See
especially what is said in the chapters on logic, ethics, and the
philosophy of religion.
CHAPTER XXIII, sections 83-87. There is a rather brief but good and
thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the
comprehension of philosophical doctrines in Falckenberg's "History of
Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893); see the
Introduction.
We have a good illustration of the fact that there may be parallel
streams of philosophic thought (section 87) when we turn to the Stoics
and the Epicureans. Zeno and Epicurus were contemporaries, but they
were men of very dissimilar character, and the schools they founded
differed widely in spirit. Zeno went back for his view of the physical
world to Heraclitus, and for his ethics to the Cynics. Epicurus
borrowed his fundamental thoughts from Democritus.
On the other hand, philosophers may sometimes be regarded as links in
the one chain. Witness the series of German thinkers: Kant, Fichte,
Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer; or the series of British thinkers:
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill. Herbert Spencer represents a confluence
of the streams. The spirit of his doctrine is predominantly British;
but he got his "Unknowable" from Kant, through Hamilton and Mansel.
At any point in a given stream there may be a division. Thus, Kant was
awakened to his creative effort by Hume. But Mill is also the
successor of Hume, and more truly the successor, for he carries on the
traditional way of approaching philosophical problems, while Kant
rebels against it, and heads a new line.
CHAPTER XXIV, sections 88-93. I hardly think it is necessary for me to
comment upon this chapter. The recommendations amount to this: that a
man should be fair-minded and reasonable, free from partisanship,
cautious, and able to suspend judgment where the evidence is not clear;
also that where the light of reason does not seem to him to shine
brightly and to illumine his path as he could wish, he should be
influenced in his actions by the reflection that he has his place in
the social order, and must meet the obligations laid upon him by this
fact. When the pragmatist emphasizes the necessity of accepting ideals
and living by them, he is doing us a service. But we must see to it
that he does not lead us into making arbitrary decisions and feeling
that we are released from the duty of seeking for evidence. Read together sections 64, 91, and 93. |
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