2015년 1월 27일 화요일

The Vedanta-Sutras 3

The Vedanta-Sutras 3

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra
declares that the soul is 'j/n/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara,
that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach,
constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially
non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a
knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.--Ramanuja, on
the other hand, explains 'j/n/a' by 'j/n/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing
agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the
Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who--like the
Sa@nkhyas and the Vedantins of /S/a@nkara's school--maintain that the
soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.--The wording of the
Sutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja's interpretation; we can hardly
imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara
should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use
the term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not
j/n/anam.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is
a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading
(sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite
views.--In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the
purvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29
formulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is
all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages,
because the qualities of the internal organ--which itself is
a/n/u--constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the
latter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.--According to Ramanuja, on the
other hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the
siddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the
Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it;
while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra
18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands
to knowledge (j/n/ana).--In order to decide between the conflicting
claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some
details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a
purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us
at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere
prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much
trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and
an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28
we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to
be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and
vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether
impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length
than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with
/S/a@nkara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the
purvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the
individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that
/S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.
Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word
'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that
quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or
qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or
"the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because
the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara
state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now,
in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of
the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second
place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the
qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
& c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the
soul even in the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in whatever
state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence;
whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or,
more strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja's
interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the
explanation of Sutras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as
setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta. Sutras 26-28 also
are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's,
special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between
knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the
substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the
question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term
vij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sutra
29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for
its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic
quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and
there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise
to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and
does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra
which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha,
serves on Ramanuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an
altogether legitimate assumption.

Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains,
according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as
long as it exists in the sa/m/sara condition, it is connected with the
buddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be
called vij/n/ana because the latter constitutes its essential quality as
long as it exists.--Sutra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in
the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected
with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes
actually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Ramanuja, teaches that
j/n/at/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential
nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul
only.--In Sutra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine
that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would
either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while,
according to Ramanuja, the Sutra means that the soul would either be
permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure
knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jn/at/ri/ and a/n/u, as
it is in reality).--The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either
interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly
refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jiva, i.e.
the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that
it is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the
final view,--the soul being essentially non-active, and all action
belonging to the world of upadhis,--he looks upon the next following
Sutra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that
the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action,
buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just
as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as
long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them
aside.--Ramanuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40
from the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is
indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not
follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter,
even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or
not work, just as he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent
on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to
Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a)
of Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not
involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections,
sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the
experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely
different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman.
According to Ramanuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14];
according to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sutra must be understood to
mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible
Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its
limiting adjuncts.--One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for
special notice. According to Sa@nkara the words 'abhasa eva /k/a' mean
'(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is
a statement of the so-called pratibimbavada, i.e. the doctrine that the
so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in
the buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavada,
i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited
by its adjuncts.--According to Ramanuja the abhasa of the Sutra has to
be taken in the sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the
Sutra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those
Vedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by
non-real adjuncts[15].


PADA IV.


Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/n/as (by which
generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-driyas, and the
manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size
(a/n/u).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pra/n/a,
i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle
distinct from air in general and from the pra/n/as discussed above; and
that it is minute (a/n/u).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pra/n/as are
superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and
that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the
mukhya pra/n/a.

Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the
namarupavyakara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the
Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yatha loke raja/s/asananuvartina/m/ /k/a
rajanugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/ariraivamatre/n/a
sasake rajany api /s/asananuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor
bhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathaha Drami/d/abhashyakara/h/ yatha loke raja
pra/k/uradanda/s/uke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e
vartamanoszpi vyajanadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipreta/ms/
/k/a lokan paripipalayishati bhoga/ms/ /k/a gandhadin
avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayati tathasau loke/s/varo
bhramatsvasamait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokan
brahmalokadi/ms/ /k/avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayatiti.]

