British Canals Is their resuscitaion
practicable?
PREFACE
The appointment of a Royal Commission
on Canals and Waterways, which first sat to take evidence on March 21, 1906,
is an event that should lead to an exhaustive and most useful enquiry into a
question which has been much discussed of late years, but on which, as I hope
to show, considerable misapprehension in regard to actual facts and
conditions has hitherto existed.
Theoretically, there is much to be
said in favour of canal restoration, and the advocates thereof have not been
backward in the vigorous and frequent ventilation of their ideas.
Practically, there are other all-important considerations which ought not to
be overlooked, though as to these the British Public have hitherto heard very
little. As a matter of detail, also, it is desirable to see whether the
theory that the decline of our canals is due to their having been "captured"
and "strangled" by the railway companies--a theory which many people
seem to believe in as implicitly as they do, say, in the
Multiplication Table--is really capable of proof, or whether that decline is
not, rather, to be attributed to wholly different causes.
In view of
the increased public interest in the general question, it has been suggested
to me that the Appendix on "The British Canal Problem" in my book on
"Railways and their Rates," published in the Spring of 1905, should now be
issued separately; but I have thought it better to deal with the subject
afresh, and at somewhat greater length, in the present work. This I now offer
to the world in the hope that, even if the conclusions at which I have
arrived are not accepted, due weight will nevertheless be given to the
important--if not (as I trust I may add) the interesting--series of facts,
concerning the past and present of canals alike at home, on the Continent,
and in the United States, which should still represent, I think, a not
unacceptable contribution to the present controversy.
EDWIN A.
PRATT.
London, _April
1906_.
CONTENTS
CHAP.
PAGE
I. INTRODUCTORY
1
II. EARLY
DAYS 12
III. RAILWAYS
TO THE RESCUE 23
IV.
RAILWAY-CONTROLLED CANALS 32
V. THE
BIRMINGHAM CANAL AND ITS STORY 57
VI. THE
TRANSITION IN TRADE 74
VII.
CONTINENTAL CONDITIONS 93
VIII.
WATERWAYS IN THE UNITED STATES 104
IX.
ENGLISH CONDITIONS 119
X.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 142
APPENDIX--THE DECLINE IN
FREIGHT TRAFFIC ON THE
MISSISSIPPI 151
INDEX 157
LIST
OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
HALF-TONE ILLUSTRATIONS
AQUEDUCT AT
PONTCYSYLLTE (in the distance) _Frontispiece_
WHAT CANAL WIDENING
WOULD MEAN: COWLEY TUNNEL AND EMBANKMENTS _To face page_
32
LOCKS ON THE KENNET AND AVON CANAL AT
DEVIZES " " 42
WAREHOUSES
AND HYDRAULIC CRANES AT ELLESMERE PORT
" " 48
WHAT CANAL WIDENING WOULD MEAN: SHROPSHIRE UNION CANAL
AT CHESTER " " 70
"FROM PIT TO PORT": PROSPECT PIT,
WIGAN " " 82
THE SHIPPING OF COAL: HYDRAULIC TIP
ON G.W.R., SWANSEA " " 88
A
CARGO BOAT ON THE MISSISSIPPI " " 110
SUCCESSFUL
RIVALS OF MISSISSIPPI
CARGO BOATS " " 114
WATER
SUPPLY FOR CANALS: BELVIDE RESERVOIR, STAFFORDSHIRE
" " 128
MAPS AND DIAGRAMS
INDEPENDENT CANALS AND INLAND
NAVIGATIONS " " 54
CANALS AND RAILWAYS BETWEEN
WOLVERHAMPTON AND BIRMINGHAM " "
56
SOME TYPICAL BRITISH CANALS " "
98
BRITISH CANALS
CHAPTER
I
INTRODUCTORY
The movement in favour of resuscitating, if not
also of reconstructing, the British canal system, in conjunction with such
improvement as may be possible in our natural waterways, is a matter that
concerns various interests, and gives rise to a number of more or less
complicated problems.
It appeals in the most direct form to the
British trader, from the point of view of the possibility of enabling him to
secure cheaper transit for his goods. Every one must sympathise with him in
that desire, and there is no need whatever for me to stay here to repeat
the oft-expressed general reflections as to the important part which
cheap transit necessarily plays in the development of trade and
commerce. But when from the general one passes to the particular, and begins
to consider how these transit questions apply directly to canal
revival, one comes at once to a certain element of insincerity in the
agitation which has arisen.
