Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from
Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the
case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them
'anuvadena,' and finally negative them.]
[Footnote 17: Ramanuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability
of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one
passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a
matapit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sastra/m/ pratarakavad
aparamarthikau nirasaniyau gu/n/au prama/n/antarapratipannau
adare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sara/k/akraparivartanena purvam eva
bambhramyamanan mumukshun bhuyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']
[Footnote 18: The /S/ri-bhashya as well as several other commentaries
reads tadbhavabhavitvat for /S/an@kara's tadbhavabhavitvat.]
FOURTH ADHYAYA.
PADA I.
Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Atman enjoined by
Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be
repeated again and again.
Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view
it as constituting his own Self.
Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the
so-called pratikopasanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is
viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano
brahmety upasita) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to
consider the pratika as constituting his own Self.
Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to be meditatively
viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the
pratika.--Ramanuja takes Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the
decision arrived at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a
new adhikara/n/a.
Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of
sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati tam udgitham
upasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the
sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance,
the udgitha is to be viewed as Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha.
Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a
sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to
those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sutra gives
no hint to that effect.
Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in
any place, favourable to concentration of mind.
Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until
death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to
sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.
Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman
has been reached, the vidvan is no longer affected by the consequences
of either past or future evil deeds.
Adhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal
translation of the Sutra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the
vidvan) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e.
of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes
place).' The last words of the Sutra, 'but on the fall,' are separated
by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted to
mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvan, who
through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of
works).'--According to Ramanuja the whole Sutra simply means, 'There is
likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is
reached), but on the death of the vidvan[19].'
Adhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding
adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anarabdhakarya works, i.e.
those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it
does not extend to the arabdhakarya works on which the present existence
of the devotee depends.
Adhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted
such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so,
for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of
knowledge.
Adhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such
sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the
upasanas referring to the different members of those works.
Adhik. XIV (19).--The arabdhakarya works have to be worked out fully by
the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvan becomes united with
Brahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sutra is, according to /S/a@nkara,
restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete
knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would
lead to future embodiments. According to Ramanuja a number of embodied
existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the
arabdhakarya works are exhausted.
PADA II.
This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya describe the fate
of the vidvan after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to
distinguish the vidvan who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he
is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower
Brahman, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and others to
the latter. According to Ramanuja the vidvan is one only.
Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).--On the death of the vidvan (i.e. of him who
possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are
merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (pra/n/a), the
vital air in the individual soul (jiva), the soul in the subtle
elements.--According to Ramanuja the combination (sampatti) of the
senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a
merging (laya).
Adhik. IV (7).--The vidvan (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who
possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvan, i.e. he who does not
possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e.
those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with
the subtle elements, and so on into the na/d/is.--The vidvan also
remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet
completely destroyed avidya, so that the immortality which Scripture
ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvan abhya/s/nute) is only a
relative one.--Ramanuja quotes the following text regarding the
immortality of the vidvan:
'Yada sarve pramu/k/yante kama yessya h/ri/di sthita/h/ atha
martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'
and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvan
as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the
destruction--mentioned in the preceding pada--of all the effects of good
and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the
intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.
Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether
the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with
the highest deity (teja/h/ parasya/m/ devatayam) are completely merged
in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the
elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on
the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sara state lasts, the elements,
although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able
to form new bodies for the soul.
According to Ramanuja the Sutras 8-11 do not constitute a new
adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The
immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul
from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sara, i.e. embodiedness
up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tavad eva /k/ira/m/ yavan na
vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from
the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also
proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from
authority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural
passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the
body (10).
Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the
Sutras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who
possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes
of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught
that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidya)
the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the
body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do
not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one
with Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sutra 12 is supposed
to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the
pra/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 5, na tasya pra/n/a utkramanti, of him the pra/n/as do not pass
out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense
of the ablative "tasmat," so that the sense of the passage is, "from
him, i.e. from the jiva of the dying sage, the pra/n/as do not depart,
but remain with it."'--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed
of in Sutra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure
of the pra/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage
B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yaj/n/avalkya instructs Artabhaga that,
when this man dies, the pra/n/as do not depart from it (asmat; the
context showing that asmat means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not
'from him,' viz. the jiva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by
Sm/ri/ti passages.