[Footnote 14: Givasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushayattam ity uktam.
Idanim kim aya/m/ giva/h/ parasmad atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma
bhrantam uta brahmaivopadhyava/kkh/innam atha brahma/ms/a iti
sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam
arambha/n/a/s/abdadibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesad ity atraivayam
aitho nir/n/ita/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nanatvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattya
skshipya jivasya brahma/ms/atvopapadanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/iyate. Yavad
dhi jivasya brahma/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/itam tavaj jivasya
brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmad adhikatva/m/ /k/a na
pratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tavat praptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/.
J/n/aj/n/nau dvav ityadibhedanirde/s/at. J/n/aj/n/ayor abheda/s/rutayas
tv agnina si/nk/ed itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa/k/arikya/h/,
Brahma/n/os/ms/o jiva ity api na sadhiya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/ava/k/i hy
a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jivasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgata dosha brahma/n/i
bhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jiva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/
kha/nd/ananarhatvad brahma/n/a/h/ praguktadoshaprasa@nga/k/ /k/a, tasmad
atyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapadam. Yadva bhranta/m/ brahmaiva
jiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam atma
brahmetyadibrahmatmabhavopade/s/at, nanatmatvavadinyas tu
pratyakshadisiddharthanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade/s/aparabhi/h/
/s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshadaya/s/ /k/a avidyantargata/h/
khyapyante.--Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jiva/h/. Kuta/h/.
Tata eva brahmatmabhavopade/s/at. Na /k/ayam upadhir bhrantiparikalpita
ita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter. Ity eva/m/
pratptesbhidhiyate. Brahma/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nanavyapade/s/ad anyatha
/k/aikatvena vyapade/s/ad ubhayatha hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate.
Navavyapade/s/as tavat
srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva--niyant/ri/tvaniyamyatva--sarvaj/n/atvaj/n/atva--
svadhinatvaparadhinatva--/s/uddhatva/s/uddhatva--
kalya/n/agu/n/akaratvaviparitatva--patitva/s/eshatvadibhir d/ris/yate.
Anyatha /k/abhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam atma
brahmetyadibhir d/ris/yate. Api da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate eke,
brahma dasa brahma dasa brahmeme kitava ity atharva/n/ika brahma/n/o
da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajivavyapitvena abhedo
vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye
jivosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]

[Footnote 15: Nanu bhrantabrahmajivavadeszpy avidyak/ri/topadhibhedad
bhogavyavasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva /k/a.
Akha/nd/aikarasapraka/s/amatratvarupasya
svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva.
Praka/s/aikasvarupasya praka/s/atirodhana/m/ praka/s/ana/s/a eveti prag
evopapaditam. Abhasa eveti va pa/th/a/h/, tatha sati hetava abhasa/h/.]


THIRD ADHYAYA.
PADA I.


Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at
the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements
(bhutasukshma) which serve as an abode to the pra/n/as attached to the
soul.

Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the
reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to
undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya)
of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their
good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.

Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the
souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not
become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the
entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls
finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life
of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.


PADA II.


Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to
/S/a@nkara the three first Sutras discuss the question whether the
creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages
produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded,
or not; Sutra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the
dreaming soul are mere 'Maya,' since they do not fully manifest the
character of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Maya,
yet have a prophetic quality. Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the
question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such
participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its
dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and
power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by
Ramanuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sutras with
each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations
of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the
individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras 1 and 2
set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the
individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of
some /s/akas declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sutra
states the siddhanta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Maya, i.e.
are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the
individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not
fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'maya,' Ramanuja remarks,
'maya/s/abdo hy a/sk/aryava/k/i janaka/s/ya kule jata devamayeva nirmita
ityadishu tatha dar/s/anat.' The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in
the /S/ri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra, according to
/S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Ramanuja. Sutras 4 and 5
(according to Ramanuja's numeration) are explained by Ramanuja very much
in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of
the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves
more intimately with the preceding Sutras than is possible on
/S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sutra 6 (su/k/aka/s/ /k/a hi) Ramanuja
sees a deduction from the siddhanta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the
images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore
they have prophetic significance.'

Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul
abides within Brahman in the heart.

Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul
awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9)
explains the nature of a swoon.

Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question
as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is
merged in the state of deep sleep. Sutra 11 declares that twofold
characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes,
nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman
even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all
passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be
destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sutra 12 continues,
that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive
attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned
limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially
stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sutra 13
adds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected
to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sutra 14), is the pre-eminent
meaning of all Vedanta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That
Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to
its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of
the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature
of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadara/n/yaka expressly
declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the
same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At
the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the
limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is
compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the
surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised
that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material
like the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate from it as the
water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that,
as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase,
decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains
unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes
of the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is
affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the
upadhis, Scripture declares (21).