There is no reason whatever for doubt
that, whereas one section of the traders favouring canal revival would
themselves directly benefit therefrom, there is a much larger section who
have joined in the movement, not because they have the slightest idea of
re-organising their own businesses on a water-transport basis, but simply
because they think the existence of improved canals will be a means
of compelling the railway companies to grant reductions of their own rates
below such point as they now find it necessary to maintain. Individuals of
this type, though admitting they would not use the canals themselves, or very
little, would have us believe that there are enough of _other_ traders who
would patronise them to make them pay. In any case, if only sufficient
pressure could be brought to bear on the railway companies to force them to
reduce their rates and charges, they would be prepared to regard with perfect
equanimity the unremunerative outlay on the canals of a large sum of public
money, and be quite indifferent as to who might have to bear the loss so long
as they gained what they wanted for themselves.
The subject is, also,
one that appeals to engineers. As originally constructed, our British canals
included some of the greatest engineering triumphs of their day, and the
reconstruction either of these or even of the ordinary canals (especially
where the differences of level are exceptionally great), would afford much
interesting work for engineers--and, also, to come to commonplace details,
would put into circulation a certain number of millions of pounds
sterling which might lead some of those engineers, at least, to take a
still keener interest in the general situation. There is absolutely no
doubt that, from an engineering standpoint, reconstruction, however
costly, would present no unsurmountable technical difficulties; but I
must confess that when engineers, looking at the problem exclusively
from their own point of view, apart from strictly economic and
practical considerations, advise canal revival as a means of improving
British trade, I am reminded of the famous remark of Sganerelle, in
Moliere's "L'Amour Medecin"--"Vous etes orfevre, M. Josse."
The
subject strongly appeals, also, to a very large number of patriotic persons
who, though having no personal or professional interests to serve, are
rightly impressed with the need for everything that is in any way practicable
being done to maintain our national welfare, and who may be inclined to
assume, from the entirely inadequate facts which, up to the present, have
been laid before them as to the real nature and possibilities of our canal
system, that great results would follow from a generous expenditure of money
on canal resuscitation here, following on the example already set in
Continental countries. It is in the highest degree desirable that persons of
this class should be enabled to form a clear and definite opinion on the
subject in all its bearings, and especially from points of view that may not
hitherto have been presented for their consideration.
Then the
question is one of very practical interest indeed to the British taxpayer. It
seems to be generally assumed by the advocates of canal revival that it is no
use depending on private enterprise. England is not yet impoverished, and
there is plenty of money still available for investment where a modest return
on it can be assured. But capitalists, large or small, are not apparently
disposed to risk their own money in the resuscitation of English canals.
Their expectation evidently is that the scheme would not pay. In the
absence, therefore, of any willingness on the part of shrewd
capitalists--ever on the look-out for profitable investments--to touch the
business, it is proposed that either the State or the local authorities
should take up the matter, and carry it through at the risk, more or less,
either of taxpayers or ratepayers.
The Association of Chambers of
Commerce, for instance, adopted, by a large majority, the following
resolution at its annual meeting, in London, in February 1905:--
"This
Association recommends that the improvement and extension of the canal system
of the United Kingdom should be carried out by means of a public trust, and,
if necessary, in combination with local or district public trusts, and aided
by a Government guarantee, and that the Executive Council be requested to
take all reasonable measures to secure early legislation upon the
subject."
Then Sir John T. Brunner has strongly supported a
nationalisation policy. In a letter to _The Times_ he once wrote:
"I
submit to you that we might begin with the nationalisation of
our canals--some for the most part sadly antiquated--and bring them up
to one modern standard gauge, such as the French gauge."
Another party
favours municipalisation and the creation of public trusts, a Bill with the
latter object in view being promoted in the Session of 1905, though it fell
through owing to an informality in procedure.
It would be idle to say
that a scheme of canal nationalisation, or even of public trusts with
"Government guarantee" (whatever the precise meaning of that term may be)
involving millions of public money, could be carried through _without_
affecting the British taxpayer. It is equally idle to say that if only the
canal system were taken in hand by the local authorities they would make such
a success of it that there would be absolutely no danger of the ratepayers
being called upon to make good any deficiency. The experiences that
Metropolitan ratepayers, at least, have had as the result of County Council
management of the Thames steamboat service would not predispose them to any
feeling of confidence in the control of the canal system of the country by
local authorities.
