Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and
cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of
the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have
reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the
single members constituting the series.--The former alternative is
impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members
of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that
the series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is
likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any
momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely
undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence),
since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states
through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence[400]. And
in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after
having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual
observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues
to exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of
cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either
case.
The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the
Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto,
must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with
its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative
would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction
takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve
the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'[401]. As
therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine
must be declared unsatisfactory.
24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a
non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two
other kinds of non-entity).
We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be
devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two
(viz. prati-sa/m/khyavirodha and aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we
now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aka/s/a).
With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is
non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of
space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated
of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the
first place from certain scriptural passages, such as 'space sprang from
the Self.'--To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as
to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real
existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we
observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the
other qualities.--Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the
absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow
that while one bird is flying--whereby space is occupied--there would be
no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you
should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence
of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the
absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity,
viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering
bodies[402].--Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of
space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the
Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On
what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following
question occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied
that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this
statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a
positive entity, not a mere negation.--Further, there is a
self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three
kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they
are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are
eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be
predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of
attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to
which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such
as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.
25. And on account of remembrance.
The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would
have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdh/ri/)
also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance
which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can
take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the
perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not
remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious
state expressed in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this
thing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the
consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the
observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every
one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state
of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be,
'_I_ remember; another person made the observation.' But no such state
of consciousness does arise.--When, on the other hand, such a state of
consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made
the original observation, and the person who remembers, are different
persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, 'I
remember that that other person saw that and that.'--In the case under
discussion, however, the Vaina/s/ika himself--whose state of
consciousness is, 'I saw that and that'--knows that there is one
thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the
remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past
perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is
hot and gives light.
As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and
subsequent remembrance, the Vaina/s/ika has necessarily to abandon the
doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all
his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong
to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all
his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how
can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a
momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of
the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the
similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being
momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on
two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal
momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able
mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense
when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he
admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity
of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one
entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of
universal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is
similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the
apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute
this by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and
'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which
the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which
similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with
the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to
that' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of
'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something
perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by
philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the
contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince
others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and
such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it
as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who
make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being
cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in
recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were
formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit
that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise
whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be
made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject
never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it
rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which
yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that
sensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be
rejected.
26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not
being observed.
The system of the Vaina/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also
that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven
to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is
expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the
manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the
cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant
springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has
ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from
the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at
once, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see
that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have
been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from
non-entity.
To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from
non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring
from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless,
since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence
of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind
as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence
is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of
reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of
origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced
from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if
non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency,
we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns
of hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it
should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having
special distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are
special qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case
the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the
non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no
case non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like
the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.--Further, if existence
sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with
non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely
positive entities distinguished by their various special
characteristics. Nor[404] does any one think that things of the nature
of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the
like; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the
effects of clay only.--The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a
cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo
destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is
false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are
always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of
effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a
destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take
place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as
the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier
condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent
particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole
undergoes decomposition).--Hence as we see on the one hand that no
entities ever originate from nonentities such as the horns of a hare,
and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as
gold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from
non-existence has to be rejected.--We finally point out that, according
to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the
four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the
atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful
assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly
perplex the mind of every one?
27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of
ends) in the case of non-active people also.
If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive
people also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a
thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman
even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves
even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too lazy to
weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end
finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody
would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the
heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is
absurd and not maintained by anybody.--Thus the doctrine of the
origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.
28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on
account of (our) consciousness (of them).
There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various
objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external
world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting
for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those
Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vij/n/ana)
exist.--The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed
propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of
his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but
it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions
alone are real.
According to this latter doctrine the process, whose constituting
members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the
result of knowledge[405], is an altogether internal one, existing in so
far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external
things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with
the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire
process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from
consciousness, we reply that we base our doctrine on the impossibility
of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be
either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But
atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it
being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms.
Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as
pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as
different nor as non-different from the atoms[406].--In the same way we
can show that the external things are not universals and so on[407].
Moreover, the cognitions--which are of a uniform nature only in so far
as they are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their
objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the
mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a
jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the
part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that
the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this
admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is
determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external
things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our
always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of
knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality
identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the
other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially
distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being
conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain
that there are no outward things.--
Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The
ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage
and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although
there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the
ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise
independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.--If we
be asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the
actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained
from the impressions left by previous ideas[408]. In the beginningless
sa/m/sara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and
effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again
produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason
for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas
is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows,
moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both
(the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there
presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions,
without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any
variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental
impressions.--Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things
exist.
