|
I reserve for another chapter a study of the Birmingham Canal
system,
which, again, is "railway controlled"; but I may say here that
I
think the facts already given show it is most unfair to suggest,
as is
constantly being done in the Press and elsewhere, that the
railway companies
bought up canals--"of malice aforethought," as it
were--for the express
purpose of killing such competition as they
represented--a form of
competition in which, as we have seen, public
confidence had already
practically disappeared. One of the witnesses at
the canal enquiry in 1883
even went so far as to assert:
"The railway companies have been enabled,
in some cases by means of
very questionable legality, to obtain command of
1,717 miles of canal,
so adroitly selected as to strangle the whole of the
inland water
traffic, which has thus been forced upon the railways, to the
great
interruption of their legitimate and lucrative trade."
The
assertions here made are constantly being reproduced in one form
or another
by newspaper writers, public speakers, and others, who have
gone to no
trouble to investigate the facts for themselves, who have
never read, or, if
they have read, have disregarded, the important
evidence of Sir James
Allport, at the same enquiry, in reference to the
London coal trade (I shall
revert to this subject later on), and who
probably have either not seen a map
of British canals and waterways
at all, or else have failed to notice the
routes that still remain
independent, and are in no way controlled by railway
companies.
[Illustration: INDEPENDENT CANALS
AND
INLAND
NAVIGATIONS
IN
ENGLAND
Which are not controlled by railway
companies]
1. River Ouse Navigation (Yorkshire).
2. River Wharfe
Navigation.
3. Aire and Calder Navigation.
4. Market Weighton
Navigation.
5. Driffield Navigation.
6. Beverley Beck
Navigation.
7. Leven Navigation.
8. Leeds and Liverpool
Canal.
9. Manchester Ship Canal.
10. Bridgewater portion of
Manchester Ship Canal.
11. Rochdale Canal.
12. Calder and Hebble
Navigation.
13. Weaver Navigation.
14. Idle Navigation.
15.
Trent Navigation Co.
16. Aucholme Navigation.
17. Caistor
Canal.
18. Louth Canal (Lincolnshire).
19. Derby Canal.
20.
Nutbrook Canal.
21. Erewash Canal.
22. Loughborough
Navigation.
23. Leicester Navigation.
24. Leicestershire Union
Canal.
25. Witham Navigation.
26. Witham Navigation.
27.
Glen Navigation.
28. Welland Navigation.
29. Nen
Navigation.
30. Wisbech Canal.
31. Nar Navigation.
32. Ouse
and Tributaries (Bedfordshire).
33. North Walsham Canal.
34. Bure
Navigation.
35. Blyth Navigation.
36. Ipswich and Stowmarket
Navigation.
37. Stour Navigation.
38. Colne Navigation.
39.
Chelmer and Blackwater Navigation.
40. Roding Navigation.
41.
Stort Navigation.
42. Lea Navigation.
43. Grand Junction
Canal.
44. Grand Union Canal.
45. Oxford Canal.
46.
Coventry Canal.
47. Warwick and Napton Canal.
48. Warwick and
Birmingham Canal.
49. Birmingham and Warwick Junction Canal.
30.
Worcester and Birmingham Canal.
51. Stafford and Worcester
Canal.
52. Severn (Lower) Navigation.
53. Gloucester and Berkeley
Ship Canal.
54. Lower Avon Navigation.
55. Stroudwater
Canal.
56. Wye Navigation.
57. Axe Navigation.
58. Parrett
Navigation.
59. Tone Navigation.
60. Wilts and Berks
Canal.
61. Thames Navigation.
62. London and Hampshire
Canal.
63. Wey Navigation.
64. Medway Navigation.
65.
Canterbury Navigation.
66. Ouse Navigation (Sussex).
67. Adur
Navigation.
68. Arun and Wey Canal.
69. Portsmouth and Arunder
Canal.
70. Itchen Navigation.
[To face page 54.
I
give, facing p. 54, a sketch which shows the nature and extent of
these
particular waterways, and the reader will see from it that they
include
entirely free and independent communication (_a_) between
Birmingham and the
Thames; (_b_) from the coal-fields of the Midlands
and the North to London;
and (_c_) between the west and east coasts,
_via_ Liverpool, Leeds, and
Goole. To say, therefore, in these
circumstances, that "the whole of the
inland water traffic" has been
strangled by the railway companies because the
canals or sections of
which they "obtained command" were "so adroitly
selected," is simply to
say what is not true.