At the Manchester meeting of the Association of
Chambers of Commerce, in September 1904, Colonel F. N. Tannett Walker (Leeds)
said, during the course of a debate on the canal question: "Personally, he
was not against big trusts run by local authorities. He knew no
more business-like concern in the world than the Mersey Harbour Board,
which was a credit to the country as showing what business men, not
working for their own selfish profits, but for the good of the
community, could do for an undertaking. He would be glad to see the Mersey
Boards scattered all over the country." But, even accepting the
principle of canal municipalisation, what prospect would there be of
Colonel Walker's aspiration being realised? The Mersey Harbour Board is
an exceptional body, not necessarily capable of widespread reproduction
on the same lines of efficiency. Against what is done in Liverpool may
be put, in the case of London, the above-mentioned waste of public
money in connection with the control of the Thames steamboat service by
the London County Council. If the municipalised canals were to be
worked on the same system, or any approach thereto, as these
municipalised steamboats, it would be a bad look-out for the ratepayers of
the country, whatever benefit might be gained by a small section of
the traders.
Then one must remember that the canals, say, from the
Midlands to one of the ports, run through various rural districts which would
have no interest in the through traffic carried, but might be
required, nevertheless, to take a share in the cost and responsibility
of keeping their sections of the municipalised waterways in an
efficient condition, or in helping to provide an adequate water-supply.
It does not follow that such districts--even if they were willing to go to
the expense or the trouble involved--would be able to provide representatives
on the managing body who would in any way compare, in regard to business
capacity, with the members of the Mersey Harbour Board, even if they did so
in respect to public spirit, and the sinking of their local interests and
prejudices to promote the welfare of manufacturers, say, in Birmingham, and
shippers in Liverpool, for neither of whom they felt any direct
concern.
Under the best possible conditions as regards municipalisation,
it is still impossible to assume that a business so full of complications
as the transport services of the country, calling for technical or
expert knowledge of the most pronounced type, could be efficiently
controlled by individuals who would be essentially amateurs at the
business--and amateurs they would still be even if assisted by members of
Chambers of Commerce who, however competent as merchants and manufacturers,
would not necessarily be thoroughly versed in all these traffic problems.
The result could not fail to be disastrous.
I come, at this point, in
connection with the possible liability of ratepayers, to just one matter of
detail that might be disposed of here. It is certainly one that seems to be
worth considering. Assume, for the sake of argument, that, in accordance with
the plans now being projected, (1) public trusts were formed by the local
authorities for the purpose of acquiring and operating the canals; (2) that
these trusts secured possession--on some fair system of compensation--of
the canals now owned or controlled by railway companies; (3) that
they sought to work the canals in more or less direct competition with
the railways; (4) that, after spending large sums of money in
improvements, they found it impossible to make the canals pay, or to avoid
heavy losses thereon; and (5) that these losses had to be made good by
the ratepayers. I am merely assuming that all this might happen, not
that it necessarily would. But, admitting that it did, would the
railway companies, as ratepayers, be called upon to contribute their
share towards making good the losses which had been sustained by the
local authorities in carrying on a direct competition with them?
Such
a policy as this would be unjust, not alone to the railway shareholders, but
also to those traders who had continued to use the railway lines, since it is
obvious that the heavier the burdens imposed on the railway companies in the
shape of local rates (which already form such substantial items in their
"working expenses"), the less will the companies concerned be in a position
to grant the concessions they might otherwise be willing to make. Besides,
apart from monetary considerations, the principle of the thing would be
intolerably unfair, and, if only to avoid an injustice, it would surely be
enacted that any possible increase in local rates, due to the failure of
particular schemes of canal municipalisation, should fall exclusively on
the traders and the general public who were to have been benefited, and in
no way on the railway companies against whom the commercially unsuccessful
competition had been waged.
This proposition will, I am sure, appeal to
that instinct of justice and fair play which every Englishman is (perhaps not
always rightly), assumed to possess. But what would happen if it were duly
carried out, as it ought to be? Well, in the Chapter on "Taxation of
Railways" in my book on "Railways and their Rates," I gave one list showing
that in a total of eighty-two parishes a certain British railway
company paid an average of 60·25 per cent. of the local rates; while
another table showed that in sixteen specified parishes the proportion of
local rates paid by the same railway company ranged from 66·9 per cent.
to 86·1 per cent. of the total, although in twelve parishes out of
the sixteen the company had not even a railway station in the place.
