The Campaign in Russian Poland 2

The Campaign in Russian Poland 2

The victors of Lemberg did not long rest on their laurels. An order

of the Day, promulgated by the Grand-duke Nicholas and phrased with

all that regard for the cherished Slav ideals and traditions which has

helped to make this war so popular in Russia, complimented General

Russky and the gallant army under his orders. Another Order, addressed

by the Grand-duke to the _Sokols_,[1] the Polish bands of partisans

organised in Galicia, sternly admonished them for the use in warfare of

dum-dum bullets, and informed them that in future they would be liable

to be treated rather as malefactors than as _bona fide_ combatants

according to the usages of war.

 

The Tsar and Tsaritsa set a fine example by spending much of their

time in visiting the hospitals and devising helpful schemes for the

amelioration of the sufferings of the thousands of sick and wounded. Of

the conduct of the military operations as a whole, the correspondent

of a New York journal wrote home that “the Russians evidently have

their heart in their work. They have profited greatly by the lessons of

their operations in Manchuria, both as regards strategy and tactics.

Every day in the field increases their efficiency, and will perfect the

co-ordination between their invading bodies.”

 

By a coincidence as dramatic as it must have been intensely

interesting, the announcement in Petrograd of the brilliant victory

of Lemberg synchronised with the Feast Day of Saint Alexander Nevsky,

Russia’s wonderful hero of the thirteenth century, who was also the

first to beat back a Teutonic invasion of his country. Only on the

previous evening, in fact, the people kneeling before the shrines in

the churches had prayed to this saint: “O Alexander the Blessed, come

to the aid of your kindred and give us victory over our enemies.”

And when, on the following day, the victory was celebrated with that

impressive ritual which the Greek Church knows so well how to employ,

doubtless many among the Slavs saw an immediate answer to their

prayers.

 

FOOTNOTE:

 

[1] _Sokol_ is a Slav word for “a hawk,” or “a falcon.”

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER II THE AUSTRIAN DEBACLE: FROM LEMBERG TO JAROSLAV

 

 

We shall now proceed to follow the fortunes of the Russo-Austrian

campaign immediately after the capture of Lemberg in the early days of

September. Such a substantial success naturally put the Russians in

good heart. Rewards were judiciously distributed on the recommendation

of the Grand-duke Nicholas, Generals Russky and Brussiloff each

receiving that most coveted of decorations, the Cross of St. George.

It was likewise officially notified that between August 17 and

September 3, a period of rather more than a fortnight, the Tsar’s

forces operating against the Austrian host of General von Auffenburg

had advanced no less a distance than 220 versts, or roughly 150 miles.

During the same period there had been practically no lull in the

fighting, which for sheer sustained fury would appear to have been

little less sanguinary than that between the German and Franco-British

armies in the West.

 

It was about this time that the _Daily Telegraph_, in an editorial

setting forth the general situation of affairs after some five weeks

of war, called attention to the influence being slowly but none the

less surely exercised by the Russian field-armies. After pointing out

that the crisis of a great war had worked wonders in the way of a more

perfect understanding between the Russian and British peoples, the

writer went on to say:

 

“The extraordinary prowess of the Russian Army has already begun

to draw the ordinary Briton out of his absorption in the military

situation in France, and to keep him in mind of the fact that the arena

of this war is not any one country, but the Continent of Europe. He

realises more fully than before that every blow struck at the Central

European Powers on their eastern frontier is, in the long run, as

telling as any reverse inflicted upon them in the western theatre of

war. But he ought to realise it more fully yet. The position is that

the long series of Russian successes, culminating in the Austrian

overthrow at Lemberg and Halicz, has cast the whole Austro-German

war-plan into confusion, which may at this moment be affecting the

German operations in France in the most serious degree. The main

Austrian Army in Southern Poland is now being attacked with unsparing

energy. Its situation is rendered desperate by the destruction of the

Second Army at Lemberg, which lays open its right wing to assault by

the victorious troops of General Russky. Should the great battle now

raging end in another such defeat as has already been inflicted there

will be nothing remaining in the field that can stay the Russian march

to Berlin. The rapidity of the Russian mobilisation and of the movement

of the Russian forces to the attack is one of the several absolutely

vital things with which Germany did not reckon. The brilliancy of

their performance in the field has surprised the enemy no less. Deeply

involved as Germany is in the French campaign, dares she provide the

heavy and immediate reinforcements for which her Ally is clamouring?

Dares she, on the other hand, refuse them? That is, put simply, the

fatal dilemma on the horns of which the monstrous ambition of German

militarism is like to perish.”