The point here raised is
not one that merely concerns the integrity
of the railway companies--though
in common justice to them it is only
right that the truth should be made
known. It really affects the whole
question at issue, because, so long as
public opinion is concentrated
more or less on this strangulation fiction,
due attention will not
be given to the real causes for the decay of the
canals, and undue
importance will be attached to the suggestions freely made
that if only
the one-third of the canal mileage owned or controlled by the
railway
companies could be got out of their hands, the revival schemes
would
have a fair chance of success.
Certain it is, therefore, as the
map I give shows beyond all possible
doubt, that the causes for the failure
of the British canal system must
be sought for elsewhere than in the fact of
a partial railway-ownership
or control. Some of these alternative causes I
propose to discuss in
the Chapters that follow my story of the Birmingham
Canal, for which
(inasmuch as Birmingham and district, by reason of their
commercial
importance and geographical position, have first claim to
consideration
in any scheme of canal resuscitation) I would beg the special
attention
of the reader.
CHAPTER V
THE BIRMINGHAM
CANAL AND ITS STORY
What is known as the "Birmingham Canal" is really
a perfect network
of waterways in and around Birmingham and South
Staffordshire,
representing a total length of about 160 miles, exclusive of
some
hundreds of private sidings in connection with different works in
the
district.
[Illustration: Map of the Canals & Railways
between
WOLVERHAMPTON & BIRMINGHAM
[_To face page
56._
]
The system was originally constructed by four different canal
companies
under Acts of Parliament passed between 1768 and 1818. These
companies
subsequently amalgamated and formed the Birmingham Canal
Navigation,
known later on as the Birmingham Canal Company. From March 1816
to
March 1818 the company paid ￡36 per annum per share on 1,000
shares,
and in the following year the amount paid on the same number of
shares
rose to ￡40 per annum. In 1823 ￡24 per annum per share was paid
on
2,000 shares, in 1838 ￡9 to ￡16 on 8,000, in 1844 ￡8 on 8,800, and
from
May 1845 to December 1846 ￡4 per annum per share on 17,600
shares.
The year 1845 was a time of great activity in railway promotion,
and
the Birmingham Canal Company, who already had a canal between that
town
and Wolverhampton, proposed to supplement it by a railway through
the
Stour Valley, using for the purpose a certain amount of spare
land
which they already owned. A similar proposal, however, in respect to
a
line of railway to take practically the same route between
Birmingham
and Wolverhampton, was brought forward by an independent company,
who
seem to have had the support of the London and Birmingham
Railway
Company; and in the result it was arranged among the different
parties
concerned (1) that the Birmingham Canal Company should not
proceed
with their scheme, but that they and the London and Birmingham
Railway
Company should each subscribe a fourth part of the capital for
the
construction of the line projected by the independent
Birmingham,
Wolverhampton, and Stour Valley Railway Company; and (2) that
the
London and Birmingham Railway Company should, subject to certain
terms
and conditions, guarantee the future dividend of the Canal
Company,
whenever the net income was insufficient to produce a dividend of
￡4
per share on the capital, the Canal Company thus being insured
against
loss resulting from competition.
The building of the Stour
Valley Line between Birmingham and
Wolverhampton, with a branch to Dudley,
was sanctioned by an Act of
1846, which further authorised the Birmingham
Canal Company and the
London and Birmingham Railway Company to contribute
each one quarter
of the necessary capital. The canal company raised their
quarter,
amounting to ￡190,087, by means of mortgages. In return for
their
guarantee of the canal company's dividend, the London and
Birmingham
Railway Company obtained certain rights and privileges in regard
to
the working of the canal. These were authorised by the London
and
Birmingham Railway and Birmingham Canal Arrangement Act, 1846,
which
empowered the two companies each to appoint five persons as a
committee
of management of the Birmingham Canal Company. Those members of
the
committee chosen by the London and Birmingham Railway Company were
to
have the same powers, etc., as the members elected by the canal
company; but
the canal company were restricted from expending, without
the consent of the
railway company, "any sum which shall exceed the sum
of five hundred pounds
in the formation of any new canal, or extension,
or branch canal or
otherwise, for the purpose of any single work to be
hereafter undertaken by
the same company"; nor, without consent of the
railway company, could the
canal company make any alterations in the
tolls, rates, or dues charged. In
the event of differences of opinion
arising between the two sections of the
committee of management, the
final decision was to be given by the railway
representatives in such
year or years as the railway company was called upon
to make good a
deficiency in the dividends, and by the canal representatives
when no
such demand had been made upon the railway company. In other words
the
canal company retained the deciding vote so long as they could
pay
their way, and in any case they could spend up to ￡500 on any
single
work without asking the consent of the railway company.