But if, in all such parishes as these, the railway companies were
very properly excused from having to make good the losses incurred by
their municipalised-canal competitors (in addition to such losses as
they might have already suffered in meeting the competition), then the
full weight of the burden would fall upon that smaller--and, in some
cases, that very small--proportion of the general body of ratepayers in
the locality concerned.
The above is just a little consideration, _en
passant_, which might be borne in mind by others than those who look at the
subject only from a trader's or an engineer's point of view. It will help,
also, to strengthen my contention that any ill-advised, or, at
least, unsuccessful municipalisation of the canal system of the country
might have serious consequences for the general body of the community,
who, in the circumstances, would do well to "look before they
leap."
But, independently of commercial, engineering, rating and
other considerations, there are important matters of principle to
be considered. Great Britain is almost the only country in the world
where the railway system has been constructed without State or
municipal aid--financial or material--of any kind whatever. The canals
were built by "private enterprise," and the railways which followed
were constructed on the same basis. This was recognised as the
national policy, and private investors were allowed to put their money
into British railways, throughout successive decades, in the belief
and expectation that the same principle would be continued. In
other countries the State has (1) provided the funds for constructing
or buying up the general railway system; (2) guaranteed payment
of interest; or (3) has granted land or made other concessions, as a means
of assisting the enterprise. Not only has the State refrained from adopting
any such course here, and allowed private investors to bear the full
financial risk, but it has imposed on British railways requirements which may
certainly have led to their being the best constructed and the most complete
of any in the world, but which have, also, combined with the extortions of
landowners in the first instance, heavy expenditure on Parliamentary
proceedings, etc., to render their construction per mile more costly than
those of any other system of railways in the world; while to-day local
taxation is being levied upon them at the rate of £5,000,000 per annum, with
an annual increment of £250,000.
This heavy expenditure, and these
increasingly heavy demands, can only be met out of the rates and charges
imposed on those who use the railways; and one of the greatest grievances
advanced against the railways, and leading to the agitation for canal
revival, is that these rates and charges are higher in Great Britain than in
various other countries, where the railways have cost less to build,
where State funds have been freely drawn on, and where the State lines may
be required to contribute nothing to local taxation. The remedy proposed,
however, is not that anything should be done to reduce the burdens imposed on
our own railways, so as to place them at least in the position of being able
to make further concessions to traders, but that the State should now itself
start in the business, in competition, more or less, with the railway
companies, in order to provide the traders--if it can--with something
_cheaper_ in the way of transport!
Whatever view may be taken of the
reasonableness and justice of such a procedure as this, it would,
undoubtedly, represent a complete change in national policy, and one that
should not be entered upon with undue haste. The logical sequel, for
instance, of nationalisation of the canals would be nationalisation of the
railways, since it would hardly do for the State to own the one and not the
other. Then, of course, the nationalisation of all our ports would have to
follow, as the further logical sequel of the State ownership of the means
of communication with them, and the consequent suppression of
competition. From a Socialist standpoint, the successive steps here mentioned
would certainly be approved; but, even if the financial difficulty could
be met, the country is hardly ready for all these things at
present.
Is it ready, even in principle, for either the nationalisation
or the municipalisation of canals alone? And, if ready in principle,
if ready to employ public funds to compete with representatives of
the private enterprise it has hitherto encouraged, is it still
certain that, when millions of pounds sterling have been spent on the
revival of our canals, the actual results will in any way justify the
heavy expenditure? Are not the physical conditions of our country such
that canal construction here presents exceptional drawbacks, and that
canal navigation must always be exceptionally slow? Are not both
physical and geographical conditions in Great Britain altogether unlike
those of most of the Continental countries of whose waterways so much
is heard? Are not our commercial conditions equally dissimilar? Is not the
comparative neglect of our canals due less to structural or other defects
than to complete changes in the whole basis of trading operations in this
country--changes that would prevent any general discarding of the quick
transit of small and frequent supplies by train, in favour of the delayed
delivery of large quantities at longer intervals by water, however much the
canals were improved?
These are merely some of the questions and
considerations that arise in connection with this most complicated of
problems, and it is with the view of enabling the public to appreciate more
fully the real nature of the situation, and to gain a clearer knowledge of
the facts on which a right solution must be based, that I venture to lay
before them the pages that follow.
