To this we make the following reply.--Brahman is to be acknowledged as
the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter
view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the
illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the
following one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that
which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived,
perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This
passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything
else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of
everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause,
since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other
hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we
know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is
different from the house he has built.--The illustrative example
referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one
clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e.
the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while
the truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference
to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances
of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is
known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is
known.'--Similar promissory statements are made in other places also,
for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else
becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is
given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1,
7).--Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When
the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is
known;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the
sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is
seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'--Similar
promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found
in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that
Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also
in the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has
to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings,
according to the grammatical rule, Pa/n/. I, 4, 30.--That Brahman is at
the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from
the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily
material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are
dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on
extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside
Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the
material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to
creation Brahman was one without a second.--The absence of a guiding
principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by
means of the argument made use of in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the
promissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were
admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would
follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby
the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be
stultified.--The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no
other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other
substance from which the world could originate.
24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the
Self).
The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise
shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages
like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may
I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is
the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's
reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause
also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective
desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.
25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the
world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material
cause).
This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general
material cause.--Brahman is the material cause of the world for that
reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world
is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their
material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and
return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some
other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of
that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the
material cause of rice, barley, and the like.--The word 'directly' (in
the Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all
this sprang from the ether only.--Observation further teaches that
effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material
causes.
26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making
itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture--in
the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)--represents
the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.--But how can the
Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be
made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the
action?--Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full
existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something
special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal
substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of
modification, changed into their products.--The word 'itself' in the
passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but
the Self.
The word 'pari/n/amat' (in the Sutra) may also be taken as constituting
a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the
material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text
speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as
co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and
undefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).
27. And because Brahman is called the source.
Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of
in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The
maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III,
1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu.
Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is
well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance,
is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word
yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the
mantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k.
Sa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source'
follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and
draws in its threads,' &c.--It is thus proved that Brahman is the
material cause of the world.--Of the objection, finally, that in
ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as
potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the
remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through
inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it.
For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture
altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that
Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the
same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject
will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.
28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which
are opposed to the Vedanta) are explained, are explained.
The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the cause of the world
has, in the Sutras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought
forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to
that doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages which, to
people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain
inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands
somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits
the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been
accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala,
and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute
the pradhana doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and
other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be
refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the
general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are
referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sutrakara formally
extends, in the above Sutra, the refutation already accomplished of the
pradhana doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished
in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine, has been
so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any
scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by
various Vedic passages.--The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is
meant to intimate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.
Notes:
[Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical Sa@nkhya-term for buddhi,
avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prak/ri/ti, and purusha
is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sa@nkhya Kar.
2, 3.]
[Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparupamanana/s/aktya haira/n/yagarbhi
buddhir manas tasya/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itaya vyaptim aha
mahan iti. Sa/m/kalpadi/s/ktitaya tarhi sa/m/dehatmatva/m/ tatraha matir
iti. Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogyajatadharatvam aha pur iti.
Ni/sk/ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirti/s/aktimattvam aha khyatir iti.
Niyamana/s/aktimatvam aha i/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/
j/n/anam tatosnatirekam aha praj/n/eti. Tatphalam api tato
narthantaravishayam ity aha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhanatvam aha /k/itir
iti. J/n/atasarvartbanusa/m/dhana/s/aktim aha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. Ananda
Giri.]
[Footnote 230: Nanu na bija/s/aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan
nety aha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijivam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti
tan na avyaktavyak/ri/tadi/s/abdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatvexpi
sva/s/aktya vi/k/itrakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasya
jiva/s/rayatva/m/ jiva/s/abdava/k/yasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat
ta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity aha parame/s/vareti.
Mayavidyayor bhedad i/s/varasya maya/s/rayatva/m/ jivanam
avidya/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya
paratantra tathaishapity artha/h/. Pratitau tasya/s/ /k/etanapeksham aha
mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.]
[Footnote 231: Sutradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go.
An. A/k/aryade/s/iyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.]
[Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the
Sattamatra of the text.--Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprak/ri/ter
adyapari/n/ame. Go. An.--Bhogapavargapurusharthasya
maha/kkh/abditabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara/n/a/m/ sad
u/k/yate tatra bhavapratyayos'pi svarupartho na samanyava/k/i
karyanumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti matra/s/abda/h/. Ananda Giri.]
[Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word aja is going to be discussed,
and as the author of the Sutras and /S/a@nkara seem to disagree as to
its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in
this place.--/S/a@nkara reads--and explains,--in the mantra, sarupa/h/
(not sarupam) and bhuktabhogam, not bhuktabhogyam.]
[Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the
views of the Sutra writer and /S/a@nkara. Govindananda notes that
according to the Bhashyak/ri/t aja means simply maya--which
interpretation is based on prakara/n/a--while, according to the
Sutra-k/ri/t, who explains aja on the ground of the Chandogya-passage
treating of the three primary elements, aja denotes the aggregate of
those three elements constituting an avantaraprak/ri/ti.--On
/S/a@nkara's explanation the term aja presents no difficulties, for maya
is aja, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sutra
writer, however, aja cannot mean unborn, since the three primary
elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the ru/dh/i
signification of aja, according to which it means she-goat. But how can
the avantara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next
Sutra replies.]
[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/a, which consists in this case in
five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an
objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in
interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct
meaning.]
[Footnote 236: That pa/nk/ajana/h/ is only one word appears from its
having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which
udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika
Sutra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a.]
[Footnote 237: So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the
Ka/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']
[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to jana when
applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/a;
while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a
direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana
being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they
are produced). The Vedantin points out that the compound pa/nk/ajana/h/
has its own ru/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear,
which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]
[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because
it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that
the yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]
[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be
accomplished, i.e. actions.]
[Footnote 241: According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself
its Self' (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, 'He created
all' (II, 6).]
[Footnote 242: By the Brahma/n/as being meant all those Brahma/n/as who
are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]
[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows:
As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the
fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the
other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in
that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from
each other; so the individual souls also--which are effects of
Brahman--are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would
mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely
non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be
distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with
Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any
instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from
Brahman and somehow non-different.--The technical name of the doctrine
here represented by A/s/marathya is bhedabhedavada.]
[Footnote 244: Bhamati: The individual soul is absolutely different from
the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different
limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as
non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself
by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and
become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus
transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference
actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa/nk/aratrikas: 'Up to the
moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are
different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the
highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'--The
technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is
satyabhedavada.]
[Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under
I, 1, 11.]
[Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute identity.]
[Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.]
[Footnote 248: Upapadita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti /s/esha/h/.
Upapadanaprakara/m/ su/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner
ityadinaikaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina
/k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.]
[Footnote 249: So according to Go. An. and An. Gi., although their
interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the
text.--Ka/mk/id evaikam iti jivasthanad anyam ity artha/h/. Go.
An.--Jivabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]
[Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in
fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]
[Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause
are separate things.]
[Footnote 252: Viz. the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti.]
SECOND ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there
would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis;
we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our
doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other
Sm/ri/tis.
It has been shown in the first adhyaya that the omniscient Lord of all
is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the
material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his
rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once
originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the
magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted
world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four
classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been
proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the
Vedanta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the
doctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have
been refuted as not being scriptural.--The purport of the second
adhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the
doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and
Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only
fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts
do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and
similar topics.--The first point is to refute the objections based on
Sm/ri/ti.
Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only
is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results
from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such
Sm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and
is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on
it[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation
of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the
non-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is
indeed room (a raison d'etre) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti,
which give information about matters connected with the whole body of
religious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the
agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with
what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how
the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to
take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further
lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four
castes and a/s/ramas[255]. The Kapila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and
similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were
composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of
final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion
also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain
the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict
with the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].--But how, somebody may ask the
purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for
certain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti
which--from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.--has been
ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman
alone is the cause of the world?--Our objection, the purvapakshin
replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent
thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are
unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally
rely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive
at the sense of /S/ruti with their assistance; while, owing to their
esteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our
explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have
been /ri/shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following
/S/ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts
the son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is
born' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be
erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by
argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore
attempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.
This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because
therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other
Sm/ri/tis.'--If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause
of the world on the ground that it would render certain Sm/ri/tis
purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Sm/ri/tis which
declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter
Sm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest
Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is
subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the
internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks
'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best
of Brahma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is
dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma/n/a.'--Thus we
read also in the Pura/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The
ancient Naraya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due
time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in
the Bhagavadgita also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of
reabsorption of the whole world.' And Apastamba too says with reference
to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary
cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In
this way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient
as well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes
us on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti
only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been
shown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that
the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis
conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which
maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which
follow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others
are to be disregarded; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter
treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is
contradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be
disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to
be recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on
/S/ruti).'--Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive
supersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient
cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such
perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed
supernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition.
For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the
performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is
characterised by injunction[258]; hence the sense of injunctions (i.e.
of the Veda) which is established first must not be fancifully
interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made
perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only.
Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be
appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have,
in all those cases where the Sm/ri/tis contradict each other in the
manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to
/S/ruti.--As to men destitute of the power of independent judgment, we
are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach
themselves to some particular Sm/ri/ti; for if men's inclinations were
so altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity
of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their
judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the
Sm/ri/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them following /S/ruti
and others not.--The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has
quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify
us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are
contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila
(without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition
with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had
the surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose,
(viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on
that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means,
(viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we
have a /S/ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu[259], viz.
'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu
himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything
('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self,
he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' i.e. becomes
Brahman, Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of
Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not
admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahabharata
also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or
one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many
persons, O King, according to the Sa@nkhya and Yoga philosophers;' that
opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the
earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal
person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there
is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of
all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be
apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed,
all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will
and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal
Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things,
what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that
unity?' (I/s/. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that
the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who
follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not
only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness
of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and
direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our
knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on
the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an
extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by
a chain of teachers and tradition.
Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room
for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda,
furnishes no valid objection.--An additional reason for this our opinion
is supplied by the following Sutra.
2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects
of the pradhana, according to the Sa@nkhya system).
The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its
modifications which the (Sa@nkhya) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance,
the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary
experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense
organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience,
may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like
Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from
experience--no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth
sense--Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages
which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in
reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1.
But if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e.
the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which
refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the
Sutra means to say.--We have thus established a second reason, proving
that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis
does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.--The weakness of
the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sa@nkhya doctrine) will
be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.
3. Thereby the Yoga (Sm/ri/ti) is refuted.
This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and
remarks that by the refutation of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti the
Yoga-sm/ri/ti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also
assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause
of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although
neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.--But, if the
same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already
disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally
to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)--We reply that here an
additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being
enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for
instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be
thought, to be meditated upon[260].' In the /S/veta/s/vatara Upanishad,
moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with
the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for
instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II,
8).
Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly
enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11,
'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;'
'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II,
6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-/s/astra itself the passage, 'Now
then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as
a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the /s/astra
at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the
entire Yoga-sm/ri/ti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just
as the Sm/ri/ti referring to the ash/t/akas[261].--To this we reply that
the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed
against the Sa@nkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt
stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/ri/ti
being authoritative, the disagreement (between Sm/ri/ti and /S/ruti) on
other topics remains as shown above.--Although[262] there are many
Sm/ri/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the
Sa@nkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means
for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many
competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic
passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be
apprehended by Sa@nkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (/S/ve.
Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might
be set up for the Sa@nkhya and Yoga-sm/ri/tis in their entirety) we
refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man)
is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti
irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For
Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the
highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is
conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him;
there is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). And the Sa@nkhya and
Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In
the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sa@nkhya
and Yoga') the terms 'Sa@nkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and
meditation, as we infer from proximity[263]. We willingly allow room for
those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In
their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities
the Sa@nkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person
(purusha) is essentially pure; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that
person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for
the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of
retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural
passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrajaka with
discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c.
(Jabala Upan. IV).
The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all
argumentative Sm/ri/tis. If it be said that those Sm/ri/tis also assist,
by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to
so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from
the Vedanta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as
'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br.
III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads'
(B/ri/. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.
4. (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of the
difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such,
(i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.
The objections, founded on Sm/ri/ti, against the doctrine of Brahman
being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been
refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.--But (to
raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections
founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been
settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely
authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious
duty (dharma).--(To this the purvapakshin replies), The analogy between
Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be
known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the
other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties,
i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now
we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing,
and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of
right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other
elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting
scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make
them accord with one, so /S/ruti, if in conflict with other means of
right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.
Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually
perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes
with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than
/S/ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge
of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates
in a perception (viz. the intuition--sakshatkara--of Brahman), and as
such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like
dharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to
be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows
that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence
an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of
the difference of nature of this (effect).'--The Vedantic opinion that
the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable
because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different
character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers
as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure,
consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is
declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the
world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different
character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause
and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have
earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of
earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth
and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this
world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and
dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and
made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of
an altogether different character. The difference in character of this
world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its
want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of
pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief,
despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various
character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence
because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the
relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the
relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the
basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be
subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).--But, it will
be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the
enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his
master.--This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case
of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the
former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed
with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the
non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense
organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither
for nor against any other being. For the Sa@nkhyas are of opinion that
the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking
in or giving out anything[265], and are non-active. Hence that only
which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor[266] is there
anything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are
of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things
which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent
is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause
in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.--Here
somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has
originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the
observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I
assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation
of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular
nature of the modification[267]. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings
do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep,
swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest
(although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the
manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men,
animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side),
and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the
one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of
action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of
a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally
of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth,
pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in
the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all
of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in
the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to
the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and
non-intelligent).--This reasoning--the purvapakshin replies--if valid
might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between
Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being
intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still
remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is
pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the
objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared
in the latter part of the Sutra, 'And its being such we learn from
Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire
world--which is supported neither by perception nor by inference,
& c.--must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the
latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent
cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other
texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature
different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage,
'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of
knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of
beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the
non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent
Brahman.--But--somebody might again object--the sacred texts themselves
sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are
generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent
beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to
the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1,
3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3;
4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These
pra/n/as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to
Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do
thou sing out for us' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2).--To this objection the
purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra.
