(12) Cf. "Il." ii. 547, {'Erekhtheos megaletoros k.t.l.}
(13) Cf. Isoc. "Paneg." 19, who handles all the topics.
(14) Commonly spoken of as "the Return." See Grote, "H. G." II. ch.
xviii.
(15) Against the Amazons and Thracians; cf. Herod. ix. 27; Plut.
"Thes." 27.
(16) The "Persian" wars; cf. Thucyd. I. i.
(17) He omits the Plataeans.
Per. Yes, so runs the story of their heroism.
Soc. Therefore it is that, amidst the many changes of inhabitants, and
the migrations which have, wave after wave, swept over Hellas, these
maintained themselves in their own land, unmoved; so that it was a
common thing for others to turn to them as to a court of appeal on
points of right, or to flee to Athens as a harbour of refuge from the
hand of the oppressor. (18)
(18) Cf. (Plat.) "Menex."; Isocr. "Paneg."
Then Pericles: And the wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came
to decline.
Soc. I think we are victims of our own success. Like some athlete, (19)
whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity
until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians,
in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are
become degenerate.
(19) Reading {athletai tines}, or if {alloi tines}, translate "any one
else."
Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?
Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the
institutions of our forefathers--applying them to the regulation of our
lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like
success; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs
to-day, (20) adapting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if
we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival
their excellence, or, by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim
at, rise superior.
(20) Sc. the Lacedaemonians. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and
brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; (21) as, for instance,
when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, reverence old age--the
Athenian, who takes his own father as a starting-point for the contempt
he pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the
body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, (22) but laughs
to scorn those who are careful in this matter? When shall we Athenians
so obey our magistrates--we who take a pride, as it were, in despising
authority? When, once more, shall we be united as a people--we who,
instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening
each other's characters, (23) envying one another more than we envy all
the world besides; and--which is our worst failing--who, in private and
public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension and are caught in a
maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbour's
difficulties rather than to render natural assistance? To make our
conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better
than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; we make them bones
of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in
possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hotbed
is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly (24) and cowardice,
and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual
hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some
disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. (25)
(21) Or, "is far enough away from Athens."
(22) See below, III. xii. 5; "Pol. Ath." i. 13; "Rev." iv. 52.
(23) Or, "to deal despitefully with one another."
(24) Reading {ateria}. See L. Dindorf ad loc., Ox. ed. lxii. Al.
{apeiria}, a want of skill, or {ataxia}, disorderliness. Cf. "Pol.
Ath." i. 5.
(25) Possibly the author is thinking of the events of 406, 405 B.C.
(see "Hell." I. vii. and II.), and history may repeat itself.
Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to
believe that Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you
not observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt
and orderly obedience to the superintendents at the gymnastic contests,
(26) their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the
training of our choruses.
(26) Epistatoi, i.e. stewards and training-masters.
Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all those
good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our
cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens
in excellence of manhood, (27) should be so entirely unamenable to
discipline.
(27) {kalokagathia}.
Then Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed
of citizens of approved (28) character, is it not?
(28) Technically, they must have passed the {dokimasia}. And for the
"Aeropagos" see Grote, "H. G." v. 498; Aristot. "Pol." ii. 12;
"Ath. Pol." 4. 4, where see Dr. Sandys' note, p. 18.
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. Then can you name any similar body, judicial or executive, trying
cases or transacting other business with greater honour, stricter
legality, higher dignity, or more impartial justice?
No, I have no fault to find on that score (he answered).
Soc. Then we ought not to despair as though all sense of orderliness and
good discipline had died out of our countrymen.
Still (he answered), if it is not to harp upon one string, I maintain
that in military service, where, if anywhere, sobreity and temperance,
orderliness and good discipline are needed, none of these essentials
receives any attention.
May it not perhaps be (asked Socrates) that in this department they are
officered by those who have the least knowledge? (29) Do you not notice,
to take the case of harp-players, choric performers, dancers, and the
like, that no one would ever dream of leading if he lacked the requisite
knowledge? and the same holds of wrestlers or pancratiasts.
(29) {episteme}. See below, III. ix. 10.
