To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following reply:--The preceding
reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits
of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other
side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind,
which are known from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti, and are comprised under the
name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Jaimini Sutra,
which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty;' the
opposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c., which is
defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to
the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and
its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic
statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which
make themselves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the
contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate
beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with
observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure
of all embodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those
differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of
the merit acquired by actions in accordance with religious duty;
therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those
qualified to perform acts of religious duty. Those latter differences
are moreover known to be affected by the desire of certain results
(which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts),
worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture
that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the
pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of
the sun; Ch. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public
utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the
southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally
reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are
degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the
passage 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed.' Analogously
it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are
enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of
hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as
defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different
degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is
inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as
defined in the prohibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This
difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its
antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of
degree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as
ignorance and the like, is well known--from /S/ruti, Sm/ri/ti, and
reasoning--to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature
(sa/m/sara). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the
body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1),
refers to the sa/m/sara-state as described above. From the following
passage, on the other hand, 'When he is free from the body then neither
pleasure nor pain touches him,' which denies the touch of pain or
pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called 'final release'
(moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined
by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be
denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said that
the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of
merit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state
to be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows
the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing
things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve' (Ka. Up. II, 22);
'He is without breath, without mind, pure' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That
person is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 15)[71]. All
which passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from
all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially
disembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal,
although changing' (pari/n/aminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose
identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for
instance, are earth and the other elements in the opinion of those who
maintain the eternity of the world, or the three gu/n/as in the opinion
of the Sa@nkhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i.e.
eternal without undergoing any changes (ku/ta/sthanitya), omnipresent as
ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not
composed of parts, of self-luminous nature. That bodiless entity in
fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold
time do not apply, is called release; a definition agreeing with
scriptural passages, such as the following: 'Different from merit and
demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and
future' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 14). It[72] (i.e. moksha) is, therefore, the same
as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If
Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and
release were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be
non-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding
a pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions
with their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is
acknowledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching concerning
Brahman can therefore not be merely supplementary to actions.
There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare
release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which
thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two;
for instance, 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 2,
9); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and
the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); 'He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears
nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached
fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4); 'That Brahman knew its Self only,
saying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10);
'What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity?'
(Is. Up. 7.) We must likewise quote the passage,--B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10,
('Seeing this the /Ri/shi Vamadeva understood: I was Manu, I was the
sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between
one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that
passage is analogous to the following one, 'standing he sings,' from
which we understand that no action due to the same agent intervenes
between the standing and the singing. Other scriptural passages show
that the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the
only fruit of the knowledge of Brahman; so, for instance, 'You indeed
are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore'
(Pr. Up. VI, 8); 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the
Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of
mine' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'To him after his faults had been rubbed out,
the venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness' (Ch. Up.
VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, supported by
arguments, of (Gautama) Akarya, 'Final release results from the
successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain,
the removal of each later member of the series depending on the removal
of the preceding member' (Nyay. Su. I, i, 2); and wrong knowledge itself
is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of
Brahman.
Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere
(fanciful) combination[73], as is made use of, for instance, in the
following passage, 'For the mind is endless, and the Vi/s/vedevas are
endless, and he thereby gains the endless world' (B/ri/. Up. III, 1,
9)[74]; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription
(superimposition)[75], as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as
Brahman,' and 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Ch. Up. III,
18, 1; 19, 1), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the
mind, Aditya and so on; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of
identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical)
with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the
absorber; breath is indeed the absorber[76]' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1; 3); nor
is it a mere (ceremonial) purification of (the Self constituting a
subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c.,
Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the
sacrificial butter[77]. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self
and Brahman were understood in the way of combination and the like,
violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose
object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of
Brahman and the Self being really identical; so, for instance, in the
following passages, 'That art thou' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'I am Brahman'
(B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19).