According to Ramanuja the three Sutras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth
adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover,
have to be combined into two Sutras. The topic continuing to be
discussed is the utkranti of the vidvan. If, Sutra 12 says, the utkranti
of the pra/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to
be contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the
tasya there is '/s/arirat' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e.
the jiva, the pra/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the
reading of some, viz. the Madhyandinas, who, in their text of the
passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmat.'--With reference to the
instruction given by Yaj/n/avalkya to Artabhaga, it is to be remarked
that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows
Brahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the
sage also when dying departs from the body.
Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on
the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his pra/n/as,
elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from
it in any way.
According to Ramanuja the two Sutras continue the teaching about the
pra/n/as, bhutas, &c. of the vidvan in general, and declare that they
are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction
(sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]
Adhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the apara
vidya, while Ramanuja continues the description of the utkranti of his
vidvan.--The jiva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence
departs out of the body by means of the na/d/is; the vidvan by means of
the na/d/i called sushum/n/a, the avidvan by means of some other na/d/i.
Adhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of
a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.
Adhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvan who dies during the dakshi/n/ayana
reaches Brahman.
PADA III.
Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the
Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvan up to
Brahman.
Adhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not
only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead
the soul on.
The remaining part of the pada is by /S/a@nkara divided into two
adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman
to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the
gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (karya) or qualified
(/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sutras 7-11 by
Badari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sutra
14. In Sutras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to
which the soul of the vidvan goes to the highest Brahman, not to the
karyam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part
of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere purvapaksha,
while Badari's opinion represents the siddhanta.--The latter of the two
adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pada; 15, 16) records the opinion of
Badaraya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those
who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that
those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a
pratika form.
According to Ramanuja, Sutras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which
the views of Badari and of Jaimini represent two purvapakshas, while
Badaraya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhanta. The question is
whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship
the effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the
highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from
Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagatmana/m/
prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmatmakam upasate).--The first view is
maintained by Badari in Sutra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those
who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the
latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as
such omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sutra 9 is similar to that
of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if
Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a manava/h/ sa
etan brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etan brahma/n/am
gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his
nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The
explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also
of l2-l4.--The siddhanta view is established in Sutra 13, 'It is the
opinion of Badaraya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads
to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratika, i.e.
those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the
individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for
its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratikas. For both
views--that of Jaimini as well as that of Badari--are faulty.' The karya
view contradicts such passages as 'asma/k/ charirat samutthaya para/m/
jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the
pa/nk/agni-vidya, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those
who know the pa/nk/agni-vidya, are also led up to Brahman.
PADA IV.
Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the
para vidya, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final
release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely
manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Ramanuja
is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvan whose going
to Brahman had been described in the preceding pada.
Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul
stands to Brahman is that of avibhaga, non-separation. This, on
/S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According
to Ramanuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul
views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhuta) from Brahman, or as
non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is
favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul
as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat
tvam asi and the like.[22]
Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul
(i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to
Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature,
possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other
places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapapmatva,
satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only
characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to
Badarayana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that
satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul
vyavaharapekshaya).
Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the apara vidya,
and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its
desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former
alternative is accepted--According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a simply
continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the
preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII,
12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves
about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The
question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa
(it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released
soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in
favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration
made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive
him.'
Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied
according to their wish and will.
Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate
several bodies at the same time.--Sutra 12 gives, according to
/S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare
the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul
do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to
the soul in the state of deep sleep (svapyaya = sushupti), or to the
fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Ramanuja
explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer
either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti =
mata/n/am according to 'van manasi sampadyate,' &c.).
Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jivas participate in all the
perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of
creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of
embodied existence.
