Sm/ri/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for
instance, 'Whatever were the names of the /ri/shis and their powers to
see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are
produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the
various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time,
thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of
whatever individuality the gods of the past ages were, equal to them are
the present gods in name and form.'
31. On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for
the madhu-vidya, &c., Jaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the
gods for the Brahma-vidya).
A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also
are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Jaimini,
considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim.--Why?--On
account of the impossibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya,
& c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should
have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya ('the knowledge of the
honey') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different
(from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not
possible; for, according to the passage, 'The Sun is indeed the honey of
the devas' (Ch. Up. III, 1, 1), men are to meditate on the sun (the god
Aditya) under the form of honey, and how, if the gods themselves are
admitted as meditating worshippers, can Aditya meditate upon another
Aditya?--Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar,
the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the
five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and
Sadhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that 'he who thus
knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he
sees the nectar and rejoices, &c., and indicates thereby that those who
know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c., attain the greatness of the
Vasus, &c.' But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus
enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to
attain?--We have also to compare the passages 'Agni is one foot, Aditya
is one foot, the quarters are one foot' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 2); 'Air is
indeed the absorber' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 1); 'Aditya is Brahman, this is the
doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of
certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities themselves are
not qualified.--So it is likewise impossible that the /ri/shis
themselves should be qualified for meditations connected with /ri/shis,
such as expressed in passages like B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 4, 'These two are
the /ri/shis Gautama and Bharadvaja; the right Gautama, the left
Bharadvaja.'--Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is
stated in the following Sutra.
32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words
denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.
To that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in
the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms
such as Aditya, i.e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from
the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary
passages[207]. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it
should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and
the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes[208]. For
mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence.
The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps
be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the
devas is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/n/as, and
from the conceptions of ordinary life[209]; but we contest the relevancy
of this remark. For the conceptions of ordinary life do not constitute
an independent means of knowledge; we rather say that a thing is known
from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of
knowledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of
knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the matter under
discussion. Itihasas and pura/n/as again being of human origin, stand
themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The
arthavada passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the
injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is
enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by
themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the
devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation,
& c., are to be employed (at the different stages of the sacrificial
action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the
sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of
authoritative knowledge for anything[210].--For these reasons the devas,
and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
33. Badaraya/n/a, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of
qualification for Brahma-vidya on the part of the gods); for there are
(passages indicatory of that).
The expression 'on the other hand' is meant to rebut the purvapaksha.
The teacher, Badaraya/n/a, maintains the existence of the qualification
on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods
cannot be admitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics
of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they
may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brahman, qualification in
general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.[211] Nor
does the impossibility of qualification in certain cases interfere with
the presence of qualification in those other cases where it is not
impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the
case of men; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything,
Brahma/n/as, for instance, not for the rajasuya-sacrifice[212].
And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scripture, moreover,
contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified; compare,
for instance, /Br/i. Up. I, 4, 10, 'Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to
know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with /ri/shis;' Ch.
Up. VIII, 7, 2, 'They said: Well, let us search for that Self by which,
if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained.
Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro/k/ana from the
Asuras.' Similar statements are met with in Sm/ri/ti, so, for instance,
in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Yaj/n/avalkya[213].--Against the
objection raised in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words
like aditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to
light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs
(persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are
used in that sense in mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas
possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of
residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like.
Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada passage explaining the words
'ram of Medhatithi,' which form part of the Subrahma/n/ya-formula, that
'Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the
descendant of Ka/n/va' (Sha/d/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Sm/ri/ti says that
'Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kunti.' Moreover,
even in such substances as earth, intelligent ruling beings must be
admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as
'the earth spoke,' 'the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light
and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted
in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also; but--as already
remarked--from the use of the words in mantras and arthavadas it appears
that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those
material elements).
We now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapakshin) that
mantras and arthavadas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no
power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not
the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other
purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes
a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is
exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other
purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves,
grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.--But, the
purvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly
analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the
grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception
of their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand,
which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory
passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is
impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.
