The Vedanta-Sutras 21

	The Vedanta-Sutras 21

The teacher has now refuted all the objections, such as difference of character, and the like, which other teachers have brought forward against what he had established as the real sense of the Veda, viz. that the intelligent Brahman is the cause and matter of this world. Now, before entering on a new chapter, whose chief aim it will be to refute the (positive) opinions held by other teachers, he sums up the foregoing chapter, the purport of which it was to show why his view should be accepted.--Because, if that Brahman is acknowledged as the cause of the world, all attributes required in the cause (of the world) are seen to be present--Brahman being all-knowing, all-powerful, and possessing the great power of Maya,--on that account this our system, founded on the Upanishads, is not open to any objections. Notes: [Footnote 253: The Sm/ri/ti called Tantra is the Sa@nkhya/s/astra as taught by Kapila; the Sm/ri/ti-writers depending on him are Asuri, Pa/nk/a/s/ikha, and others.] [Footnote 254: Mima/m/sa Su. I, 1, 2: /k/odanalaksha/n/osxrtho dharma/h/. Commentary: /k/odana iti kriyaya/h/ pravartaka/m/ va/k/anam ahu/h/.] [Footnote 255: Purushartha; in opposition to the rules referred to in the preceding sentence which are kratvartha, i.e. the acting according to which secures the proper performance of certain rites.] [Footnote 256: It having been decided by the Purva Mima/m/sa already that Sm/ri/tis contradicted by /S/ruti are to be disregarded.] [Footnote 257: On the meaning of 'kapila' in the above passage, compare the Introduction to the Upanishads, translated by Max Muller, vol. ii, p. xxxviii ff.--As will be seen later on, /S/a@nkara, in this bhashya, takes the Kapila referred to to be some /ri/shi.] [Footnote 258: I.e. religious duty is known only from the injunctive passages of the Veda.] [Footnote 259: After it has been shown that Kapila the dvaitavadin is not mentioned in /S/ruti, it is now shown that Manu the sarvatmavadin is mentioned there.] [Footnote 260: In which passage the phrase 'to be meditated upon' (nididhyasa) indicates the act of mental concentration characteristic of the Yoga.] [Footnote 261: The ash/t/akas (certain oblations to be made on the eighth days after the full moons of the seasons hemanta and /s/i/s/ira) furnish the stock illustration for the doctrine of the Purva Mim. that Sm/ri/ti is authoritative in so far as it is based on /S/ruti.] [Footnote 262: But why--it will be asked--do you apply yourself to the refutation of the Sa@nkhya and Yoga only, and not also to that of other Sm/ri/tis conflicting with the Vedanta views?] [Footnote 263: I.e. from the fact of these terms being employed in a passage standing close to other passages which refer to Vedic knowledge.] [Footnote 264: The cognition of Brahman terminates in an act of anubhava; hence as it has been shown that reasoning is more closely connected with anubhava than /S/ruti is, we have the right to apply reasoning to /S/ruti.--Ananda Giri comments on the passage from anubhavavasanam as follows: brahmasakshatkarasya mokshopayataya pradhanyat tatra /s/abdad api parokshago/k/arad aparoksharthasadharmyago/k/aras tarkosxntara@ngam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity artha/h/. Aitihyamatre/n/a pravadaparamparyamatre/n/a parokshatayeti yavat. Anubhavasya pradhanye tarkasyoktanyayena tasminn antara@ngatvad agamasya /k/a bahira@ngatvad antara@ngabahira@ngayor antara@nga/m/ balavad ity nyayad ukta/m/ tarkasya balavattvam. Anubhavapradhanya/m/ tu nadyapi siddham ity a/s/a@nkyahanubhaveti. Nanu Brahmaj/n/adna/m/ vaidikatvad dharmavad ad/ri/sh/t/aphalam esh/t/avya/m/ tat kutosxsyanubhavavasanavidyanivartakatva/m/ tatraha moksheti. Adhish/th/anasakshatkarasya /s/uktyadj/n/ane tadavidyatatkaryanivartakatvad/ri/sh/t/e/h/, brahmaj/n/anasyapi tarkava/s/ad asambhavanadinirasadvara sakshatkaravasayinas tadavidyadinivartakatvenaiva muktihetuteti nad/ri/sh/t/aphalatety artha/h/.] [Footnote 265: Nirati/s/aya/h/, upajanapayadharma/s/unyatva/m/ nirati/s/ayatvam. An. Gi.] [Footnote 266: A sentence replying to the possible objection that the world, as being the effect of the intelligent Brahman, might itself be intelligent.] [Footnote 267: In the case of things commonly considered non-intelligent, intelligence is not influenced by an internal organ, and on that account remains unperceived; samaste jagati satoszpi /k/aitanyasya tatra tatranta/h/kara/n/apari/n/amanuparagad anupalabdhir aviruddha. An. Gi.] [Footnote 268: On i/s/vara in the above meaning, compare Deussen, p. 69, note 41.] [Footnote 269: The line 'prak/ri/tibhya/h/ param,' &c. is wanting in all MSS. I have consulted.] [Footnote 270: Ananda Giri on the above passage: /s/rutyaka@nkshita/m/ tarkam eva mananavidhivishayam udaharati svapnanteti. Svapnajagaritayor mithovyabhi/k/arad atmana/h/ svabhavatas tadvattvabhavad avastha dvayena tasya svatosxsa/m/p/ri/ktatvam ato jivasyavasthavatvena nabrahmatvam ity artha/h/. Tathapi dehaditadatmyenatmano bhavan na ni/h/prapa/nk/abrahmatety a/s/a@nkyaha sa/m/prasade /k/eti. Sata somya tada sa/m/panno bhavatiti /s/rute/h/ sushupte ni/h/prapa/nk/asadatmatvavagamad atmanas tathavidhabrahmatvasiddhir ity artha/h/. Dvaitagrahipratyakshadivirodhat katham atmanosxdvitiyabrahmatvam ity a/s/a@nkya tajjatvadihetuna brahmatiriktavastvabhavasiddher adhyakshadinam atatvavedakaprama/n/yad avirodhad yuktam atmano xsvitiyabrahmatvam ity aha prapa/nk/asyeti.] [Footnote 271: Let us finally assume, merely for argument's sake, that a vailaksha/n/ya of cause and effect is not admissible, and enquire whether that assumption can be reconciled more easily with an intelligent or a non-intelligent cause of the world.] [Footnote 272: Nanu pralayakale karyadharma/s/ /k/en navatish/th/eran na tarhi kara/n/adharma api tish/th/eyus tayor abhedat tatrahananyatveszpiti. An. Gi.] [Footnote 273: For if they are effects of the pradhana they must as such be reabsorbed into it at the time of general reabsorption.] [Footnote 274: And that the Vedanta view is preferable because the nullity of the objections has already been demonstrated in its case.] [Footnote 275: The whole style of argumentation of the Mima/m/sa would be impossible, if all reasoning were sound; for then no purvapaksha view could be maintained.] [Footnote 276: The following arthavada-passage, for instance, 'the sacrificial post is the sun,' is to be taken in a metaphorical sense; because perception renders it impossible for us to take it in its literal meaning.] [Footnote 277: Which are to be known from the Veda only.] [Footnote 278: Pari/n/amavadam avalambyapatato virodha/m/ samadhaya vivartavadam a/s/ritya paramasamadhanam aha. An. Gi.] [Footnote 279: Ananda Giri construes differently: etad uktam iti, paramarthato vij/n/atam iti sambandha/h/.] [Footnote 280: D/ri/sh/t/eti kada/k/id dr/ri/sh/t/a/m/ punar nash/t/am anityam iti yavat.--D/ri/sh/t/agraha/n/asu/k/ita/m/ pratitikalesxpi sattarahitya/m/ tatraiva hetvantaram aha svarupe/n/eti. An. Gi.] [Footnote 281: In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being compared to the 'false-minded' thief who, knowing himself to be guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.] [Footnote 282: I.e. