|
There is little room for doubt that a substantial proportion of
these
consignments and packages consisted partly of goods required by
traders
either to replenish their stocks, or, as in the case of
tailors
and dressmakers, to enable them to execute particular orders;
and
partly of commodities purchased from traders, and on their way to
the
customers. In regard to the latter class of goods, it is a matter
of
common knowledge that there has been an increasing tendency of
late
years to eliminate the middleman, and establish direct trading
between
producer and consumer. Just as the small shopkeeper will purchase
from
the manufacturer, and avoid the wholesale dealer, so, also, there
are
individual householders and others who eliminate even the
shopkeeper,
and deal direct with advertising manufacturers willing to supply
to
them the same quantities as could be obtained from a retail
trader.
For trades and businesses conducted on these lines, the
railway--taking
and delivering promptly consignments great or small,
penetrating to
every part of the country, and supplemented by its own
commodious
warehouses, in which goods can be stored as desired by the
trader
pending delivery or shipment--is a far more convenient mode
of
transport than the canal boat; and to the railway the
perfect
revolution that has been brought about in the general trade of
this
country is mainly due. Business has been simplified, subdivided,
and
brought within the reach of "small" men to an extent that, but for
the
railway, would have been impossible; and it is difficult to
imagine
that traders in general will forego all these advantages now,
and
revert once more to the canal boat, merely for the sake of a saving
in
freight which, in the long run, might be no saving at all.
Here it
may be replied by my critics that there is no idea of reviving
canals in the
interests of the general trader, and that all that is
sought is to provide a
cheaper form of transport for those heavier
or bulkier minerals or
commodities which, it is said, can be carried
better and more economically by
water than by rail.
Now this argument implies the admission that canal
resuscitation, on
a national basis, or at the risk more or less of the
community, is
to be effected, not for the general trader, but for certain
special
classes of traders. As a matter of fact, however, such canal
traffic
as exists to-day is by no means limited to heavy or bulky articles.
In
their earlier days canal companies simply provided a water-road, as
it
were, along which goods could be taken by other persons on payment
of certain
tolls. To enable them to meet better the competition of
the railways,
Parliament granted to the canal companies, in 1846,
the right to become
common carriers as well, and, though only a very
small proportion of them
took advantage of this concession, those that
did are indebted in part to the
transport of general merchandise for
such degree of prosperity as they have
retained. The separate firms
of canal carriers ("by-traders") have adopted a
like policy, and,
notwithstanding the changes in trade of which I have
spoken, a good
deal of general merchandise does go by canal to or from places
that
happen to be situated in the immediate vicinity of the waterways. It
is
extremely probable that if some of the canals which have survived
had
depended entirely on the transport of heavy or bulky commodities,
their
financial condition to-day would have been even worse than it really
is.
But let us look somewhat more closely into this theory that canals
are
better adapted than railways for the transport of minerals or
heavy
merchandise, calling for the payment of a low freight. At the
first
glance such a commodity as coal would claim special attention from
this
point of view; yet here one soon learns that not only have the
railways
secured the great bulk of this traffic in fair and open
competition
with the canals, but there is no probability of the latter taking
it
away from them again to any appreciable extent.
Some interesting
facts in this connection were mentioned by the late
Sir James Allport in the
evidence he gave before the Select Committee
on Canals in 1883. Not a yard,
he said, of the series of waterways
between London and Derbyshire,
Nottinghamshire, part of Staffordshire,
Warwickshire and
Leicestershire--counties which included some of the
best coal districts in
England for supplying the metropolis--was owned
by railway companies, yet the
amount of coal carried by canal to London
had steadily declined, while that
by rail had enormously increased.
To prove this assertion, he took the year
1852 as one when there was
practically no competition on the part of the
railways with the canals
for the transport of coal, and he compared therewith
the year 1882,
giving for each the total amount of coal received by canal and
railway
respectively, as
follows:--
1852
1882
Received by canal 33,000 tons 7,900
tons
" " railway 317,000 " 6,546,000 "
The
figures quoted by Sir James Allport were taken from the official
returns in
respect to the dues formerly levied by the City of London
and the late
Metropolitan Board of Works on all coal coming within
the Metropolitan Police
Area, representing a total of 700 square
miles; though at an earlier period
the district in which the dues were
enforced was that included in a 20-mile
radius. The dues were abolished
in 1889, and since then the statistics in
question have no longer been
compiled. But the returns for 1889 show that the
imports of coal, by
railway and by canal respectively, into the Metropolitan
Police Area
for that year were as
follows:--
BY
RAILWAY
Tons.
Cwts.
Midland 2,647,554
0
London and North-Western 1,735,067 13
Great
Northern 1,360,205 0
Great
Eastern 1,077,504 13
Great
Western 940,829 0
London and
South-Western 81,311
2
South-Eastern 27,776 18
------------------
Total by Railway 7,870,248
6
------------------
BY CANAL
Grand
Junction
12,601 15
----------------------
Difference 7,857,646 11
----------------------
If, therefore, the independent canal companies,
having a waterway from
the colliery district of the Midlands and the North
through to London
(without, as already stated, any section thereof being
controlled by
railway companies), had improved their canals, and doubled,
trebled,
or even quadrupled the quantity of coal they carried in 1889,
their
total would still have been insignificant as compared with the
quantity
conveyed by rail.
