We have above been obliged to leave it an open question what kind of
Vedanta is represented by the Vedanta-sutras, although reason was shown
for the supposition that in some important points their teaching is more
closely related to the system of Ramanuja than to that of /S/a@nkara. If
so, the philosophy of /S/a@nkara would on the whole stand nearer to the
teaching of the Upanishads than the Sutras of Badaraya/n/a. This would
indeed be a somewhat unexpected conclusion--for, judging a priori, we
should be more inclined to assume a direct propagation of the true
doctrine of the Upanishads through Badaraya/n/a to /S/a@nkara--but a
priori considerations have of course no weight against positive evidence
to the contrary. There are, moreover, other facts in the history of
Indian philosophy and theology which help us better to appreciate the
possibility of Badaraya/n/a's Sutras already setting forth a doctrine
that lays greater stress on the personal character of the highest being
than is in agreement with the prevailing tendency of the Upanishads.
That the pure doctrine of those ancient Brahminical treatises underwent
at a rather early period amalgamations with beliefs which most probably
had sprung up in altogether different--priestly or
non-priestly--communities is a well-known circumstance; it suffices for
our purposes to refer to the most eminent of the early literary
monuments in which an amalgamation of the kind mentioned is observable,
viz. the Bhagavadgita. The doctrine of the Bhagavadgita represents a
fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upanishads with the belief in a
personal highest being--K/ri/sh/n/a or Vish/n/u--which in many respects
approximates very closely to the system of the Bhagavatas; the attempts
of a certain set of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth
pure Vedanta, i.e. the pure doctrine of the Upanishads, may simply be
set aside. But this same Bhagavadgita is quoted in Badaraya/n/a's Sutras
(at least according to the unanimous explanations of the most eminent
scholiasts of different schools) as inferior to /S/ruti only in
authority. The Sutras, moreover, refer in different places to certain
Vedantic portions of the Mahabharata, especially the twelfth book,
several of which represent forms of Vedanta distinctly differing from
/S/a@nkara's teaching, and closely related to the system of the
Bhagavatas.
Facts of this nature--from entering into the details of which we are
prevented by want of space--tend to mitigate the prima facie strangeness
of the assumption that the Vedanta-sutras, which occupy an intermediate
position between the Upanishads and /S/a@nkara, should yet diverge in
their teaching from both. The Vedanta of Gau/d/apada and /S/a@nkara
would in that case mark a strictly orthodox reaction against all
combinations of non-Vedic elements of belief and doctrine with the
teaching of the Upanishads. But although this form of doctrine has ever
since /S/a@nkara's time been the one most generally accepted by
Brahminic students of philosophy, it has never had any wide-reaching
influence on the masses of India. It is too little in sympathy with the
wants of the human heart, which, after all, are not so very different in
India from what they are elsewhere. Comparatively few, even in India,
are those who rejoice in the idea of a universal non-personal essence in
which their own individuality is to be merged and lost for ever, who
think it sweet 'to be wrecked on the ocean of the Infinite.'[31] The
only forms of Vedantic philosophy which are--and can at any time have
been--really popular, are those in which the Brahman of the Upanishads
has somehow transformed itself into a being, between which and the
devotee there can exist a personal relation, love and faith on the part
of man, justice tempered by mercy on the part of the divinity. The only
religious books of widespread influence are such as the Ramayan of
Tulsidas, which lay no stress on the distinction between an absolute
Brahman inaccessible to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy
Lord whose very conception depends on the illusory principle of Maya,
but love to dwell on the delights of devotion to one all-wise and
merciful ruler, who is able and willing to lend a gracious ear to the
supplication of the worshipper.
