Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant
(in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the
words 'This (him) I will explain further,' &c., as referring to the
individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the
individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but)
to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c., which
Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII,
1).--Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it
disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i.e. the 'this' in
'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers
to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is
opposed to the word 'further' (or 'again') met with in the text, since
from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in
the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section.
Moreover, if Prajapati, after having made a promise in the clause, 'This
I shall explain' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did
previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each
section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully.--Hence
(our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz.
that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as
such--which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the
desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoyers, and is connected
with evils of various kinds--is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the
soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i.e. into its true state
in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom
from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by
which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of
the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.
Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiya/s/ /k/a. ke/k/it),
are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real. To the end of
refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete
intuition of the unity of the Self this /s/ariraka-/s/astra has been set
forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever
unchanging, whose substance is cognition[188], and who, by means of
Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg
appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that
Lord there is no other substance of cognition.--If, now, the Sutrakara
raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in
reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he
does in this and the preceding Sutras[189], he does so for the following
purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and
free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything,
devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are
erroneously ascribed; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the
colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of
Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to
disprove the doctrine of duality--which passages he strengthens by
arguments--he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the
individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is
different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul,
refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary
thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic
injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting
and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not
stultified.--That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real
purport of the /s/astra's teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for
instance, in I, 1, 30[190]. The refutation of the reproach of futility
raised against the injunctions of works has already been set forth by
us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess
full knowledge, and such as do not.
20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.
The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out
(by the purvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about
the small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if
the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the
worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject
under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of
meaning.--On that account the Sutra declares that the reference has
another meaning, i.e. that the reference to the individual soul is not
meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the
nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul
which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in
the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and
the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the na/d/is of the body, and enjoys
the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state;
and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state
of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the
subtle body, reaches the highest light, i.e. the highest Brahman
previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of
specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light
which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its
true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there
represented as the object of worship.--In this sense the reference to
the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in
reality the highest Lord is meant.
21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural declaration of the
smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that
has been explained (before).
The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by
Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest
Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in
another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark
calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it
having been shown--under I, 2, 7--that a relative smallness may be
attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is--as the Sutra points
out--to be applied here also.--That smallness is, moreover, contradicted
by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart)
with the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether so large
is the ether within the heart.')
22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), (that after
which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and
(because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).
We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine
there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this
fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him
all this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom
when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is
lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (praj/n/a
atman).
A luminous substance, the purvapakshin maintains.--Why?--Because the
passage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and
the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies
such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun,
which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that
thing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and
the sun himself, does not shine is likewise a thing of light. The
'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body
already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of
any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar
nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks
himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the passage refers to
some luminous body.
To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.--Why?--On
account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the passage,
'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the
praj/n/a Self, i.e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that praj/n/a
Self another scriptural passage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts
are true' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any
means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body.
Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies
such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other
luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for
instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such
absolute rule (as the purvapakshin asserted) that acting after is
observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed
among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts
after, i.e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground
blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.--The clause 'on account of the
acting after' (which forms part of the Sutra) points to the shining
after (mentioned in the scriptural /s/loka under discussion); the clause
'and of him' points to the fourth pada of the same /s/loka. The meaning
of this latter clause is that the cause assigned for the light of the
sun, &c. (in the passage 'by the light of him everything is lighted')
intimates the praj/n/a Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the
gods worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (B/ri/. Up. IV,
4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c,
should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not
known; and, in the second place, absurd as one (physical) light is
counteracted by another.--Or else the cause assigned for the shining
does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the
/s/loka; but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is--as we may
conclude from the comprehensive statement 'all this'--that the
manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts,
agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the
light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the
cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.--Moreover, the text
shows by means of the word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.)
that the passage is to be connected with the general topic, and that
topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven,
the earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a passage
subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the passage
under discussion). 'In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman
without passion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of
lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.' This passage
giving rise to the question, 'How is it the light of lights?' there is
occasion for the reply given in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.--In
refutation of the assertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as
the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another
luminous body--as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is
denied only when the sun is shining--we point out that it has been shown
that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing
else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so
on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the
light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it;
while Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other
light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by
anything else; according to such scriptural passages as, 'By the Self
alone as his light man sits,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 6), and 'He is
incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended '(B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).
23. Moreover Sm/ri/ti also speaks of him (i.e. of the praj/n/a Self as
being the universal light).
Moreover that aspect of the praj/n/a Self is spoken of in Sm/ri/ti also,
viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon,
nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return,
that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun
illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which
is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'
24. On account of the term, (viz. the term 'lord' applied to it) the
(person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).