[Illustration: "FROM PIT TO
PORT."
(Prospect Pit, Wigan Coal and Iron Company. Raised to the
surface,
the coal is emptied on to a mechanical shaker, which grades it
into
various sizes--lumps, cobbles, nuts, and slack. These sizes then
each
pass along a picking belt--so that impurities can be removed--and
fall
into the railway trucks placed at the end ready to receive them.
The
coal can thus be taken direct from the mouth of the pit to any port
or
town in Great Britain.)
[_To face page 82._
]
The
reasons for this transition in the London coal trade (and the
same general
principle applies elsewhere) can be readily stated. They
are to be found in
the facilities conferred by the railway companies,
and the great changes
that, as the direct result thereof, have taken
place in the coal trade
itself. Not only are most of the collieries in
communication with the
railways, but the coal waggons are generally
so arranged alongside the mouth
of each pit that the coal, as raised,
can be tipped into them direct from the
screens. Coal trains, thus
made up, are next brought to certain sidings in
the neighbourhood of
London, where the waggons await the orders of the coal
merchants to
whom they have been consigned. At Willesden, for example, there
is
special accommodation for 2,000 coal waggons, and the sidings
are
generally full. Liberal provision of a like character has also
been
made in London by the Midland, the Great Northern, and other
railway
companies in touch with the colliery districts. An intimation as to
the
arrival of the consignments is sent by the railway company to the
coal
merchant, who, in London, is allowed three "free" days at these
coal
sidings in which to give instructions where the coal is to be
sent.
After three days he is charged the very modest sum of 6d. per day
per
truck. Assuming that the coal merchant gives directions, either
within
the three days or later, for a dozen trucks, containing
particular
qualities of coal, to be sent to different parts of London,
north,
south, east and west, those dozen trucks will have to be picked
out
from the one or two thousand on the sidings, shunted, and coupled
on
to trains going through to the stated destination. This represents
in
itself a considerable amount of work, and special staffs have to
be
kept on duty for the purpose.
Then, at no fewer than one hundred
and thirty-five railway stations in
London and the suburbs thereof, the
railway companies have provided
coal depots on such vacant land as may be
available close to the local
sidings, and here a certain amount of space is
allotted to the use
of coal merchants. For this accommodation no charge
whatever is made
in London, though a small rent has to be paid in the
provinces. The
London coal merchant gets so many feet, or yards, allotted to
him
on the railway property; he puts up a board with his name, or that
of
his firm; he stores on the said space the coal for which he has
no immediate
sale; and he sends his men there to fetch from day to
day just such
quantities as he wants in order to execute the orders
received. With free
accommodation such as this at half a dozen, or even
a score, of suburban
railway stations, all that the coal merchant of
to-day requires in addition
is a diminutive little office immediately
adjoining each railway station,
where orders can be received, and
whence instructions can be sent. Not only,
also, do the railway
companies provide him with a local coal depot which
serves his every
purpose, but, after allowing him three "free" days on the
great coal
sidings, to which the waggons first come, they give him, on the
local
sidings, another seven "free" days in which to arrange his
business.
He thus gets ten clear days altogether, before any charge is made
for
demurrage, and, if then he is still awaiting orders, he has only
to
have the coal removed from the trucks on to the depot, or "wharf" as
it
is technically called, so escaping any payment beyond the ordinary
railway
rate, in which all these privileges and advantages are included.
If canal
transport were substituted for rail transport, the coal would
first have to
be taken from the mouth of the pit to the canal, and,
inasmuch as
comparatively few collieries (except in certain districts)
have canals
immediately adjoining, the coal would have to go by rail to
the canal, unless
the expense were incurred of cutting a branch of the
canal to the colliery--a
much more costly business, especially where
locks are necessary, than laying
a railway siding. At the canal the
coal would be tipped from the railway
truck into the canal boat,[8]
which would take it to the canal terminus, or
to some wharf or basin on
the canal banks. There the coal would be thrown up
from the boat into
the wharf (in itself a more laborious and more expensive
operation than
that of shovelling it down, or into sacks on the same level,
from a
railway waggon), and from the wharf it would have to be carted,
perhaps
several miles, to final destination.
Under this arrangement
the coal would receive much more handling--and
each handling means so much
additional slack and depreciation in value;
a week would have to be allowed
for a journey now possible in a day;
the coal dealers would have to provide
their own depots and pay more
for cartage, and they would have to order
particular kinds of coal by
the boat load instead of by the waggon
load.
This last necessity would alone suffice to render the scheme
abortive.