 

If this last pertinent question was not destined to be immediately

answered, the military situation now began to be one of increasing

menace for the Austro-German Allies. In war one is bound to get a

vast amount of “claim and counterclaim” on the part of the contending

nations. On September 6 the Tsar’s Government took the step of publicly

characterising as “wilful falsehoods” certain Austrian and German

official reports of recent successes. It was claimed, in disproof of

these statements, that in the region between the rivers Vistula and

Bug the Russians had, up to and including September 4, captured many

Austrian guns, 150 officers, and 12,000 men. It was added that, “having

broken the Austrian resistance,” the Tsar’s army was already continuing

its victorious advance southwards from Lemberg.

 

The Grand-duke and General Russky had determined that no rest must

be given to the enemy’s army already so badly beaten in front of the

capital of Galicia. Scouting far to the flank, the Cossack cavalry

already found themselves in the passes of the Carpathians. A German

division intended to stiffen the Austrian resistance along this

extended line was understood to have been badly cut up on the left

bank of the Vistula; but details of the affair were vague. To the west

of Krasnostaw, however, a whole Austrian battalion--the 45th of the

line--was cut off and surrounded, being compelled to surrender to the

number of 1,500 men and nearly 50 officers.

 

The next Russian objective would obviously be the important and

strongly fortified town of Przemysl, fifty-five miles west of Lemberg.

But, before attacking this strong place of arms, it was essential to

get possession of Mikolaiev. This point owes its strategical importance

to the circumstance that it is situated at the junction of the railways

to Lemberg, Jimacheff, and (via Stry) to the Carpathians. Entrenchments

had been thrown up on both banks of the Dniester for the protection

of the bridges crossing that river. With a mixed population of Poles

and Jews of a little over 4,000, it had a garrison of some 10,000 men.

Moreover, it was common knowledge that the Austrian authorities did

not believe in the practicability of Mikolaiev being reduced either by

investment or direct assault, owing to the deep marshes that surround

the place for many miles. But, alas! a similar impregnability has been

claimed for only too many of the fortresses involved in this war, which

have held out for no longer than a few days. Mikolaiev was to prove no

exception to the rule, although we are told that the fortress’s guns

were mounted in “armoured cupolas.”

 

Apparently the place surrendered at discretion after a very moderate

resistance. The garrison, forty heavy guns, and a great quantity of

ammunition became the prizes of the victors; but the details of what

must have been a brilliant feat of arms are conspicuously meagre. It

is stated, however, that the defences included triple lines of barbed

wire “and other obstacles.”

 

We have now the spectacle of two separate Austrian armies, that of

Galicia and that which was operating in Southern Poland, striving

desperately to stem the tide that appeared to be setting dead against

them.

 

By the second week of September public interest in Russia had become

deeply centred in the plight of the latter army. It was by this time

fighting a series of rearguard actions with its wary and well-handled

opponents. Although the majority of well-informed military critics

assumed the ultimate destruction of this army as a fighting force,

the extent of the assistance it might receive from the German side

could not be gauged with accuracy. Thus a special correspondent of the

_Daily Telegraph_ wrote from Petrograd on September 11:

 

“The theory is put forward that at any rate the greater part of the

300,000 men whom the Germans are known to have withdrawn from their

western front, and who are supposed to have been replaced by the

Landwehr and the Landsturm corps, have been directed to the assistance

of the Austrians, and not to East Prussia. An army paper issued

officially at the front for the information of the troops says that

on September 5 and 6 the battle continued on the Austrian front. The

Russian troops operating between Lublin and the Vistula had occupied

the river Chodel. They had to deal with a well-entrenched enemy, and

therefore the attack developed rather slowly. Moving from Krasnostaw,

the Austrian force attempted to reach the railway line between Lublin

and Cholm, to cut the communications between those two places; but the

plan was frustrated by the battle of September 2 and 3 at Suchodol

and other Russian counter-moves. The position of the Russians was, on

September 6, much stronger, and Krasnostaw was in their hands. There

were then also pretty plain signs of a general Austrian retreat.”

 

These German reinforcements amounted, at all events, to one or two

army corps, and with their co-operation hard fighting took place on

September 8-9 along the entire front. It is significant that 10 per

cent. of the prisoners taken on those days are said to have been

Germans. The Austrian commander appears to have strengthened his left

wing, now resting on the Vistula, at the expense of his right in

order to attempt to hold the relentless flanking movement of General

Russky. A large Austrian force was thrown for this purpose along a

front running roughly from Lubisch to Komarno, which had formed a

rallying-point for considerable numbers of the army broken up near

Lemberg. Along this line they managed to entrench with some skill

and elaboration, and Russky encountered a stubborn resistance in the

task of turning them out, though it has been claimed on the Russian