We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands
in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the
size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of
the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'--The
question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned
in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.
The purvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the
person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self
which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the
measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is
connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may,
by means of some fictitious assumption, be predicated. Sm/ri/ti also
confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of
Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and
helpless' (Mahabh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force
the highest Self, the passage is clearly seen to refer to the
transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence
infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic passage under discussion.
To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only be the highest
Lord.--Why?--On account of the term 'lord of the past and of the
future.' For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past
and the future.--Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the
passage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the
topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, 'That
which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause,
as neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, 14).--'On account of
the term,' i.e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a
designation, viz. the term 'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord
is meant[191].--But still the question remains how a certain extension
can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.--The reply to this is
given, in the next Sutra.
25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of
the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).
The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although
omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to
ether (space) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the
joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be
ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on
the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be
meant here, on account of the term 'Lord,' and so on.--But--an objection
may be raised--as the size of the heart varies in the different classes
of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration of the
highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with
reference to the heart.--To this objection the second half of the Sutra
replies: On account of men (only) being entitled. For the /s/astra,
although propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself
specifying what class of beings is to proceed according to its
precepts), does in reality entitle men[192] only (to act according to
its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly,
capable (of complying with the precepts of the /s/astra); are, secondly,
desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the /s/astra); are,
thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the
precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on[193]. This point has
been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikara
(Purva Mim. S. VI, 1).--Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size,
and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb.
Hence, as men (only) are entitled to study and practise the /s/astra,
the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart,
be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.--In reply to the
purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on
account of Sm/ri/ti we can understand by him who is of the size of a
thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that--analogously to such
passages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'--our passage teaches
that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in
reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta-passages have a twofold purport; some
of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at
teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our
passage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self,
not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the
Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always
settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his
body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know
that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).
26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study
and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it),
according to Badaraya/n/a.
It has been said above that the passage about him who is of the size of
a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are entitled to
study and act according to the /s/astra. This gives us an occasion for
the following discussion.--It is true that the /s/astra entitles men,
but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule entitling men only to
the knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badaraya/n/a, rather thinks that
the /s/astra entitles those (classes of beings) also which are above
men, viz. gods, and so on.--On what account?--On the account of
possibility.--For in their cases also the different causes on which the
qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may
exist. In the first place, the gods also may have the desire of final
release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers
are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as
their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas,
pura/n/as, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no
prohibition (excluding them like /S/udras). Nor does, in the fourth
place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their
title; for that ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to
the gods the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the gods,
moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship,
and the like, appears from such scriptural passages as 'One hundred and
one years Indra lived as a disciple with Prajapati' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11,
3), and 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, "Sir,
teach me Brahman"' (Taitt. Up. III, 1).--And the reasons which have been
given above against gods and /ri/shis being entitled to perform
religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circumstance of there
being no other gods (to whom the gods could offer sacrifices), and of
there being no other /ri/shis (who could be invoked during the
sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra
and the other gods, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts
to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bh/ri/gu and other
/ri/shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circumstance of
their belonging to the same gotra as Bh/ri/gu, &c. What, then, should
stand in the way of the gods' and /ri/shis' right to acquire
knowledge?--Moreover, the passage about that which is of the size of a
thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the gods, &c. is admitted;
it has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference
to the particular size of the thumb (of the class of beings spoken of).
27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods
involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on
account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods)
of several (forms).
If the right of the gods, and other beings superior to men, to the
acquisition of knowledge is founded on the assumption of their
corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that
corporeality, that Indra and the other gods stand in the relation of
subordinate members (a@nga) to sacrificial acts, by means of their being
present in person just as the priests are. But this admission will lead
to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circumstance
of the gods forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their
personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is
not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be
present in person at many sacrifices.
To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.--Why?--On account
of the assumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the
same divine Self to assume several forms at the same time.--How is that
known?--From observation.--For a scriptural passage at first replies to
the question how many gods there are, by the declaration that there are
'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently,
on the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only
the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three gods'
(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine
Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds
to show that these thirty-three gods themselves are in reality contained
in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is
the one god?' that Breath is the one god, shows that the gods are all
forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear
in many forms.--Sm/ri/ti also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero
of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand
shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the
objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may
again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the multitude of his
rays.' If such Sm/ri/ti passages as the above declare that even Yogins,
who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety
of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how
much more capable of such feats must the gods be, who naturally possess
all supernatural powers. The gods thus being able to assume several
shapes, a god may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation
with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the while unseen by
others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.
The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner
also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality
are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one
action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time
enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahma/n/a,
for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers.