Some years ago when there was so much discussion as to the use of
a
larger size of railway waggon, efforts were made to induce the
coal
interests to adopt this policy. But the 8-ton truck was so
convenient
a unit, and suited so well the essentially retail nature of the
coal
trade to-day, that as a rule the coal merchants would have nothing
to
do with trucks even of 15 or 20 tons. Much less, therefore, would
they
be inclined to favour barge loads of 200 or 250 tons.
Exceptions
might be made in the case of gas works, or of factories
already situated
alongside the banks of canals which have direct
communication with
collieries. In the Black Country considerable
quantities of coal thus go by
canal from the collieries to the many
local ironworks, etc., which, as I have
shown, are still actively
served by the Birmingham Canal system. But these
exceptions can
hardly be offered as an adequate reason for the
nationalisation of
British canals. The general conditions, and especially the
nature of
the coal trade transition, will be better realised from some
figures
mentioned by the chairman of the London and North-Western
Railway
Company, Lord Stalbridge, at the half-yearly meeting in February
1903.
Notwithstanding the heavy coal traffic--in the aggregate--the
average
consignment of coal, he showed, on the London and North-Western
Railway
is only 17-1/2 tons, and over 80 per cent. of the total
quantity
carried represents consignments of less than 20 tons, the
actual
weights ranging from lots of 2 tons 14 cwts. to close upon 1,000
tons
for shipment.
"But," the reader may say, "if coal is taken in
1,000-ton lots to a
port for shipment, surely canal transport could be
resorted to here!"
This course is adopted on the Aire and Calder Navigation,
which is very
favourably situated, and goes over almost perfectly level
ground. The
average conditions of coal shipment in the United Kingdom are,
however,
much better met by the special facilities which rail transport
offers.
Of the way in which coal is loaded into railway trucks direct
from the
colliery screens I have already spoken; but, in respect to steam
coal,
it should be added that anthracite is sold in about twelve
different
sizes, and that one colliery will make three or four of these
sizes,
each dropped into separate trucks under the aforesaid screens.
The
output of an anthracite colliery would be from 200 to 300 tons a
day,
in the three or four sizes, as stated, this total being equal to
from
20 to 30 truck-loads. An order received by a coal factor for 2,000
or
3,000 tons of a particular size would, therefore, have to be made
up
with coal from a number of different collieries.
The coal, however,
is not actually sold at the collieries. It is
sent down to the port, and
there it stands about for weeks, and
sometimes for months, awaiting sale or
the arrival of vessels. It must
necessarily be on the spot, so that orders
can be executed with the
utmost expedition, and delays to shipping avoided.
Consequently it is
necessary that ample accommodation should be provided at
the port for
what may be described as the coal-in-waiting. At Newport, for
example,
where about 4,000,000 tons of coal are shipped in the course of
the
year (independently of "bunkers,") there are 50 miles of coal
sidings,
capable of accommodating from 40,000 to 50,000 tons of coal sent
there
for shipment. A record number of loaded coal trucks actually on
these
sidings at any one time is 3,716. The daily average is
2,800.
Now assume that the coal for shipment from Newport had been
brought
there by canal boat. To begin with, it would have been first
loaded,
by means of the colliery screens, into railway trucks, taken in
these
to the canal, and then tipped into the boats. This would mean
further
breakage, and, in the case of steam coal especially, a depreciation
in
value. But suppose that the coal had duly arrived at the port in
the
canal boats, where would it be stored for those weeks and months
to
await sale or vessels? Space for miles of sidings on land can easily
be
found; but the water area in a canal or dock in which barges can
wait
is limited, and, in the case of Newport at least, it would hardly
be
equal to the equivalent of 3,000 truck-loads of coal.
There comes
next the important matter of detail as to the way in which
coal brought to a
port is to be shipped. Nothing could be simpler and
more expeditious than the
practice generally adopted in the case of
rail-borne coal. When a given
quantity of coal is to be despatched, the
vessel is brought alongside a
hydraulic coal-tip, such as that shown
in the illustration facing this page,
and the loaded coal trucks are
placed in succession underneath the tip.
Raised one by one to the level
of the shoot, the trucks are there inclined to
such an angle that the
entire contents fall on to the shoot, and thence into
the hold of the
ship. Brought to the horizontal again, the empty truck passes
on to a
viaduct, down which it goes, by gravitation, back to the sidings,
the
place it has vacated on the tip being at once taken by another
loaded
truck.
[Illustration: THE SHIPPING OF COAL: HYDRAULIC TIP ON
G.W.R., SWANSEA.
(The loaded truck is hoisted to level of shoot, and is
there inclined
to necessary angle to "tip" the coal, which falls from shoot
into hold
of vessel. Empty truck passes by gravitation along viaduct, on
left,
to sidings.)
[_To face page 88._
]
Substitute
coal barges for coal trucks, and how will the loading then
be accomplished?
Under any possible circumstances it would take longer
to put a series of
canal barges alongside a vessel in the dock than
to place a series of coal
trucks under the tip on shore. Nor could
the canal barge itself be raised to
the level of a shoot, and have
its contents tipped bodily into the collier.