CHAPTER II
EARLY
DAYS
It seems to be customary with writers on the subject of canals
and waterways to begin with the Egyptians, to detail the achievements
of the Chinese, to record the doings of the Greeks, and then to pass on to
the Romans, before even beginning their account of what has been done in
Great Britain. Here, however, I propose to leave alone all this ancient
history, which, to my mind, has no more to do with existing conditions in our
own country than the system of inland navigation adopted by Noah, or the
character of the canals which are supposed to exist in the planet of
Mars.
For the purposes of the present work it will suffice if I go no
further back than what I would call the "pack-horse period" in the
development of transport in England. This was the period immediately
preceding the introduction of artificial canals, which had their rise in this
country about 1760-70. It preceded, also, the advent of John Loudon
McAdam, that great reformer of our roads, whose name has been immortalised
in the verb "to macadamise." Born in 1756, it was not until the early
days of the nineteenth century that McAdam really started on his
beneficent mission, and even then the high-roads of England--and especially
of Scotland--were, as a rule, deplorably bad, "being at once loose, rough,
and perishable, expensive, tedious and dangerous to travel on, and very
costly to repair." Pending those improvements which McAdam brought about,
adapting them to the better use of stage-coaches and carriers' waggons, the
few roads already existing were practically available--as regards the
transport of merchandise--for pack-horses only. Even coal was then carried by
pack-horse, the cost working out at about 2s. 6d. per mile for as much as a
horse could carry.
It was from these conditions that canals saved the
country--long, of course, before the locomotive came into vogue. As it
happened, too, it was this very question of coal transport that led to
their earliest development. There is quite an element of romance in
the story. Francis Egerton, third and last Duke of Bridgewater (born
1736), had an unfortunate love affair in London when he reached the age
of twenty-three, and, apparently in disgust with the world, he retired
to his Lancashire property, where he found solace to his wounded
feelings by devoting himself to the development of the Worsley coal mines. As
a boy he had been so feeble-minded that the doubt arose whether he
would be capable of managing his own affairs. As a young man disappointed
in love, he applied himself to business in a manner so eminently
practical that he deservedly became famous as a pioneer of improved
transport. He saw that if only the cost of carriage could be reduced, a most
valuable market for coal from his Worsley mines could be opened up in
Manchester.
It is true that, in this particular instance, the pack-horse
had been supplemented by the Mersey and Irwell Navigation, established as
the result of Parliamentary powers obtained in 1733. This navigation was
conducted almost entirely by natural waterways, but it had many drawbacks and
inconveniences, while the freight for general merchandise between Liverpool
and Manchester by this route came to 12s. per ton. The Duke's new scheme was
one for the construction of an artificial waterway which could be carried
over the Irwell at Barton by means of an aqueduct. This idea he got from the
aqueduct on the Languedoc Canal, in the south of France.
But the Duke
required a practical man to help him, and such a man he found in James
Brindley. Born in 1716, Brindley was the son of a small farmer in
Derbyshire--a dissolute sort of fellow, who neglected his children, did
little or no work, and devoted his chief energies to the then popular sport
of bull-baiting. In the circumstances James Brindley's school-teaching was
wholly neglected. He could no more have passed an examination in the Sixth
Standard than he could have flown over the Irwell with some of his ducal
patron's coals. "He remained to the last illiterate, hardly able to write,
and quite unable to spell. He did most of his work in his head, without
written calculations or drawings, and when he had a puzzling bit of work he
would go to bed, and think it out." From the point of view of present day
Board School inspectors, and of the worthy magistrates who, with
varied moral reflections, remorselessly enforce the principles of
compulsory education, such an individual ought to have come to a bad end. But
he didn't. He became, instead, "the father of inland
navigation."
James Brindley had served his apprenticeship to a
millwright, or engineer; he had started a little business as a repairer of
old machinery and a maker of new; and he had in various ways given proof
of his possession of mechanical skill. The Duke--evidently a reader
of men--saw in him the possibility of better things, took him over,
and appointed him his right-hand man in constructing the proposed
canal. After much active opposition from the proprietors of the Mersey
and Irwell Navigation, and also from various landowners and others,
the Duke got his first Act, to which the Royal assent was given in
1762, and the work was begun. It presented many difficulties, for the
canal had to be carried over streams and bogs, and through tunnels
costly to make, and the time came when the Duke's financial resources
were almost exhausted. Brindley's wages were not extravagant. They
amounted, in fact, to £1 a week--substantially less than the minimum wage
that would be paid to-day to a municipal road-sweeper. But the costs
of construction were heavy, and the landowners had unduly big ideas of
the value of the land compulsorily acquired from them, so that the
Duke's steward sometimes had to ride about among the tenantry and borrow
a few pounds from one and another in order to pay the week's wages.