* * * * *
The present translation of the Vedanta-sutras does not aim at rendering
that sense which their author may have aimed at conveying, but strictly
follows /S/a@nkara's interpretation. The question as to how far the
latter agrees with the views held by Badaraya/n/a has been discussed
above, with the result that for the present it must, on the whole, be
left an open one. In any case it would not be feasible to combine a
translation of /S/a@nkara's commentary with an independent version of
the Sutras which it explains. Similar considerations have determined the
method followed in rendering the passages of the Upanishads referred to
in the Sutras and discussed at length by /S/a@nkara. There also the
views of the commentator have to be followed closely; otherwise much of
the comment would appear devoid of meaning. Hence, while of course
following on the whole the critical translation published by Professor
Max Muller in the earlier volumes of this Series, I had, in a not
inconsiderable number of cases, to modify it so as to render
intelligible /S/a@nkara's explanations and reasonings. I hope to find
space in the introduction to the second volume of this translation for
making some general remarks on the method to be followed in translating
the Upanishads.
I regret that want of space has prevented me from extracting fuller
notes from later scholiasts. The notes given are based, most of them, on
the /t/ikas composed by Anandagiri and Govindananda (the former of which
is unpublished as yet, so far as I know), and on the Bhamati.
My best thanks are due to Pa/nd/its Rama Mi/s/ra /S/astrin and
Ga@ngadhara /S/astrin of the Benares Sanskrit College, whom I have
consulted on several difficult passages. Greater still are my
obligations to Pa/nd/it Ke/s/ava /S/astrin, of the same institution, who
most kindly undertook to read a proof of the whole of the present
volume, and whose advice has enabled me to render my version of more
than one passage more definite or correct.
Notes:
[Footnote 19: Nanu vidusho z pi setikartavyatakopasananirv/ri/ttaye
v/ri/shyannadiphalanish/t/any eva katha/m/ tesha/m/ virodhad vina/s/a
u/k/yate. Tatraha pate tv iti. /S/arirapate tu tesha/m/ vina/s/a/h/
/s/arirapatad urdhv/m/ tu vidyanugu/n/ad/ri/sh/t/aphalani suk/ri/tani
na/s/yantity artha/h/.]
[Footnote 20: Upalabhyate hi devayanena pantha ga/kkh/ato vidushas tam
pratibruuyat satyam bruyad iti /k/andramasa sa/m/vadava/k/anena
/s/arirasadbhava/h/, ata/h/ sukshma/s/ariram anuvartate.]
[Footnote 21: When the jiva has passed out of the body and ascends to
the world of Brahman, it remains enveloped by the subtle body until it
reaches the river Vijara. There it divests itself of the subtle body,
and the latter is merged in Brahman.].
[Footnote 22: Kim aya/m/ para/m/, yotir upasampanna/h/
saivabandhavinirmukta/h/ pratyagatma svatmana/m/ paramatmana/h/
p/rit/hagbhutam anubhavati uta tatpraharataya tadavibhaktam iti visnye
so, /s/nate sarvan kaman saha brahma/n/a vipas/k/ita pasya/h/ pasyate
rukmavar/n/a/m/ kartaram isa/m/ purusha/m/ brahmayoni/m/ tada vidvin
pu/n/yapape vidhuya nirangana/h/ parama/m/ samyam upaiti ida/m/ jnanam
upasritya mama sadharinyam agata/h/ sarve, punopajayante pralayena
vyathanti /k/etyadysruysm/nt/ibhyo muktasta pare/n/a
sahityasamyasadharmyavagamat p/ri/thagbhutam anubhavatiu prapte
u/k/yate. Avibhageneti. Parasmad brahmana/h/ svatmanam
avibhagenanubhavati mukta/h/. Kuta/h/. D/ri/shtatvat. Para/m/
brahmopasampadya niv/ri/ttavidyanrodhanasya yathatathyena svatamano
d/ri/sh/ta/tvat. Svatmana/h/ ssvarupa/m/ hi tat tvam asy ayam atma
brahma aitadatmyam ida/m/ sarva/m/ sarva/m/ khalv ida/m/
brahnetyadisamanadhikara/n/yanirdesai/h/ ya atmani tishtan atmano ntaro
yam atma na veda yastatma sarira/m/ ya atmanam antaro yamayati
atmantaryamy am/ri/tah anta/h/ pravishta/h/ sasta ananam ityadibhis /k/a
paramatmatmaka/m/ ta/kk/haritataya tatprakatabhutam iti pratipaditam
avashitei iti kasak/ri/stnety atrato vibhagenaha/m/ brahmasmity
cvanubhavati.]
