The Vedanta-Sutras 10

The Vedanta-Sutras 10

The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of pra/n/a, under the aspect of praj/n/a, and in itself. The passages, 'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is pra/n/a,' and 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as uktha,' refer to the pra/n/a aspect. The introductory passage, 'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/n/a,' and the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/n/a taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the praj/n/a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/n/a, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the pra/n/a.' Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body is pra/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the pra/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of pra/n/a, praj/n/a, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter. Notes: [Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material world.] [Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.] [Footnote 34: Adhyasa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.] [Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.] [Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.] [Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.'] [Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form of remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in Pa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.] [Footnote 39: The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.] [Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyativadins.] [Footnote 41: Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 42: The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayampraka/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jiva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bhamati, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idatmaiva svayampraka/s/oszpi buddhyadivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/at katha/mk/id asm upratyayavishayoszha/m/karaspada/m/ jiva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a ksheuajna iti /k/akhyayate.'] [Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by itself or by anything else.--It is known or manifest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i.e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatveszpy aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatvabbavat tasminn aha@nkaradyadhyasa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id atmano nesh/t/am ity asa@nkyaha pratyagatmeti.] [Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/n/e sati. Bha. Tasminn adhyase uktarityazvidyavmake sati. Go. Yatratmani buddhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa/h/ tena buddhyadi-nasztmana va k/ri/tenasz/s/anayadidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena /k/atmanatma va vastuto na svalpenapi yujyate. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.] [Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.] [Footnote 47: The Bhamati takes adhish/th/anam in the sense of superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.] [Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.] [Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.] [Footnote 50: The Mima/m/sa, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with Brahman. This Mima/m/sa being an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta mima/m/sa.] [Footnote 51: Nadhikarartha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha/h/, kam ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/n/ane/kkh/ya/h/ kim vantar/n/itavi/k/arasya athave/kkh/avi/s/esha/n/aj/n/anasyarambhartha/h/. Nadya/h/ tasya mima/m/sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya/s/ /k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipadanat. Na dvitiyoztha/s/abdenanantaryoktidvara vi/s/ish/t/adhikaryasamarpa/n/e sadhana/k/atush/t/ayasampannana/m/ brahmadhitadvi/k/arayor anarthitvad vi/k/aranarambhan na /k/a vi/k/aravidhiva/s/ad adhikari kalpya/h/ prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhikari/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na t/ri/tiya/h/ brahmaj/n/anasyanandasakshatkaratvenadhikaryatve z pyapradhanyad atha/s/abdasambandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of anantarya.] [Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the breast.] [Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the prayajas is to the dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apur/n/amasa qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.] [Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering (titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and faith (/s/raddha).] [Footnote 56: According to Pa/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.] [Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.] [Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the Brahma-mima/m/sa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.] [Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyaya, the Sa@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.] [Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in the beginning,' &c.] [Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and Go.; the Bha. proposes another less plausible division.] [Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara/h/ are: origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.] [Footnote 63: The pradhana, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the /S/a@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhana has been left untranslated. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika 3.] [Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sari/n/am evagamaj jagaddhetum a/k/akshate. Ananada Giri.] [Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.] [Footnote 66: Atmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Purva Mima/m/sa.] [Footnote 68: The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.] [Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial post.'] [Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/astras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/astras; if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.] [Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the third that is independent of either.] [Footnote 72: Ananda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is: p/ri/thagjij/n/asavishayatva/k/ /k/a dharmadyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/ brahma/n/o yuktam ityaha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapa/th/e dharmadyasparse karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetuk/ri/tam.--The above translation follows Govindananda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvad ity artha/h/.] [Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both.] [Footnote 75: Adhyasa/h/ /s/astratoitasmi/m/s taddhi/h/. Sampadi sampadyamanasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vi/s/esha/h/. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/ sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vayau pra/n/e /k/a da/s/a/s/agata/m/ jagad dar/s/ayati yatha jivatmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyaya brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvayaphalayakalpata iti. Bhamati.] [Footnote 77: The butter used in the upa/ms/uyaja is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kart/ri/--agent--stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.] [Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses.] [Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/ karoti), things to be obtained (grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).] [Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.] [Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.] [Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?] [Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural motives--not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.] [Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.] [Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean 'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahma/n/a is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression 'a non-Brahma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word 'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Purva Mima/m/sa; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.] [Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.] [Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.] [Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.] [Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.] [Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.] [Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.] [Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle independent of Sattva.] [Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapatlim nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad va brahma/n/o sarvaj/n/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti. Prathama/m/ pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvara viyz/rin/oti anityatve hiti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/n/aneti. Svato nityasyapi j/n/anasya tattadarthava/kkh/innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatity aha.