When the Worsley section had been completed, and had become
remunerative, the Duke pledged it to Messrs Child, the London bankers, for
£25,000, and with the money thus raised he pushed on with the remainder of
the canal, seeing it finally extended to Liverpool in 1772. Altogether he
expended on his own canals no less than £220,000; but he lived to derive from
them a revenue of £80,000 a year.
The Duke of Bridgewater's schemes gave
a great impetus to canal construction in Great Britain, though it was only
natural that a good deal of opposition should be raised, as well. About the
year 1765 numerous pamphlets were published to show the danger and impolicy
of canals. Turnpike trustees were afraid the canals would divert
traffic from the roads. Owners of pack-horses fancied that ruin stared them
in the face. Thereupon the turnpike trustees and the pack-horse
owners sought the further support of the agricultural interests,
representing that, when the demand for pack-horses fell off, there would be
less need for hay and oats, and the welfare of British agriculture would
be prejudiced. So the farmers joined in, and the three parties combined in
an effort to arouse the country. Canals, it was said, would involve a great
waste of land; they would destroy the breed of draught horses; they would
produce noxious or humid vapours; they would encourage pilfering; they would
injure old mines and works by allowing of new ones being opened; and they
would destroy the coasting trade, and, consequently, "the nursery for
seamen."
By arguments such as these the opposition actually checked for
some years the carrying out of several important undertakings,
including the Trent and Mersey Navigation. But, when once the movement
had fairly started, it made rapid progress. James Brindley's energy,
down to the time of his death in 1772, was especially indomitable.
Having ensured the success of the Bridgewater Canal, he turned his
attention to a scheme for linking up the four ports of Liverpool, Hull,
Bristol, and London by a system of main waterways, connected by branch
canals with leading industrial centres off the chief lines of route.
Other projects followed, as it was seen that the earlier ventures
were yielding substantial profits, and in 1790 a canal mania began. In
1792 no fewer than eighteen new canals were promoted. In 1793 and 1794
the number of canal and navigation Acts passed was forty-five,
increasing to eighty-one the total number which had been obtained since 1790.
So great was the public anxiety to invest in canals that new ones
were projected on all hands, and, though many of them were of a
useful type, others were purely speculative, were doomed to failure from
the start, and occasioned serious losses to thousands of investors.
In certain instances existing canals were granted the right to levy
tolls upon new-comers, as compensation for prospective loss of
traffic--even when the new canals were to be 4 or 5 miles away--fresh schemes
being actually undertaken on this basis.
The canals that paid at all
paid well, and the good they conferred on the country in the days of their
prosperity is undeniable. Failing, at that time, more efficient means of
transport, they played a most important role in developing the trade,
industries, and commerce of our country at a period especially favourable to
national advancement. For half a century, in fact, the canals had everything
their own way. They had a monopoly of the transport business--except as
regards road traffic--and in various instances they helped their proprietors
to make huge profits. But great changes were impending, and these were
brought about, at last, with the advent of the locomotive.
The general
situation at this period is well shown by the following extracts from an
article on "Canals and Rail-roads," published in the _Quarterly Review_ of
March 1825:--
"It is true that we, who, in this age, are accustomed to
roll along our hard and even roads at the rate of 8 or 9 miles an hour,
can hardly imagine the inconveniences which beset our
great-grandfathers when they had to undertake a journey--forcing their way
through deep miry lanes; fording swollen rivers; obliged to halt for days
together when 'the waters were out'; and then crawling along at a pace of
2 or 3 miles an hour, in constant fear of being set down fast in some deep
quagmire, of being overturned, breaking down, or swept away by a sudden
inundation.