For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more
comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not
possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for
instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words
constituting the negative sentence, '(Do) not drink wine,' one meaning
only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an
additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of
the last two words, 'drink wine.'--To this objection we reply, that the
instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).
The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one
whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor
syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be
accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand,
the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own
which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to
that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they
enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as
an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of
prosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.' All the words contained
in this passage are directly connected with the injunction. This is,
however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding
arthavada passage, 'For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he approaches
with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of
this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of
the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which
contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far
as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with
a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate
(arthavada) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the
arthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i.e. a statement referring to
something (already known)[215]. When its contents are contradicted by
other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/n/avada, i.e. a
statement of a quality[216]. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned
conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthavada is to be
taken as a gu/n/avada on account of the absence of other means of
knowledge, or as an arthavada referring to something known (i.e. an
anuvada) on account of the absence of contradiction by other means of
proof. The latter alternative is, however, to be embraced by reflecting
people.--The same reasoning applies to mantras also.
There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The
Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the
other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual
divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent
Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not
represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to
it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is
taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1).
Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a
thing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing
(denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness
of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and
the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and
arthavadas.--Moreover, itihasas and pura/n/as also--because based on
mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner
described--are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the
devas. Itihasa and pura/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on
perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have
been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times.
Sm/ri/ti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods
face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were
no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would
thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well
maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the
whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by
which the scriptural injunction of the rajasuya-sacrifice[218] would be
stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of
duty of the different castes and a/s/ramas were as generally unsettled
as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture
which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore
altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in
consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods
face to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda
there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sutra II,
44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement
of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact
which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also
proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat,
and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is
no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body
produced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the
right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/shis who
see the mantras and brahma/n/a passages (i.e. the Veda).--From all this
it appears that the itihasas and pura/n/as have an adequate basis.--And
the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be
unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.
The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as
possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas,
itihasas, pura/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods
may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be
considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the
declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation[219]
agree with this latter supposition only.
34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jana/s/ruti) (arose) on account of his hearing
a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of
that (grief) (Raikva called him /S/udra); for it (the grief) is pointed
at (by Raikva).
(In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to
knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c.
also possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for
the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the
claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/udras also
possess such a claim.
The purvapakshin maintains that the /S/udras also have such a claim,
because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and
because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural
prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text,
'Therefore[220] the /S/udra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h.
VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/udras for
sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not
invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be
apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an
inferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/udras; for in the
so-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jana/s/ruti
Pautraya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/udra 'Fie,
necklace and carnage be thine, O /S/udra, together with the cows' (Ch.
Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were
born from /S/udra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.--Hence the
/S/udra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
To this we reply that the /S/udras have no such claim, on account of
their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and
understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a
/S/udra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its
antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the
three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a
condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if
capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute
a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in
spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the
/S/udras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the
Veda.--The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/udra is unfit for
sacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for
knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both
cases[221].--With reference to the purvapakshin's opinion that the fact
of the word '/S/udra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge
constitutes an inferential mark (of the /S/udra's qualification for
knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on
account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential
mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments
being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage
quoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/udra' which occurs in the
sa/m/varga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the /S/udras to
that one vidya only, not to all vidyas. In reality, however, it is
powerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the /S/udras'
claim to anything.--The word '/S/udra' can moreover be made to agree
with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When
Jana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the
flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were
like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind,
and to that grief the /ri/shi Raikva alludes with the word /S/udra, in
order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation
must be accepted because a (real) born /S/udra is not qualified (for the
sa/m/varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen
in Janasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/udra, we
reply: On account of the rushing on (adrava/n/a) of the grief. For we
may etymologise the word /S/udra by dividing it into its parts, either
as 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on
him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand
it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense.
The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover
expressly touched upon in the legend[223].
35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jana/s/ruti) is understood from
the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with
/K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).