[Footnote 23: /S/a@nkara's favourite illustrative instance of the
magician producing illusive sights is--significantly enough--not known
to the Sutras.]
[Footnote 24: Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.]
[Footnote 25: It is well known that, with the exception of the
/S/vitasvatara and Maitrayaniya, none of the chief Upanishads exhibits
the word 'maya.' The term indeed occurs in one place in the
B/ri/hadara/n/yaka; but that passage is a quotation from the /Ri/k
Sa/m/bita in which maya means 'creative power.' Cp. P. Regnaud, La Maya,
in the Revue de l'Histoire des Religions, tome xii, No. 3, 1885.]
[Footnote 26: As is demonstrated very satisfactorily by Ramanuja.]
[Footnote 27: Gough, Philosophy of the Upanishads pp. 213 ff.]
[Footnote 28: I cannot discuss in this place the Maya passages of the
Svetasvatara and the Maitrayaniya Upanishads. Reasons which want of
space prevents me from setting forth in detail induce me to believe that
neither of those two treatises deserves to be considered by us when
wishing to ascertain the true immixed doctrine of the Upanishads.]
[Footnote 29: The I/s/vara who allots to the individual souls their new
forms of embodiment in strict accordance with their merit or demerit
cannot be called anything else but a personal God. That this personal
conscious being is at the same time identified with the totality of the
individual souls in the unconscious state of deep dreamless sleep, is
one of those extraordinary contradictions which thorough-going
systematisers of Vedantic doctrine are apparently unable to avoid
altogether.]
[Footnote 30: That section of the introduction in which the point
referred to in the text is touched upon will I hope form part of the
second volume of the translation. The same remark applies to a point
concerning which further information had been promised above on page v.]
[Footnote 31:
Cosi tra questa
Immensita s'annega il pensier mio,
E il naufrago m' e dolce in qnesto mare.
LEOPARDI.
]
VEDANTA-SUTRAS
WITH
/S/A@NKARA BHASHYA.
/S/A@NKARA'S INTRODUCTION
FIRST ADHYAYA.
FIRST PADA.
REVERENCE TO THE AUGUST VASUDEVA!
It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the
subject[32] whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the
Non-Ego[33]) and the 'Ego,' and which are opposed to each other as much
as darkness and light are, cannot be identified. All the less can their
respective attributes be identified. Hence it follows that it is wrong
to superimpose[34] upon the subject--whose Self is intelligence, and
which has for its sphere the notion of the Ego--the object whose sphere
is the notion of the Non-Ego, and the attributes of the object, and
_vice versa_ to superimpose the subject and the attributes of the
subject on the object. In spite of this it is on the part of man a
natural[35] procedure--which which has its cause in wrong knowledge--not
to distinguish the two entities (object and subject) and their
respective attributes, although they are absolutely distinct, but to
superimpose upon each the characteristic nature and the attributes of
the other, and thus, coupling the Real and the Unreal[36], to make use
of expressions such as 'That am I,' 'That is mine.[37]'--But what have
we to understand by the term 'superimposition?'--The apparent
presentation, in the form of remembrance, to consciousness of something
previously observed, in some other thing.[38]
Some indeed define the term 'superimposition' as the superimposition of
the attributes of one thing on another thing.[39] Others, again, define
superimposition as the error founded on the non-apprehension of the
difference of that which is superimposed from that on which it is
superimposed.[40] Others[41], again, define it as the fictitious
assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which
something else is superimposed. But all these definitions agree in so
far as they represent superimposition as the apparent presentation of
the attributes of one thing in another thing. And therewith agrees also
the popular view which is exemplified by expressions such as the
following: 'Mother-of-pearl appears like silver,' 'The moon although one
only appears as if she were double.' But how is it possible that on the
interior Self which itself is not an object there should be superimposed
objects and their attributes? For every one superimposes an object only
on such other objects as are placed before him (i.e. in contact with his
sense-organs), and you have said before that the interior Self which is
entirely disconnected from the idea of the Thou (the Non-Ego) is never
an object. It is not, we reply, non-object in the absolute sense. For it
is the object of the notion of the Ego[42], and the interior Self is
well known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive)
presentation.[43] Nor is it an exceptionless rule that objects can be
superimposed only on such other objects as are before us, i.e. in
contact with our sense-organs; for non-discerning men superimpose on the
ether, which is not the object of sensuous perception, dark-blue colour.