From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given
in the Sri-bhashya differs totally. According to Ramanuja the
adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to
the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end)
affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within
the soul as antaryamin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self
within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections)
because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold
characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil,
apahatapapman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed
with all auspicious qualities, satyakama, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.)
(11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially
free from evil--according to the Prajapativakya in the Chandogya--yet is
liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies,
so the antaryamin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny
this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin
(in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the
ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the
jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and
the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord
(dva supar/n/a sayuja sakhaya) (13).--Should it be said that, according
to the Chandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the
elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence
participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sara;
we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is
in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent;
pradhana) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to
'aka/s/o ha vai namarupayor nirvahita') (14).--But does not the passage
'satya/m/ j/n/anam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but
light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage
'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to
deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport,
we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that
Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which
those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover
the Taittiriya passage only asserts so much, viz. the praka/s/arupata of
Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti
neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the
sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
(17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by
their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether
limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that
the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is
apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryamin really
abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their
defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely
that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate
in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both
similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be
employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

Sutras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a
(VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti
neti; B/ri/hadar) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms
of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26
further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive
attributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The last four Sutras
return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so
many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory
hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all
difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

According to Ramanuja, Sutras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in
Sutra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman
be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the
B/ri/hadara/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes
(prakara), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra)?--The
reply given in Sutra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of
Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it
would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them
again[16]), but merely denies the prak/ri/taitavattva, the previously
stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses
only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that
subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further
qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the
object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sutra
23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the
intuition (sakshatkkara) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/radhana,
i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as
Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti'
is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as
praka/s/a, luminousness, j/n/ana, intelligence, &c., so also the quality
of being differentiated by the world (prapa/nk/avsish/t/ata) is intuited
as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that
praka/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated
practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vamadeva) in the work of
sa/m/radhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is
connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious
qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in
Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the
a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the
b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the
latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as
special arrangements (sa/m/sthanavisesha/h/) of Brahman, as the coils
are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e.
sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as
different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in
the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous
to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both
being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that
stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls
(whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29,
30).

Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly
implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be
truly understood.

Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini
opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called
apurva, but is allotted by the Lord.


PADA III.


With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new section of the work
begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled
by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be
determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more
particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to
each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The
reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the
different /s/akhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly
identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the
same /s/akha exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The
reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and
philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the
composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different
priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear
in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing
dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school
to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the
fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar
contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not
any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances
enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/akha were found
described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other
/s/akhas also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long
before the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present form, the
Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever
regards sacrificial acts, one /s/akha may indeed safely follow its own
texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/akhas; that, however, all
texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the
relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into
one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all
Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts
may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition
is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one
only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the
one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met
with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what
sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the
same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The
latter is the special task of the present pada.

Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those
vidyas, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one
sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyas, or one
vidya only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those
vidyas whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the
non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of
course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently
in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or
some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as
manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later
adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/a/nd/ilyavidya
which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in
B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the
/S/atapathabrahma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation
on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified
in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bharupatva),
while others are peculiar to each separate passage (pra/n/a/s/ariratva
and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chandogya
Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka
Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to
in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether
the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the
devout Vedantin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of
immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held
apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on
the other hand, the vidya is one only, all the different qualities of
Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one
meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of
the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages
shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation
also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the
three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate,
although apparently identical. The examples selected are the
udgithavidyas of the Chandogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the
B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain
similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in
both identified with pra/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the
subject of the Chandogya vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the
sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad represents
the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.

Sutra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV),
proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the
O/m/kara and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the
other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kara which,'
& c.--According to Ramanuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more
satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sutra, the latter
merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in
the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the
so-called pra/n/a-vidyas and the consequent comprehension of the
different qualities of the pra/n/a, which are mentioned in the different
texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sutras 11-13. The
point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its
qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special
vidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of
Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account
everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance,
the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.)
are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to
/S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11
is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than
everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only.--Adhik. VIII
(16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in
Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called
sutratman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this
place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest
Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.

