But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore
connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the
nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual
soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure,
pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from
its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different
from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other
knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the
highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory
existence.
This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From
the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living
beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to
fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is
the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and
demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter
is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all
evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the
fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on
the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their
essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in
Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is
on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and
refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of
more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because
Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be
subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the
question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no
other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as,
'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and
so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural
matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not
sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.
Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is
free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel
even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then
should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the
part of Brahman?--Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and
Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.--In that case, we
reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong
knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched
thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in
consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason
the Sutrakara says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of
their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition
on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a
difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being
the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed
by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect
knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the
figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of
fruition on Brahman's part.
9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is
immovable is mentioned (as his food).
We read in the Ka/th/avalli (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He
to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a
condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and
'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the
eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no
distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the
individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that
Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141].
The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from
Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be
the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater,
according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up.
III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of
the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu.
Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'
The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is
mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable
and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death
is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the
consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self,
however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to
eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made
of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right
to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that
this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all
living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being
the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may
here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances
only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self
cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on
without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the
fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such
fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to
negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it
is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause
of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore
the eater can here be Brahman only.
10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self
only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage
(Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which
shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the
general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then
knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with
difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.
11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the
highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the
same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same
nature).
In the same Ka/th/avalli we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking
the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into
the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call
them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the
Tri/n/a/k/iketa sacrifice.'
Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul
are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the
mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of
as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the
body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on
this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a
preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is
dead--some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know
taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand,
the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it
intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul;
and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question
contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different
from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the
past and the future, tell me that.'
The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus been stated, a
caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can
be maintained.--Why?--On account of the characteristic mark implied in
the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the
fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent
individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual
form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the
two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the
same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual
soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the
fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account
of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'
These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that
in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men)
are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which
properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to
many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them
is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that,
while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink
because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume
that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument
being figuratively spoken of as the agent--a figure of speech
exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a
chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be
represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt
whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the
individual soul and the highest Self.
Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views
is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into
the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in
either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as
'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another
interpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here
ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world
of their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of
the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the
sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the
scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow
smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what
is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed
to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi
and the individual soul are spoken of.
To this we make the following reply:--In the passage under discussion
the individual soul (vij/n/anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of,
because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature.
For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned,
beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance,
the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this
bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So
here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to
determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when
a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for
the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the
soul.--But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be
meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the
cave?--Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest
Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12),
'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.
Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;'
and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not
contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special
locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already
demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works,
which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual
soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one
of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade
also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not
belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like
light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience,
and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore
understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and
the highest Self.--Another reason for this interpretation follows.
12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).
Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only
with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent
passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be
the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual
soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory
existence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end
of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents
the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding
passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his
Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has
entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the
abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same
two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The
highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause,
'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special
class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted
(as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the
passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest
Self.
The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two
birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general
topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore
conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the
passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is
meant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and
of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without
eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again
the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged
into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own
impotence (ani/s/a), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord
(i/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'
Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra,
'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision
of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is
differently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya Brahma/n/a. According to
the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other
being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/n/a); so
that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/n/a). The
objection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the
word kshetraj/n/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in
the first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/n/a have the settled
meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second
place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,)
'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one,
the seer, is the kshetraj/n/a; the two are therefore the internal organ
and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall
under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting
forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by
the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting
and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes
connected with the sa/m/sara and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is
pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on
without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti
passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the
individual soul' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the
passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in
the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the
kshetraj/n/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity
attaches[142].'--But how can, on the above interpretation, the
non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an
enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet
fruit?'--The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the
fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the
intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of
Brahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically
ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so
far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting
and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the
soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in
reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not
the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is
not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be
considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere
presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here
maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one
sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical
assumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the assumption of the
existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the
sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is
all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically
postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative
knowledge.
13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement
(of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).
Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is
the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even
though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on
both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).
The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self
which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of
some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.
With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is
meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image
of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well
known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the
eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately
take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual
Self (cognitional Self, vij/n/anatman) which perceives the colours by
means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and,
moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this
interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to
the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the
passage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his
rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as
immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the
scriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord,
on the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality
is spoken of.
Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by
the person within the eye.--Why?--'On account of the agreement.' For the
qualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest
Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the
highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we
know from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality
and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The
location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest
Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free
from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the
eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the
passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs
away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the
qualities of sa/m/yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord
only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvama, for all blessings
(vama) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vamani, for he leads
(nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati)
in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within
the eye is the highest Lord.
14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.
But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which
is omnipresent like the ether?--To this question we reply that there
would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were
assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so
on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,'
& c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned,
viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so
on,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is
assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that
also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman
which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it.