What was done in the
South Wales district by one colliery some years ago was
to load up a
barge with iron tubs, or boxes, filled with coal, and placed in
pairs
from end to end. In dock one of these would be lifted out of
the
barge by a crane, and lowered into the hold, where the bottom would
be
knocked out, the emptied tub being then replaced in the barge by
the crane,
and the next one to it raised in turn. But, apart from the
other
considerations already presented, this system of shipment was
found more
costly than the direct tipping of railway trucks, and was
consequently
abandoned.
Although, therefore, in theory coal would appear to be an
ideal
commodity for transport by canal, in actual practice it is
found
that rail transport is both more convenient and more economical,
and
certainly much better adapted to the exigences of present day trade
in
general, in the case alike of domestic coal and of coal for
shipment.
Whether or not the country would be warranted in going to a
heavy
expense for canal resuscitation for the special benefit of a
limited
number of traders having works or factories alongside canal banks is
a
wholly different question.
I take next the case of raw cotton as
another bulky commodity carried
in substantial quantities. At one time it was
the custom in the
Lancashire spinning trade for considerable supplies to be
bought in
Liverpool, taken to destination by canal, and stored in the mills
for
use as required. A certain proportion is still handled in this
way;
but the Lancashire spinners who now store their cotton are
extremely
few in number, and represent the exception rather than the rule. It
is
found much more convenient to receive from Liverpool from day to day
by
rail the exact number of bales required to meet immediate wants.
The order
can be sent, if necessary, by post, telegraph, or telephone,
and the cotton
may be expected at the mill next day, or as desired. If
barge-loads of cotton
were received at one time, capital would at least
have to be sunk in
providing warehousing accommodation, and the spinner
thinks he can make
better use of his money.
The day-by-day arrangement is thus both a
convenience and a saving to
the trader; though it has one disadvantage from a
railway standpoint,
for cotton consignments by rail are, as a rule, so small
that there is
difficulty in making up a "paying load" for particular
destinations. As
the further result of the agitation a few years ago for the
use of a
larger type of railway waggons, experiments have been made at
Liverpool
with large trucks for the conveyance especially of raw cotton.
But,
owing to the day-by-day policy of the spinners, it is no easy
matter
to make up a 20-ton truck of cotton for many of the places to
which
consignments are sent, and the shortage in the load represents
so
much dead weight. Consignments ordered forward by rail must,
however,
be despatched wholly, or at any rate in part, on day of receipt.
Any
keeping of them back, with the idea of thus making up a better load
for
the railway truck, would involve the risk of a complaint, if not of
a
claim, against the railway company, on the ground that the mill had
had
to stop work owing to delay in the arrival of the cotton.
If the
spinners would only adopt a two- or three-days-together policy,
it would be a
great advantage to the railways; but even this might
involve the provision of
storage accommodation at the mills, and they
accordingly prefer the existing
arrangement. What hope could there be,
therefore, except under very special
circumstances, that they would be
willing to change their procedure, and
receive their raw cotton in bulk
by canal boat?
Passing on to other
heavy commodities carried in large quantities, such
as bricks, stone,
drain-pipes, manure, or road-making materials, it
is found, in practice, that
unless both the place whence these things
are despatched and the place where
they are actually wanted are close
to a waterway, it is generally more
convenient and more economical to
send by rail. The railway truck is not only
(once more) a better unit
in regard to quantity, but, as in the case of
domestic coal, it can go
to any railway station, and can often be brought
miles nearer to the
actual destination than if the articles or materials in
question are
forwarded by water; while the addition to the canal toll of the
cost of
cartage at either end, or both, may swell the total to the full
amount
of the railway rate, or leave so small a margin that conveyance
by
rail, in view of the other advantages offered, is naturally
preferred.
Here we have further reasons why commodities that seem to be
specially
adapted for transport by canal so often go by rail
instead.
There are manufacturers, again, who, if executing a large
shipping
order, would rather consign the goods, as they are ready, to a
railway
warehouse at the port, there to await shipment, than occupy
valuable
space with them on their own premises. Assuming that it might
be
possible and of advantage to forward to destination by canal boat,
they
would still prefer to send off 25 or 30 tons at a time, in a
narrow
boat (and 25 to 30 tons would represent a big lot in most
industries),
rather than keep everything back (with the incidental result
of
blocking up the factory) until, in order to save a little on
the
freight, they could fill up a barge of 200 or 300 tons.
So the
moral of this part of my story is that, even if the canals of
the country
were thoroughly revived, and made available for large
craft, there could not
be any really great resort to them unless there
were, also, brought about a
change in the whole basis of our general
trading
conditions.
CHAPTER VII
CONTINENTAL
CONDITIONS
The larger proportion of the arguments advanced in the
Press or in
public in favour of a restoration of our own canal system is
derived
from the statements which are unceasingly being made as to what
our
neighbours on the Continent of Europe are doing.
