[Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that
account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters
themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]
[Footnote 202: With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally
accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as
different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the
upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between
articulated letters and non-articulated tone.]
[Footnote 203: I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its
object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary
sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the
letters, although more than one, express one sense only.]
[Footnote 204: Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge
appertains not only to Hira/n/yagarbha, but to many beings.]
[Footnote 205: Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.]
[Footnote 206: Asmin kalpe sarvesham pra/n/inam dahapakapraka/s/akari
yozyam agnir d/ris/yate sozyam agni/h/ purvasmin kalpe manushya/h/ san
devatvapadaprapaka/m/ karmanush/th/ayasmin kalpa etaj janma labdhavan
ata/h/ purvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini/m/ sa/m/j/n/am a/sri/tyagnir
iti vyapadi/s/yate.--Saya/n/a on the quoted passage.]
[Footnote 207: As, for instance, 'So long as Aditya rises in the east
and sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).]
[Footnote 208: Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings,
and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.]
[Footnote 209: Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a
person with a staff in his hand, Varu/n/a with a noose, Indra with a
thunderbolt, &c. &c.]
[Footnote 210: On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according
to the Mima/m/sa, cp. Arthasa/m/graha, Introduction.]
[Footnote 211: See above, p. 197.]
[Footnote 212: Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.]
[Footnote 213: /S/rautali@ngenanumanabadha/m/ dar/s/ayitva smartenapi
tadbadha/m/ dar/s/ayati smartam iti. Ki/m/ atra brahma am/ri/tam ki/m/
svid vedyam anuttamam, /k/intayet tatra vai gatva gandharvo mam
ap/rikkh/ata, Vi/s/vavasus tato rajan vedantaj/n/anakovida iti
mokshadharme janakayaj/n/avalkyasa/m/vadat prahladajagarasa/m/vada/k/
/k/oktanumanasiddhir ity artha/h/.]
[Footnote 214: As opposed to an action to be accomplished.]
[Footnote 215: Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, 'Fire is
a remedy for cold.']
[Footnote 216: Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the
sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun,
luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).]
[Footnote 217: And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a
certain word forming part of a mantra.]
[Footnote 218: The rajasuya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who
wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.]
[Footnote 219: In one of whose stages the being desirous of final
emancipation becomes a deva.]
[Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of
his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not,
however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]
[Footnote 221: The /S/udra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic
matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under
the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidya.]
[Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/udra' has no proving
power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority if not
connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the
li@nga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted by those
injunctions which militate against the /S/udras' qualification for Vedic
matters.]
[Footnote 223: Ha/m/savakyad atmanoznadara/m/ /s/rutva jana/s/rute/h/
/s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenasau /s/udra/s/abdena
sa/k/yate tatraha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ananda Giri.]
[Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of
/S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read
/k/aitrarathinamaika/h/). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by
/k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.--The text of the Ta/nd/ya Br. runs:
tasma/k/ /k/aitrarathinam eka/h/ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary
explains: tasmat kara/n/ad adyapi /k/itrava/ms/otpannana/m/ madhye eka
eva raja kshatrapatir baladhipatir bhavati.--Grammar does not authorise
the form /k/ahraratha used in the Sutra.]
[Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brahma/n/as as his
pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the
upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the
general rule.]
[Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be
translated as follows (and are so translated by the purvapakshin),
'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the pra/n/a, there goes
forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']
[Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that
the Self does not really think or move.]
FOURTH PADA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference
(i.e. the pradhana); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers
to what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself);
and (that the text) shows.
In the preceding part of this work--as whose topic there has been set
forth an enquiry into Brahman--we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1,
2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies
to the pradhana also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority
for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common
purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman,
and not the pradha/n/a, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the
Sa@nkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been
finally disposed of.
It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no
scriptural authority for the pradhana; for some /s/akhas contain
expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhana. From this it
follows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of
the pradhana being the general cause only because it is based on the
Veda.--As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages
to which the Sa@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not
allude to the pradhana), all our previous argumentation as to the
omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as
unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving
that those passages actually have a different meaning.
The Sa@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e.
the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some /s/akhas. We read, for
instance, they say, in the Ka/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there
is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There
we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order,
the three entities with which we are acquainted from the
Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the
pradhana), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the
pradhana is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the
etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhana being
called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It
cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for
the pradhana. And this pradhana vouched for by Scripture we declare to
be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and
ratiocination.
Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Ka/th/aka
quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great
principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the
Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti. We do not recognise there the pradhana of the
Sa@nkhyas, i.e. an independent general cause consisting of three
constituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which
does not denote any particular determined thing, but may--owing to its
etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not
manifest'--denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The
Sa@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to
the pradhana; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and
has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does
mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be
recognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a
horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We,
moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that
the passage does not refer to the pradhana the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas,
'on account of there being referred to that which is contained in the
simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the
simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer
this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the
circumstance of nothing else remaining.--The immediately preceding part
of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so
on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the
Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the
intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call
the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is
in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call
him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c.
are not well controlled enters into sa/m/sara, while he who has them
under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of
Vish/n/u. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the
highest place of Vish/n/u? Whereupon the text explains that the highest
Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the
journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. 'Beyond the senses there are the
objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is
the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great
there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.