And other texts which declare that the fruit of the cognition of Brahman
is the cessation of Ignorance would be contradicted thereby; so, for
instance, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved'
(Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Nor, finally, would it be possible, in that case,
satisfactorily to explain the passages which speak of the individual
Self becoming Brahman: such as 'He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman'
(Mu. Up. III, 2, 9). Hence the knowledge of the unity of Brahman and the
Self cannot be of the nature of figurative combination and the like. The
knowledge of Brahman does, therefore, not depend on the active energy of
man, but is analogous to the knowledge of those things which are the
objects of perception, inference, and so on, and thus depends on the
object of knowledge only. Of such a Brahman or its knowledge it is
impossible to establish, by reasoning, any connection with actions.
Nor, again, can we connect Brahman with acts by representing it as the
object of the action of knowing. For that it is not such is expressly
declared in two passages, viz. 'It is different from the known and again
above (i.e. different from) the unknown' (Ken. Up. I, 3); and 'How
should he know him by whom he knows all this?' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13.)
In the same way Brahman is expressly declared not to be the object of
the act of devout meditation, viz. in the second half of the verse, Ken.
Up. I, 5, whose first half declares it not to be an object (of speech,
mind, and so on), 'That which is not proclaimed by speech, by which
speech is proclaimed, that only know to be Brahman, not that on which
people devoutly meditate as this.' If it should be objected that if
Brahman is not an object (of speech, mind, &c.) the sastra can
impossibly be its source, we refute this objection by the remark that
the aim of the sastra is to discard all distinctions fictitiously
created by Nescience. The sastra's purport is not to represent Brahman
definitely as this or that object, its purpose is rather to show that
Brahman as the eternal subject (pratyagatman, the inward Self) is never
an object, and thereby to remove the distinction of objects known,
knowers, acts of knowledge, &c., which is fictitiously created by
Nescience. Accordingly the sastra says, 'By whom it is not thought by
him it is thought, by whom it is thought he does not know it; unknown by
those who know it, it is known by those who do not know it' (Ken. Up.
II, 3); and 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight, thou couldst not
hear the hearer of hearing, nor perceive the perceiver of perception,
nor know the knower of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2). As thereby
(i.e. by the knowledge derived from the sastra) the imagination of the
transitoriness of Release which is due to Nescience is discarded, and
Release is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self, it
cannot be charged with the imperfection of non-eternality. Those, on the
other hand, who consider Release to be something to be effected properly
maintain that it depends on the action of mind, speech, or body. So,
likewise, those who consider it to be a mere modification.
Non-eternality of Release is the certain consequence of these two
opinions; for we observe in common life that things which are
modifications, such as sour milk and the like, and things which are
effects, such as jars, &c., are non-eternal. Nor, again, can it be said
that there is a dependance on action in consequence of (Brahman or
Release) being something which is to be obtained[78]; for as Brahman
constitutes a person's Self it is not something to be attained by that
person. And even if Brahman were altogether different from a person's
Self still it would not be something to be obtained; for as it is
omnipresent it is part of its nature that it is ever present to every
one, just as the (all-pervading) ether is. Nor, again, can it be
maintained that Release is something to be ceremonially purified, and as
such depends on an activity. For ceremonial purification (sa/m/skara)
results either from the accretion of some excellence or from the removal
of some blemish. The former alternative does not apply to Release as it
is of the nature of Brahman, to which no excellence can be added; nor,
again, does the latter alternative apply, since Release is of the nature
of Brahman, which is eternally pure.--But, it might be said, Release
might be a quality of the Self which is merely hidden and becomes
manifest on the Self being purified by some action; just as the quality
of clearness becomes manifest in a mirror when the mirror is cleaned by
means of the action of rubbing.--This objection is invalid, we reply,
because the Self cannot be the abode of any action. For an action cannot
exist without modifying that in which it abides. But if the Self were
modified by an action its non-eternality would result therefrom, and
texts such as the following, 'unchangeable he is called,' would thus be
stultified; an altogether unacceptable result. Hence it is impossible to
assume that any action should abide in the Self. On the other hand, the
Self cannot be purified by actions abiding in something else as it
stands in no relation to that extraneous something. Nor will it avail to
point out (as a quasi-analogous case) that the embodied Self (dehin, the
individual soul) is purified by certain ritual actions which abide in
the body, such as bathing, rinsing one's mouth, wearing the sacrificial
thread, and the like. For what is purified by those actions is that Self
merely which is joined to the body, i.e. the Self in so far as it is
under the power of Nescience. For it is a matter of perception that
bathing and similar actions stand in the relation of inherence to the
body, and it is therefore only proper to conclude that by such actions
only that something is purified which is joined to the body. If a person
thinks 'I am free from disease,' he predicates health of that entity
only which is connected with and mistakenly identifies itself with the
harmonious condition of matter (i.e. the body) resulting from
appropriate medical treatment applied to the body (i.e. the 'I'
constituting the subject of predication is only the individual embodied
Self). Analogously that I which predicates of itself, that it is
purified by bathing and the like, is only the individual soul joined to
the body. For it is only this latter principle of egoity
(aha/m/kart/ri/), the object of the notion of the ego and the agent in
all cognition, which accomplishes all actions and enjoys their results.