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes.] [Footnote 283: Svapnajagraddehayor vyabhi/k/arezpi pratyabhij/n/anat tadanugatatmaikyasiddhe/s/ /k/aitanyasya /k/a dehadharmatve rutmano dehadvayatiredkasiddher dehatratmavado na yukta ity artha/h/. An. Gi.] [Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahara; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.] [Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yadi/s/rutina/m/ svarthe phatavaikalye satiti yavat. An. Gi.] [Footnote 286: A Mima/m/sa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is independent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act.] [Footnote 287: According to the /S/ruti 'in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he passes himself.'] [Footnote 288: Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na hisvaratvena te niru/k/yete ja/d/ajadayor abhedayogat napi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/ svatantrye/n/a sattasphurtyasambhavat na hi j/ad/am aga/d/anapekshya/m/ sattasphurtimad upalakshyate ja/d/atvabha@ngaprasa@ngat tasmad avidyatmake namarupe ity artha/h/. An. Gi.] [Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.] [Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.] [Footnote 291: I.e. (as An. Gi. explains) because we assume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhavanuvidhayibhavatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatva/m/ /k/a karyasya kara/n/ananyatve hetur dhumavi/s/eshasya /k/agnibhavanuvidhayibhavatvesxpi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat.] [Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non-existing.] [Footnote 293: Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate relation, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.] [Footnote 294: Samavayasya svatantryapaksha/m/ dushayati anabhyupagamyamane/k/eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate ki/m/ tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyagu/n/adina/m/ /k/a. viprakarsha/h/ syat sa/m/nidhayakabhavad ity artha/h/. An. Gi.] [Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.] [Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; analogously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.] [Footnote 297: Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha /k/a yathavayavai/h/ sutra/m/ kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi g/r/ihyate tatha katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am ity artha/h/. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta ki/m/ va tadatiriklavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana/m/ drish/l/am iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum a/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitiyam dushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prak/ri/tavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syad iti bhava/h/. An. Gi.] [Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.] [Footnote 299: Every action, /S/a@nkara says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to assume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.] [Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of this adhyaya.] [Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.] [Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the 'and' of the Sutra.] [Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etana' as found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.] [Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti, pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am a/k/aryadyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ An. Gi.] [Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/a@nkara divides the Sutra; An. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: atmani /k/eti vyakhyaya vi/k/itra/s/ /k/a hiti vya/k/ash/t/e.'] [Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else--against the assumption--consist of parts.] [Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we assume the three gu/n/as in combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.] [Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more space than one atom.] [Footnote 309: The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sutra 24.] [Footnote 310: The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Maya joined with time and karman.] [Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. An. Avidya naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha. An. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva niv/ri/tter api darsanad i/s/varasyapi mayamayyam lilayam tatha-bhave vinapi sa/my/agj/n/ana/m/ sa/m/sarasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatraha na /ke/ti. Anirva/ky/a khalv avidya paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhavo lileti /kok/yate tatra na pratitikasvabhavayam anupapattir avataratity artha/h/.] [Footnote 312: From this passage we must not--the commentators say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common cause only (as Parjanya does).] [Footnote 313: Ragadveshamoha ragadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhadibhi/h/ kli/s/yantita kle/s/as tesb/am/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/as tabhir aksbipta/m/ dharmadilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshavidya. An. Gi.] SECOND PADA. REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF! 1. That which is inferred (by the Sa@nkhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis). Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the Sa@nkhya and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Vedanta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others. Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sa@nkhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness. But, it might be said, the Sa@nkhya and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished. As the Sa@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-passages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta-texts. The Sa@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together constitute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e. enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as the limitation of all effects and the like[316]. Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sankhyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word 'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next Sa@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides. 2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity. Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible. But, the Sa@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the Sa@nkhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sa@nkhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)?--We must, the Sa@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324] existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent. To all this we--the Vedantins--make the following reply.--We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be raised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.