In
course of time the Stour Valley Line, as well as the London
and Birmingham
Company, became part of the system of the London
and North-Western Railway
Company, which thus took over the
responsibilities and obligations, in regard
to the waterways, already
assumed; while the mortgages issued by the
Birmingham Canal Company,
when they undertook to raise one-fourth of the
capital for the Stour
Valley Railway, were exchanged for ￡126,725 of ordinary
stock in the
London and North-Western Railway.
The Birmingham Canal
Company was able down to 1873 (except only in one
year, 1868, when it
required ￡835 from the London and North-Western
Company) to pay its dividend
of ￡4 per annum on each share, without
calling on the railway company to make
good a deficiency. In 1874,
however, there was a substantial shortage of
revenue, and since that
time the London and North-Western Railway Company,
under the agreement
already mentioned, have had to pay considerable sums to
the canal
company, as the following table
shows:--
Year
1874 ￡10,528
18 0
1875 nil.
1876 4,796
10 9
1877 361 7 9
1878
11,370 5 7
1879 20,225 0 5
1880 13,534
19 6
1881
15,028 9 3
1882 6,826 7 1
1883 8,879 4 7
1884
14,196 7 9
1885 25,460 19 10
1886
35,169 9 6
1887 31,491 14 1
1888 15,350 10
11
1889 5,341 19 3
1890
22,069 9 8
1891 17,626 2 3
1892
29,508 4 2
1893 31,618 19 4
1894
27,935 8 9
1895 39,065 15 2
1896 22,994 0
10
1897 10,186 19 7
1898 10,286
13 3
1899 18,470 18 1
1900 34,075
19 6
1901 62,644 2 8
1902
27,645 2 3
1903 34,047 4 6
1904
37,832 5 8
1905 39,860 13 0
The sum total of these
figures is ￡685,265, 2s. 11d.
It will have been seen, from the facts
already narrated, that for a
period of over twenty years from the date of the
agreement the canal
company continued to earn their own dividend without
requiring any
assistance from the railway company. Meantime, however,
various
local, in addition to general, causes had been in operation
tending
to affect the prosperity of the canals. The decline of the
pig-iron
industry in the Black Country had set in, while though the
conversion
of manufactured iron into plates, implements, etc., largely
took
its place, the raw materials came more and more from districts
not
served by the canals, and the finished goods were carried mainly
by
the railways then rapidly spreading through the district,
affording
facilities in the way of sidings to a considerable number
of
manufacturers whose works were not on the canal route. Then the
local
iron ore deposits were either worked out or ceased to be
remunerative,
in view of the competition of other districts, again
facilitated by the
railways; and the extension of the Bessemer process of
steel-making
also affected the Staffordshire iron industry.
These
changes were quite sufficient in themselves to account for
the increasing
unprofitableness of the canals, without any need for
suggestions of hostility
towards them on the part of the railways.
In point of fact, the extension of
the railways and the provision of
"railway basins" brought the canals a
certain amount of traffic they
might not otherwise have got. It was, indeed,
due less to an actual
decrease in the tonnage than to a decrease in the
distance carried
that the amount received in tolls fell off, that the traffic
ceased to
be remunerative, and that the deficiencies arose which, under
their
statutory obligations, the London and North-Western Railway
Company
had to meet. The more that the traffic actually left the canals,
the
greater was the deficiency which, as shown by the figures I
have
given, the railway company had to make good.[6]
The condition of
the canals in 1874, when the responsibilities
assumed by the London and
North-Western Railway Company began to
fall more heavily upon them, left a
good deal to be desired, and the
railway company found themselves faced with
the necessity of finding
money for improvements which eventually represented
a very heavy
expenditure, apart altogether from the making up of a
guaranteed
dividend. They proceeded, all the same, to acquit themselves of
these
responsibilities, and it is no exaggeration to say that, during
the
thirty years which have since elapsed, they have spent enormous sums
in
improving the canals, and in maintaining them in what--adverse
critics
notwithstanding--is their present high state of efficiency,
considering
the peculiarities of their position.