Thus the mantras also declare, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit, the
other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1); and 'When he is in
union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him
the Enjoyer' (Ka. Up. III, 1, 4). Of Brahman, on the other hand, the two
following passages declare that it is incapable of receiving any
accretion and eternally pure, 'He is the one God, hidden in all beings,
all-pervading, the Self within all beings, watching over all works,
dwelling in all beings, the witness, the perceiver, the only one; free
from qualities' (/S/v. Up. VI, 11); and 'He pervaded all, bright,
incorporeal, scatheless, without muscles, pure, untouched by evil'
(I/s/. Up. 8). But Release is nothing but being Brahman. Therefore
Release is not something to be purified. And as nobody is able to show
any other way in which Release could be connected with action, it is
impossible that it should stand in any, even the slightest, relation to
any action, excepting knowledge.
But, it will be said here, knowledge itself is an activity of the mind.
By no means, we reply; since the two are of different nature. An action
is that which is enjoined as being independent of the nature of existing
things and dependent on the energy of some person's mind; compare, for
instance, the following passages, 'To whichever divinity the offering is
made on that one let him meditate when about to say vasha/t/' (Ait.
Brahm. III, 8, 1); and 'Let him meditate in his mind on the sandhya.'
Meditation and reflection are indeed mental, but as they depend on the
(meditating, &c.) person they may either be performed or not be
performed or modified. Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of
the different means of (right) knowledge, and those have for their
objects existing things; knowledge can therefore not be either made or
not made or modified, but depends entirely on existing things, and not
either on Vedic statements or on the mind of man. Although mental it
thus widely differs from meditation and the like.
The meditation, for instance, on man and woman as fire, which is founded
on Ch. Up. V, 7, 1; 8, 1, 'The fire is man, O Gautama; the fire is
woman, O Gautama,' is on account of its being the result of a Vedic
statement, merely an action and dependent on man; that conception of
fire, on the other hand, which refers to the well-known (real) fire, is
neither dependent on Vedic statements nor on man, but only on a real
thing which is an object of perception; it is therefore knowledge and
not an action. The same remark applies to all things which are the
objects of the different means of right knowledge. This being thus that
knowledge also which has the existent Brahman for its object is not
dependent on Vedic injunction. Hence, although imperative and similar
forms referring to the knowledge of Brahman are found in the Vedic
texts, yet they are ineffective because they refer to something which
cannot be enjoined, just as the edge of a razor becomes blunt when it is
applied to a stone. For they have for their object something which can
neither be endeavoured after nor avoided.--But what then, it will be
asked, is the purport of those sentences which, at any rate, have the
appearance of injunctions; such as, 'The Self is to be seen, to be heard
about?'--They have the purport, we reply, of diverting (men) from the
objects of natural activity. For when a man acts intent on external
things, and only anxious to attain the objects of his desire and to
eschew the objects of his aversion, and does not thereby reach the
highest aim of man although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the
one quoted divert him from the objects of natural activity and turn the
stream of his thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. That for him
who is engaged in the enquiry into the Self, the true nature of the Self
is nothing either to be endeavoured after or to be avoided, we learn
from texts such as the following: 'This everything, all is that Self'
(B/ri/, Up. II, 4, 6); 'But when the Self only is all this, how should
he see another, how should he know another, how should he know the
knower?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15); 'This Self is Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. II,
5, 19). That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a
thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit
or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit; for just
that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all
our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus /S/ruti says,
'If a man understands the Self, saying, "I am he," what could he wish or
desire that he should pine after the body?' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 12.) And
similarly Sm/ri/ti declares, 'Having understood this the understanding
man has done with all work, O Bharata' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore
Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.