Moreover, while in these cases any one in command can tell you where he
got the elementary knowledge of what he presides over, most generals are
amateurs and improvisers. (30) I do not at all suppose that you are
one of that sort. I believe you could give as clear an account of your
schooling in strategy as you could in the matter of wrestling. No
doubt you have got at first hand many of your father's "rules for
generalship," which you carefully preserve, besides having collected
many others from every quarter whence it was possible to pick up any
knowledge which would be of use to a future general. Again, I feel
sure you are deeply concerned to escape even unconscious ignorance of
anything which will be serviceable to you in so high an office; and
if you detect in yourself any ignorance, you turn to those who have
knowledge in these matters (sparing neither gifts nor gratitude) to
supplement your ignorance by their knowledge and to secure their help.
(30) Cf. "Pol. Lac." xiii. 5.
To which Pericles: I am not so blind, Socrates, as to imagine you say
these words under the idea that I am truly so careful in these matters;
but rather your object is to teach me that the would-be general must
make such things his care. I admit in any case all you say.
Socrates proceeded: Has it ever caught your observation, Pericles, that
a high mountain barrier stretches like a bulwark in front of our country
down towards Boeotia--cleft, moreover, by narrow and precipitous passes,
the only avenues into the heart of Attica, which lies engirdled by a
ring of natural fortresses? (31)
(31) The mountains are Cithaeron and Parnes N., and Cerata N.W.
Per. Certainly I have.
Soc. Well, and have you ever heard tell of the Mysians and Pisidians
living within the territory of the great king, (32) who, inside their
mountain fortresses, lightly armed, are able to rush down and inflict
much injury on the king's territory by their raids, while preserving
their own freedom?
(32) For this illustration see "Anab." III. ii. 23; cf. "Econ." iv.
18, where Socrates ({XS}) refers to Cyrus's expedition and death.
Per. Yes, the circumstance is not new to me.
And do you not think (added Socrates) that a corps of young able-bodied
Athenians, accoutred with lighter arms, (33) and holding our natural
mountain rampart in possession, would prove at once a thorn in the
enemy's side offensively, whilst defensively they would form a splendid
bulwark to protect the country?
(33) Cf. the reforms of Iphicrates.
To which Pericles: I think, Socrates, these would be all useful
measures, decidedly.
If, then (replied Socrates), these suggestions meet your approbation,
try, O best of men, to realise them--if you can carry out a portion
of them, it will be an honour to yourself and a blessing to the state;
while, if you fail in any point, there will be no damage done to the
city nor discredit to yourself.
VI
Glaucon, (1) the son of Ariston, had conceived such an ardour to gain
the headship of the state that nothing could hinder him but he must
deliver a course of public speeches, (2) though he had not yet reached
the age of twenty. His friends and relatives tried in vain to stop him
making himself ridiculous and being dragged down from the bema. (3)
Socrates, who took a kindly interest in the youth for the sake of
Charmides (4) the son of Glaucon, and of Plato, alone succeeded in
restraining him. It happened thus. He fell in with him, and first of
all, to get him to listen, detained him by some such remarks as the
following: (5)
(1) Glaucon, Plato's brother. Grote, "Plato," i. 508.
(2) "Harangue the People."
(3) See Plat. "Protag." 319 C: "And if some person offers to give them
advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art
(sc. of politics), even though he be good-looking, and rich, and
noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoot
him, until he is either clamoured down and retires of himself; or
if he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at
the command of the prytanes" (Jowett). Cf. Aristoph. "Knights,"
665, {kath eilkon auton oi prutaneis kai toxotai}.
(4) For Charmides (maternal uncle of Plato and Glaucon, cousin of
Critias) see ch. vii. below; Plato the philosopher, Glaucon's
brother, see Cobet, "Pros. Xen." p. 28.
(5) Or, "and in the first instance addressing him in such terms he
could not choose but hear, detained him." See above, II. vi. 11.
Socrates applies his own theory.
Ah, Glaucon (he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime
minister? (6)
(6) {prostateuein}.
Glauc. Yes, Socrates, I have.
Soc. And what a noble aim! if aught human ever deserved to be called
noble; since if you succeed in your design, it follows, as the night the
day, you will be able not only to gratify your every wish, but you
will be in a position to benefit your friends, you will raise up your
father's house, you will exalt your fatherland, you will become a name
thrice famous in the city first, and next in Hellas, and lastly even
among barbarians perhaps, like Themistocles; but be it here or be it
there, wherever you be, you will be the observed of all beholders. (7)
(7) "The centre of attraction--the cynosure of neighbouring eyes."