After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the
contents of the Brahma-sutras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as
well as Ramanuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two
modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely
approximates to the true meaning of the Sutras. That few of the Sutras
are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above;
but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair
degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees
better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.
We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous
discrepancies,--of which only the more important ones have been singled
out in the conspectus of contents,--the two commentators are at one as
to the general drift of the Sutras and the arrangement of topics. As a
rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing
upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases
the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred
to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends
to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sutras.
This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain
confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the
meaning of the Sutras on which the bulk of the interpretations of
/S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja are based.
But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number
of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge more or
less widely, and that the Sutras affected thereby are, most of them,
especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the
Vedanta system. The question then remains which of the two
interpretations is entitled to preference.
Regarding a small number of Sutras I have already (in the conspectus of
contents) given it as my opinion that Ramanuja's explanation appears to
be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a
number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal
meaning of a Sutra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the
necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and
reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while
Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands. To exemplify this
remark, I again direct attention to all those Sutras which in clear
terms represent the individual soul as something different from the
highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to
have recourse to the plea of the Sutra referring, not to what is true in
the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked
upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that
/S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the
Sutras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr.
Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to
the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood
by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while
present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires
convincing proofs before it can be allowed.--We have had, in the second
place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sutras concerning
whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja disagree altogether; and we
have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter
commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with
the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by
the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jiva,
and where Ramanuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to
/S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole
adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sutras. The adhikara/n/a
is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view
held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the
question what kind of Vedanta is embodied in Badaraya/n/a's work.
But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a
few detached Sutras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some
opinion as to the relation of the Vedanta-sutras as a whole to the chief
distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Ramanuja. Such an
attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the
present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the
conclusion that the Sutras do not teach particular doctrines found in
them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.
The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the
Sutras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to
distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which
leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in
Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an
exalted form of individual existence. The adhyaya first to be considered
in this connexion is the fourth one. According to /S/a@nkara the three
latter padas of that adhyaya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate
of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two
sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who,
before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman.
According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the three padas, referring
throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the
successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the
Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it
had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever
without returning into the sa/m/sara.
On an a priori view of the matter it certainly appears somewhat strange
that the concluding section of the Sutras should be almost entirely
taken up with describing the fate of him who has after all acquired an
altogether inferior knowledge only, and has remained shut out from the
true sanctuary of Vedantic knowledge, while the fate of the fully
initiated is disposed of in a few occasional Sutras. It is, I think, not
too much to say that no unbiassed student of the Sutras would--before
having allowed himself to be influenced by /S/a@nkara's
interpretations--imagine for a moment that the solemn words, 'From
thence is no return, from thence is no return,' with which the Sutras
conclude, are meant to describe, not the lasting condition of him who
has reached final release, the highest aim of man, but merely a stage on
the way of that soul which is engaged in the slow progress of gradual
release, a stage which is indeed greatly superior to any earthly form of
existence, but yet itself belongs to the essentially fictitious
sa/m/sara, and as such remains infinitely below the bliss of true mukti.
And this a priori impression--which, although no doubt significant,
could hardly be appealed to as decisive--is confirmed by a detailed
consideration of the two sets of Sutras which /S/a@nkara connects with
the knowledge of the higher Brahman. How these Sutras are interpreted by
/S/a@nkara and Ramanuja has been stated above in the conspectus of
contents; the points which render the interpretation given by Ramanuja
more probable are as follows. With regard to IV, 2, 12-14, we have to
note, in the first place, the circumstance--relevant although not
decisive in itself--that Sutra 12 does not contain any indication of a
new topic being introduced. In the second place, it can hardly be
doubted that the text of Sutra 13, 'spash/t/o hy ekesham,' is more
appropriately understood, with Ramanuja, as furnishing a reason for the
opinion advanced in the preceding Sutra, than--with /S/a@nkara--as
embodying the refutation of a previous statement (in which latter case
we should expect not 'hi' but 'tu'). And, in the third place, the 'eke,'
i.e. 'some,' referred to in Sutra 13 would, on /S/a@nkara's
interpretation, denote the very same persons to whom the preceding Sutra
had referred, viz. the followers of the Ka/n/va-/s/akha (the two Vedic
passages referred to in 12 and 13 being B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, and III, 2,
11, according to the Ka/n/va recension); while it is the standing
practice of the Sutras to introduce, by means of the designation 'eke,'
members of Vedic /s/akhas, teachers, &c. other than those alluded to in
the preceding Sutras. With this practice Ramanuja's interpretation, on
the other hand, fully agrees; for, according to him, the 'eke' are the
Madhyandinas, whose reading in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, viz. 'tasmat,'
clearly indicates that the 'tasya' in the corresponding passage of the
Ka/n/vas denotes the /s/arira, i.e. the jiva. I think it is not saying
too much that /S/a@nkara's explanation, according to which the 'eke'
would denote the very same Ka/n/vas to whom the preceding Sutra had
referred--so that the Ka/n/vas would be distinguished from themselves as
it were--is altogether impossible.