One of the greatest
difficulties in the situation was in regard to
water supply. At Birmingham,
portions of the canal are 453 feet above
ordnance datum; Wolverhampton,
Wednesfield, Tipton, Dudley, and Oldbury
are higher still, for their
elevation is 473 feet, while Walsall,
Darlaston, and Wednesbury are at a
height of 408 feet. On high-lands
like these there are naturally no powerful
streams, and such is the
lack of local water supplies that, as every one
knows, the city of
Birmingham has recently had to go as far as Wales in order
to obtain
sufficient water to meet the needs of its citizens.
In these
circumstances special efforts had to be made to obtain water
for the canals
in the district, and to ensure a due regard for economy
in its use. The
canals have, in fact, had to depend to a certain extent
on water pumped from
the bottom of coal pits in the Black Country, and
stored in reservoirs on the
top levels; the water, also, temporarily
lost each time a canal boat passed
through one of the many locks in the
district being pumped back to the top to
be used over again.
To this end pumping machinery had already been
provided by the old
canal companies, but the London and North-Western Railway
Company, on
taking over the virtual direction of the canals for which they
were
financially responsible, substituted new and improved plant, and
added
various new pumping stations. Thanks to the changes thus
effected--at,
I need hardly say, very considerable cost--the average amount
of water
now pumped from lower to higher levels, during an average year,
is
25,000,000 gallons per day, equal to 1,000 locks of water. On
occasions
the actual quantity dealt with is 50,000,000 gallons per day,
while
the total capacity of the present pumping machinery is equal to
about
102,000,000 gallons, or 4,080 locks, per day. There is absolutely
no
doubt that, but for the special provisions made for an additional
water
supply, the Birmingham Canal would have had to cease operations
altogether in
the summer of 1905--probably for two months--because
of the shortage of
water. The reservoirs on the top level were
practically empty, and it was
solely owing to the company acquiring new
sources of supply, involving a very
substantial expenditure indeed,
that the canal system was kept going at all.
A canal company with no
large financial resources would inevitably have
broken down under the
strain.
Then the London and North-Western
Company are actively engaged in
substituting new pumping
machinery--representing "all the latest
improvements"--for old, the special
aim, here, being the securing of a
reduction of more than 50 per cent. over
the former cost of pumping. An
expenditure of from ￡15,000 to ￡16,000 was,
for example, incurred by
them so recently as 1905 at the Ocker Hill pumping
station. In this way
the railway company are seeking both to maintain the
efficiency of the
canal and to reduce the heavy annual demands made upon them
in respect
to the general cost of operation and shareholders'
dividend.
For reasons which will be indicated later on, it is impossible
to
improve the Black Country canals on any large scale; but, in
addition
to what I have already related, the London and North-Western
Railway
Company are constantly spending money on small improvements, such
as
dredging, widening waterway under-bridges, taking off corners,
and
putting in side walls in place of slopes, so as to give more space
for
the boats. In the latter respect many miles have been so treated,
to
the distinct betterment of the canal.
All this heavy outlay by the
railway company, carried on for a series
of years, is now beginning to tell,
to the advantage alike of the
traders and of the canal as a property, and if
any scheme of State
or municipal purchase were decided on by the country the
various
substantial items mentioned would naturally have to be taken
into
account in making terms.
Another feature of the Birmingham Canal
system is that it passes to a
considerable extent through the mining
districts of the Black Country.
This means, in the first place, that wherever
important works have been
constructed, as in the case of tunnels, (and the
system passes through
a number of tunnels, three of these being 3,172 yards,
3,027 yards,
and 3,785 yards respectively in length) the mineral rights
underneath
have to be bought up in order to avoid subsidences. In one
instance
the railway company paid no less than ￡28,500 for the mining
rights
underneath a short length (754 yards) of a canal tunnel. In
other
words, this ￡28,500 was practically buried in the ground, not in
order
to work the minerals, but with a view to maintain a secure
foundation
for the canal. Altogether the expenditure of the company in this
one
direction, and for this one special purpose alone, in the Black
Country
district, must amount by this time to some hundreds of thousands
of
pounds.