Jana/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/udra by birth for that reason also
that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz.
his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya
/K/aitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage
complementary to the sa/m/varga-vidya, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi
Abhipratarin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin
Kakshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged
of them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a /K/aitrarathi
(i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion
with a Kapeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of
/K/itraratha himself with the Kapeyas ('the Kapeyas made /K/itraratha
perform that sacrifice;' Ta/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule
sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one
and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from
him a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he
(/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a
kshattriya. The fact now of Jana/s/ruti being praised in the same vidya
with the kshattriya Abhipratarin intimates that the former also was a
kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals.
That Jana/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending
his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the
text).--Hence the /S/udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of
Brahman).
36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case
of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in
the case of the /S/udras).
That the /S/udras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also
that in different places of the vidyas such ceremonies as the upanayana
and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5,
3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir!
thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in
Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their
hands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach
them all that.'--Thus the following passage also, 'He without having
made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7),
shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].--With
reference to the /S/udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies
is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are
spoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/udra is the fourth caste,
once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/udra there is not any sin, and
he is not fit for any ceremony.'
37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Jabala) on the
ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/udra).
The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having
ascertained Jabala not to be a /S/udra from his speaking the truth,
proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brahma/n/a
would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you.
You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which
scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/udras not
being capable of initiation).
38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm/ri/ti, of (the /S/udras')
hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic)
matters.
The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti
prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their
understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing
the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who
hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a
/S/udra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in
the vicinity of a /S/udra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of
studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in
whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express
prohibition (of the /S/udras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be
slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves
it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the
prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there
are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart
knowledge to the /S/udra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study,
sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'--From those /S/udras, however,
who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in
consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their
knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about
its fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are
qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and pura/n/as;
compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahabh.).--It
remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such
qualification with regard to the Veda.
39. (The pra/n/a is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of
the whole world).
The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge--on which we
entered as an opportunity offered--being finished we return to our chief
topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts.--We read
(Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth
trembles in the pra/n/a. It (the pra/n/a) is a great terror, a raised
thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226].'--This passage
declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in pra/n/a, and that
there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that
through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not
immediately clear what the pra/n/a is, and what that terrible
thunderbolt, a discussion arises.
The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning
of the term, pra/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that
the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and
that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he
says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five
forms--which is here called pra/n/a--and the terrible thunderbolts also
spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say,
when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder,
rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.--Through the knowledge of
that air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural
passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things
together. He who knows this conquers death.'--We therefore conclude that
the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.
To this we make the following reply.--Brahman only can be meant, on
account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as
well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of;
how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once
the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as
follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that
alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one
goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our
passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from
the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in
pra/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the
abode of the whole world. That the word pra/n/a can denote the highest
Self also, appears from such passages as 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a'
(B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a
quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere
air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the pra/n/a and the breath
that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up.
II, 5 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under
discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns,
from terror Indra and Vayu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman,
and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of
that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the
whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that
the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the
ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of
Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great
terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to
denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man
strictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in
his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened
punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry
out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire,
air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from
fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a
thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is
Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the
sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the
fifth.'--That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further
follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is
immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of
Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him
only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI,
15).--That immortality which the purvapakshin asserts to be sometimes
represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely
relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is
quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic
being started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of
the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')--That in
the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally
from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas
in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither
effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to
the highest Self.
40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in
the scriptural passage).
We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this
body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest
light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word
'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and
dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.
The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known
(physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word.
For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under
I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the
chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there
is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning
aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the na/d/is of
the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he
departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch.
Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our
passage, the ordinary light.
To this we make the following reply.--The word 'light' can denote the
highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the
whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the
Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general
subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is
thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be
understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I
shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom
from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when
he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,'
VIII, 12, 1)--and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman--and
it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person'
(VIII, 12, 3).--Against the statement, made by the purvapakshin, that
Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we
remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one,
since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That
the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards
we shall show later on.