The result of this closer consideration of the first set of Sutras,
alleged by /S/a@nkara to concern the owner of the higher knowledge of
Brahman, entitles us to view with some distrust /S/a@nkara's assertion
that another set also--IV, 4, 1-7--has to be detached from the general
topic of the fourth adhyaya, and to be understood as depicting the
condition of those who have obtained final absolute release. And the
Sutras themselves do not tend to weaken this preliminary want of
confidence. In the first place their wording also gives no indication
whatever of their having to be separated from what precedes as well as
what follows. And, in the second place, the last Sutra of the set (7)
obliges /S/a@nkara to ascribe to his truly released souls qualities
which clearly cannot belong to them; so that he finally is obliged to
make the extraordinary statement that those qualities belong to them
'vyavaharapekshaya,' while yet the purport of the whole adhikara/n/a is
said to be the description of the truly released soul for which no
vyavahara exists! Very truly /S/a@nkara's commentator here remarks,
'atra ke/k/in muhyanti akha/n/da/k/inmatrajanan muktasyajnanabhavat kuta
aj/n/anika-dharmayoga/h/,' and the way in which thereupon he himself
attempts to get over the difficulty certainly does not improve matters.
In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth
adhyaya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the
distinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to
in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of
/S/a@nkara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the
Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three
different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the
vidvan repairs on death, or--according to Ramanuja--the worshippers of
which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanuja treats the views
of Badari and Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of
Badaraya/n/a--which is stated last--as the siddhanta. /S/a@nkara, on the
other hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/n/a's view is set
forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which,
although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether
illegitimate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first,
represents the siddhanta, while Jaimini's view, set forth subsequently,
is to be considered a mere purvapaksha. This, of course, is altogether
inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as
well as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras to conclude the discussion of
contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted
as the authoritative one. This is so patent that /S/a@nkara feels
himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule
(Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any
arguments but such as are valid only if /S/a@nkara's system itself is
already accepted.
The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice
but to side with Ramanuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth
adhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all
particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the
Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the
same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher
and lower knowledge of Brahman in /S/a@nkara's sense.
If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of
Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman
is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on
the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the
entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately
connected with this investigation--in fact, one with it from a certain
point of view--is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of
their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of
illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself
transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or I/s/vara.
That Ramanuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the
doctrine of Maya we have seen above; we shall, however, in the
subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and
interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras
themselves.
Placing myself at the point of view of a /S/a@nkara, I am startled at
the outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to
give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination
and so on (i.e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world
proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define?--That
Brahman, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sutra
declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta; that Brahman
whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact
which /S/a@nkara calls the highest.--But, here we must object to
ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from
which the world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors
were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman
and the lower Brahman related to Maya or the world, we meet with
definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only
remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as
sa/k/-/k/id-ananda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the
introductory /s/lokas of the Pa/nk/ada/s/i dilating on the sa/m/vid
svayam-prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time,
past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P.D. I, 7).