That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard'
(Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of,
for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name
and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to
attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence,
subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary
to reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred
/s/alagram.
15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is
distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).
There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant
in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman
being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is
distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as
characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in
the clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that
same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage
also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion;
the clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way[147],' merely announcing
that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject
will be started].--How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman,
as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the
passage?--We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is
Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako/s/ala says, 'I understand
that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is
Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is
Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.
If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to
qualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude that the name Brahman is
here symbolically[148] given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in
other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to
the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure
springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If
the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should
conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two
words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they
intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If[149] in the passage referred
to (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second
Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not
added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka
would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being
a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To
prevent this, both words--Ka as well as Kha--are joined with the word
Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to
intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated
upon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the
beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is
spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim
in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is
our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they
point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will
tell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding
passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude
the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying,
'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one
who knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding speech of
the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person
within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person
within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus
appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman
which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent
it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of
Sa/m/yadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus
knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That
person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'
16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the
Upanishads.
The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following
reason also. From /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti we are acquainted with the
way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i.e.
who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described
(Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance,
abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This
is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest.
From thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 24), 'Fire,
light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of
the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to
Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for
him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Ch. Up. IV, 15,
5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to
light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon
to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.
This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who
proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this
description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows
Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.
17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on
account of the non-permanency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the
impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed
to the other Selfs).
To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is
either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul)
or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.--No other Self
such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on
account of non-permanency.--The reflected Self, in the first place, does
not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the
eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the
person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage 'That
person within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of
proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the
object of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of
his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then,
another man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the
image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we
reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that
the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye
another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye.
Scripture, moreover, (viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self)
perishes as soon as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of
the reflected Self.--And, further, 'on account of impossibility' (the
person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the
other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be
perceived in the reflected Self.--Of the cognitional Self, in the second
place, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the
senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in
the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading
may, for the purpose of contemplation, be spoken of as connected with
particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already.
The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility
of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it.
Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the
highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhyaropita)
the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz, mortality and fear; so
that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities
of being the sa/m/yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the
cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power
(ai/s/varya).--In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz.
the sun) has its station in the eye--according to the scriptural
passage, 'He rests with his rays in him'--still Selfhood cannot be
ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva).
Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks
of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of
the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their
lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally
belong to them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the
wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra,
yea, Death runs as the fifth.'--Hence the person in the eye must be
viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being
adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known
and established, which is contained in the words 'is seen' (in the
phrase 'the person that is seen in the eye'), has to be taken as
referring to (the mental perception founded on) the /s/astra which
belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation)
has to be understood as its purpose.
18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because
the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.
In B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules this world and
the other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He who dwells in the
earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the
earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within,
the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of
a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling
within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the
sacrifice, the beings, the Self.--Here now, owing to the unusualness of
the term (antaryamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self
of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who
has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability
of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being.
What alternative then does recommend itself?
As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume
that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all
those mentioned above.--Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we
have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character,
and that, on the other hand, the term antaryamin--which is derived from
antaryamana (ruling within)--cannot be called altogether unknown, that
therefore antaryamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over
the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He
whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,'
& c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on,
dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action;
rulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.--Or else the rulership
spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable
to enter within all things.--The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot
be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are
required for ruling).
To this we make the following reply.--The internal ruler, of whom
Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self,
cannot be anything else.--Why so?--Because its qualities are designated
in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the
statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of
created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate
attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the
omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.--The qualities
of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage,
'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their
primary sense to the highest Self.--Further, the passage, 'He whom the
earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not
known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for
the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.--The attributes
'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of
shape and other sensible qualities.--The objection that the highest Self
is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is
without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to
the organs of action of those whom he rules.--If it should be objected
that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual
soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad
infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no
other ruler (but the highest Self[150]). The objection would be valid
only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.--For all
these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.
19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Sm/ri/ti assumes,
(viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not
belonging to it.
Good so far, a Sa@nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of
not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana assumed by the
Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other
sensible qualities. For their Sm/ri/ti says, 'Undiscoverable,
unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also
the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects.
Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana.
The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra I, 1, 5,
but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging
to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.
To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies that the word 'internal
ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to
the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as
not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the
Sa@nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage
which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler
(B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but
hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'--And Selfhood
also cannot belong to the pradhana.
Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote
the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us
suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is
intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is
internal (pratya/nk/), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is
immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil
actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not
being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an
action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the
action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance
(B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The
individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of
the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler
is the embodied soul.--To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.
20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the internal
ruler), for both also (i.e. both recensions of the B/ri/had Ara/n/yaka)
speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).
