|
The value to which canal shares had risen at this time is well
shown by
the following figures, which I take from the _Gentleman's Magazine_
for
December,
1824:--
+-------------------------------+----------------------+--------+
| Canal.
| Shares. | Price.
|
+-------------------------------+----------------------+--------+
|
| ￡ _s._ _d._ | ￡ |
|Trent and Mersey |
75 0 0 | 2,200 |
|Loughborough
|197 0 0 | 4,600 |
|Coventry |
44 0 0 (and bonus) | 1,300 |
|Oxford (short shares) |
32 0 0 " " | 850 |
|Grand Junction |
10 0 0 " " | 290 |
|Old
Union | 4 0 0 |
103 |
|Neath | 15 0 0 |
400 |
|Swansea | 11 0 0 |
250 |
|Monmouthshire | 10 0 0 |
245 |
|Brecknock and Abergavenny | 8 0 0 |
175 |
|Staffordshire & Worcestershire | 40 0 0 |
960 |
|Birmingham | 12 10 0 |
350 |
|Worcester and Birmingham | 1 10 0
| 56 |
|Shropshire | 8 0 0 |
175 |
|Ellesmere | 3 10 0 |
102 |
|Rochdale | 4 0 0 |
140 |
|Barnsley | 12 0 0 |
330 |
|Lancaster | 1 0 0
| 45 |
|Kennet and Avon | 1 0 0
| 29 |
+-------------------------------+----------------------+--------+
These
substantial values, and the large dividends that led to them,
were due in
part, no doubt, to the general improvement in trade which
the canals had
helped most materially to effect; but they had been
greatly swollen by the
merciless way in which the traders of those
days were exploited by the
representatives of the canal interest. As
bearing on this point, I might
interrupt the course of my narrative
to say that in the House of Commons on
May 17, 1836, Mr Morrison,
member for Ipswich, made a speech in which, as
reported by Hansard, he
expressed himself "clearly of opinion" that
"Parliament should, when it
established companies for the formation of
canals, railroads, or such
like undertakings, invariably reserve to itself
the power to make such
periodical revisions of the rates and charges as it
may, under the then
circumstances, deem expedient"; and he proposed a
resolution to this
effect. He was moved to adopt this course in view of past
experiences
in connection with the canals, and a desire that there should be
no
repetition of them in regard to the railways then being very
generally
promoted. In the course of his speech he said:--
"The
history of existing canals, waterways, etc., affords abundant
evidence of the
evils to which I have been averting. An original share
in the Loughborough
Canal, for example, which cost ￡142, 17s. is now
selling at about ￡1,250, and
yields a dividend of ￡90 or ￡100 a year.
The fourth part of a Trent and
Mersey Canal share, or ￡50 of the
company's stock, is now fetching ￡600, and
yields a dividend of about
￡30 a year. And there are various other canals in
nearly the same
situation."
At the close of the debate which followed,
Mr Morrison withdrew his
resolution, owing to the announcement that the
matter to which he had
called attention would be dealt with in a Bill then
being framed. It
is none the less interesting thus to find that Parliamentary
revisions
of railway rates were, in the first instance, directly inspired by
the
extortions practised on the traders by canal companies in the
interest
of dividends far in excess of any that the railway companies
have
themselves attempted to pay.
Reverting to the story of the
Liverpool and Manchester Railway--the
projection of which, as Mr Sandars'
"Letter" shows, represented
a revolt against "the exorbitant and unjust
charges of the
water-carriers"--the Bill promoted in its favour was opposed
so
vigorously by the canal and other interests that ￡70,000 was spent
in
the Parliamentary proceedings in getting it through. But it was
carried
in 1826, and the new line, opened in 1830, was so great a success
that
it soon began to inspire many similar projects in other
directions,
while with its opening the building of fresh canals for ordinary
inland
navigation (as distinct from ship canals) practically
ceased.
There is not the slightest doubt that, but for the
extreme
dissatisfaction of the trading interests in regard alike to the
heavy
charges and to the shortcomings of the canal system, the Liverpool
and
Manchester Railway--that precursor of the "railway mania"--would
not
have been actually constructed until at least several years later.
But
there were other directions, also, in which the revolt against the
then
existing conditions was to bring about important developments. In
the
pack-horse period the collieries of Nottinghamshire and
Leicestershire
respectively supplied local needs only, the cost of transport
by
road making it practically impossible to send coal out of the county
in
which it was raised. With the advent of canals the coal could be
taken longer
distances, and the canals themselves gained so much
from the business that at
one time shares in the Loughborough Canal,
on which ￡142 had been paid, rose,
as already shown, to ￡4,600, and
were looked upon as being as safe as
Consols. But the collapse of a
canal from the Leicestershire coal-fields to
the town of Leicester
placed the coalowners of that county at a disadvantage,
and this they
overcame, in 1832, by opening the Leicester and Swinnington
line of
railway. Thereupon the disadvantage was thrown upon the
Nottinghamshire
coalowners, who could no longer compete with Leicestershire.