"Such was the travelling condition of our ancestors, until
the several turnpike Acts effected a gradual and most favourable change, not
only in the state of the roads, but the whole appearance of the
country; by increasing the facility of communication, and the transport
of many weighty and bulky articles which, before that period, no
effort could move from one part of the country to another. The pack-horse
was now yoked to the waggon, and stage coaches and post-chaises
usurped the place of saddle-horses. Imperfectly as most of these
turnpike roads were constructed, and greatly as their repairs were
neglected, they were still a prodigious improvement; yet, for the
conveyance of heavy merchandise the progress of waggons was slow and
their capacity limited. This defect was at length remedied by the
opening of canals, an improvement which became, with regard to turnpike
roads and waggons, what these had been to deep lanes and
pack-horses.[1] But we may apply to projectors the observation of Sheridan,
'Give these fellows a good thing and they never know when to have done
with it,' for so vehement became the rage for canal-making that, in a
few years, the whole surface of the country was intersected by
these inland navigations, and frequently in parts of the island where
there was little or no traffic to be conveyed. The consequence was, that
a large proportion of them scarcely paid an interest of one per cent., and
many nothing at all; while others, judiciously conducted over populous,
commercial, and manufacturing districts, have not only amply remunerated the
parties concerned, but have contributed in no small degree to the wealth and
prosperity of the nation.
"Yet these expensive establishments for
facilitating the conveyance of the commercial, manufacturing and agricultural
products of the country to their several destinations, excellent and useful
as all must acknowledge them to be, are now likely, in their turn, to
give way to the old invention of Rail-roads. Nothing now is heard of
but rail-roads; the daily papers teem with notices of new lines of them in
every direction, and pamphlets and paragraphs are thrown before the public
eye, recommending nothing short of making them general throughout the
kingdom. Yet, till within these few months past, this old invention, in use a
full century before canals, has been suffered, with few exceptions, to act
the part only of an auxiliary to canals, in the conveyance of goods to and
from the wharfs, and of iron, coals, limestone, and other products of the
mines to the nearest place of shipment....
"The powers of the
steam-engine, and a growing conviction that our present modes of conveyance,
excellent as they are, both require and admit of great improvements, are, no
doubt, among the chief reasons that have set the current of speculation in
this particular direction."
Dealing with the question of "vested rights,"
the article warns "the projectors of the intended railroads ... of the
necessity of being prepared to meet the most strenuous opposition from the
canal proprietors," and proceeds:--
"But, we are free to confess, it
does not appear to us that the canal proprietors have the least ground for
complaining of a grievance. They embarked their property in what they
conceived to be a good speculation, which in some cases was realised far
beyond their most sanguine hopes; in others, failed beyond their most
desponding calculations. If those that have succeeded should be able to
maintain a competition with rail-ways by lowering their charges; what
they thus lose will be a fair and unimpeachable gain to the public, and
a moderate and just profit will still remain to them; while the
others would do well to transfer their interests from a bad concern into
one whose superiority must be thus established. Indeed, we understand
that this has already been proposed to a very considerable extent, and
that the level beds of certain unproductive canals have been offered
for the reception of rail-ways.
"There is, however, another ground
upon which, in many instances, we have no doubt, the opposition of the canal
proprietors may be properly met--we mean, and we state it distinctly, the
unquestionable fact, that our trade and manufactures have suffered
considerably by the disproportionate rates of charge upon canal conveyance.
The immense tonnage of coal, iron, and earthenware, Mr Cumming tells us,[2]
'have enabled one of the canals, passing through these districts
(near Birmingham), to pay an annual dividend to the proprietary of £140
upon an original share of £140, and as such has enhanced the value of
each share from £140 to £3,200; and another canal in the same district,
to pay an annual dividend of £160 upon the original share of £200, and the
shares themselves have reached the value of £4,600 each.'
"Nor are these
solitary instances. Mr Sandars informs us[3] that, of the only two canals
which unite Liverpool with Manchester, the thirty-nine original proprietors
of one of them, the Old Quay,[4] have been paid for every other year, for
nearly half a century, the _total amount of their investment_; and that a
share in this canal, which cost only £70, has recently been sold for £1,250;
and that, with regard to the other, the late Duke of Bridgewater's, there is
good reason to believe that the net income has, for the last twenty
years, averaged nearly £100,000 per annum!"
In regard, however, to the
supersession of canals in general by railways, the writer of the article
says:--
"We are not the advocates for visionary projects that interfere
with useful establishments; we scout the idea of a _general_ rail-road
as altogether impracticable....
"As to those persons who speculate on
making rail-ways general throughout the kingdom, and superseding all the
canals, all the waggons, mail and stage-coaches, post-chaises, and, in short,
every other mode of conveyance by land and water, we deem them and
their visionary schemes unworthy of notice."