'That from which the world proceeds' can by a /S/a@nkara be accepted
only as a definition of I/s/vara, of Brahman which by its association
with Maya is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and
it certainly is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a
definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can
accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is
unlikely that they should conclude with a description of the state of
those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from
obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the
idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brahman as one only, as the
all-enfolding being which sometimes emits the world from its own
substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining
one in all its various manifestations--a conception which need not by
any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the
Ramanujas--the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes
altogether unobjectionable.
We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in
which Badaraya/n/a defines Brahman, viz. that he does not distinguish
between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Maya, is
confirmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sutras being
throughout far from direct in their enunciations, we shall have to look
less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines
of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being
taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the
Sutrakara against the Sa@nkhya doctrine, which maintains that the world
has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the
non-intelligent pradhana. The most important Sutras relative to this
point are to be met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those
Sutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by themselves, but the
unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them
as steps in our investigation. The sixth Sutra of the pada mentioned
replies to the Sa@nkhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot
spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that 'it is thus
seen,' i.e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent
things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence; hair and
nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from
dung.--Now, an argumentation of this kind is altogether out of place
from the point of view of the true /S/a@nkara. According to the latter
the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the
latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya.
Maya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a
non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers
identified with the prak/ri/ti of the Sa@nkhyas. Similarly the
illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing
that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal substances do not
impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material
world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its
own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion
with the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material world is no
more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its
subsistence. According to /S/a@nkara the world is not merged in Brahman,
but the special forms into which the upadana of the world, i.e. Maya,
had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to
Brahman is not changed thereby.--The illustration, again, given in Sutra
24 of the mode in which Brahman, by means of its inherent power,
transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous
instruments of action, 'kshiravad dhi,' 'as milk (of its own accord
turns into curds),' would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring
nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the
illusive appearance of the world; and also the analogous instance given
in the Sutra next following, 'as Gods and the like (create palaces,
chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will)'--which refers to the
real creation of real things--would hardly be in its place if meant to
illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character
of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous
illustrative instances (kshiravad dhi; devadivat), moreover, seems to
show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite
theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from
Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or
other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent
without having recourse to any extraneous means.[23]
That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara,
further appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first
adhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but
also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been
the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is
the material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is
unreal; but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect.
Sutra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term
'pari/n/amat;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of
itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the
Vedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/n/avada' was used to
denote that very theory to which the followers of /S/a@nkara are most
violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not
a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the
effect of Brahman undergoing a real change, may that change be conceived
to take place in the way taught by Ramanuja or in some other
manner.--With regard to the last-quoted Sutra, as well as to those
touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms
and modes of expression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in
reality reconcilable with it; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda
remarks that the term 'pari/n/ama' only denotes an effect in general
(karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of
this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we
were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as
Ramanuja, are satisfied to take 'pari/n/ama' and similar terms in their
generally received sense.
A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III,
2, 11 ff. It is, according to /S/a@nkara's view, of special importance,
as it is alleged to set forth that Brahman is in itself destitute of all
qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting
adjuncts (upadhis), the offspring of Maya. I have above (in the
conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole
section as interpreted by /S/a@nkara on the one hand, and Ramanuja on
the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to
the purport of the group of Sutras widely diverges from that of
/S/a@nkara. The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague
that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators--if
indeed either--is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide; regarding the
sense of some Sutras /S/a@nkara's explanation seems to deserve
preference, in the case of others Ramanuja seems to keep closer to the
text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Ramanuja's interpretation of
Sutra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and more
especially with regard to the term 'prak/ri/taitavattvam,' whose proper
force is brought out by Ramanuja's explanation only. So much is certain
that none of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by
/S/a@nkara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence
and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that
the section is one of those--perhaps not few in number--in which both
interpreters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to
tradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya/n/a's Sutras to bear
testimony to the truth of their own philosophic theories.