The heart of Glaucon swelled with pride as he drank in the words, and
gladly he stayed to listen.
Presently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not?
that you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her
honours?
Glauc. Undoubtedly.
Then, by all that is sacred (Socrates continued), do not keep us in the
dark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state?
what is your starting-point? (8) When Glaucon remained with sealed lips,
as if he were now for the first time debating what this starting-point
should be, Socrates continued: I presume, if you wished to improve a
friend's estate, you would endeavour to do so by adding to its wealth,
would you not? So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the
state?
(8) Or, "tell us what your starting-point will be in the path of
benefaction."
Most decidedly (he answered).
Soc. And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as
her revenues increase?
Glauc. That seems probable, at any rate.
Soc. Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the
state are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude? No
doubt you have gone carefully into the question, so that if any of these
are failing you may make up the deficit, or if neglected for any reason,
make some new provision. (9)
(9) Or, "or if others have dropped out or been negligently overlooked,
you may replace them."
Glauc. Nay, to speak the truth, these are matters I have not thoroughly
gone into.
Never mind (he said) if you have omitted the point; but you might oblige
us by running through the items or heads of expenditure. Obviously you
propose to remove all those which are superfluous?
Glauc. Well, no. Upon my word I have not had time to look into that side
of the matter either as yet.
Soc. Then we will postpone for the present the problem of making
the state wealthier; obviously without knowing the outgoings and the
incomings it would be impossible to deal with the matter seriously.
But, Socrates (Glaucon remarked), it is possible to enrich the state out
of the pockets of her enemies!
Yes, to be sure, considerably (answered Socrates), in the event of
getting the better of them; but in the event of being worsted, it is
also possible to lose what we have got.
A true observation (he replied).
And therefore (proceeded Socrates), before he makes up his mind with
what enemy to go to war, a statesman should know the relative powers of
his own city and the adversary's, so that, in case the superiority be
on his own side, he may throw the weight of his advice into the scale
of undertaking war; but if the opposite he may plead in favour of
exercising caution.
You are right (he answered).
Soc. Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces
first of Athens and then of our opponents?
Glauc. Pardon me. I could not tell you them off-hand at a moment's
notice.
Or (added Socrates), if you have got the figures on paper, you might
produce them. I cannot tell how anxious I am to hear your statement.
Glauc. No, I assure you, I have not got them even on paper yet.
Soc. Well then, we will defer tending advice on the topic of peace or
war, in a maiden speech at any rate. (10) I can understand that, owing
to the magnitude of the questions, in these early days of your ministry
you have not yet fully examined them. But come, I am sure that you have
studied the defences of the country, at all events, and you know exactly
how many forts and outposts are serviceable (11) and how many are not;
you can tell us which garrisons are strong enough and which defective;
and you are prepared to throw in the weight of your advice in favour
of increasing the serviceable outposts and sweeping away those that are
superfluous?
(10) See "Econ." xi. 1.
(11) Or, "advantageously situated." See the author's own tract on
"Revenues."
Glauc. Yes, sweep them all away, that's my advice; for any good that is
likely to come of them! Defences indeed! so maintained that the property
of the rural districts is simply pilfered.
But suppose you sweep away the outposts (he asked), may not something
worse, think you, be the consequence? will not sheer plundering be free
to any ruffian who likes?... But may I ask is this judgment the
result of personal inspection? have you gone yourself and examined the
defences? or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?
Glauc. I conjecture that it is so.
Soc. Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall
we defer giving advice on the matter? (It will be time enough when we
know the facts.)
Possibly it would be better to wait till then (replied Glaucon).
Soc. Then there are the mines, (12) but, of course, I am aware that you
have not visited them in person, so as to be able to say why they are
less productive than formerly.
(12) Again the author's tract on "Revenues" is a comment on the
matter.
Well, no; I have never been there myself (he answered).
Soc. No, Heaven help us! an unhealthy district by all accounts; so
that, when the moment for advice on that topic arrives, you will have an
excuse ready to hand.
I see you are making fun of me (Glaucon answered).