Almost every
writer or speaker on the subject brings forward the same
stock of facts and
figures as to the large sums of money that are
being expended on waterways in
Continental countries; the contention
advanced being, in effect, that because
such and such things are done
on the Continent of Europe, therefore they
ought to be done here. In
the "Engineering Supplement" of _The Times_, for
instance--to give only
one example out of many--there appeared early in 1906
two articles on
"Belgian Canals and Waterways" by an engineering contributor
who wrote,
among other things, that, in view of "the well-directed efforts
now
being made with the object of effecting the regeneration of the
British
canal system, the study of Belgian canals and other navigable
waterways
possesses distinct interest"; and declared, in concluding his
account
thereof, that "if the necessary powers, money, and concentrated
effort
were available, there is little doubt that equally satisfactory
results
could be obtained in Great Britain." Is this really the case?
Could
we possibly hope to do all that can be done either in Belgium or
in
Continental countries generally, even if we had the said powers
and
money, and showed the same concentrated effort? For my part I do
not
think we could, and these are my reasons for thinking so:--
Taking
geographical considerations first, a glance at the map of Europe
will show
that, apart from their national requirements, enterprises,
and facilities,
Germany, Belgium, and Holland are the gateways to vast
expanses producing, or
receiving, very large quantities of merchandise
and raw materials, much of
which is eminently suitable for water
transport on long journeys that have
absolutely no parallel in this
country. In the case of Belgium, a good idea
of the general position
may be gained from some remarks made by the British
Consul-General at
Antwerp, Sir E. Cecil Hertslet, in a report ("Miscellaneous
Series,"
604) on "Canals and other Navigable Waterways of Belgium," issued
by
the Foreign Office in 1904. Referring to the position of Antwerp
he
wrote:--
"In order to form a clear idea of the great utility of the
canal
system of Belgium, it is from its heart, from the great port
of
Antwerp, as a centre, that the survey must be taken.... Antwerp
holds a
leading position among the great ports of the world, and
this is due, not
only to her splendid geographical situation at the
centre of the ocean
highways of commerce, but, also, and perhaps more
particularly, to her
practically unique position as a distributing
centre for a large portion of
North-Eastern Europe."
Thus the canals and waterways of Belgium do not
serve merely local,
domestic, or national purposes, but represent the first
or final links
in a network of water communications by means of which
merchandise
can be taken to, or brought from, in bulk, "a large portion
of
North-Eastern Europe." Much of this traffic, again, can just as
well
pass through one Continental country, on its way to or from the
coast,
as through another. In fact, some of the most productive of
German
industrial centres are much nearer to Antwerp or Rotterdam than
they
are to Hamburg or Bremen. Hence the extremely keen rivalry
between
Continental countries having ports on the North Sea for the
capture
of these great volumes of trans-Continental traffic, and hence,
also,
their low transport rates, and, to a certain extent, their
large
expenditure on waterways.
Comparing these with British
conditions, we must bear in mind the
fact that we dwell in a group of
islands, and not in a country which
forms part of a Continent. We have,
therefore, no such transit
traffic available for "through" barges as that
which is handled on
the Continent. Traffic originating in Liverpool, and
destined say,
for Austria, would not be put in a canal boat which would first
go to
Goole, or Hull, then cross the North Sea in the same boat to
Holland
or Belgium, and so on to its destination. Nor would traffic in
bulk
from the United States for the Continent--or even for any of our
East
Coast ports--be taken by boat across England. It would go round by
sea.
Traffic, again, originating in Birmingham, might be taken to a
port
by boat. But it would there require transhipment into an
ocean-going
vessel, just as the commodities received from abroad would have
to be
transferred to a canal boat--unless Birmingham could be converted
into
a sea-port.
If Belgium and Holland, especially, had had no chance
of getting more
than local, as distinct from through or transit traffic--if,
in other
words, they had been islands like our own, with the same
geographical
limitations as ourselves, and with no trans-Continental traffic
to
handle, is there the slightest probability that they would have
spent
anything like the same amount of money on the development of
their
waterways as they have actually done? In the particular
circumstances
of their position they have acted wisely; but it does not
necessarily
follow that we, in wholly different circumstances, have acted
foolishly
in not following their example.
It might further be noted,
in this connection, that while in the
case of Belgium all the waterways in,
or leading into, the country
converge to the one great port of Antwerp, in
England we have great
ports, competing more or less the one with the other,
all round our
coasts, and the conferring of special advantages on one by the
State
would probably be followed by like demands on the part of all
the
others. As for communication between our different ports, this
is
maintained so effectively by coasting vessels (the competition of
which
already powerfully influences railway rates) that heavy expenditure
on
canal improvement could hardly be justified on this account.
However
effectively the Thames might be joined to the Mersey, or the
Humber
to the Severn, by canal, the vast bulk of port-to-port traffic
would
probably still go by sea.