With special reference to the Maya doctrine one important Sutra has yet
to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs,
viz. III, 2, 3. According to /S/a@nkara the Sutra signifies that the
environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i.e.
unsubstantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character
of real objects. Ramanuja (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a
different explanation of the term 'maya,' but in judging of /S/a@nkara's
views we may for the time accept /S/a@nkara's own interpretation. Now,
from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams
are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the
characteristics of reality, the objective world surrounding the waking
soul must not be called Maya. But that the world perceived by waking men
is Maya, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming
consciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the /S/a@nkara Vedanta; and the
Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/n/a did not hold the
doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after
all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term 'maya' in a sense
altogether different from that in which /S/a@nkara employs it.--If, on
the other hand, we, with Ramanuja, understand the word 'maya' to denote
a wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing whatever on the
doctrine of Maya in its later technical sense.
We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to
Brahman. Do the Sutras indicate anywhere that their author held
/S/a@nkara's doctrine, according to which the jiva is in reality
identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a
false surmise due to avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the
souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements
of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual existence apart from it?
This question is in fact only another aspect of the Maya question, but
yet requires a short separate treatment.
In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which
the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in
/S/a@nkara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among
others by Ramanuja, that the soul is of minute size. We have further
seen that Sutra 18 of the third pada of the second adhyaya, which
describes the soul as 'j/n/a,' is more appropriately understood in the
sense assigned to it by Ramanuja; and, again, that the Sutras which
treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with /S/a@nkara's
views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to
authorise.--We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul
is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we
have already noticed, can be made to fall in with /S/a@nkara's views
only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by 'a/ms/a iva,'
while Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands.--We also have
already referred to Sutra 50, 'abhasa eva /k/a,' which /S/a@nkara
interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to
which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.
But almost every Sutra--and Sutra 50 forms no exception--being so
obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often
totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in
view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and
spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no
means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 50,
if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43,
which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman? For that 43
contains, as /S/a@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the
ava/kkh/edavada, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by
a/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I
confess that Ramanuja's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is
accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me
particularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other
passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be
ascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean 'reflection,' but may mean
hetvabhasa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this
one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the
pratibimbavada which, in its turn, presupposes the mayavada, is the
teaching of the Sutras.
To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the
absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of
/S/a@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with
here and there in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had
occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1, 22, which
distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e. additional to, or
different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to
be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the
/s/arira is not the antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the
Ka/n/vas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam
adhiyate), and in 22 the /s/arira and the pradhana are referred to as
the two 'others' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive
attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word 'itara' (the
other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16; I, 3, 16; II, 1,
21) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in
contradistinction from the Lord. The /S/a@nkaras indeed maintain that
all those passages refer to an unreal distinction due to avidya. But
this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in
no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands
that the Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the
interpretations of the school of /S/a@nkara, it remains altogether
unintelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what
/S/a@nkara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that
the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only,
ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its
nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara
was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of
esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept /S/a@nkara's mode of
interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming; nowhere among the
avowed followers of the /S/a@nkara system is there any tendency to treat
the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and
hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau/d/apada down to the most
modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to
inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language
that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord
and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but
this one knowledge is without true value.
There remains one more important passage concerning the relation of the
individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our
attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early
divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean I, 4,
20-22, which three Sutras state the views of A/s/marathya, Au/d/ulomi,
and Ka/s/akr/ri/tsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the
B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed
to the highest Self. The siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22,
'avasthiter iti Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna/h/' i.e. Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna (accounts for
the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or
abode.' By this 'permanent abiding' /S/a@nkara understands the Lord's
abiding as, i.e. existing as--or in the condition of--the individual
soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enunciation of his own view that the
individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avik/ri/ta/h/
parame/s/varo jivo nanya/h/.' Ramanuja on the other hand, likewise
accepting Ka/saak/ri/tsna's opinion as the siddhanta view, explains
'avasthiti' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul,
as described in the antaryamin-brahma/n/a.--We can hardly maintain that
the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by
Sa@/n/kara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged
in favour of Ramanuja's interpretation that in the five other places
where avasthiti (or anavasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something. |
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