The Campaign in Russian Poland 8

The Campaign in Russian Poland 8

On the other hand, not one but several of Russia’s military

leaders had enormously increased their reputations. These included

General Russky--who had led the masterly advance along the river

Pilitza--General Ivanoff, and, most of all, of course, the Grand-duke

Nicholas himself. As Mr. Granville Fortescue phrases it, Nicholas

Nicolavitch is a Russian of the old school. He is known to be a

strict disciplinarian, but “when one carries the responsibility of

one-sixth of the world on his shoulders one cannot listen to excuses.

In the army he is the law and the word.” While the prolonged agony

of the Warsaw battles was taking place the Tsar conferred upon the

Grand-duke that prized decoration the Order of St. George. Lesser

grades in the same decoration went to his skilful Chief-of-the-Staff,

General Yanuskevitch, and to Quartermaster-General Daniloff. The Tsar

also similarly rewarded Captain Martinoff for acts of deep devotion

and gallantry. While not yet recovered from a wound, this brave man

insisted upon taking over the command of Turret Hill in the defence

of the fortress of Ossovetz, where he remained for three days in an

exposed position of the utmost danger and under a continuous hail of

fire. When a shell dropped close to the magazine and threatened to blow

it up, Martinoff personally headed a party to the scene of the danger

and extinguished the flames.

 

During the time of crisis Warsaw did not entirely escape the

bomb-throwing from aeroplanes which has been such a feature of the

German aggressive in both theatres of war. One such messenger of death

(October 19), or, rather, several such, killed nine and wounded no

fewer than fifty-six of the civilian population, including several

women and children. Then was witnessed the novel spectacle of the

people mounting the roofs of their houses and taking “pot-shots” at the

deadly Taube machines, one of which had been instrumental in killing

or maiming upwards of sixty non-combatants.

 

It was only natural that victory for the Russian arms should have

enhanced the already high enthusiasm and patriotism of the Tsar’s

peoples. It was known that there had long existed in German minds a

profound contempt for the Muscovite military organisation, Potsdam

professors of war having clung to the belief that they were opposed

to a system which was faulty and calculated to break down, especially

after the adverse verdict of the war with Japan in 1904-5. But such

critics had not reckoned with the complete reorganisation of the

Russian military “machine” carried out in 1910, nor yet allowed for

the vastly improved personnel of the Russian rank and file. Of this

last-mentioned point, one of the war correspondents wrote:

 

“The Russian ‘Tommy,’ or, as he is called here, Ivan, son of Ivan, is a

most impressive-looking soldier. Nearly all over 5 ft. 6 in. in height,

and of splendid build, they recall certain Irish regiments in size

and swagger. For as soon as the peasant has donned the long, light,

terra-cotta-coloured overcoat and learned to set his cap at a jaunty

angle, he assumes the martial swagger. The Russian military overcoat is

the best bit of soldiers’ wearing apparel I have seen in any army. Not

only is it smart in cut and colour, but eminently practical. No better

protection against the winter cold could be devised. I used to think

that the English military overcoat was the best made; but the Russian

is better. It is not necessary to emphasise the importance of having a

good covering in Russia in winter.”

 

It was stated, apparently with authority, that some of the German

prisoners arriving at Vilna were lads of sixteen years of age. Among

stories of “atrocities” vouched for was one to the effect that an

enemy patrol, having captured a Cossack trooper, flung the poor wretch

on to a fire and literally roasted him alive! It was averred that a

Russian officer, doubting the reliability of the horrible story, caused

the charred remains of the Cossack to be disinterred. But there were

counter-charges of atrocities preferred against the Russians, and

on both sides some very wild talk on the subject. In a war of such

inveterate bitterness as this had now become one must perforce suspend

judgment.

 

The official _communiqué_ upon the defence of the Vistula and the

complete defeat of the invasion of Russian Poland closed with these

impressive words: “We owe thanks for our victory to the unfailing grace

which God has shown to the superhuman heroism of our warriors, of whom

Russia may be justly proud. The victory which has been achieved makes

it possible for our troops to set about the solution of fresh problems,

the grappling with which commences a new period of the war.”

 

At Radom--now in Russian hands again after a month’s occupation by

the enemy, and where his invasion plan is supposed to have been

perfected--the following proclamation to the Polish inhabitants was

issued by the commander of a Russian army corps: “Poles! Our wounded

officers and soldiers, and also our prisoners who had fallen into the

hands of the enemy and had passed through the town and province of

Radom, speak with deep gratitude of your cordial treatment of them.

You have tended the wounded, fed the starving, and sheltered from the

enemy those escaping from captivity. You have given them money, and

guided them to our lines. Accept from me, and from all ranks of the

army entrusted to me, warm and hearty thanks for all your kindness, for

your Slavonic sympathy and goodness.”