Actual subsidences represent a great source of trouble.
There are
some parts of the Birmingham Canal where the waterway was
originally
constructed on a level with the adjoining ground, but, as more
and
more coal has been taken from the mines underneath, and especially
as
more and more of the ribs of coal originally left to support the
roof
have been removed, the land has subsided from time to time,
rendering
necessary the raising of the canal. So far has this gone that
to-day
the canal, at certain of these points, instead of being on a level
with
the adjoining ground, is on an embankment 30 feet above. Drops of
from
10 to 20 feet are of frequent occurrence, even with narrow canals,
and
the cost involved in repairs and restoration is enormous, as the
reader
may well suppose, considering that the total length of the
Birmingham
Canal subject to subsidences from mining is about 90
miles.
I come next to the point as to the comparative narrowness
of
the Birmingham Canal system and the small capacity of
the
locks--conditions, as we are rightly told, which tell against
the
possibility of through, or even local, traffic in a larger type
of
boat. Such conditions as these are generally presented as one of
the
main reasons why the control should be transferred to the State,
to
municipalities, or to public trusts, who, it is assumed, would soon
get
rid of them.
The reader must have fully realised by this time that
the original
size of the waterways and locks on the Birmingham Canal was
determined
by the question of water supply. But any extensive scheme of
widening
would involve much beyond the securing of more water.
During
the decades the Birmingham Canal has been in existence important
works of all
kinds have been built alongside its banks, not only in
and around Birmingham
itself, but all through the Black Country. There
are parts of the canal where
almost continuous lines of such works on
each side of the canal, flush up to
the banks or towing path, are to be
seen for miles together. Any general
widening, therefore, even of the
main waterways, would involve such a buying
up, reconstruction of, or
interference with extremely valuable properties
that the expenditure
involved--in the interests of a problematical saving in
canal
tolls--would be alike prodigious and prohibitive.
There is the
less reason for incurring such expenditure when we
consider the special
purposes which the canals of the district already
serve, and, I may even say,
efficiently serve. The total traffic
passing over the Birmingham Canal system
amounts to about 8,000,000
tons per annum,[7] and of this a considerable
proportion is collected
for eventual transport by rail. Every few miles along
the canal in
the Black Country there is a "railway-basin" put in either by
the
London and North-Western Railway Company, who have had the
privilege
of finding the money to keep the canal going since 1874, or by
the
Great Western or the Midland Railway Companies. Here, again,
very
considerable expenditure has been incurred by the railway
companies
in the provision alike of wharves, cranes, sheds, etc., and of
branch
railways connecting with the main lines of the company
concerned.
From these railway-basins narrow boats are sent out to works all
over
the district to collect iron, hardware, tinplates, bricks,
tiles,
manufactured articles, and general merchandise, and bring them in
for
loading into the railway trucks alongside. So complete is the
network
of canals, with their hundreds of small "special" branches, that
for
many of the local works their only means of communication with
the
railway is by water, and the consignments are simply conveyed to
the
railway by canal boat, instead of, as elsewhere, by collecting van
or
road lorry.
The number of these railway-basins--the cost of which
is distinctly
substantial--is constantly being increased, for the traffic
through
them grows almost from day to day.
The Great Western Railway
Company, for example, have already several
large transhipping basins on the
canals of the Black Country. They
have one at Wolverhampton, and another at
Tipton, only 5 miles away;
yet they have now decided to construct still
another, about half-way
between the two. The matter is thus referred to in
the _Great Western
Railway Magazine_ for March, 1906:--
"The Directors
have approved a scheme for an extensive depot adjoining
the Birmingham Canal
at Bilston, the site being advantageously central
in the town. It will
comprise a canal basin and transfer shed, sidings
for over one hundred and
twenty waggons, and a loop for made-up
trains. A large share of the traffic
of the district, mainly raw
material and manufactured articles of the iron
trade, will doubtless
be secured as a result of this important step--the
railway and canal
mutually serving each other as feeders."
The reader
will see from this how the tendency, even on canals that
survive, is for the
length of haul to become shorter and shorter, so
that the receipts of the
canal company from tolls may decline even
where there is no actual decrease
in the weight of the traffic handled.