Then there are great differences
between the physical conditions of
Great Britain and those parts of the
Continent of Europe where the
improvement of waterways has undergone the
greatest expansion. Portions
of Holland--as everybody knows--are below the
level of the sea, and
the remainder are not much above it. A large part of
Belgium is flat;
so is most of Northern Germany. In fact there is practically
a level
plain right away from the shores of the North Sea to the steppes
of
Russia. Canal construction in these conditions is a
comparatively
simple and a comparatively inexpensive matter; though where
such
conditions do not exist to the same extent--as in the south of
Germany,
for example--the building of canals becomes a very different
problem.
This fact is well recognised by Herr Franz Ulrich in his book
on
"Staffeltarife und Wasserstrassen," where he argues that the
building
of canals is practicable only in districts favoured by Nature, and
that
hilly and backward country is thus unavoidably handicapped.
Much,
again, of the work done on the Continent has been a matter either
of linking
up great rivers or of canalising these for navigation
purposes. We have in
England no such rivers as the Rhine, the Weser,
the Elbe, and the Oder, but
the very essence of the German scheme of
waterways is to connect these and
other rivers by canals, a through
route by water being thus provided from the
North Sea to the borders
of Russia. Further south there is already a small
canal, the Ludwigs
Canal, connecting the Rhine and the Danube, and this
canal--as distinct
from those in the northern plains--certainly does rise to
an elevation
of 600 feet from the River Main to its summit level. A scheme
has now
been projected for establishing a better connection between the
Rhine
and the Danube by a ship canal following the route either of the
Main
or of the Neckar. In describing these two powerful streams
Professor
Meiklejohn says, in his "New Geography":--
"The two greatest
rivers of Europe--greatest from almost every point
of view--are the Danube
and the Rhine. The Danube is the largest river
in Europe in respect of its
volume of water; it is the only large
European river that flows due east; and
it is therefore the great
highway to the East for South Germany, for Austria,
for Hungary, and
for the younger nations in its valley. It flows through more
lands,
races, and languages than any other European river. The Rhine is
the
great water-highway for Western Europe; and it carries the traffic
and
the travellers of many countries and peoples. Both streams give
life
to the whole Continent; they join many countries and the most
varied
interests; while the streams of France exist only for France
itself.
The Danube runs parallel with the mighty ranges of the Alps; the
Rhine
saws its way through the secondary highlands which lie between
the
Alps and the Netherlands."
The construction of this proposed link
would give direct water
communication between the North Sea and the Black
Sea, a distance, as
the crow flies, and not counting river windings, of about
1,300 miles.
Such an achievement as this would put entirely in the shade even
the
present possible voyage, by canal and river, of 300 miles from
Antwerp
to Strasburg.
What are our conditions in Great Britain, as
against all these?
In place of the "great lowland plain" in which most of
the Continental
canal work we hear so much about has been done, we possess
an
undulating country whose physical conditions are well indicated by
the
canal sections given opposite this page. Such differences of
level as those
that are there shown must be overcome by locks, lifts,
or inclined planes,
together with occasional tunnels or viaducts.
In the result the construction
of canals is necessarily much more
costly in Great Britain than on the
aforesaid "great lowland plain"
of Continental Europe, and dimensions readily
obtainable there become
practically impossible here on account alike of the
prohibitive cost
of construction and the difficulties that would arise in
respect to
water supply. A canal connecting the Rhine, the Weser, and the
Elbe, in
Germany, is hardly likely to run short of water, and the same may
be
said of the canals in Holland, and of those in the lowlands of
Belgium.
This is a very different matter from having to pump water from
low
levels to high levels, to fill reservoirs for canal purposes, as
must
be done on the Birmingham and other canals, or from taking a
fortnight
to accomplish the journey from Hull to Nottingham as once
happened
owing to insufficiency of water.
[Illustration: SOME TYPICAL
BRITISH CANALS.
[_To face page 98._
]
There is, also,
that very important consideration, from a transport
standpoint, of the
"length of haul." Assuming, for the sake of argument
(1) that the commercial
conditions were the same in Great Britain as
they are on the Continent; (2)
that our country, also, consisted of
a "great lowland plain"; and (3) that
we, as well, had great natural
waterways, like the Rhine, yielding an
abundant water supply;--assuming
all this, it would still be impossible, in
the circumscribed dimensions
of our isles, to get a "length of haul" in any
way approaching the
barge-journeys that are regularly made between, say,
North Sea ports
and various centres in Germany.
The geographical
differences in general between Great Britain and
Continental countries were
thus summed up by Mr W. H. Wheeler in the
discussion on Mr Saner's paper at
the Institution of Civil Engineers:--
"There really did not seem to
be any justification for Government
interference with the canals. England was
in an entirely different
situation from Continental countries. She was a
sea-girt nation, with
no less than eight first-class ports on a coast-line of
1,820 miles.
Communication between these by coasting steamers was,
therefore,
easy, and could be accomplished in much less time and at less
cost
than by canal. There was no large manufacturing town in England
that
was more than about 80 miles in a direct line from a
first-class
seaport; and taking the country south of the Firth of Forth,
there
were only 42-1/2 square miles to each mile of coast. France, on
the
other hand, had only two first-class ports, one in the north and
the
other in the extreme south, over a coast-line of 1,360 miles.