Hence it follows that the assumption of the Non-Self being superimposed
on the interior Self is not unreasonable.
This superimposition thus defined, learned men consider to be Nescience
(avidya), and the ascertainment of the true nature of that which is (the
Self) by means of the discrimination of that (which is superimposed on
the Self), they call knowledge (vidya). There being such knowledge
(neither the Self nor the Non-Self) are affected in the least by any
blemish or (good) quality produced by their mutual superimposition[44].
The mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self, which is termed
Nescience, is the presupposition on which there base all the practical
distinctions--those made in ordinary life as well as those laid down by
the Veda--between means of knowledge, objects of knowledge (and knowing
persons), and all scriptural texts, whether they are concerned with
injunctions and prohibitions (of meritorious and non-meritorious
actions), or with final release[45].--But how can the means of right
knowledge such as perception, inference, &c., and scriptural texts have
for their object that which is dependent on Nescience[46]?--Because, we
reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a
knowing personality, and because the existence of the latter depends on
the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical
with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the
employment of the senses, perception and the other means of right
knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i.e. the body[47]) the
senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the
nature of the Self is not superimposed[48]. Nor can, in the absence of
all that[49], the Self which, in its own nature is free from all
contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the
means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence
perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts
have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. (That human
cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superimposition
described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect
of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities
affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance
according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or
disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching
with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and
therefore moves away; while she walks up to a man who advances with some
fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also--who possess a higher
intelligence--run away when they see strong fierce-looking fellows
drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently
approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that
men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to
the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well known that the
procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and
Non-Self); we therefore conclude that, as they present the same
appearances, men also--although distinguished by superior
intelligence--proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same
way as animals do; as long, that is to say, as the mutual
superimposition of Self and Non-Self lasts. With reference again to that
kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like),
it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on
it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another
world; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge,
derivable from the Vedanta-texts, of the true nature of the Self as free
from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Brahma/n/a and
Kshattriya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory existence. For
such knowledge is useless and even contradictory to the claim (on the
part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their
fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic
texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which
is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, 'A
Brahma/n/a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that
on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage
of life, age, outward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition
we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we
have already explained. (The superimposition of the Non-Self will be
understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal
attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself
sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so
on are sound and entire or not. Attributes of the body are superimposed
on the Self, if a man thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair,
as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he
thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the
internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention,
doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the
Ego (i.e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self,
which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the
internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is the witness
of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so
on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning--and endless
superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the
cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the
results of their actions), and is observed by every one.
With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the
cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute
unity of the Self the study of the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the
Vedanta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called
/S/ariraka-mima/m/sa.[50]
Of this Vedanta-mima/m/sa about to be explained by us the first Sutra is
as follows.
1. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.