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI THE SIEGE OF PRZEMYSL--THE STRUGGLE ON THE SAN

 

 

“When Przemysl falls,” wrote Mr. Granville Fortescue in the _Daily

Telegraph_, “the name of Radko Dimitrieff will ring around the world.”

It was not, however, the immediate object of General Dimitrieff and his

coadjutors to bring about a hurried capitulation of this commanding

fortress and its 30,000 defenders. The Russian headquarters in Galicia

could well afford to play a waiting game and let the grim business of

starvation do its work.

 

In our second chapter we brought down the record of events on the

Galician theatre of war to the important capture of Jaroslav by the

Russians on September 21, after only three days’ investment. The

Colonel Shumsky from whom I have already quoted points out the enormous

significance of this capture when taken in conjunction with the

all-round breakdown of the Austro-German conception. That plan assumed,

he opines that Western Poland would have been cut off, and there would

have been a last development of the Austro-German forces from Jaroslav

over Ivangorod and East Prussia seawards. From “the Baltic to the

Carpathians” was certainly the grandest of grand conceptions--instead

of which, we have the well-nigh incredible estimate of _a million_

Austrian troops put out of action in less than two months of war, and

the frank statement by one of their general officers that “the enemy is

too much for us.”

 

It would appear that the Austrian forces operating along the line

Lublin-Holm in August to September included the 3rd, 11th, 12th, and

portions of the 7th, 13th, and 14th Army Corps, with five cavalry

divisions. But in one day’s fighting alone they are known to have

had 20,000 casualties, the mobility and rapidity of the Russian

offensive seeming quite to have paralysed them. After Lemberg, the

capture of Halicz and later still of Jaroslav rendered their position

still more unenviable. As Professor Pares points out, “the chief

harm which Germany and Austria could inflict in a war against Russia

was to conquer Russian Poland, whose frontier made defence extremely

difficult. Regarding this protuberance as a head, Germany and Austria

could make a simultaneous amputating operation at its neck, attacking

the one from East Prussia and the other from Galicia. But the German

policy, which had other and more primary objects, precipitated war

with France and threw the bulk of the German forces westward. Thus the

German army in East Prussia kept the defensive, and Austria was left to

make her advance from Galicia without support.” We have seen in part

how that forlorn advance was destined to be beaten back in blood.

 

Perhaps never in the history of war have more lies, false rumours, and

unintelligent anticipations got into print than in connection with the

momentous event happening in Galicia consequent upon the “pleasant

surprise” of the capture of Jaroslav on September 21. As that important

success, taken in conjunction with the huge battles in East Prussia and

Russian Poland, certainly implied the imminent danger of Przemysl,

we heard all sorts of things about the fate of that great fortress.

It was on the eve of capture, it was on fire, most of the forts were

taken--the garrison was driven to the inner defences, etc., etc. In

short, Przemysl was by the many-headed held to have been captured, or

at all events isolated, quite early in September. But the powerful

German advance into Poland, with the co-operating Austrian movement

on their right in Galicia, had put the fortress for the moment out of

danger. Jaroslav’s fall was a decided nail in the coffin of Przemysl,

but no more.

 

This fortress--whose remarkable orthography was the subject of a sly

little joke by Mr. Lloyd George in a speech on the war--is stated to

have been insufficiently garrisoned (30,000). It has not a large

civil population, and after September 21 the extreme step was taken by

the Commandant of expelling all persons who had not provisions for a

siege of three months. The retreating Austrians did not have time to

destroy the bridges over the San, and the almost complete isolation

of Przemysl was rendered more acute by the announcement that, “as the

crow flies,” the Russian advance-guard was not more than 135 miles from

Cracow itself! The general line of the Austrian retreat was mainly

towards that famous and historic city, where the hospitals and houses

were already crowded with their thousands of wounded. Such a retreat

would link them up to the right wing of their German allies, when they

would become a more component part of the Kaiser’s forces. Comparisons

were freely bandied about, in which the energetic Russian pursuit

was likened to Kutusoff’s chase of Napoleon’s Grand Army in 1812, and

to Lee’s pursuit by Grant in the American Civil War in 1864. In any

event, the crumbling away of the Austrian defence of Galicia was now so

significant as to dwarf minor considerations.

 

The retreat towards Cracow was marked by a good deal of demoralisation

and by the plundering of the estates of some of the Polish aristocracy.

The capture of the railway junctions of Debica and Chyrov by the

conquering foe further isolated the threatened fortress, while the

passage of the Carpathians by way of the Uszok Pass was planting the

Russian army firmly upon Hungarian soil, where there were no great

places of strength to be reduced. The tables had been turned with a

vengeance, and the invasion of Austro-Hungary was an accomplished

fact. What would Germany do in face of these changed conditions? became

for a week or so the burning topic among strategists and lookers-on at

the great game.

 

Coincident, presumably, with the expulsion o