--The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the verbal affix in 'janati' indicating the particularity of the act.] [Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapa/th/aka of the Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.] [Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three passages.] [Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.] [Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.] [Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.] [Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.] [Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jivatman is conversant with the names and forms of individual things.] [Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.] [Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities--such as the heart and the like--which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.] [Footnote 103: Ananda Giri reads avish/t/asya for avishk/ri/tasya.] [Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, & c. only the satta, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.] [Footnote 105: Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sutrak/ri/to api matam ity aha, evam iti, /s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/astre dvairupyam brahma/n/o bhavati; tatra sopadhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/n/am udaharati adityeti; uktanyaya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasarayati evam iti; sopadhikopade/s/avan nirupadhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityadina, atmaj/n/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam aha pareti; annamayadyupadhidvarokasya katham paravidyavishayatva/m/ tatraha upadhiti; nir/n/ayakramam aha vakyeti, uktartham adhikara/n/a/m/ kvastity asa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.] [Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.] [Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.] [Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.] [Footnote 109: Yadi labdha na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramatmano vastutobhinnena jivatmana paramatma labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhamati.] [Footnote 110: Yatha paramesvarad bhinno jivatma drash/t/a na bhavaty evam givatmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti, jivasyanirva/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirva/k/ya/h/ syad ity ata aha parame/s/varas tv avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.] [Footnote 111: The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is attributed by Go. An. to the v/ri/ttikara.] [Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.] [Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.] [Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ] [Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs (consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.] [Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets and singers is Brahman.] [Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.'] [Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against the accent of /rik/a/h/. Saya/n/a explains /rik/a/h/ as genitive.] [Footnote 119: O/m/karasya pratikatvena va/k/akatvena lakshakatvena va brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyarthendriyayogajatva/m/ varayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhutaka/s/atva/m/ vyaseddhum pura/n/am ity uktam. An. Gi.] [Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into consideration.] [Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikara, the commentators say.] [Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was entriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the latter.] [Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as non-tripartite light exists at all.] [Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/ vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhavozvi/s/eshakatvam. An. Gi.] [Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.] [Footnote 126: Svasamarthyena sarvanamna/h/ sannihitaparamar/s/itvava/s/ena.] [Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikara according to Go. An. in his /t/ika on the bhashya to the next Sutra.] [Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.] [Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a pra/n/ana/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,' and Go. An. explains 'astitve pra/n/asthitau pra/n/ana/m/ indriya/n/am sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim aha.' He as well as An. Gi. quotes as the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athato ni/hs/reyasadanam ity adi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's edition.]. [Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the Kau. Up. is Brahman.] [Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.] [Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/ariram instead of ida/m/ /s/ariram.] [Footnote 133: Pa/nk/a /s/abdadaya/h/ pa/nk/a p/ri/thivyadaya/s/ /k/a da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ pa/nk/a buddhindriya/n/i pa/nk/a buddhaya iti da/s/a praj/n/amatra/h/. Yadva j/n/anendriyartha/h/ pa/nk/a karzmendriyartha/s/ /ka/ pa/nk/eti da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ dvividhanindriya/n/i praj/n/amatra da/s/eti bhava/h/. An. Gi.] [Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikara.] [Footnote 135: Ihapi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogat' of the Sutra.] SECOND PADA. REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF! In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points. 1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what is known from everywhere. Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, & c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman. The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.--Why?--Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'--But, it may be objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?--This objection does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because Brahman is all this, tajjalan, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,' & c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c., cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on. To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on.--Why?--'On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic.--But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself.--True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, & c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal. 2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman). Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world' (Bha. Gita III, 13). The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms 'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation. 3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.). The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (/s/arira) we have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for /s/ruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, 'He is greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist. 4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage, 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.--And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul. 5. On account of the difference of words. That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words. That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different. 6. And on account of Sm/ri/ti. Sm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.' But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the preceding Sutras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gita XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O Bharata, to be the kshetiaj/n/a in all kshetras.' True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned--from the passage, 'That art thou'--that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like. 7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that of ether. On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of Ayodhya although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole earth.--But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be minute?--He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar qualities--which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a modification of the mind--just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called /S/alagram. Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on. 8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).