The word 'then' is here to be taken as denoting immediate consecution;
not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon;
for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing
Brahman) is not of that nature[51]. Nor has the word 'then' the sense of
auspiciousness (or blessing); for a word of that meaning could not be
properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather
acts as an auspicious term by being pronounced and heard merely, while
it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution
as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows moreover from the
circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the
previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from
the relation of immediate consecution.[52]
If, then, the word 'then' intimates immediate consecution it must be
explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends;
just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject
of the Purva Mima/m/sa) specially depends on the antecedent reading of
the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for
those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for
those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to
the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the
understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means
of the Purva Mima/m/sa). To this question we reply in the negative,
because for a man who has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is
possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in
the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word
'then' to indicate order of succession; a purport which it serves in
other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off
of pieces from the heart and other parts of the sacrificial animal.[53]
(For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the
agent in both cases were the same; but this is not the case), because
there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the
enquiry into Brahman to stand in the relation of principal and
subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act)
on the part of the person qualified[54]; and because the result as well
as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of
active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that
again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into
Brahman, on the other hand, has for its fruit eternal bliss, and does
not depend on the performance of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not
yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to
be accomplished (in the future); for they depend on the activity of man.
In the Brahma-mima/m/sa, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i.e.
Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent),--for it is
eternal,--and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ
moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental
texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious
duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on
him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.); while the
fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without laying on
him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their
immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information
regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are
approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something
should be stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is
proposed.--Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent conditions are
the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the
renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both
here and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and
the other means[55], and the desire of final release. If these
conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into
active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman
and come to know it; but not otherwise. The word 'then' therefore
intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition
of the above-mentioned (spiritual) means.
The word 'therefore' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while
declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which
are means of happiness is non-eternal (as, for instance. Ch. Up. VIII,
1, 6, 'As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so
perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious
duty'), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised
by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who
knows Brahman attains the highest'); therefore the enquiry into Brahman
is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned
means.
By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be
given in the next Sutra (I, 1, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed
that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance,
the brahminical caste. In the Sutra the genitive case ('of Brahman;' the
literal translation of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of
knowledge of Brahman') denotes the object, not something generally
supplementary (/s/esha[56]); for the desire of knowledge demands an
object of desire and no other such object is stated.--But why should not
the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary
relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it
might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the
general relation may base itself on the more particular one.--This
assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the
direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object; an
altogether needless procedure.--Not needless; for if we explain the
words of the Sutra to mean 'the desire of knowledge connected with
Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of
discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.--This reason also, we
reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the
statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary
matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all
objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those
objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those
objects need therefore not be mentioned, especially in the Sutra.
Analogously the sentence 'there the king is going' implicitly means that
the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation
(according to which the Sutra represents Brahman as the direct object of
knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents
Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge; compare, for instance,
the passage, 'That from whence these beings are born, &c., desire to
know that. That is Brahman' (Taitt. Up. III, 1). With passages of this
kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the
object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is
the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires
having reference to results[57]. Knowledge thus constitutes the means by
which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained.
For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man,
since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of
the entire Sa/m/sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be
entertained.
But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the
enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry
concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.
We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and
endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity,
intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of
the word 'Brahman,' from the root b/ri/h, 'to be great,' we at once
understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman[58].
Moreover the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of its being
the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of
(his) Self, and never thinks 'I am not.' If the existence of the Self
were not known, every one would think 'I am not.' And this Self (of
whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is
generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it!
Not so, we reply; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special
nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas are of opinion that the
mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others
that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain
that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a
mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again
(to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge the authority of the
Veda), maintain that there is a transmigrating being different from the
body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of
action); others teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting;
others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an
all-knowing, all-powerful Lord[59]. Others, finally, (i.e. the
Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i.e. of
the individual soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the
product of Nescience).
Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound
arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on fallacious arguments and
scriptural texts misunderstood[60]. If therefore a man would embrace
some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar
himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this
reason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry
into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with
the help of conformable arguments, and having for its aim the highest
beatitude.
So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The
question now arises what the characteristics of that Brahman are, and
the reverend author of the Sutras therefore propounds the following
aphorism.
2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin,
subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).