Soc. Well, but here is a point, I am sure, which you have not neglected.
No, you will have thoroughly gone into it, and you can tell us. For how
long a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support
the city? how much is requisite for a single year, so that the city may
not run short of this prime necessary, before you are well aware; but on
the contrary you with your full knowledge will be in a position to give
advice on so vital a question, to the aid or may be the salvation of
your country?
It is a colossal business this (Glaucon answered), if I am to be obliged
to give attention to all these details.
Soc. On the other hand, a man could not even manage his own house or his
estate well, without, in the first place, knowing what he requires, and,
in the second place, taking pains, item by item, to supply his wants.
But since this city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and it is
not easy to pay minute attention to so many all at once, how is it you
did not practise yourself by trying to augment the resources of one at
any rate of these--I mean your own uncle's? The service would not be
thrown away. Then if your strength suffices in the single case you might
take in hand a larger number; but if you fail to relieve one, how could
you possibly hope to succeed with many? How absurd for a man, if he
cannot carry half a hundredweight, to attempt to carry a whole! (13)
(13) Lit. "a single talent's weight... to carry two."
Glauc. Nay, for my part, I am willing enough to assist my uncle's house,
if my uncle would only be persuaded to listen to my advice.
Soc. Then, when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will
be able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you?
Be careful, Glaucon (he added), lest in your thirst for glory and high
repute you come to the opposite. Do you not see how dangerous it is for
a man to speak or act beyond the range (14) of his knowledge? To take
the cases known to you of people whose conversation or conduct clearly
transcends these limits: should you say they gain more praise or more
blame on that account? Are they admired the rather or despised? Or,
again, consider those who do know what they say and what they do; and
you will find, I venture to say, that in every sort of undertaking those
who enjoy repute and admiration belong to the class of those endowed
with the highest knowledge; whilst conversely the people of sinister
reputation, the mean and the contemptible, emanate from some depth of
ignorance and dulness. If therefore what you thirst for is repute and
admiration as a statesman, try to make sure of one accomplishment: in
other words, the knowledge as far as in you lies of what you wish to do.
(15) If, indeed, with this to distinguish you from the rest of the
world you venture to concern yourself with state affairs, it would not
surprise me but that you might reach the goal of your ambition easily.
(14) Or, "to talk of things which he does not know, or to meddle with
them."
(15) Or, "try as far as possible to achieve one thing, and that is to
know the business which you propose to carry out."
VII
Now Charmides, (1) the son of Glaucon, was, as Socrates observed, a man
of mark and influence: a much more powerful person in fact than the mass
of those devoted to politics at that date, but at the same time he was
a man who shrank from approaching the people or busying himself with the
concerns of the state. Accordingly Socrates addressed him thus:
(1) See last chapter for his relationship to Glaucon (the younger) and
Plato; for a conception of his character, Plato's dialogue
"Charmides"; "Theag." 128 E; "Hell." II. iv. 19; "Symp." iv. 31;
Grote, "Plato," i. 480.
Tell me, Charmides, supposing some one competent to win a victory in the
arena and to receive a crown, (2) whereby he will gain honour himself
and make the land of his fathers more glorious in Hellas, (3) were to
refuse to enter the lists--what kind of person should you set him down
to be?
(2) In some conquest (e.g. of the Olympic games) where the prize is a
mere wreath.
(3) Cf. Pindar passim.
Clearly an effeminate and cowardly fellow (he answered).
Soc. And what if another man, who had it in him, by devotion to affairs
of state, to exalt his city and win honour himself thereby, were to
shrink and hesitate and hang back--would he too not reasonably be
regarded as a coward?
Possibly (he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?
Because (replied Socrates) I think that you, who have this power, do
hesitate to devote yourself to matters which, as being a citizen, if for
no other reason, you are bound to take part in. (4)
(4) Or add, "and cannot escape from."
Charm. And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so
severe a sentence upon me?
Soc. I have detected it plainly enough in those gatherings (5) in which
you meet the politicians of the day, when, as I observe, each time they
consult you on any point you have always good advice to offer, and when
they make a blunder you lay your finger on the weak point immediately.
(5) See above, I. v. 4; here possibly of political club conversation.
Charm. To discuss and reason in private is one thing, Socrates, to
battle in the throng of the assembly is another.