Its
capital was 100 miles from the nearest seaport, and the towns in
the
centre of the country were 250 to 300 miles from either Havre
or Marseilles.
For every mile of coast-line there were 162 square
miles of country. Belgium
had one large seaport and only 50 miles of
coast-line, with 227 square miles
of country to every square mile.
Germany had only two first-class ports, both
situated on its northern
coast; Frankfort and Berlin were distant from those
ports about 250
miles, and for every mile of coast-line there were 231 square
miles
of country. The necessity of an extended system of inland
waterways
for the distribution of produce and materials was, therefore, far
more
important in those countries than it was in England."
Passing
from commercial and geographical to political conditions, we
find that in
Germany the State owns or controls alike railways and
waterways. Prussia
bought up most of the former, partly with the idea
of safeguarding the
protective policy of the country (endangered by
the low rates charged on
imports by independent railway companies),
and partly in order that the
Government could secure, in the profits
on railway operation, a source of
income independent of Parliamentary
votes. So well has the latter aim been
achieved that a contribution
to the Exchequer of from ￡10,000,000 to
￡15,000,000 a year has been
obtained, and, rather than allow this source of
income to be checked
by heavy expenditure, the Prussian Government have
refrained from
carrying out such widenings and improvements of their State
system of
railways as a British or an American railway company would
certainly
have adopted in like circumstances, and have left the traders to
find
relief in the waterways instead. The increased traffic the
waterways
of Germany are actually getting is mainly traffic which has
either
been diverted from the railways, or would have been handled by
the
railways in other countries in the natural course of their
expansion.
Whatever may be the case with the waterways, the railways of
Prussia,
especially, are comparatively unprogressive, and, instead of
developing
through traffic at competitive rates, they are reverting more and
more
to the original position of railways as feeders to the waterways.
They
get a short haul from place of origin to the waterway, and
another
short haul, perhaps, from waterway again to final destination; but
the
greater part of the journey is done by water.
These conditions
represent one very material factor in the substantial
expansion of
water-borne traffic in Germany--and most of that traffic,
be it remembered,
has been on great rivers rather than on artificial
canals. The latter are
certainly being increased in number, especially,
as I have said, where they
connect the rivers; and the Government are
the more inclined that the
waterways should be developed because then
there will be less need for
spending money on the railways, and for
any interference with the
"revenue-producing machine" which those
railways represent.
In France
the railways owned and operated by the State are only a
comparatively small
section of the whole; but successive Governments
have advanced immense sums
for railway construction, and the State
guarantees the dividends of the
companies; while in France as in
Germany railway rates are controlled
absolutely by the State. In
neither country is there free competition between
rail and water
transport. If there were, the railways would probably secure
a
much greater proportion of the traffic than they do. Still
another
consideration to be borne in mind is that although each country
has
spent great sums of money--at the cost of the general taxpayer--on
the
provision of canals or the improvement of waterways, no tolls
are,
with few exceptions, imposed on the traders. The canal charges
include
nothing but actual cost of carriage, whereas British railway rates
may
cover various other services, in addition, and have to be fixed on
a
scale that will allow of a great variety of charges and
obligations
being met. Not only, both in Germany and France, may the waterway
be
constructed and improved by the State, but the State also meets
the
annual expenditure on dredging, lighting, superintendence and
the
maintenance of inland harbours. Here we have further reasons for
the
growth of the water-borne traffic on the Continent.
Where the
State, as railway owner or railway subsidiser, spends money
also on canals,
it competes only, to a certain extent, with itself;
but this would be a very
different position from State-owned or
State-supported canals in this country
competing with privately-owned
railways.[9]
If then, as I maintain is
the case, there is absolutely no basis for
fair comparison between
Continental and British conditions--whether
commercial, geographical, or
political--we are left to conclude that
the question of reviving British
canals must be judged and decided
strictly from a British standpoint, and
subject to the limitations of
British policy, circumstances, and
possibilities.
CHAPTER VIII
WATERWAYS IN THE UNITED
STATES
In some respects conditions in the United States compare with
those of
Continental Europe, for they suggest alike powerful streams,
artificial
canals constructed on (as a rule) flat or comparatively flat
surfaces,
and the possibilities of traffic in large quantities for
transport
over long distances before they can reach a seaport. In other
respects
the comparison is less with Continental than with British
conditions,
inasmuch as, for the last half century at least, the American
railways
have been free to compete with the waterways, and fair play has
been
given to the exercise of economic forces, with the result that,
in
the United States as in the United Kingdom, the railways have
fully
established their position as the factors in inland transport
best
suited to the varied requirements of trade and commerce of
to-day,
while the rivers and canals (I do not here deal with the Great
Lakes,
which represent an entirely different proposition) have played a
role
of steadily diminishing importance.