In fact,
the immediate outlook before them was that they would be excluded
from
their chief markets, that their collieries might have to be closed,
and
that the mining population would be thrown out of employment.
In
their dilemma they appealed to the canal companies, and asked
for such a
reduction in rates as would enable them to meet the
new situation; but the
canal companies--wedded to their big
dividends--would make only such
concessions as were thought by
the other side to be totally inadequate.
Following on this the
Nottinghamshire coalowners met in the parlour of a
village inn at
Eastwood, in the autumn of 1832, and formally declared that
"there
remained no other plan for their adoption than to attempt to lay
a
railway from their collieries to the town of Leicester." The
proposal
was confirmed by a subsequent meeting, which resolved that "a
railway
from Pinxton to Leicester is essential to the interests of
the
coal-trade of this district." Communications were opened with
George
Stephenson, the services of his son Robert were secured, the
"Midland
Counties Railway" was duly constructed, and the final outcome of
the
action thus taken--as the direct result of the attitude of the
canal
companies--is to be seen in the splendid system known to-day as
the
Midland Railway.
Once more, I might refer to Mr Charles H.
Grinling's "History of the
Great Northern Railway," in which, speaking of
early conditions, he
says:--
"During the winter of 1843-44 a strong
desire arose among the
landowners and farmers of the eastern counties to
secure some of the
benefits which other districts were enjoying from the new
method
of locomotion. One great want of this part of England was that
of
cheaper fuel, for though there were collieries open at this time
in
Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire, the nearest
pits with which
the eastern counties had practicable transport
communication were those of
South Yorkshire and Durham, and this was
of so circuitous a character that
even in places situated on navigable
rivers, unserved by a canal, the price
of coal often rose as high as
40s. or even 50s. a ton. In remoter places, to
which it had to be
carted 10, 20, or even 30 miles along bad cross-roads,
coal even for
house-firing was a positive luxury, quite unattainable by the
poorer
classes. Moreover, in the most severe weather, when the canals
were
frozen, the whole system of supply became paralysed, and even
the
wealthy had not seldom to retreat shivering to bed for lack of
fuel."
In this particular instance it was George Hudson, the "Railway
King,"
who was approached, and the first lines were laid of what is now
the
Great Northern Railway.
So it happened that, when the new form of
transport came into vogue, in
succession to the canals, it was essentially a
case of "Railways to the
Rescue."
CHAPTER
IV
RAILWAY-CONTROLLED CANALS
Both canals and railways were, in
their early days, made according to
local conditions, and were intended to
serve local purposes. In the
case of the former the design and dimensions of
the canal boat used
were influenced by the depth and nature of the estuary or
river along
which it might require to proceed, and the size of the lock
(affecting,
again, the size of the boat) might vary according to whether the
lock
was constructed on a low level, where there was ample water, or on
a
high level, where economy in the use of water had to be
practised.
Uniformity under these varying conditions would certainly have
been
difficult to secure, and, in effect, it was not attempted. The
original
designers of the canals, in days when the trade of the country was
far
less than it is now and the general trading conditions very
different,
probably knew better what they were about than their critics of
to-day
give them credit for. They realised more completely than most
of
those critics do what were the limitations of canal construction in
a
country of hills and dales, and especially in rugged and
mountainous
districts. They cut their coat, as it were, according to their
cloth,
and sought to meet the actual needs of the day rather than
anticipate
the requirements of futurity. From their point of view this was
the
simplest solution of the problem.
[Illustration: WHAT CANAL
WIDENING WOULD MEAN.
(Cowley Tunnel and Embankments, on Shropshire Union
Route between
Wolverhampton and the Mersey.)
[_To face page
32._
]
But, though the canals thus made suited local conditions, they
became
unavailable for through traffic, except in boats sufficiently
small
to pass the smallest lock or the narrowest and shallowest canal
_en
route_. Then the lack of uniformity in construction was accompanied
by
a lack of unity in management. Each and every through route was
divided
among, as a rule, from four to eight or ten different navigations,
and
a boat-owner making the journey had to deal separately with
each.