41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different,
& c. (from name and form).
Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (aka/s/a) is the revealer of
all forms and names. That within which these forms and names are
contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).
There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the
highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapakshin
declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because
it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and,
secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very
well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room
(for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory
mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.
To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest
Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the
clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,'
designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But,
excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and
form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names
and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be
accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which
declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings)
with this living Self (jiva atman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up.
VI, 3, 2). But--it may be said--from this very passage it is apparent
that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing
power with regard to names and forms.--True, we reply, but what the
passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the
individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement
concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of
signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the
like.--Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII,
14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.
42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as
different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and
departing.
In the sixth prapa/th/aka of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka there is given, in
reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the
nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the pra/n/as, the
person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here
the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an
additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known
already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the
non-transmigrating Self.
The purvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature
of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and
concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the
pra/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the
embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great
unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must
therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages
also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self,
represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.
In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving
information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements
about the embodied soul.--Why?--On account of the highest Lord being
designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep
sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied
soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage,
'This person embraced by the intelligent (praj/n/a) Self knows nothing
that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,'
must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he
knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and
without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord,
because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.--in his
case--all-embracing knowledge.--Similarly, the passage treating of
departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self
moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the
individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one'
the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the
'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account
of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep
sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the
passage.--With reference to the purvapakshin's assertion that the entire
chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the
latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in
the first place the introductory passage ('He among the pra/n/as who
consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of
the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the
nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at
declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that
the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227],
aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The
concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words,
'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that
that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the pra/n/as, is the
great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord--He, again, who imagines that
the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth
the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking
state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants
to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the
states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the
soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as
free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident
from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in
every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/n/avalkya
replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is
not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he
says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for
he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore,
to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the
nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.
That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the
non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also
that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the
nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature
of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance,
'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all
things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become
greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'--From all which we
conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.
Notes:
[Footnote 164: From passages of which nature we may infer that in the
passage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.]
[Footnote 165: From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage
under discussion also refers to Brahman.]
[Footnote 166: Yat sarvam avidyaropita/m/ tat sarva/m/ paramarthato
brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]
[Footnote 167: So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That,
viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.']
[Footnote 168: Bhogyasya bhokt/ris/eshatvat tasyayatanatvam uktam
a/s/a@nkyaha na /k/eti, jivasyad/ri/sh/t/advara dyubhvadinimittatvezpi
na sakshat tadayatanatvam aupadhikatvenavibhutvad ity artha/h/. Ananda
Giri.]
[Footnote 169: It would not have been requisite to introduce a special
Sutra for the individual soul--which, like the air, is already excluded
by the preceding Sutra--if it were not for the new argument brought
forward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul
only.]
[Footnote 170: If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven,
earth, &c., the statement regarding I/s/vara made in the passage about
the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground
objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard
to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to
everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.--I
subjoin Ananda Giri's commentary on the entire passage:
Jivasyopadhyaikyenavivakshitatvat tadj/n/anezpi sarvaj/n/anasiddhes
tasyayatanatvadyabhave hetvantara/m/ va/k/yam ity a/s/a@nkya sutre/n/a
pariharati kuta/sk/etyadina. Tad vya/k/ash/t/e dyubhvaditi. Nirde/s/am
eva dar/s/ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhya/m/ /k/eti.
Sthitye/s/varasyadanaj jivasa/m/grahezpi katham i/s/varasyaiva
vi/s/vayatanatva/m/ tadaha yaditi. I/s/varasyayanatvenaprak/ri/tatve
jivap/ri/thakkathananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvaraha anyatheti.
Jivasyayatanatvenaprak/ri/tatve tulyanupapattir iti /s/a@nkate nanviti.
Tasyaikyartha/m/ lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti.
Jivasyapurvatvabhavenapratipadyatvam eva praka/t/ayati kshetraj/n/o
hiti. I/s/varasyapi lokavadisiddhatvad apratipadyatety a/s/a@nkyaha
i/s/varas tv iti.]