According to Ramanuja the Sutras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a
whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a.
Sutras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sutra 12,
however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head,
& c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to
be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities,
difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would
involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the
discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If
priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman,
for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sutra 14
replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the
purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of
delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having
limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sutra
15 replies, 'the term "Self" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.'--But
in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/n/amaya,
& c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in atma
anandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies,
'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages
(atmaa va idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage,
viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not
the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding
clauses about the pra/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the
Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of
greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the
former half of 17 (anvayad iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it
denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of
the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz.
II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the
pra/n/asa/m/vada.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated
already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a
contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as
abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we
therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two
separate vidyas.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain
attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/n/ayaniya-khila have not to be
introduced into the corresponding Chandogya vidya, because the stated
difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidya.--Adhik. XIII
(24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma/n/a
passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance,
a brahma/n/a about the mahavrata ceremony at the beginning of the
Aitareya-ara/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to
connect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they
show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the
possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and
affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the
effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies
of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of
which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good
and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road
to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the
body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken
literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate
question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds
in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or
not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond
the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who
knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any
other place.

The /S/ri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara/n/a whose two
first Sutras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sutra 29 raises an
objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the
path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its
works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death,
partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a
contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were
all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise
perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to
proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The
complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible,
since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since
scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely
annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet
connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir
upasampadya svena rupe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kri/d/an
ramamana/h/ sa svara/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama/k/aro
bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's
vidyamahatmya.--That the explanation of the /S/ri-bhashya agrees with
the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show;
especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam
ubhayatha,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case,
and non-arthavattva in the other case.

The next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that
the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyas
which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are
acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyas of Brahman.--The explanation given
in the /S/ri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places)
is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on
Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and
sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The
/S/ri-bhashya reads 'sarvesham,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvasam,'
all sagu/n/a-vidyas.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true
knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as
have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of
discharging certain offices.--In the /S/ri-bhashya, where the Sutra
follows immediately on Sutra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close
connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule
divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body
which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain,
yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman,
remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain
until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned
in some vidyas--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be
included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that
Ka/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidya only,
because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to
Ramanuja the Sutra contains a reply to an objection raised against the
conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36)
maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5,
constitute one vidya only, the object of knowledge being in both cases
Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the
contrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not
one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the
vidya of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one
only--According to Ramanuja, Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a
only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidya, since the former refers to
Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with
Brahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats,
according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V,
11 ff.--According to the /S/ri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one
adhikara/n/a whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same conclusion
as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general
question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an
opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are
predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakamatva, &c.--cannot be
considered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti,
and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those
qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final
release.--To this objection Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not
to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage
under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with
emphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he
who meditates on Brahman as satyakama, &c. obtains a mere perishable
reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in
Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not
include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection
Sutra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the
worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom
(i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of
(the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous
of release, may include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected
with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions,
are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the
latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a
similar Ch. Up. passage, Vayu and Pra/n/a are not to be identified, but
to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made
of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute
parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of
the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but
merely subjects of meditations.

Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of
digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent
of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists
maintain).--According to the /S/ri-bhashya the adhikara/n/a does not
refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more
immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question
as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the
meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras then have to be
translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has,
in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which
belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/n/at/ri/tva and the like),
because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next
Sutra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e.
the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final
release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to
the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in
the condition of final release).'

Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent
elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of
difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that
/s/akha in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all
/s/akhas.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vanara Agni of Ch.
Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single
parts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to
one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be
held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya,
/S/a/nd/ilyavidya, &c. remain separate.

Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which
the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no
reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those
meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be
cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI
(61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with
constituent elements of action, such as the udgitha.


PADA IV.


Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha,
i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms
this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrajins is enjoined
by the sacred law, and that for them vidya only is prescribed, not
action.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part
of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but themselves enjoin the
meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedanta-texts are not to be
used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of
glorifying--as arthavadas--the injunctions with which they are connected
(Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the urdhvaretasa/h/ require
no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions
enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds,
& c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik.
VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws
regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII,
28-3l).--The a/s/ramakarma/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not
strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to
poverty and so on, are ana/s/rama have claims to vidya (Adhik. IX,
36-39).--An urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation
of the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the
fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those
meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the
sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamana (Adhik.
XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition
to balya and pa/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By balya is to be
understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

Sutras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Ramanuja, the question when the
vidya, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises.
Sutra 51 treats of that vidya whose result is mere exaltation
(abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if
there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in
which latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of Scripture
declaring this (in various passages).'--Sutra 52, 'Thus there is also
absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that
knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one
also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an
obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sutras as two
adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a
somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a
more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyas.

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