The railway companies soon began to rid themselves of their own
local
limitations. A "Railway Clearing House" was set up in 1847, in
the
interests of through traffic; groups of small undertakings
amalgamated
into "great" companies; facilities of a kind unknown before were
made
available, while the whole system of railway operation was
simplified
for traders and travellers. The canal companies, however, made
no
attempt to follow the example thus set. They were certainly in a
more
difficult position than the railways. They might have amalgamated,
and
they might have established a Canal Clearing House. These would
have
been comparatively easy things to do. But any satisfactory linking
up
of the various canal systems throughout the country would have
meant
virtual reconstruction, and this may well have been thought a
serious
proposition in regard, especially, to canals built at a
considerable
elevation above the sea level, where the water supply was
limited, and
where, for that reason, some of the smallest locks were to be
found.
To say the least of it, such a work meant a very large outlay, and
at
that time practically all the capital available for investment
in
transport was being absorbed by new railways. These, again, had
secured
the public confidence which the canals were losing. As Mr Sandars
said
in his "Letter":--
"Canals have done well for the country, just
as high roads and
pack-horses had done before canals were established; but
the
country has now presented to it cheaper and more expeditious means
of
conveyance, and the attempt to prevent its adoption is
utterly
hopeless."
All that the canal companies did, in the first
instance, was to attempt
the very thing which Mr Sandars considered "utterly
hopeless." They
adopted a policy of blind and narrow-minded hostility. They
seemed to
think that, if they only fought them vigorously enough, they
could
drive the railways off the field; and fight them they did, at
every
possible point. In those days many of the canal companies were
still
wealthy concerns, and what their opposition might mean has
been
already shown in the case of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway.
The
newcomers had thus to concentrate their efforts and meet the
opposition
as best they could.
For a time the canal companies clung
obstinately to their high tolls
and charges, in the hope that they would
still be able to pay their big
dividends. But, when the superiority of the
railways over the waterways
became more and more manifest, and when the canal
companies saw greater
and still greater quantities of traffic being diverted
from them by
their opponents, in fair competition, they realised the
situation at
last, and brought down their tolls with a rush. The reductions
made
were so substantial that they would have been thought incredible a
few
years previously.
In the result, benefits were gained by all
classes of traders, for
those who still patronised the canals were charged
much more reasonable
tolls than they had ever paid before. But even the
adoption of this
belated policy by the canal companies did not help them very
much.
The diversion of the stream of traffic to the railways had become
too
pronounced to be checked by even the most substantial of reductions
in
canal charges. With the increasing industrial and commercial
development of
the country it was seen that the new means of transport
offered advantages of
even greater weight than cost of transport,
namely, speed and certainty of
delivery. For the average trader it was
essentially a case of time meaning
money. The canal companies might
now reduce their tolls so much that, instead
of being substantially
in excess of the railway rates, as they were at first,
they would
fall considerably below; but they still could not offer those
other
all-important advantages.
As the canal companies found that the
struggle was, indeed, "utterly
hopeless," some of them adopted new lines of
policy. Either they
proposed to build railways themselves, or they tried to
dispose of
their canal property to the newcomers. In some instances the route
of
a canal, no longer of much value, was really wanted for the route of
a
proposed railway, and an arrangement was easily made. In others,
where
the railway promoters did not wish to buy, opposition to their
schemes
was offered by the canal companies with the idea of forcing them
either
so to do, or, alternatively, to make such terms with them as would
be
to the advantage of the canal shareholders.
The tendency in this
direction is shown by the extract already given
from the _Quarterly Review_;
and I may repeat here the passage in which
the writer suggested that some of
the canal companies "would do well to
transfer their interests from a bad
concern into one whose superiority
must be thus established," and added:
"Indeed, we understand that
this has already been proposed to a very
considerable extent, and
that the level beds of certain unproductive canals
have been offered
for the reception of rail-ways." This was as early as 1825.
Later on
the tendency became still more pronounced as pressure was put on
the
railway companies, or as promoters, in days when plenty of money
was
available for railway schemes, thought the easiest way to
overcome
actual or prospective opposition was to buy it off by making the
best
terms they could. So far, in fact, was the principle recognised that
in
1845 Parliament expressly sanctioned the control of canals by
railway
companies, whether by amalgamation, lease, purchase, or guarantee,
and
a considerable amount of canal mileage thus came into the
possession,
or under the control, of railway companies, especially in the
years
1845, 1846, and 1847. This sanction was practically repealed by
the
Railway and Traffic Acts of 1873 and 1888. By that time about
one-third
of the existing canals had been either voluntarily acquired by,
or
forced upon, the railway companies. It is obvious, however, that
the
responsibility for what was done rests with Parliament itself,
and
that in many cases, probably, the railway companies, instead of
being
arch-conspirators, anxious to spend their money in killing off
moribund
competitors, who were generally considered to be on the point of
dying
a natural death, were, at times, victims of the situation,
being
practically driven into purchases or guarantees which, had they
been
perfectly free agents, they might not have cared to touch.