The earliest canal built in
the United States was that known as
the Erie Canal. It was first projected in
1768, with the idea of
establishing a through route by water between Lake
Erie and the River
Hudson at Albany, whence the boats or barges employed
would be able
to reach the port of New York. The Act for its construction was
not
passed, however, by the Provincial Legislature of the State of New
York
until 1817. The canal itself was opened for traffic in 1825. It had
a
total length from Cleveland to Albany of 364 miles, included
therein
being some notable engineering work in the way of aqueducts,
etc.
At the date in question there were four North Atlantic
seaports,
namely, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, all of
about
equal importance. Boston, however, had appeared likely to take
the
lead, by reason both of her comparatively dense population and of
her
substantial development of manufactures. Philadelphia was also
then
somewhat in advance of New York in trade and population. The effect
of
the Erie Canal, however, was to concentrate all the advantages, for
the
time being, on New York. Thanks to the canal, New York secured the
domestic
trade of a widespread territory in the middle west, while
her rivals could
not possess themselves of like facilities, because
of the impracticability of
constructing canals to cross the ranges
of mountains separating them from the
valley of the Mississippi and
the basin of the Great Lakes--ranges broken
only by the Hudson and
the Mohawk valleys, of which the constructors of the
Erie Canal had
already taken advantage. So New York, with its splendid
harbour, made
great progress alike in trade, wealth, and population,
completely
outdistancing her rivals, and becoming, as a State, "the
Empire
State," and, as a city, "the financial and commercial centre of
the
Western Hemisphere."
While, again, the Erie Canal was "one of the
most efficient factors"
in bringing about these results, it was also
developing the north-west
by giving an outlet to the commerce of the Great
Lakes, and during
the second quarter of the nineteenth century it represented
what has
been well described as "the most potent influence of American
progress
and civilisation." Not only did the traffic it carried increase
from
1,250,000 tons, in 1837, to 3,000,000 tons in 1847, but it
further
inspired the building of canals in other sections of the United
States.
In course of time the artificial waterways of that country
represented
a total length of 5,000 miles.
With the advent of the
railways there came revolutionary changes
which were by no means generally
appreciated at first. The cost of
the various canals had been defrayed mostly
by the different States,
and, though financial considerations had thus been
more readily met,
the policy pursued had committed the States concerned to
the support
of the canals against possible competition. When, therefore,
"private
enterprise" introduced railways, in which the doom of the canals
was
foreseen, there was a wild outburst of indignant protest. The money
of
the taxpayers, it was said, had been sunk in building the canals,
and,
if the welfare of these should be prejudiced by the railways,
every
taxpayer in the State would suffer. When it was seen that the
railways
had come to stay, the demand arose that, while passengers
might
travel by rail, the canals should have the exclusive right to
convey
merchandise.
The question was even discussed by the Legislature
of the State of
New York, in 1857, whether the railways should not be
prevented from
carrying goods at all, or, alternatively, whether heavy taxes
should
not be imposed on goods traffic carried by rail in order to check
the
considerable tendency then being shown for merchandise to go by
rail
instead of by canal, irrespective of any difference in rates.
The
railway companies were further accused of conspiring to "break
down
those great public works upon which the State has spent forty
years
of labour," and so active was the campaign against them--while
it
lasted--that one New York paper wrote:--"The whole community is
aroused
as it never was before."
Some of the laws which had been
actually passed to protect the
State-constructed canals against the railways
were, however, repealed
in 1851, and the agitation itself was not continued
beyond 1857, from
which year the railways had free scope and opportunity to
show what
they could do. The contest was vigorous and prolonged, but the
railways
steadily won.
In the first instance the Erie Canal had a
depth of 4 feet, and could
be navigated only by 30-ton boats. In 1862 it was
deepened to 7 feet,
in order that boats of 240 tons, with a capacity of 8,000
tons of
wheat, could pass, the cost of construction being thus increased
from
$7,000,000 to $50,000,000. Then, in 1882, all tolls were abolished,
and
the canal has since been maintained out of the State treasury. But
how
the traffic on the New York canals as a whole (including the Erie,
the
Oswego, the Champlain, etc.) has declined, in competition with
the
railroads, is well shown by the following
table:--[10]
+-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
| Year. |
Total Traffic on New York | Percentage on |
| | Canals
and Railroads. | Canals only.
|
+-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
|
| Tons. | Per cent. |
| 1860 |
7,155,803 | 65 |
| 1870
| 17,488,469 | 35 |
| 1880
| 29,943,633 | 21 |
| 1890
| 56,327,661 | 9.3 |
| 1900
| 84,942,988 | 4.1 |
| 1903
| 93,248,299 | 3.9
|
+-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
The
falling off in the canal traffic has been greatest in just those
heavy or
bulky commodities that are generally assumed to be specially
adapted for
conveyance by water. Of the flour and grain, for instance,
received at New
York, less than 10 per cent. in 1899, and less than 8
per cent. in 1900, came
by the Erie Canal. |
|
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