We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there
is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about
mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition,
or supplementary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul
(purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a
complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended
from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman,
different in nature from the four classes of substances[79], which forms
a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else; of that
soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended; for
the passage, 'That Self is to be described by No, no!' (B/ri/. Up. III,
9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied.
The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul
is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of
self-consciousness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the
Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i.e. of the object of
self-consciousness, viz. the jivatman). For neither from that part of
the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that
soul which, different from the agent that is the object of
self-consciousness, merely witnesses it; which is permanent in all
(transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of
everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be represented as the
mere complement of injunctions; for of that very person who might deny
it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be
striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because
they are mere modifications, up to (i.e. exclusive of) the soul. But the
soul is imperishable[80], as there is no cause why it should perish; and
eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any
modification; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And
from passages, such as 'Beyond the soul there is nothing; this is the
goal, the highest road' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in
the Upanishads, I ask thee' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26), it appears that the
attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as
it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no
portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold
assertion.
With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with
the purport of the /S/astra (who alone were stated to have declared that
the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to
do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the /S/astra which
consists of injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other
passage quoted ('as action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not
refer to action is purportless') we remark that if that passage were
taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those
words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all
information about existent things is meaningless[81]. If, on the other
hand, the Veda--in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation
of activity--does give information about existent things as being
subservient to some action to be accomplished, why then should it not
give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self?
For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become
an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act).--But, it will
be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are
instrumental to action, the information given about such things is
merely subservient to action.--This, we reply, does not matter; for
although the information may be subservient to action, the things
themselves about which information is given are already intimated
thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain
actions. Their final end (prayojana) indeed may be subserviency to some
action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given
about them, intimated in themselves.--Well, and if they are thus
intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose[82]? We reply that
the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not
comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the
information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of
the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of
transmigration, and thus a purpose is established which renders the
passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give
information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are
found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such
passages as 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' which teach abstinence
from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor
instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages
which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it
would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach
abstinence from action, are devoid of purport--a consequence which is of
course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word
'not' stands with the action expressed by the verb 'is to be
killed'--which action is naturally established[83]--be used as a reason
for assuming that 'not' denotes an action non-established elsewhere[84],
different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence
from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle 'not'
is to intimate the idea of the non-existence of that with which it is
connected, and the conception of the non-existence (of something to be
done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected
that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of
passivity will again make room for activity; for) that idea itself
passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse
prompting to the murder of a Brahma/n/a, &c., just as a fire is
extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel). Hence we
are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as 'a
Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting
in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special
cases, such as the so-called Prajapati-vow, &c.[85] Hence the charge of
want of purpose is to be considered as referring (not to the
Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as
are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose
of man.
The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing
not connected with an injunction of something to be done, is purposeless
(as, for instance, the statement that the earth contains seven dvipas)
has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist
in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a
rope.'--But how about the objection raised above that the information
about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the
statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard
about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory world?--We
reply as follows: It is impossible to show that a man who has once
understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world
in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to
the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who
imagines the body, and so on, to constitute the Self, is subject to fear
and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after
having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and
thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same
manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In
the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of
his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him; but we
do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has
once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And,
again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings
derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership; but after he has
lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure
derived from them vanishes. Thus /S/ruti also declares, 'When he is free
from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up.
VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free
from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man
being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to
establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong
knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account
of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The
objection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit
effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that
as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself
not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the
action of the Self is likewise not established; for (if we should try to
get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as
caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of
making embodiedness dependent on merit and demerit, and again merit and
demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive
chain (of embodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than
a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the
Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate
relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be
considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people
are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere
presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance; for kings may
become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by
giving them wages, &c., while it is impossible to imagine anything,
analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the
Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination,
on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be
joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two
(which is not based on any assumption). This explains also in how far
the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar
acts[86]. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the
body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be
understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate
by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of
words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of
things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a
certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the
exclusive primary object of the idea and word 'lion,' and we are
likewise acquainted with persons possessing in an eminent degree certain
leonine qualities, such as fierceness, courage, &c.; here, a well
settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name 'lion' are
applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those
cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well
established, the transfer of the conception and name of the one to the
other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for
instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern
that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception
and designation of a man; such is likewise the case of the conception
and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl
somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the
application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c.,
which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the
Not-Self, is figurative (rather than simply false)? considering that
even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self
confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.
As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on
the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the
body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness
of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that
the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even
while still alive. The same is declared in the /S/ruti passages
concerning him who knows Brahman: 'And as the slough of a snake lies on
an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that
disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light' (B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 7); and 'With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears
without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a
mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it
were.' Sm/ri/ti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are
enumerated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that
he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore
the man who has once comprehended Brahman to be the Self, does not
belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other
hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not
comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved
contradictions.
With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not fully
determined in its own nature, but stands in a complementary relation to
injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by
consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and
reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of
Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a
subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely
supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and
reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It
follows that the /S/astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in
so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on
account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta-texts, an independent
Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is
room for beginning the new /S/astra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then
therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the
Vedanta-texts were connected with injunctions, a new /S/astra would
either not be begun at all, since the /S/astra concerned with
injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of
the Purva Mima/m/sa, 'Then therefore the enquiry into duty;' or if it
were begun it would be introduced as follows: 'Then therefore the
enquiry into the remaining duties;' just as a new portion of the Purva
Mima/m/sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the
enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what
subserves the purpose of man' (Pu. Mi. Su. IV, 1, 1). But as the
comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been
propounded (in the previous /S/astra), it is quite appropriate that a
new /S/astra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence
all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition
expressed in the words, 'I am Brahman;' for as soon as there supervenes
the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to
be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing
agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In
accordance with this, they (i.e. men knowing Brahman) have made the
following declaration:--'When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the
knowledge, "I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to
the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the
(imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an
end[87]; how should then the effect[88] (of that wrong imagination)
exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture
tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing
subject; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz.
(the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of
the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all
the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid
only until the one Self is ascertained.'
(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished[89].)
So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is
the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object
therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions.
And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omnipotent
cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now
the Sa@nkhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is
to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer
different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and thereupon
interpret the Vedanta-passages as referring to the latter. All the
Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the
world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be
concluded from the effect by inference; and the cause which is to be
inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The
followers of Ka/n/ada again infer from the very same passages that the
Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its
material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on
passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious arguments
raise various objections. For this reason the teacher
(Vyasa)--thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, passages, and means
of proof--proceeds to state as prima facie views, and afterwards to
refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious
arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the
Vedanta-texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.
The Sa@nkhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pradhana consisting of
three constituent elements (gu/n/a) is the cause of the world argue as
follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that
the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be
consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pradhana being the
general cause. Omnipotence (more literally: the possession of all
powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its
effects for its objects. All-knowingness also can be ascribed to it,
viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in
reality an attribute of the gu/n/a of Goodness[90], according to the
Sm/ri/ti passage 'from Goodness springs knowledge' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17).