[Footnote 171: As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle
'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.]
[Footnote 172: It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be
viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding
past of the chapter.]
[Footnote 173: And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental
principle of the Mima/m/sa.]
[Footnote 174: A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain
the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.]
[Footnote 175: Pi/nd/a/h/ sthulo deha/h/, pra/n/a/h/ sutratma. Ananda
Giri.-The lower Brahman (hira/n/yagarbha on sutratman) is the vital
principle (pra/n/a) in all creatures.]
[Footnote 176: Sa/m/yagdar/s/ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the
same term which in other places--where it is not requisite to insist on
the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or
'meditating'--is rendered by perfect knowledge.]
[Footnote 177: Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual
soul.']
[Footnote 178: Pa/n/ini III, 3, 77, 'murtta/m/ ghana/h/.']
[Footnote 179: So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be
objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to
itself.]
[Footnote 180: So that no objection can be raised on the ground that
heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.]
[Footnote 181: Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two
explanations: na /k/eti, paravi/s/esha/n/atvenety atra paro daharaka/s/a
upadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta/kkh/abdasyeti /s/esha/h/. Yadva
para/s/abdo s nta/h/sthavastuvishayas tadvi/s/esha/n/alvena tasminn iti
daharaka/s/asyokter ity artha/h/. Ta/kkh/abdasya
samnik/ri/sh/t/anvayayoge viprak/ri/sh/t/anvayasya jaghanyatvad
aka/s/antargata/m/ dhyeyam iti bhava/h/.]
[Footnote 182: A vakyabheda--split of the sentence--takes place
according to the Mimam/s/a when one and the same sentence contains two
new statements which are different.]
[Footnote 183: While the explanation of Brahman by jiva would compel us
to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual
soul.]
[Footnote 184: Upalabdher adhish/th/anam brahma/n/a deha ishyate.
Tenasadhara/n/atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet. Bhamati.]
[Footnote 185: I.e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.]
[Footnote 186: The masculine 'avirbhutasvarupa/h/' qualifies the
substantive jiva/h/ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the jiva
whose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is
no longer jiva; hence the explanatory statement that the term jiva is
used with reference to what the jiva was before it became Brahman.]
[Footnote 187: To state another reason showing that the first and second
chapters of Prajapati's instruction refer to the same subject.]
[Footnote 188: I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.]
[Footnote 189: Although in reality there is no such thing as an
individual soul.]
[Footnote 190: Nanu jivabrahma/n/or aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato
vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/t/am tatraha
pratipadyam tv iti.]
[Footnote 191: This last sentence is directed against the possible
objection that '/s/abda,' which the Sutra brings forward as an argument
in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence'
(vakya), and is therefore of less force than li@nga, i.e. indicatory or
inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the
a@ngush/th/amatrata of the purusha, and favours the jiva interpretation.
/S/abda, the text remarks, here means /s/ruti, i.e. direct enunciation,
and /s/ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than li@nga.]
[Footnote 192: I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.]
[Footnote 193: The first reason excludes animals, gods, and /ri/shis.
Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of
which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering
meant for the gods. /Ri/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of
whose performance the ancestral /ri/shis of the sacrificer are
invoked.--The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is
emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of
sacrifices.--The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/udras who are
indirectly disqualified for /s/astric works because the Veda in
different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for
whom the ceremony of the upanayana--indispensable for all who wish to
study the Veda--is not prescribed.--Cp. Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras VI, 1.]
[Footnote 194: The reference is to Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not
to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]
[Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]
[Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the
thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]
[Footnote 197: Ak/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]
[Footnote 198: The purvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for
the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words
a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the
letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests
the sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed
in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which
is manifested.--The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so
far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it
with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from
its being distinctly called va/k/aka or abhidhayaka, and its being
represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word
(arthadhihetu).]
[Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not
observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to
be declared useless.]
[Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the
word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus
the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to
infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the
smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the
impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.] |
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