The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is
mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture
as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares
the order of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the
passage, Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And
with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of
qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered,
through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this'
denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by
perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case
indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which'
denote the cause. The full sense of the Sutra therefore is: That
omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence,
and dissolution of this world--which world is differentiated by names
and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits
of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and
causes[61], and the nature of whose arrangement cannot even be conceived
by the mind,--that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of
existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination,
subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in
the Sutra. As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yaska[62] are
possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it
might--were they referred to in the Sutra--be suspected that what is
meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as
dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to
be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from
Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into
Brahman.
The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot
possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated
qualities; not either from a non-intelligent pradhana[63], or from
atoms, or from non-being, or from a being subject to transmigration[64];
nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously,
without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects)
special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.
(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world[65],
think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating
beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without
recourse being had to Scripture at all).--But, it might be said, you
yourself in the Sutra under discussion have merely brought forward the
same argument!--By no means, we reply. The Sutras (i.e. literally 'the
strings') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of
the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages referred to by the
Sutras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected
by the ascertainment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the
Vedanta-texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right
knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages primarily declare the
cause of the origin, &c., of the world, inference also, being an
instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the
Vedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the
meaning ascertained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation;
for the passages, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5 ('the Self is to be heard, to be
considered'), and Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2 ('as the man, &c., having been
informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at Gandhara,
in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'),
declare that human understanding assists Scripture[66].
Scriptural text, &c.[67], are not, in the enquiry into Brahman, the only
means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i.e. in
the Purva Mima/m/sa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and
intuition[68], &c., on the other hand, are to be had recourse to
according to the occasion: firstly, because intuition is the final
result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the
enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the
knowledge of Brahman were something to be accomplished, there would be
no reference to intuition, and text, &c., would be the only means of
knowledge. The origination of something to be accomplished depends,
moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent
on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different
way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by
means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to
quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture
with sentences such as the following: 'At the atiratra he takes the
sho/d/asin cup,' and 'at the atiratra he does not take the sho/d/asin
cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen,' and, 'he
makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the
quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional
procedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would
have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing
to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to
whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All
option depends on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real
nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the
thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a
man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth; the two ideas, 'it
is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, 'it
is a post,' which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of
true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on
the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends
altogether on the thing, i.e. Brahman itself.--But, it might be said, as
Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other
means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a
discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purposeless.--This we deny; for as
Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those
other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their
nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman
were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is
connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i.e. the
world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception)
whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the
Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound inference (as the means
of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text.--Which,
then, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be
considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman?--It is the
passage Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father
Varu/n/a, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from whence
these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into
which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The
sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6:
'From bliss these beings are born; by bliss, when born, they live; into
bliss they enter at their death.' Other passages also are to be adduced
which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature
is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.
That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being
shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the
Sutrakara continues as follows:
3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of
Scripture.
Brahman is the source, i.e. the cause of the great body of Scripture,
consisting of the /Ri/g-veda and other branches, which is supported by
various disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura/n/a, &c.); which
lamp-like illuminates all things; which is itself all-knowing as it
were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of
omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is
generally understood that the man from whom some special body of
doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for
instance, grammar from Pa/n/ini possesses a more extensive knowledge
than his work, comprehensive though it be; what idea, then, shall we
have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great
Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his
breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the
/Ri/g-veda, &c., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold
branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and
conditions of gods, animals, and men! See what Scripture says about him,
'The /Ri/g-veda, &c., have been breathed forth from that great Being'
(B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 10).
Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of
the /Ri/g-veda, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e.
the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of
Brahman. So that the sense would be: through Scripture only as a means
of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c., of the
world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the
preceding Sutra 'from which these beings are born,' &c.--But as the
preceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is
the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra?--The words
of the preceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the
scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the
origin, &c., of the world were adduced merely as determining an
inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the
Sutra under discussion has been propounded.