Beyond the Person there is nothing--this is the goal, the highest Road.'
In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding
simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the
mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject.
The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages
under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the
objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the
senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known
from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e.
graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas
(B/ri/ Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects,
because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the
mind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects
of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher
than the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord
of the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the
chariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest
from the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to
intelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally
superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately
called great as it is the master.--Or else the phrase 'the great Self'
may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/n/yagarbha which is
the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following
Sm/ri/ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman;
the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge,
consciousness; thought, remembrance[229], and likewise with the
following scriptural passage, 'He (Hira/n/ya-garbha) who first creates
Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18). The
intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its
common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be
represented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter
explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the
personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer
is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned
last); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal
Self and the highest Self are identical.--Thus there remains now the
body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore
conclude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the
other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place,
points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only
thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the
body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of
the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through
sa/m/sara and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c.
of the soul--which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a
body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.--are compared to
a chariot, and so on.--In accordance with this the subsequent verse
states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish/n/u ('the
Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by
subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that
the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that
cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should
keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down
within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet
Self.'--That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the
outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he
should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external
objects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision,
recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain
intelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the
fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm
Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole
chapter treats.--If we in this manner review the general context, we
perceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the
Sankhyas.
2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its
capability (of being so designated).
It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term 'the
Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general subject-matter and
because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the
Sa@nkhyas.--But here the following doubt arises: How can the word
'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and
clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i.e. that which
is developed or manifested?
To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is
the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped.
The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the
subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be
called so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to
the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance,
the phrase 'mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk' (/Ri/g-veda. S. IX, 46,
4). Another scriptural passage also--'now all this was then undeveloped'
(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7)--shows that this, i.e. this developed world with
its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed
undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely
seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of
name and form.
3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on
account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is)
according to reason.
Here a new objection is raised.--If, the opponent says, in order to
prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit
that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names
or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede
the doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we
Sa@nkhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent
condition of the world.
Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state
of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should
indeed implicitly, admit the pradhana doctrine. What we admit is,
however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an
independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed
by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and
reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as
creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the
potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality
renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on
new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For
that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly
denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its
substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep
in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of
the consciousness of their individual character.[230] This undeveloped
principle is sometimes denoted by the term aka/s/a, ether; so, for
instance, in the passage, 'In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether
is woven like warp and woof' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11). Sometimes, again,
it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance
(Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it
is spoken of as Maya, illusion; so, for instance (/S/ve. Up. IV, 10),
'Know then Prak/ri/ti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected
with Maya.' For Maya is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested
since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is
not.--The statement of the Ka/th/aka that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the
Great one' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the
Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira/n/yagarbha. If,
on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul,
the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual
soul depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience. For the continued
existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the
relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond
the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e.
Nescience, is attributed to the body which is the product of Nescience,
the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Although the
senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term 'the
Undeveloped' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having
already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body
alone being left.--Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a
somewhat different explanation[231].--There are, they say, two kinds of
body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which
is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on.
(Ved. Su. III, 1, 1.) Both these bodies together were in the simile
compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only
the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body
only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing
through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is
said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i.e. just as the
objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the
latter depends on the objects.--But how--we ask interpreters--is it
possible that the word 'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body
only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile
been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the
topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the passage
under discussion)?--If you should rejoin that you are authorised to
settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find
fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs
in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body
which is vyakta, i.e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this
rejoinder by remarking that the determination of the sense depends on
the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical
whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they
convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject
started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot
be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a
complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the
connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the
latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had
been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred
to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves
from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that
the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that
reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while
the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily
perceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means refer to
such a distinction--as we conclude from the circumstance of there being
no verb enjoining it--but has for its only subject the highest place of
Vish/n/u, which had been mentioned immediately before. For after having
enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always
superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is
beyond the Person.--We might, however, accept the interpretation just
discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever
explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Ka/th/aka passage
does not refer to the pradhana.
4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because there is no statement as
to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.
The Sa@nkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhana as something to be
cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference
of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there
results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of
the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise
the difference of the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the
pradhana is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special
powers.--Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not
mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word
avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be
known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a
knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of
any advantage to man.--For this reason also we maintain that the word
avyakta cannot denote the pradhana.--Our interpretation, on the other
hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the
body (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of
throwing light on the highest place of Vish/n/u, in continuation of the
simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.
5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhana as an
object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is
meant, on account of the general subject-matter.