By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men
endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as
all-knowing Yogins; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with
the very highest degree of 'Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which
is isolated, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure
(undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either
all-knowingness or limited knowledge; the pradhana, on the other hand,
because consisting of the three gu/n/as, comprises also in its pradhana
state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The
Vedanta-passages therefore in a derived (figurative) sense ascribe
all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself
non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an
all-knowing Brahman can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as
that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be
actually engaged in the cognition of everything; for from this there
would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would
involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the
activity of knowing. And if you should propose to consider Brahman's
cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of
the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is
possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you
assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is
without any instruments of action. But without the body, the senses, &c.
which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in
any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as consisting
of various elements, is capable of undergoing modifications, and may
therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances;
while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.
To these conclusions he (Vyasa) replies in the following Sutra.
5. On account of seeing (i.e. thinking being attributed in the
Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhana) is not (to be
identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not
founded on Scripture.
It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the
non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas; because it is
not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i.e.
thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Ch.
Up. VI, 2, (which begins: 'Being only, my dear, this was in the
beginning, one only, without a second,' and goes on, 'It thought (saw),
may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that
this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by
the word 'this,' was before its origination identical with the Self of
that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or
'that which is') sent forth fire and the other elements after having
thought. The following passage also ('Verily in the beginning all this
was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He
thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait.
Ar. II, 4, 1, 2) declares the creation to have had thought for its
antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the
person of sixteen parts, 'He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/n/a.' By
'seeing' (i.e. the verb 'seeing' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant
that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense;
just as the verb 'to sacrifice' is used to denote any kind of offering.
Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an
all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as,
for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows
all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that
Brahman, name and form and food.'
The argumentation of the Sa@nkhyas that the pradhana may be called
all-knowing on account of knowledge constituting an attribute of the
gu/n/a Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the
three gu/n/as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality
of Goodness only is not possible[91]. Nor can we admit the explanation
that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for
all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the gu/n/as, we
term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge
residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with
reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and
Darkness.
Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a
witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and
the non-intelligent pradhana is destitute of such a principle. It is
therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradhana all-knowingness. The
case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under
consideration; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an
excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience[92].--Well then
(say those Sa@nkhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us
assume that the pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the
witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is
imparted to an iron ball by fire.--No, we reply; for if this were so, it
would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the
pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary
Brahman itself is the cause of the world.
The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense
cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent,
Brahman could not be considered as independent with regard to it, we
refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sa@nkhya, is Brahman's
all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To
maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light
on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge
were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he
would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not
all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's
knowledge to be permanent.--But, it may be objected, on this latter
alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with
reference to the act of knowing.--Why not? we reply; the sun also,
although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as
independent when we say, 'he burns, he gives light[93].'--But, it will
again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he
stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated; Brahman,
on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no
relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not
parallel.--This objection too, we reply, is not valid; for as a matter
of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines' even
without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman
also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as 'it thought,'
& c., even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an
object is supposed to be required ('knowing' being a transitive verb
while 'shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman
will fit all the better.--What then is that object to which the
knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the
world?--Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being
identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to
be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-/s/astra assume, the
Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through
the favour of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to speak of the
eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the
creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world! The objection that
Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think
because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply; for
Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition--as the sun's nature is
eternal luminousness--can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of
knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa/m/sarin) indeed, which is under
the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge
may arise in it; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments
of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does
not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions.
'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like
unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent,
acting as knowledge and force.' 'Grasping without hands, hasting without
feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be
known, but no one knows him; they call him the first, the great person'
(/S/v. Up. VI, 8; III, 19).
But, to raise a new objection, there exists no transmigrating soul
different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge; for
/S/ruti expressly declares that 'there is no other seer but he; there is
no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23). How then can it be said
that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on
a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord?--True, we
reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the
Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts,
consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether
to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars,
pots, caves, and the like. And just as in consequence of connexion of
the latter kind such conceptions and terms as 'the hollow (space) of a
jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not
really different from universal space, and just as in consequence
thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are
different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on; so there prevails
likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are
different; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal)
connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the
body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence,
imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like which are
Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong
conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception.
And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the
transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.
The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements,
can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while
the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the
pradhana not basing on Scripture. That, moreover, it is possible to
establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the
pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the second Adhyaya (II, 1, 4, &c.). |
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