In the event of State or municipal
purchase being resorted to, the
expenditure on all these costly basins and
the works connected
therewith would have to be taken into consideration,
equally with the
pumping machinery and general improvements, and, also, the
purchase of
mining rights, already spoken of; but I fail to see what more
either
Government or County Council control could, in the circumstances,
do
for the Birmingham system than is being done already. Far more for
the
purposes of maintenance has been spent on the canal by the London
and
North-Western Railway Company than had been so spent by the canal
company
itself; and, although a considerable amount of traffic arising
in the
district does find its way down to the Mersey, the purpose
served by the
canal is, and must necessarily be, mainly a local one.
That Birmingham
should become a sort of half-way stage on a continuous
line of widened canals
across country from the Thames to the Mersey
is one of the most impracticable
of dreams. Even if there were not
the question of the prodigious cost that
widenings of the Birmingham
Canal would involve, there would remain the
equally fatal drawback
of the elevation of Birmingham and Wolverhampton above
sea level. In
constructing a broad cross-country canal, linking up the two
rivers in
question, it would be absolutely necessary to avoid alike
Birmingham
and the whole of the Black Country. That city and district,
therefore,
would gain no direct advantage from such a through route. They
would
have to be content to send down their commodities in the
existing
small boats to a lower level, and there, in order to reach the
Mersey,
connect with either the Shropshire Union Canal or the Trent and
Mersey.
One of these two waterways would certainly have to be selected for
a
widened through route to the Mersey.
Assume that the former were
decided upon, and that, to meet the
present-day agitation, the State, or some
Trust backed by State or
local funds, bought up the Shropshire Union, and
resolved upon a
substantial widening of this particular waterway, so as to
admit of a
larger type of boat and the various other improvements now
projected.
In this case the _crux_ of the situation (apart from Birmingham
and
Black Country conditions), would be the city of Chester.
For a
distance of 1-1/2 miles the Shropshire Union Canal passes
through the very
heart of Chester. Right alongside the canal one sees
successively very large
flour mills or lead works, big warehouses, a
school, streets which border it
for some distance, masses of houses,
and, also, the old city walls. At one
point the existing canal makes
a bend that is equal almost to a right angle.
Here there would have
to be a substantial clearance if boats much larger than
those now in
use were to get round so ugly a corner in safety. This bend,
too, is
just where the canal goes underneath the main lines of the London
and
North-Western and the Great Western Railways, the gradients of
which
would certainly have to be altered if it were desired to employ
larger
boats.
[Illustration: WHAT CANAL WIDENING WOULD
MEAN.
(The Shropshire Union Canal at the Northgate, Chester, looking
East.)
[_To face page 70._
]
The widening of the
Shropshire Union Canal at Chester would, in effect,
necessitate a wholesale
destruction of, or interference with, valuable
property (even if the city
walls were spared), and an expenditure of
hundreds of thousands of pounds.
Such a thing is clearly not to be
thought of. The city of Chester would have
to be avoided by the through
route from the Midlands to the Mersey, just as
the canals of Birmingham
and the Black Country would have to be avoided in a
through route
from the Thames. If the Shropshire Union were still kept to, a
new
branch canal would have to be constructed from Waverton to
connect
again with the Shropshire Union at a point half-way between Chester
and
Ellesmere Port, leaving Chester in a neglected bend on the
south.
On this point as to the possibility of enlarging the Shropshire
Union
Canal, I should like to quote the following from some remarks made
by
Mr G. R. Jebb, engineer to the Shropshire Union Railways and
Canal
Company, in the discussion on Mr Saner's paper at the Institution
of
Civil Engineers:--
"As to the suggestion that the railway companies
did not consider
it possible to make successful commercial use of their
canals in
conjunction with their lines, and that the London and
North-Western
Railway Company might have improved the main line of the
Shropshire
Union Canal between Ellesmere Port and Wolverhampton, and thus
have
relieved their already overburdened line, as a matter of fact
about
twenty years ago he went carefully into the question of
enlarging
that particular length of canal, which formed the main line
between
the Midlands and the sea. He drew up estimates and plans for
wide
canals, of different cross sections, one of which was almost
identical
with the cross section proposed by Mr Saner. After very
careful
consideration with a disposition to improve the canal if possible,
it
was found that the cost of the necessary works would be too
heavy.