Here the Sa@nkhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the
averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on
speaks of the pradhana--which had been referred to as the
Undeveloped--as an object of knowledge. 'He who has perceived that which
is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without
taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond
the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up.
II, 3, 15). For here the text speaks of the pradhana, which is beyond
the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the
Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of
perception. Hence we conclude that the pradhana is denoted by the term
avyakta.
To this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as the
object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i.e. the
highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that
the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the
following reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage,
'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest
Road;' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the
passage, 'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,'
because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the
restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in
the passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and,
finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of
its knowledge. The Sa@nkhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a
man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana,
but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent
Self.--The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as
possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage
quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows,
that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of
knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.
6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only
(not to the pradhana).
To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the
circumstance that the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad brings forward, as subjects
of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the
individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama
explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only
the questions of Na/k/iketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or
enquired about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained
in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire
sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of
faith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, 1, 20,
'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he
is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of
my boons.' And the question about the highest Self is asked in the
passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as
neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me
that.'--The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told
him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what
bricks are required for the altar, and how many;' in the passage met
with considerably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall
tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self
after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as
organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work
and according to their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2, 18), 'The
knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which latter passage
dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no question relative
to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.
Here the Sa@nkhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question
relative to the Self which is asked in the passage, 'There is that doubt
when a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in the passage, 'That which thou
seest as neither this nor that,' &c, or does the latter passage raise a
distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self
coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions
only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the
Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and
explanations relating to three subjects.--If the latter, you do not
consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of
boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an
explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions
asked.
To this we make the following reply.--We by no means assume a question
in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so
by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which
constitutes the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the
topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the
Upanishad--which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and
Na/k/iketas--carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to
Na/k/iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first
boon Na/k/iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him,
for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third
boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the
third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1,
20), 'There is that doubt--; this is the third of my boons.'--If we
therefore supposed that the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither
this nor that,' &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a
question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the
connexion of the entire Upanishad.--But--the Sa@nkhya will perhaps
interpose--it must needs be admitted that the passage last quoted does
raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one.
For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude
from the doubt expressed in the words, 'There is that doubt when a man
is dead--some saying, he is; others, he is not.' Now this individual
soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object
of a question expressed in such terms as, 'This which thou seest as
neither this nor that,' &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be
enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The
appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the
former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter
is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c.
Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one
cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume
the subject of the former one.--All this argumentation is not valid, we
reply, since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the
individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest
Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate
independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know
from other scriptural passages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the
Upanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which
thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, 'The knowing
Self is not born, it dies not'--which answer is given in the form of a
denial of the birth and death of the Self-clearly shows that the
embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room
for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the
possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since
it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.--There is,
moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4,
'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in
sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.'
This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge
of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of
greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual
Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of
all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a
recognised Vedanta tenet.--There is another passage also warning men not
to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different
entities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is
there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death
to death.'--The following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration.
When Na/k/iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or
non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to
choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of
desire. But Na/k/iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the
distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom
and ignorance, praises Na/k/iketas, 'I believe Na/k/iketas to be one who
desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I,
2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na/k/iketas, 'The wise
who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is
difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in
the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and
sorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the
individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if
Na/k/iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for
himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked
a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly.
Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou
seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the
question in I, 1, 20 had referred.--Nor is there any basis to the
objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in
reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first
enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the
second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to
sa/m/sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is
affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes
to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such
scriptural texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or
inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the
soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the
ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling;
thereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it is only a rope,
not a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined
snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subsequent
absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no
difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of
the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul,
although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained
in the passage, 'It is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered
as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.--The Sutra is
to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual
Self and the highest Self which results from Nescience. Although the
question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former
part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since
there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the
time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific
marks of the sa/m/sara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied;
while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of
being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest
Self.--For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of
question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul,
and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the
pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can
point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an
answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.
7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.
While the Sa@nkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the
first-born entity, which is mere existence[232] (? viz. the intellect),
the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its
being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following,
'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great
omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great person' (/S/ve.
Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it
occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhana.--The pradhana is
therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.
8. (It cannot be maintained that aja means the pradhana) because no
special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.
Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that
the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved.
For, he says, we have the following mantra (/S/ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is
one aja[233], red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the
same nature. There is one aja who loves her and lies by her; there is
another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'--In this mantra the
words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements
of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i.e.
influencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is of the
nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and
obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent
elements, i.e. the pradhana, is denoted by the attributes of its parts,
and is therefore called red-white-black. It is further called aja, i.e.
unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of
which everything springs, not a mere effect.--But has not the word aja
the settled meaning of she-goat?--True; but the ordinary meaning of the
word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the
general subject-matter.--That pradhana produces many creatures
participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves
her and lies by her, i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach
her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are
in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory
existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative
knowledge, lose their attachment to prak/ri/ti, and leave her after
having enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and
release.--On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the
followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana
hypothesis.