Soc. And yet a man who can count, counts every bit as well in a crowd as
when seated alone by himself; and it is the best performer on the harp
in private who carries off the palm of victory in public.
Charm. But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings
implanted in man's nature? and these are much more powerfully present to
us in a crowd than within the circle of our intimates.
Soc. Yes, but what I am bent on teaching you is that while you feel no
such bashfulness and timidity before the wisest and strongest of men,
you are ashamed of opening your lips in the midst of weaklings and
dullards. (6) Is it the fullers among them of whom you stand in awe, or
the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the coppersmiths, or the merchants,
or the farmers, or the hucksters of the market-place exchanging their
wares, and bethinking them how they are to buy this thing cheap, and to
sell the other dear--is it before these you are ashamed, for these are
the individual atoms out of which the Public Assembly is composed? (7)
And what is the difference, pray, between your behaviour and that of a
man who, being the superior of trained athletes, quails before a set of
amateurs? Is it not the case that you who can argue so readily with the
foremost statesmen in the city, some of whom affect to look down
upon you--you, with your vast superiority over practised popular
debaters--are no sooner confronted with a set of folk who never in their
lives gave politics a thought, and into whose heads certainly it never
entered to look down upon you--than you are afraid to open your lips in
mortal terror of being laughed at?
(6) Cf. Cic. "Tusc." v. 36, 104; Plat. "Gorg." 452 E, 454 B.
(7) Cf. Plat. "Protag." 319 C. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 103.
Well, but you would admit (he answered) that sound argument does
frequently bring down the ridicule of the Popular Assembly.
Soc. Which is equally true of the others. (8) And that is just what
rouses my astonishment, that you who can cope so easily with these
lordly people (when guilty of ridicule) should persuade yourself that
you cannot stand up against a set of commoners. (9) My good fellow, do
not be ignorant of yourself! (10) do not fall into that commonest of
errors--theirs who rush off to investigate the concerns of the rest of
the world, and have no time to turn and examine themselves. Yet that is
a duty which you must not in cowardly sort draw back from: rather must
you brace ourself to give good heed to your own self; and as to public
affairs, if by any manner of means they may be improved through you, do
not neglect them. Success in the sphere of politics means that not only
the mass of your fellow-citizens, but your personal friends and you
yourself last but not least, will profit by your action.
(8) {oi eteroi}, i.e. "the foremost statesmen" mentioned before. Al.
"the opposite party," the "Tories," if one may so say, of the
political clubs.
(9) Lit. "those... these."
(10) Ernesti aptly cf. Cic. "ad Quint." iii. 6. See below, III. ix. 6;
IV. ii. 24.
VIII
Once when Aristippus (1) set himself to subject Socrates to a
cross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of
Socrates on a former occasion, (2) Socrates, being minded to benefit
those who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater
guarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of
the supreme importance of right conduct. (3)
(1) For Aristippus see above, p. 38; for the connection, {boulomenos
tous sunontas ophelein}, between this and the preceeding chapter,
see above, Conspectus, p. xxvi.
(2) Possibly in reference to the conversation above. In reference to
the present dialogue see Grote, "Plato," I. xi. p. 380 foll.
(3) For {prattein ta deonta} cf. below, III. ix. 4, 11; Plat. "Charm."
164 B; but see J. J. Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 141.
Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good," (4) intending in
case he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or
drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out
that the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing
troubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our
trouble, answered precisely as it was best to do. (5)
(4) See Grote, "Plato," ii. 585, on Philebus.
(5) Or, "made the happiest answer."
Soc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for
fever?
No (he replied), that is not my question.
Soc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?
Aristip. No, nor yet that.
Soc. Well then, for hunger?
Aristip. No, nor yet for hunger.
Well, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good
thing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.
And when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him "if he knew of
any thing beautiful."
He answered: Yes, many things.
Aristip. Are they all like each other?
Soc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.
How then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?
Soc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who
is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful
boxer, (6) or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose
of defence, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful
weapon of swift and sure discharge.
(6) See Grote, "H. G." x. 164, in reference to Epaminondas and his
gymnastic training; below, III. x. 6.
Aristip. Your answers are no better now than (7) when I asked you
whether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.