Bridges of wide span and larger headway--entailing approaches
which
could not be constructed without destroying valuable property
on
either side--new locks and hydraulic lifts would be required, and
a
transhipping depot would have been necessary where each of the
narrow canals
joined. The company were satisfied, and he himself was
satisfied, that no
reasonable return for that expenditure could be
expected, and therefore the
work was not proceeded with.... He was
satisfied that whoever found the money
for canal improvements would
get no fair return for it."
The adoption
of the alternative route, _via_ the Trent and Mersey,
would involve (1)
locking-up to and down a considerable summit, and (2)
a continuous series of
widenings (except along the Weaver Canal), the
cost of which, especially in
the towns of Stoke, Etruria, Middlewich,
and Northwich, would attain to
proportions altogether prohibitive.
The conclusion at which I arrive in
regard to the Birmingham Canal
system is that it cannot be directly included
in any scheme of
cross-country waterways from river to river; that by reason
alike
of elevation, water supply, and the existence of a vast amount
of
valuable property immediately alongside, any general widening of
the
present system of canals in the district is altogether
impracticable;
that, within the scope of their unavoidable limitations,
those
particular canals already afford every reasonable facility to the
real
requirements of the local traders; that, instead of their having
been
"strangled" by the railways, they have been kept alive and in
operation
solely and entirely because of the heavy expenditure upon them by
the
London and North-Western Railway Company, following on conditions
which
must inevitably have led to collapse (with serious disadvantages to
the
traders dependent on them for transport) if the control had
remained
with an independent but impoverished canal company; and that
very
little, if anything, more--with due regard both for what is
practical,
and for the avoidance of any waste of public money--could be done
than
is already being done, even if State or municipal authorities made
the
costly experiment of trying what they could do for them with their
own
'prentice hands.
CHAPTER VI
THE TRANSITION IN
TRADE
Of the various causes which have operated to bring about
the
comparative decay of the British canal system (for, as already
shown,
there are sections that still retain a certain amount of vitality),
the
most important are to be found in the great changes that have
taken
place in the general conditions of trade, manufacture and
commerce.
The tendency in almost every branch of business to-day is for
the
trader to have small, or comparatively small, stocks of any
particular
commodity, which he can replenish speedily at frequent intervals
as
occasion requires. The advantages are obvious. A smaller amount
of
capital is locked up in any one article; a larger variety of goods
can
be dealt in; less accommodation is required for storage; and men
with limited
means can enter on businesses which otherwise could be
undertaken only by
individuals or companies possessed of considerable
resources. If a draper or
a grocer at Plymouth finds one afternoon that
he has run short of a
particular article, he need only telegraph to
the wholesale house with which
he deals in London, and a fresh supply
will be delivered to him the following
morning. A trader in London
who wanted something from Dublin, and telegraphed
for it one day,
would expect as a matter of course to have it the next. What,
again,
would a London shopkeeper be likely to say if, wanting to
replenish
his limited stock with some Birmingham goods, he was informed by
the
manufacturer:--"We are in receipt of your esteemed order, and
are
sending the goods on by canal. You may hope to get them in about
a
week"?
With a little wider margin in the matter of delivery,
the
same principle applies to those trading in, or requiring,
raw
materials--coal, steel, ironstone, bricks, and so on.
Merchants,
manufacturers, and builders are no more anxious than the
average
shopkeeper to keep on hand stocks unnecessarily large, and to have
so
much money lying idle. They calculate the length of time that will
be
required to get in more supplies when likely to be wanted, and
they
work their business accordingly.
From this point of view the
railway is far superior to the canal in two
respects, at least.
First,
there is the question of speed. The value of this factor was
well recognised
so far back as 1825, when, as I have told on page 25,
Mr Sandars related how
speed and certainty of delivery were regarded as
"of the first importance,"
and constituted one of the leading reasons
for the desired introduction of
railways. But speed and certainty of
delivery become absolutely essential
when the margin in regard to
supplies on hand is habitually kept to a working
minimum. The saving in
freight effected as between, on the one hand, waiting
at least several
days, if not a full week, for goods by canal boat, and, on
the other,
receiving them the following day by train, may be more than
swallowed
up by the loss of profit or the loss of business in consequence
of
the delay. If the railway transport be a little more costly than
the
canal transport, the difference should be fully counterbalanced by
the
possibility of a more rapid turnover, as well as the other
advantages
of which I have spoken.