To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means
proves the Sa@nkhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra,
taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any
doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms aja, &c.
can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the
special assertion that the Sa@nkhya doctrine only is meant. The case is
analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup
having its mouth below and its bottom above' (B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just
as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by
itself what special cup is meant--it being possible to ascribe, somehow
or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup--so
here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible
to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the
term aja, or something else.--But in connexion with the mantra about the
cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup
is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom
above is this head.'--Whence, however, can we learn what special being
is meant by the aja of the /S/veta/s/vatara-upanishad?--To this question
the next Sutra replies.
9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term aja);
for some read so in their text.
By the term aja we have to understand the causal matter of the four
classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and
begins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and earth.--The word
'but' (in the Sutra) gives emphasis to the assertion.--This aja is to be
considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting
of three gu/n/as in the Sa@nkhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the
fact that one /s/akha, after having related how fire, water, and earth
sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on.
'The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary
fire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black
colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements--fire, water,
and earth--we recognise in the /S/veta/s/vatara passage, as the words
red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words
primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sa@nkhya
gu/n/as in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond
doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a
generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the
/S/veta/s/vatara--after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The
Brahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'--the text, previous to the
passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which
arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and
concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in
its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in
two subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, Prak/ri/ti is Maya,
and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya;' 'who being one only
rules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that
the mantra treating of the aja refers to some independent causal matter
called pradhana. We rather assert, on the ground of the general
subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred
to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and
which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world
in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is
represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water,
and earth, have three distinct colours.--But how can we maintain, on the
ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal
matter is appropriately called a three-coloured aja? if we consider, on
the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus aja (i.e. goat) does
not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that
Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that
the word aja cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced[234].'--To this
question the next Sutra replies.
10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor)
there is nothing contrary to reason (in aja denoting the causal matter);
just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.
The word aja neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the
goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather
expresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the assumption of the source
of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being
compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be
partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats
resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by
her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her;
so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising
fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings
similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience,
while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true
knowledge.--Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual
souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that
reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of
other philosophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to
intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of the
states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with
reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that
multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is
the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural
passages such as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings,
all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.--The words 'like the honey'
(in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is
represented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a cow (B/ri/. Up.
V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 9),
so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is
metaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary
to reason in the circumstance of the term aja being used to denote the
aggregate of fire, water, and earth.
11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the pradhana,
& c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the
Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and
on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).
The attempt to base the Sa@nkhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the
aja having failed, the Sa@nkhya again comes forward and points to
another mantra: 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest,
him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be
Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which
expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word,
viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together
therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many
beings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories
the Sankhya system counts. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika, 3: 'The fundamental
causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven
(substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal
substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither
a causal substance nor an effect.' As therefore the number twenty-five,
which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the
twenty-five categories taught in the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, it follows that
the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.
To this reasoning we make the following reply.--It is impossible to base
the assertion that the pradhana, &c. have Scripture in their favour on
the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, 'on
account of the diversity of the Sa@nkhya categories.' The Sa@nkhya
categories have each their individual difference, and there are no
attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the
number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number
of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into
smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for
such combination.--Here the Sa@nkhya will perhaps rejoin that the
expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number
twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as
the poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only
that there was no rain for twelve years.--But this explanation also is
not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it
has recourse to indirect indication.[235] In the second place, the
second 'five' constitutes a compound with the word 'people,' the
Brahma/n/a-accent showing that the two form one word only.[236] To the
same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Sa/m/h. I, 6,
2, 2, pa/nk/ana/m/ tva pa/nk/ajananam, &c.) where the two terms
constitute one word, have one accent and one case-termination. The word
thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,'
involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the
mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another
word.--But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound
'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound
will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the
expression 'five five-bundles' (pa/nk/a pa/nk/apulya/h/) conveys the
idea of twenty-five bundles.--The instance is not an analogous one, we
reply. The word 'pa/nk/apuli' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up
of five bundles) and hence when the question arises, 'How many such
bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating
that there are five such bundles. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/, on the other
hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct
things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know
how many people there are, and hence no room for a further
qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it
can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection
against which assumption has already been stated.--For all these reasons
the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five
categories of the Sa@nkhyas.--This is further not possible 'on account
of the excess.' For on the Sa@nkhya interpretation there would be an
excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the
ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as
the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe
to be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent
clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sa@nkhyas which is
already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on
their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as
constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the
other hand, the soul were supposed not to be compiled in the twenty-five
categories, the Sa@nkhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the
categories being twenty-five. The same remarks apply to the separate
mention made of the ether.--How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a
certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the
assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sa@nkhya categories of
which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that
the word jana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the
number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the passage. |
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