(7) Or, "You answer precisely as you did when..."
Soc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and
another beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard
all things are at once beautiful and good? (8) In the first place,
virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful
thing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human
beings, on the same principle (9) and relatively to the same standard,
are called "beautiful and good"; and so the bodily frames of men
relatively to the same standards are seen to be "beautiful and good,"
and in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as
at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard--the standing
being in each case what the thing happens to be useful for. (10)
(8) Or, "good and beautiful are convertible terms: whatever is good is
beautiful, or whatever is beautiful is good."
(9) Or, "in the same breath." Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 295 D; "Gorg."
474 D.
(10) Or, "and this standard is the serviceableness of the thing in
question."
Aristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung (11) is a
beautiful thing?
(11) Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 288 D, 290 D; and Grote's note, loc. cit.
p. 381: "in regard to the question wherein consists {to kalon}?"
Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their
respective uses--the former is well and the latter ill adapted.
Aristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and
ugly?
Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and
bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and
what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for
wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good
and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when
ill adapted for the same.
Similarly when he spoke about houses, (12) and argued that "the same
house must be at once beautiful and useful"--I could not help feeling
that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to
be built." He investigated the matter thus:
(12) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 488; "Classical Review," vii. 262.
Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house (13)
will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as
possible?" and that point being admitted, (14) the next question would
be:
(13) Or, "the ideal house"; lit. "a house as it should be."
(14) See below, IV. vi. 15.
"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter,
is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained assent, "Now,
supposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will
steal in under the verandah, (15) but in summer, when the sun traverses
a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade,
will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern
side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter
sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding
ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and
most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at
all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his
goods with the greatest security."
(15) Or, "porticoes" or "collonades."
Paintings (16) and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one
of more joy (17) than they confer.
(16) See "Econ." ix. 2; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 298 A; "Rep." 529; Becker,
"Charicles," 268 (Engl. trans.)
(17) {euphrosunas}, archaic or "poetical" = "joyance." See "Hiero,"
vi. 1.
The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site
visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: (18) since it was a
glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up
his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. (19)
(18) e.g. the summit of Lycabettos, or the height on which stands the
temple of Phygaleia. Cf. Eur. "Phoen." 1372, {Pallados
khrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato} of Eteocles.
(19) See Vitruvius, i. 7, iv. 5, ap. Schneid. ad loc.; W. L. Newman,
op. cit. i. 338.
IX
Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught, (1) or did
it come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by
nature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by
nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly
I do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and
customs differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by
learning and practice the natural aptitude may always be strengthened
towards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or
Thracians would not venture to take shield and spear and contend with
Lacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would
demur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to
their light shields and javelins, or against Scythians without some
weapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. (2) And as far as I can
see, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man
from another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of
care and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has
endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike
is to learn and practise those things in which we would fain achieve
distinction.
(1) Or, "When some one retorted upon him with the question: 'Can
courage be taught?'" and for this problem see IV. vi. 10, 11;
"Symp." ii. 12; Plat. "Lach."; "Protag." 349; "Phaedr." 269 D; K.
Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.; Grote, "Plato," i. 468 foll., ii. 60;
Jowett, "Plato," i. 77, 119; Newman, op. cit. i. 343.
(2) Or, "against Thracians with light shields and javelins, or against
Scythians with bows and arrows"; and for the national arms of
these peoples respectively see Arist. "Lysistr." 563; "Anab." III.
iv. 15; VI. VII. passim.
Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no
distinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things
beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other
hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so,
Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate).
(4)
(3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.
(4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. "he discovered the
wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise
things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his
being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things
base." Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. "The man who
not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,
in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in
the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul." Cf. Plat.
"Charm."
And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have
the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and
self-controlled?"--"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them
to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately
chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive
to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that
those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor
self-controlled.
(5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III. xii. 1;
"Econ." xii. 18. Al. "I should by no means choose to consider them
wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."
(6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."
He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is
to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue,
are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things
deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the
special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the
attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform
the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot,
but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and
generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it
is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.
On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom;
not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it
thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that
he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself,
yet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different
language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of
mankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him "mad"; (8) but a like
aberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope
of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who
imagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall
without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt
any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in
the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small
matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion
in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled madness. |
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