But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing
Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action
(according to the Purva Mima/m/sa Sutra I, 2, 1, 'As the purport of
Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not
action are purportless'), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not
action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they
must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the
action, form supplements to the passages enjoining actions, or serve the
purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout
meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying
information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the
latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which
give sufficient information about them; while it is the recognised
object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from
other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be
connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to
man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as 'he howled, &c.,'
which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in
so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mi. Su. I, 2, 7,
'Because they stand in syntactical connection with the injunctions,
therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions'). In the same way
mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far
as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are
accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, 'For strength thee (I cut;'
which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the
dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can
be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action.
And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects
cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the
Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin
actions; notifying the agents, divinities, and results connected with
those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its
involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the
Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmaka/nd/a of the Veda),
we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above viz.)
that the Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar
actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of
all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.
To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows:
4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scripture), because it is
connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport.
The word 'but' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view
as urged above). That all-knowing, all-powerful Brahman, which is the
cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known
from the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the
Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their
purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for
instance, 'Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second'
(Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only' (Ait.
Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); 'This is the Brahman without cause and without effect,
without anything inside or outside; this Self is Brahman perceiving
everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19); 'That immortal Brahman is before'
(Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in
these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their
purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to
have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning
the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can
we conclude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the
nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious
duty); for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all
actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13,
'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there
is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor
again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing,
be the object of perception and the other means of knowledge; for the
fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without
the aid of the scriptural passage 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7).
Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not
connected with something either to be striven after or shunned; for from
the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either
to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain,
and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying
certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of
devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be
admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous
relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the knowledge of
absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be
desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to
which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the
conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute
unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman
being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of
devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far
as they are connected with injunctions; still it is impossible to impugn
on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge
of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can
the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so
that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all
which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right
knowledge of Brahman.
Here others raise the following objection:--Although the Veda is the
means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it intimates Brahman
only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which
the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other
objects not known from the practice of common life is merely
supplementary to certain injunctions[69]. Why so? Because the Veda has
the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For
men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following
declaration, 'The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of
actions' (Bhashya on Jaimini Sutra I, 1, 1); 'Injunction means passages
impelling to action' (Bh. on Jaim. Su. I, 1, 2); 'Of this (viz. active
religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction' (part of Jaim. Su.
I, 1, 5); 'The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with
(the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose purport is action'
(Jaim. Su. I, 1, 25); 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever
does not refer to action is purportless' (Jaim. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore
the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man
with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others;
other passages (i.e. all those passages which are not directly
injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions
and prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts also as likewise belonging to
the Veda can have a meaning in the same way only. And if their aim is
injunction, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are
enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the
knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of
immortality.--But--somebody might object--it has been declared that
there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the
object of enquiry in the karma-ka/nd/a (that part of the Veda which
treats of active religious duty) being something to be accomplished,
viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely
accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the
knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the
knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions[70].--We
reply that it must not be such because the Vedanta-texts give
information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with
injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind,
'Verily the Self is to be seen' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5); 'The Self which
is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which
we must try to understand' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'Let a man worship him
as Self' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7); 'Let a man worship the Self only as his
true state' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 15); 'He who knows Brahman becomes
Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire
to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the
Vedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task
by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely
self-sufficient, ever pure, intelligent and free, pure knowledge,
absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results
as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the
ordinary way, is discerned by means of the /s/astra. If, on the other
hand, the Vedanta-texts were considered to have no reference to
injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere
(accomplished) things, just as if one were saying 'the earth comprises
seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be purportless,
because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be
shunned or endeavoured after.--Perhaps it will here be objected that
sometimes a mere statement about existent things has a purpose, as, for
instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the
purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and
that so likewise the Vedanta-passages making statements about the
non-transmigrating Self, have a purport of their own (without reference
to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of
the Self being liable to transmigration.--We reply that this might be so
if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the
fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true
nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being
subject to transmigration. But this is not the case; for we observe that
even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to
be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the
transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, /Bri/. Up.
II, 4, 5, 'The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected
upon,' that consideration and reflection have to follow the mere
hearing. From all this it results that the sastra can be admitted as a
means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with injunctions. |
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