The word 'not' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding
Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual
soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a
jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the
other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of
both /s/akhas, i.e. the Ka/n/vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in
their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler,
viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the
object of his rule. The Ka/n/vas read (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who
dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If
the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual
soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word
'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is
therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual
soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'--But how,
it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two
seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul
different from him?--Why--we ask in return--should that be
impossible?--Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural
passages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that
there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal
ruler under discussion.--May, we rejoin, that passage not have the
purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?--No, the opponent
replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no
occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any
specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in
general.)
We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's
objection.--The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and
the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of
the organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely
true. For the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not
possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically
treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the
ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those
scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object
of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the
intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of
Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance
with this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is duality, as it were,
there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists
only in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent passage, 'But when
the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the
practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.
21. That which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on (is
Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.
Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the
Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized,
which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without
hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal,
that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the
source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).--Here the doubt arises
whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by
invisibility, &c. be the pradhana or the embodied soul, or the highest
Lord.
We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings
the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately
subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned
as parallel instances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its
thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring
forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the
Indestructible.'--But, it may be objected, men and spiders which are
here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.--No, the
purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the
source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the
non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source
of the threads; and so in the case of man also.--While, moreover, in the
case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be
accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as
invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer
and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as
invisibility which agree with the pradhana, no attribute of a contrary
nature being mentioned.--But the qualities mentioned in the
complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), 'He who knows all and perceives
all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the
source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana?--To this the
purvapakshin replies: The passage, 'The higher knowledge is that by
which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,'
& c., points, by means of the term 'the Indestructible,' to the source of
all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This
same 'Indestructible' is again mentioned later on in the passage, 'It is
higher than the high Imperishable.' Now that which in this latter
passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the
qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhana
denoted by the term 'the Imperishable' is the source of all beings.--If,
however, the word 'source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative
cause, we may by 'the source of the beings' understand the embodied Self
also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin
of the complex of things.
To this we make the following reply.--That which here is spoken of as
the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as
invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing
else.--Whereupon is this conclusion founded?--On the statement of
attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,'
clearly states an attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since
the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated
either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power
of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that
the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under
discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all
beings--which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable'--not to
the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible
because the source of all beings, which--in the clause, 'From the
Indestructible everything here arises'--is designated as the material
cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and
again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9),
'From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of
knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As
therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of discussion
is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred
to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same
Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are
ascribed.--We further maintain that also the passage, 'Higher than the
high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the
imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of
discussion. We conclude this from the circumstance that the passage, 'He
truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the
imperishable true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the
passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely
declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by
invisibility and the like--which formed the subject of the preceding
chapter--will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is
called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the
next Sutra.--Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the
Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that
it comprises the /Ri/g-veda and so on, and then the text continues, 'The
higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.'
Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher
knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible
distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different
from the highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not be the
higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on
account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere
worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would
assume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge of the
pradhana.--Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest
Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable
source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be
acknowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds
only.--Further, the reference to the knowledge of everything being
implied in the knowledge of one thing--which is contained in the passage
(I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything
else becomes known?'--is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the
Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which comprises only what is
non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of
enjoyment.--The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman
as the chief subject--which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told
the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest
son Atharvan'--and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of
knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads
to the comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of
the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the
term 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that
Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not
Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the /Ri/g-veda,
and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for
the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages
in which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I,
2, 7), 'But frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen
in which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as
the highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.'
After these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away
from the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12),
'Let a Brahama/n/a after he has examined all these worlds which are
gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is
eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him
in order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru
who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'--The remark that,
because the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as
parallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source
of all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it
is not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other
should be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which
the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are
material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be
material.--For all these reasons the source of all beings, which
possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.
22. The two others (i.e. the individual soul and the pradhana) are not
(the source of all beings) because there are stated distinctive
attributes and difference.
The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the two
others, viz. the pradhana and the individual soul, on account of the
following reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the
source of all beings from the embodied soul, as something of a different
nature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), 'That heavenly person is without
body, he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and
without mind, pure.' The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as
being of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the
individual soul, which erroneously considers itself to be limited by
name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their
attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly refers to the
Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.--In the second place,
the source of all beings which forms the general topic is represented in
the text as something different from the pradhana, viz. in the passage,
'Higher than the high Imperishable.' Here the term 'Imperishable' means
that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal potentiality of
names and forms, contains the fine parts of the material elements,
abides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, and being itself no
effect is high in comparison to all effects; the whole phrase, 'Higher
than the high Imperishable,' which expresses a difference then clearly
shows that the highest Self is meant here.--We do not on that account
assume an independent entity called pradhana and say that the source of
all beings is stated separately therefrom; but if a pradhana is to be
assumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being
assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the
statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings denoted
by the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on, we have no objection to such
an assumption, and declare that, on account of the separate statement
therefrom, i.e. from that pradhana, 'the source of all beings' must mean the highest Lord.--A further argument in favour of the same conclusion is supplied by the next Sutra. |
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