--If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience.--Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause. 3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence). Well, the Sa@nkhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.--As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man. This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers. Scriptural passages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in the water and within the water, who rules the water within,' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 4; and, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gargi, some rivers flow to the East,' &c., B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our general principle[325] cannot be used to show that the latter is too wide.--Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move either with absolute independence--for its flow depends on the declivity of the soil and similar circumstances--or independently of an intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in all cases.--If, finally, our opponent should point to Sutra II, 1, 24 as contradicting the present Sutra, we remark that there we have merely shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord. 4. And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.) The three gu/n/as of the Sa@nkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the pradhana. Beyond the pradhana there exists no external principle which could either impel the pradhana to activity or restrain it from activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves to--nor restrains from--action. As therefore the pradhana stands in no relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being connected with the power of illusion (maya). 5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal). Let this be (the Sa@nkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c. independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhana also transforms itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the transformation of the pradhana is of the same kind. To this we make the following reply.--The transformation of the pradhana might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men, others result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more milk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the pradhana cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like. 6. Even if we admit (the Sa@nkhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana). Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sa@nkhya's) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.--If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].--It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul. 7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome). Well then--the Sa@nkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances--let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana.--Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana? A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.--The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Maya and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sa@nkhyas). 8. And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gu/n/as). For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible.--The condition of the pradhana consists in the three gu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other effects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu/n/as--is impossible. 9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of intelligence. But--the Sa@nkhya resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise. Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, & c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sa@nkhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover, if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before[333]. 10. And moreover (the Sa@nkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions. The doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions. Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts /S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Sm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the Sa@nkhya system is objectionable. Here the Sa@nkhya again brings a countercharge--The system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light. And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves, & c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and light.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained. (And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and 'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person (anarthin). An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term 'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed. All this reasoning--we, the Vedantins, reply--is futile, because on account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject. But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself since it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and sufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed (which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is not difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of suffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless to seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and suffers pain.--Nor would you (the Sa@nkhya) also assume that the affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can you admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach to the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain that the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these two[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because it leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not really suffer. If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to the phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit, that, then my (the Vedantic) doctrine also is free from objections[345]. But perhaps you (the Sa@nkhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on the part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the impossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as the cause of suffering (viz. the pradhana) is admitted to be eternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that, although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhana) are eternal, yet suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the two--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the non-discrimination of the pradhana by the soul--and that hence, when that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal. And as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and sinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the conjunction of soul and pradhana (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the Sa@nkhyas cannot escape the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine. To the Vedantin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it. Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhana to be the cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.