In cases, again, where it is not a
matter of quickly replenishing
stocks but of effecting prompt delivery even
of bulky goods, time may
be all-important. This fact is well illustrated in a
contribution, from
Birmingham, published in the "Engineering Supplement" of
_The Times_ of
February 14, 1906, in which it was said:--
"Makers of
wheels, tires, axles, springs, and similar parts are busy.
Of late the South
African colonies have been larger buyers, while
India and the Far Eastern
markets, including China and Japan, South
America, and some other shipping
markets are providing very good and
valuable indents. In all cases, it is
especially remarked, very early
execution of contracts and urgent delivery is
impressed by buyers. The
leading firms have learned a good deal of late from
German, American,
Belgian, and other foreign competitors in the matter of
rapid output.
By the improvement of plant, the laying down of new and costly
machine
tools, and by other advances in methods of production, delivery is
now
made of contracts of heavy tonnage within periods which not so
long
ago would have been deemed by these same producers quite
impossible.
In no branch of the engineering trades is this expedition
more
apparent than in the constructional engineering department, such
as
bridges, roofs, etc., also in steam boiler work."
Now where, in
cases such as these, "urgent delivery is impressed by
buyers," and the utmost
energy is probably being enforced on the
workers, is it likely that even the
heavy goods so made would be
sent down to the port by the tediously slow
process of canal boat,
taking, perhaps, as many days as even a goods train
would take hours?
Alternatively, would the manufacturers run the risk of
delaying urgent
work by having the raw materials delivered by canal boat in
order to
effect a small saving on cost of transport?
Certainty of
delivery might again be seriously affected in the case
of canal transport by
delays arising either from scarcity of water
during dry seasons, or from
frost in winter. The entire stoppage
of a canal system, from one or other of
these causes, for weeks
together, especially on high levels, is no unusual
occurrence, and the
inconvenience which would then result to traders who
depended on the
canals is self-evident. In Holland, where most of the goods
traffic
goes by the canals that spread as a perfect network throughout
the
whole country, and link up each town with every other town, the
advent
of a severe frost means that the whole body of traffic is
suddenly
thrown on the railways, which then have more to get through than
they
can manage. Here the problem arises: If waterways take traffic from
the
railways during the greater part of the year, should the railways
still
be expected to keep on hand sufficient rolling stock, etc., not
only
for their normal conditions, but to meet all the demands made upon
them
during such periods as their competitors cannot operate?
There is
an idea in some quarters that stoppage from frost need not be
feared in this
country because, under an improved system of waterways,
measures would be
taken to keep the ice on the canals constantly
broken up. But even with this
arrangement there comes a time, during a
prolonged frost, when the quantity
of broken ice in the canal is so
great that navigation is stopped unless the
ice itself is removed from
the water. Frost must, therefore, still be
reckoned with as a serious
factor among the possibilities of delay in canal
transport.
Secondly, there is the question of quantities. For the average
trader
the railway truck is a much more convenient unit than the canal
boat.
It takes just such amount as he may want to send or receive. For
some
commodities the minimum load for which the lowest railway rate
is
quoted is as little as 2 tons; but many a railway truck has been
run
through to destination with a solitary consignment of not more
than
half-a-ton. On the other hand, a vast proportion of the
consignments
by rail are essentially of the "small" type. From the goods
depot at
Curzon Street, Birmingham, a total of 1,615 tons dealt with, over
a
certain period, represented 6,110 consignments and 51,114 packages,
the
average weight per consignment being 5 cwts. 1 qr. 4 lbs., and
the average
weight per package, 2 qrs. 14 lbs. At the Liverpool goods
depots of the
London and North-Western Railway, a total weight of 3,895
tons handled
consisted of 5,049 consignments and 79,513 packages, the
average weight per
consignment being 15 cwts. 1 qr. 20 lbs., and the
average weight per package
3 qrs. 26 lbs. From the depot at Broad
Street, London, 906 tons represented
6,201 consignments and 23,067
packages, with an average weight per
consignment of 2 cwts. 3 qrs. 19
lbs., and per package, 3 qrs. 4 lbs.; and so
on with other important centres of traffic |
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