CHAPTER
III
RAILWAYS TO THE RESCUE
It is not a little curious to find
that, whereas the proposed resuscitation of canals is now being actively
supported in various quarters as a means of effecting increased competition
with the railways, the railway system itself originally had a most
cordial welcome from the traders of this country as a means of
relieving them from what had become the intolerable monopoly of the canals
and waterways!
It will have been seen that in the article published in
the _Quarterly Review_ of March 1825, from which I gave extracts in the last
Chapter, reference was made to a "Letter on the Subject of the
Projected Rail-road between Liverpool and Manchester," by Mr Joseph Sandars,
and published that same year. I have looked up the original "Letter,"
and found in it some instructive reading. Mr Sandars showed that
although, under the Act of Parliament obtained by the Duke of Bridgewater,
the tolls to be charged on his canal between Liverpool and Manchester
were not to exceed 2s. 6d. per ton, his trustees had, by various
exactions, increased them to 5s. 2d. per ton on all goods carried along
the canal. They had also got possession of all the available land
and warehouses along the canal banks at Manchester, thus monopolising
the accommodation, or nearly so, and forcing the traders to keep to
the trustees, and not patronise independent carriers. It was, Mr
Sandars declared, "the most oppressive and unjust monopoly known to the
trade of this country--a monopoly which there is every reason to
believe compels the public to pay, in one shape or another, £100,000
more per annum than they ought to pay." The Bridgewater trustees and
the proprietors of the Mersey and Irwell Navigation were, he
continued, "deaf to all remonstrances, to all entreaties"; they were
"actuated solely by a spirit of monopoly and extension," and "the only
remedy the public has left is to go to Parliament and ask for a new line
of conveyance." But this new line, he said, would have to be a railway.
It could not take the form of another canal, as the two existing
routes had absorbed all the available water-supply.
In discussing the
advantages of a railway over a canal, Mr Sandars continued:--
"It is
computed that goods could be carried for considerably less than is now
charged, and for one-half of what has been charged, and that they would be
conveyed in one-sixth of the time. Canals in summer are often short of water,
and in winter are obstructed by frost; a Railway would not have to encounter
these impediments."
Mr Sandars further wrote:--
"The distance
between Liverpool and Manchester, by the three lines of Water conveyance, is
upwards of 50 miles--by a Rail-road it would only be 33. Goods conveyed by
the Duke and Old Quay [Mersey and Irwell Navigation] are exposed to storms,
the delays from adverse winds, and the risk of damage, during a passage of 18
miles in the tide-way of the Mersey. For days together it frequently happens
that when the wind blows very strong, either south or north, their
vessels cannot move against it. It is very true that when the winds and
tides are favourable they can occasionally effect a passage in
fourteen hours; but the average is certainly thirty. However,
notwithstanding all the accommodation they can offer, the delays are such
that the spinners and dealers are frequently obliged to cart cotton on
the public high-road, a distance of 36 miles, for which they pay
four times the price which would be charged by a Rail-road, and they
are three times as long in getting it to hand. The same
observation applies to manufactured goods which are sent by land-carriage
daily, and for which the rate paid is five times that which they would
be subject to by the Rail-road. This enormous sacrifice is made for
two reasons--sometimes because conveyance by water cannot be
promptly obtained, but more frequently because speed and certainty as
to delivery are of the first importance. Packages of goods sent
from Manchester, for immediate shipment at Liverpool, often pay two
or three pounds per ton; and yet there are those who assert that
the difference of a few hours in speed can be no object. The
merchants know better."
In the same year that Mr Sandars issued his
"Letter," the merchants of the port of Liverpool addressed a memorial to the
Mayor and Common Council of the borough, praying them to support the scheme
for the building of a railway, and stating:--
"The merchants of this
port have for a long time past experienced very great difficulties and
obstructions in the prosecution of their business, in consequence of the high
charges on the freight of goods between this town and Manchester, and of the
frequent impossibility of obtaining vessels for days together."
It is
clear from all this that, however great the benefit which canal transport had
conferred, as compared with prior conditions, the canal companies had abused
their monopoly in order to secure what were often enormous profits; that the
canals themselves, apart from the excessive tolls and charges imposed, failed
entirely to meet the requirements of traders; and that the most effective
means of obtaining relief was looked for in the provision of railways. |
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