But in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many
actions at the same time; one Brahma/n/a, for instance, may constitute
the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same
time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the
parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view
(to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their
respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same
individual divinity. The individuality of the gods does not, therefore,
involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.
28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the
word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates
from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.
Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal
individuality of the gods, no contradiction will result in the case of
sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the
'word' (/s/abda).--How?--The authoritativeness of the Veda has been
proved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal)
connection of the word with its sense ('the thing signified')[194]. But
now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as
admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to
enjoy at the same time the oblations which form part of several
sacrifices yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject
to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion
of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a
contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritativeness proved to
belong to the word of the Veda.
To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account
of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the
world, with the gods and other beings, originates.--But--an objection
will be raised--in Sutra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c.
of this world') it has been proved that the world originates from
Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word?
And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda
be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed
thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the
Vi/s/vedevas, and the Maruts[195] are non-eternal beings, because
produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the
non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is
known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born,
the name Yaj/n/adatta is given to him (lit. made for him)[196]. Hence we
adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the
'word.'
This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity
of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things
denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted
by the word) cow have an origin, their species[197] does not have an
origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and
actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with
the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals,
which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into
that connexion. Hence, although the individuals do not originate, no
contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like,
since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual gods are
admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such
words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are
eternal. And that the gods, and so on, belong to different species, is
to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal
appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as
'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some
particular place, analogously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence,
whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular
name.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be
understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause
of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting
words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their
eternal sense (i.e. the ak/r/itis denoted), the accomplishment of such
individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them
is called an origination from those words.
How then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From
perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in
order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).
'Inference' denotes Sm/r/iti which, in order to be authoritative,
depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that
creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural passage says, 'At
the word these Prajapati created the gods; at the words were poured out
he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words
through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones
he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the /s/astra; at
the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another passage
says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the
Veda.--B/ri/. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places
that the word precedes the creation.--Sm/r/ti also delivers itself as
follows, 'In the beginning a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or
end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all
activities proceeded.' By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to
understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of
a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be
predicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahe/s/vara shaped from
the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the
procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and
conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of
the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any
one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first
remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We
therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became
manifest in the mind of Prajapati the creator, and that after that he
created the things conesponding to those words. Scripture also, where it
says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhur he created the earth,'
& c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e.
were created from the words bhur, &c. which had become manifest in the
mind (of Prajapati).
Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that
the world originates from the 'word?'--It is the spho/t/a, the
purvapakshin says.[198] For on the assumption that the letters are the
word, the doctrine that the individual gods, and so on, originates from
the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the
letters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. pronounced). These
perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to
the pronunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able
to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person
whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta
or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of
difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not
apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to
maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the
letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself
intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an assumption;[199]
nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole
aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor
can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together
with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters
is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us
apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having
reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and
the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when
it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter
combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not
actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of
perception.[200] Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those
impressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from
their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter
combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which
impressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates
the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the
remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts
which succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the
spho/t/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i.e. the buddhi,
has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word,
received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been
matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/t/a
presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental
act of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of
apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the
letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form
the object of one act of apprehension.--As that spho/t/a is recognised
as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the
apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the
letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the
spho/t/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object
denoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results
of action.
Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters
only are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above
that the letters no sooner produced pass away!--That assertion is not
true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time
they are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition
is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for
the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of
the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again,
can it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so
that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a
letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before);
for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised.
That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be
maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different
individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are
apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But
this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are
recognised as often as they are pronounced. If, for instance, the word
cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been
pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But,
our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are
apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as
appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing
the sound of Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta reading.--Although, we reply, it
is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we
admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but
as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and
disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those
differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the
articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters
themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters
are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to
assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of
difference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much
simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is
conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the
intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is
that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension
of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent
was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should,
for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is pronounced in the same
moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz.
accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as
well as non-nasal[201]? Or else[202]--and this is the preferable
explanation--we assume that the difference of apprehension is caused not
by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to
understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a
distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which,
for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own
distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone
that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not
on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the
same whenever they are pronounced. On this theory only we gain a basis
for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the
like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should
have to assume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the
processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the
letters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not
different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not
matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any
differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the
udatta and so on remains without a basis.--Nor should it be urged that
from the difference of the udatta and so on there results also a
difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter
does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is
free from difference. Nobody, for instance, thinks that because the
individuals are different from each other the species also contains a
difference in itself.