5. But (there takes place) denotation of the superintending (deities),
on account of the difference and the connexion.
The word 'but' discards the doubt raised. We are not entitled to base
the assumption of the elements and the sense organs being of an
intellectual nature on such passages as 'the earth spoke,' &c. because
'there takes place denotation of that which presides.' In the case of
actions like speaking, disputing, and so on, which require intelligence,
the scriptural passages denote not the mere material elements and
organs, but rather the intelligent divinities which preside over earth,
& c., on the one hand, and Speech, &c., on the other hand. And why so?
'On account of the difference and the connexion.' The difference is the
one previously referred to between the enjoying souls, on the one hand,
and the material elements and organs, on the other hand, which is
founded on the distinction between intelligent and non-intelligent
beings; that difference would not be possible if all beings were
intelligent. Moreover, the Kaushitakins in their account of the dispute
of the pra/n/as make express use of the word 'divinities' in order to
preclude the idea of the mere material organs being meant, and in order
to include the superintending intelligent beings. They say, 'The deities
contending with each for who was the best;' and, again, 'All these
deities having recognised the pre-eminence in pra/n/a' (Kau. Up. II,
14).--And, secondly, Mantras, Arthavadas, Itihasas, Pura/n/as, &c. all
declare that intelligent presiding divinities are connected with
everything. Moreover, such scriptural passages as 'Agni having become
Speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4) show that each
bodily organ is connected with its own favouring divinity. And in the
passages supplementary to the quarrel of the pra/n/as we read in one
place how, for the purpose of settling their relative excellence, they
went to Prajapati, and how they settled their quarrel on the ground of
presence and absence, each of them, as Prajapati had advised, departing
from the body for some time ('They went to their father Prajapati and
said,' &c,; Ch. Up. V, 1, 7); and in another place it is said that they
made an offering to pra/n/a (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 13), &c.; all of them
proceedings which are analogous to those of men, &c., and therefore
strengthen the hypothesis that the text refers to the superintending
deities. In the case of such passages as, 'Fire thought,' we must assume
that the thought spoken of is that of the highest deity which is
connected with its effects as a superintending principle.--From all this
it follows that this world is different in nature from Brahman, and
hence cannot have it for its material cause.
To this objection raised by the purvapakshin the next Sutra replies.
6. But it is seen.
The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.
Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on
account of the difference of its character is not founded on an
absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to
be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate,
and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such
as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state
an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is
the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent
bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.--Even
thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the
cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of
the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is
the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other
non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of
nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the
bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is,
on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable
after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the
bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the
case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material
cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)
would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men
and hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one
characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well
as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply
that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic
feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which
are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He,
moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to
invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must
assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the
non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the
characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)
characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of
intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the
relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the
fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause
(for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be
distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running
counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the
characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found
likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite
proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought
forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an
effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any
such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things
has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are
contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the
purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the
world. It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other
means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman,
on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be
accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely
gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot
become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no
characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based),
inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,
like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy
tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be
obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O
dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in
truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation
sprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the
cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings
(i/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.
There are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect: 'Do
not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'
'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions
of the gods know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in
every way the origin of the gods and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gi. X,
2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage
enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the
sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be
allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be
taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be
understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of
intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for
instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of
dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected
with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves
the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure
Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world;
that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from
Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and
effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be
demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the
ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world
would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would
find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became
knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction
of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the
doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes
non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sa@nkhya),
would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly
teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.
If, then, on account of difference of character that which is
intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also
which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana
of the Sa@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much
for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on
difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an
intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.
7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its
origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation
(without an object).
If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as
sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of
an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the
qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered
as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedantin--who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already. |
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