To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply.--The
non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are
conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are
conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it
be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we
are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words
of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its
approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward
thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man
who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction
avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?--If the Bauddha
should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object
but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of
consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement
he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the
outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be
accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody
when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only,
but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of
their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears
also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external
things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an
internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they
practically accept the general consciousness, which testifies to the
existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to
refute it they speak of the external things as 'like something
external.' If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the
existence of the external world, how could they use the expression 'like
something external?' No one says, 'Vish/n/umitra appears like the son of
a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our
consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us
as something external, not like something external.--But--the Bauddha
may reply--we conclude that the object of perception is only like
something external because external things are impossible.--This
conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility
of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or
non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while on the other hand,
the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not
to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities.
Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of
proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things
are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of
knowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the
ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or
non-difference from atoms?--Nor, again, does the non-existence of
objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the
objects; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms
of the objects, and the objects are actually apprehended as
external.--For the same reason (i.e. because the distinction of thing
and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea
and thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing
constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical.
Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of
cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies
are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as when we
see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two
perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the
generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one
permanent factor (from the two--or more--varying factors) is proved
throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versa the difference of
the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one
(permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view
is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a
jar; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct
while the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when conscious of
the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell
and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.
Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away
as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot
apprehend--or be apprehended by--each other. From this it follows that
certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld;
so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the doctrine
that everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doctrine of the distinction
of individuals and classes; the doctrine that a former idea leaves an
impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction,
owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and
non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (depending on absence
and presence of right knowledge)[409].
Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit
that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that
we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a
luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we
reply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make
yourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns
itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and
altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing
by means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of
extraordinary philosophic insight!--It cannot, moreover, be asserted in
any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our
consciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its
own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea
is to be apprehended by something different from it, that something also
must be apprehended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And,
moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of an
essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further
cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the
one cannot give light to the other.--But both these objections are
unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no
necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the
idea (is conscious of the idea), there results no regressus ad
infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially
different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation
of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witnessing
Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.--Moreover, if you
maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in
need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that
ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,
and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert
that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks
manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit
your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea
itself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the
lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent
furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea
also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only
through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object
that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely
express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is
self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the
attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on
(while our Self is one and permanent).--We thus have proved that an
idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render
it manifest.
29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the
waking state) are not like those of a dream.
We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the
Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious
in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just
as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.--The two sets of ideas,
we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the
difference of their character. They differ as follows.--The things of
which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking
consciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man;
no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so
the false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of which we are
conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like,
are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other
hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and
the like, are never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of a
dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are
acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance
and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as being
founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a
man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but
merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the
two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the
inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere
consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot
allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly
evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying
what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to
demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those
ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having
certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But
if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's
own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having
certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt
to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its
having attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature
between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.
30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible on the
Bauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external
things).
We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety
of ideas can be explained from the variety of mental impressions,
without any reference to external things, and remark that on your
doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do
not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental
impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived.
How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things
were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental
impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum,
sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish
your position.--The same argument, i.e. the one founded on the
impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external
things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground
of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that
ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We
rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to
establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. 'the
perception of external things is admitted to take place also without
mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to
originate independently of the perception of external
things.'--Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and
modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is
some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such
a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot
be cognised through any means of knowledge.
31. And on account of the momentariness (of the alayavij/n/ana, it
cannot be the abode of mental impressions).
If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition
(alayavij/n/ana[410]) assumed by you may constitute the abode of the
mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being
admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of
impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions
(prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle
equally connected with the past, the present, and the future[411], or an
absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable
to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to
mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other
hand, you declare your alayavij/n/ana to be something permanent, you
thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavij/n/ana as well as everything
else being momentary.--Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as
the tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of
the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward
against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the
principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the
latter.
We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which
maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the
doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of
Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that absolutely
nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and
therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose
existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied,
unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could
impugn its existence)--for a general principle is proved by the absence
of contrary instances.
32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.
No further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new
points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its
probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in
sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and
hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of
life are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually
contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external
world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself
made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent
assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound
absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly
confused.--So that--and this the Sutra means to indicate--Buddha's
doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard
for their own happiness.
33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one
thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).
Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the
Gymnosophists (Jainas).
The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jiva),
non-soul (ajiva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sa/m/vara),
destruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412].
Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul
and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under
these two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the
two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikayas
('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul
(jiva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space
(aka/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful
ways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning,
which they call the saptabha@nginaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not;
somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and
is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is
and is not and is indescribable.
To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions
as that of unity and eternity[414].
This doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reasoning, we say, is
inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to
say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and
non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just
as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the
same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many
and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in
the words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of
indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt
is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than
one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny
this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive
nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative
predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a
definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion
and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are
not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the
knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how
can the Tirthakara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can
his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether
indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is
known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation.
Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents
does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a
madman.--Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the
five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are
five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of
view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it
logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are
so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are
described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction.
And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are
ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not
ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being
ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that
imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the
opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like
a sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly
world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or
non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied
in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of
gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows
from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you
claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from
all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute
indetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being
and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding
non-being and vice versa non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the
Arhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the
assertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding
whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality,
permanency or non-permanency, separateness or norn-separateness, and so
on.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by
them called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its
refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given
in a previous part of this work.
34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine)
non-universality of the Self.
We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting
from the syadvada, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory
attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it
would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not
omnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size
as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite
extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar
things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of
different size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the
size of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former
deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not
be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being
relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient
room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to
the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old
age.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as
consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing
compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask
in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul
may occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows
that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of
limited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the
space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle
only, the extension of all the particles together will remain
inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of
the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited
size contains an infinite number of soul particles.
Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the
soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw
from it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next
Sutra furnishes a reply.
35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts
acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c.
(of the soul).
Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be
satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive
accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve
the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually
being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of
parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is
liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and
similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine
of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the
soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of
works and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sara, rises when its bonds are
sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is
freed from the encumbering clay[415].'--Moreover, those particles which
in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and
cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the
body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently
remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine
which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.--We have further
to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the
soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it.
They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements;
for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence
of some other, general or special, reservoir of
soul-particles.--Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul
would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and
departing is itself indefinite.--On account of all these and similar
difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns
attach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.
The Sutra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sutra
has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be
permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its
limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that
although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent,
just as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually
changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of
the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth
and so on, are non-permanent.--To this rejoinder our Sutra replies that
if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general
void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with
the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Jaina view
impossible.
36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and
the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no
difference (of size, at any time).
Moreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size
of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows
also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be
permanent[416], and that hence there is no difference between the three
sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies
of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter
into bigger and smaller bodies.--Or else (to explain the Sutra in a
somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is
permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also
is permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the
same size--whether minute or infinite--and not of the varying size of
its bodies.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be
set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.
37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the
inappropriateness (of that doctrine).
The Sutrakara now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine,
according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as
he is the general ruler.--But how do you know that that is the purport
of the Sutra (which speaks of the Lord 'without any
qualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher
himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord
is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the
present Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general,
the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory,
and the Sutrakara would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore
must assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make an
energetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is
not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause
of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the
unity of Brahman.
The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedanta are of
various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sa@nkhya and Yoga systems
assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the
pradhana and of the souls, and that pradhana, soul, and Lord are of
mutually different nature.--The Mahe/s/varas (/S/aivas) maintain that
the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain,
were taught by the Lord Pa/s/upati (/S/iva) to the end of breaking the
bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa/s/upati is, according to them,
the Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vai/s/eshikas and others
also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow
the operative cause of the world.
Against all these opinions the Sutra remarks 'the Lord, on account of
the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the
ruler of the pradhana and the soul should be the cause of the world, on
account of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is
supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low,
intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows
that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of
us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming
that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of
the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical
see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be
considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is
not removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the
resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no
beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual
interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series
is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is,
moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyayikas themselves that
'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action'
(Nyaya Sutra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they
be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else,
are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted
that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by
an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the
Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives
only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with
pity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that
you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it
follows that he must be devoid of all activity.
38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord
with the souls and the pradhana).
Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the
further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the souls
cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a
certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be
conjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhana and
the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be
inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the
abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other
connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from
the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not
settled as yet[417].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the
Vedantins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord
and the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the
connexion we assume is that of identity (tadatmya). The adherent of
Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the
basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets
throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand,
who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances
furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines
as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that
Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be
used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedantin; for that
would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord
being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of
Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For
all these reasons the Sa@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid
of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on
the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.
39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the
Lord).
The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis,
for the following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume
that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just
as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be
admitted; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other
qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account
of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence
cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.
40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c. |
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