The assumption of the spho/t/a is further gratuitous, because the sense
of the word may be apprehended from the letters.--But--our opponent here
objects--I do not assume the existence of the spho/t/a. I, on the
contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed
by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/t/a
all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.--You are
mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak
is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition
which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the
word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters constituting
the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circumstance
that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those
letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other
letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/t/a--i.e.
something different from the letters of the given word--then those
letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any
other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final
comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance
which has the letters of the word for its object.--Our opponent has
asserted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the
object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which
we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers
ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as
comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same
cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole
is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one
sense in many letters[203]; in the same way as the idea of a wood, an
army, and so on. But--our opponent may here object--if the word were
nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object
of one mental act, such couples of words as jara and raja or pika and
kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters
are presented to consciousness in each of the words constituting one
couple.--There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive
consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants
constitute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so
the letters also constitute the idea of a certain word only if they
follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason
that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of
the different order in which they are arranged.
The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may
therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word
consists--assisted by a certain order and number--have, through
traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the
time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i.e. in
their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having
apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the
entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their
definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the
complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho/t/a is
the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to
assume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a
definite order are said to manifest the spho/t/a, and the spho/t/a in
its turn is said to manifest the sense.
Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time
they are pronounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must assume
species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual
letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated
in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the
species.
From all this it follows that the theory according to which the
individual gods and so on originate from the eternal words is
unobjectionable.
29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.
As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance
of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the
doctrine that the gods and other individuals have sprung from it. That
doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.--The present Sutra now
confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of
the word of the Veda has to be assumed for this very reason, that the
world with its definite (eternal) species, such as gods and so on,
originates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they
followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the /ri/shis,'
/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the
/ri/shis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyasa also speaks as
follows: 'Formerly the great /ri/shis, being allowed to do so by
Svayambhu, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the
itihasas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'
30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no
contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the
renovation (of the world); as is seen from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.
If--the purvapakshin resumes--the individual gods and so on did, like
the individual animals, originate and pass away in an unbroken
succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical
existence including denominations, things denominated and agents
denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal,
and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word
(raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as /S/ruti and
Sm/ri/ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself
of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and
is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to
have been removed?
To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even
then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a
point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the
beginningless sa/m/sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and
the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we
look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them
according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take
place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking
state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is
carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the
waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush.
Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes
one with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the
eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.
And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all
directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as proceed, each towards its
place; from the pra/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'
Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises
in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical
existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping
person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of
practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a
mahapralaya (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a
different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is
interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be
resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that
form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.
This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahapralaya does
cut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour
of the highest Lord, the Lords (i/s/vara), such as Hira/n/yagarbha and
so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in
the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we
see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former
birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings.
For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of
grass a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is
observed--although they all have the common attribute of being
animated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to
Hira/n/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge,
power, &c. takes place; a circumstance which /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that
account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as
Hira/n/yagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by
superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the
present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the
present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the
preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same
form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus
Scripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hira/n/yagarbha)
and delivers the Vedas to him, to that God who is the light of his own
thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18).
/S/aunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukrama/n/is of the Veda)
that the ten books (of the /Ri/g-veda) were seen by Madhu/kkh/andas and
other /ri/shis.[204] And, similarly, Sm/ri/ti tells us, for every Veda,
of men of exalted mental vision (/ri/shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of
their respective Vedas, such as ka/nd/as and so on. Scripture also
declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the
mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the /ri/shi and so on, 'He
who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which
he does not know the /ri/shi, the metre, the divinity, and the
Brahma/n/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit[205], &c. &c.,
therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (Arsheya
Brahma/n/a, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and
its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain
pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects
pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and
do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new
creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit
(of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with
a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm/ri/ti also
declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had
turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again
and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or
cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed;
hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain
kind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is
dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (/s/akti) of the
world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the
root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect
without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of
different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although
the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different
classes of animate beings such as gods, animals, and men, and the
different conditions based on caste, a/s/rama, religious duty and fruit
(of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted
and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in
the beginningless sa/m/sara, subject to a certain determinateness
analogous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the
senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the
relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in
different creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth
sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves.
As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the
Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there
manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same
names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and,
owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical
renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general
creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the
Veda. The permanent identity of names and forms is declared in /S/ruti
as well as Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, /Ri/k. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3,
'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air,
and the heavenly world;' which passage means that the highest Lord
arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun
and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding
kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brahm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I
become the consumer of the food of the gods; for that end he offered a
cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the K/ri/ttikas.' This passage,
which forms part of the injunction of the ish/t/i to the Nakshatras, declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to whom he offered.[206] |
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