The
general position was, perhaps, very fairly indicated by the late
Sir James
Allport, at one time General Manager of the Midland Railway
Company, in the
evidence he gave before the Select Committee on Canals
in 1883.
"I
doubt (he said) if Parliament ever, at that time of day, came
to any
deliberate decision as to the advisability or otherwise of
railways
possessing canals; but I presume that they did not do so
without the fullest
evidence before them, and no doubt canal companies
were very anxious to get
rid of their property to railways, and they
opposed their Bills, and, in the
desire to obtain their Bills, railway
companies purchased their canals. That,
I think, would be found to
be the fact, if it were possible to trace them out
in every case. I
do not believe that the London and North-Western would have
bought
the Birmingham Canal but for this circumstance. I have no doubt
that
the Birmingham Canal, when the Stour Valley line was projected,
felt
that their property was jeopardised, and that it was then that
the
arrangement was made by which the London and North-Western
Railway
Company guaranteed them 4 per cent."
The bargains thus
effected, either voluntarily or otherwise (and mostly
otherwise), were not
necessarily to the advantage of the railway
companies, who might often have
done better for themselves if they had
fought out the fight at the time with
their antagonists, and left the
canal companies to their fate, instead of
taking over waterways which
have been more or less of a loss to them ever
since. Considering the
condition into which many of the canals had already
drifted, or were
then drifting, there is very little room for doubt what
their fate
would have been if the railway companies had left them severely
alone.
Indeed, there are various canals whose continued operation to-day,
in
spite of the losses on their wholly unremunerative traffic, is
due
exclusively to the fact that they are owned or controlled by
railway
companies. Independent proprietors, looking to them for dividends,
and
not under any statutory obligations (as the railway companies are)
to
keep them going, would long ago have abandoned such canals
entirely,
and allowed them to be numbered among the derelicts.
As
bearing on the facts here narrated, I might mention that, in the
course of a
discussion at the Institution of Civil Engineers, in
November 1905, on a
paper read by Mr John Arthur Saner, "Waterways
in Great Britain" (reported in
the official "Proceedings" of the
Institution), Mr James Inglis, General
Manager of the Great Western
Railway Company, said that "his company owned
about 216 miles of canal,
not a mile of which had been acquired voluntarily.
Many of those
canals had been forced on the railway as the price of securing
Acts,
and some had been obtained by negotiations with the canal
companies.
The others had been acquired in incidental ways, arising from the
fact
that the traffic had absolutely disappeared." Mr Inglis further
told
the story of the Kennet and Avon Canal, which his company maintain
at
a loss of about ￡4,000 per annum. The canal, it seems, was
constructed
in 1794 at a cost of ￡1,000,000, and at one time paid 5 per cent.
The
traffic fell off steadily with the extension of the railway
system,
and in 1846 the canal company, seeing their position was
hopeless,
applied to Parliament for powers to construct a railway parallel
with
the canal. Sanction was refused, though the company were authorised
to
act as common carriers. In 1851 the canal owners approached the
Great
Western Railway Company, and told them of their intention to seek
again
for powers to build an opposition railway. The upshot of the
matter
was that the railway company took over the canal, and agreed to
pay
the canal company ￡7,773 a year. This they have done, with a loss
to
themselves ever since. The rates charged on the canal were
successively
reduced by the Board of Trade (on appeal being made to that
body) to
1-1/4d., then to 1d., and finally 1/2d. per ton-mile; but there
had
never been a sign, Mr Inglis added, that the reduction had any
effect
in attracting additional traffic.[5]
To ascertain for
myself some further details as to the past and present
of the Kennet and Avon
Navigation, I paid a visit of inspection to the
canal in the neighbourhood of
Bath, where it enters the River Avon, and
also at Devizes, where I saw the
remarkable series of locks by means
of which the canal reaches the town of
Devizes, at an elevation of 425
feet above sea level. In conversation, too,
with various authorities,
including Mr H. J. Saunders, the Canals Engineer of
the Great Western
Railway Company, I obtained some interesting facts which
throw light
on the reasons for the falling off of the traffic along the
canal.
Dealing with this last mentioned point first, I learned that
much
of the former prosperity of the Kennet and Avon Navigation was due
to
a substantial business then done in the transport of coal from
a considerable
colliery district in Somersetshire, comprising the
Radstock, Camerton,
Dunkerton, and Timsbury collieries. This coal was
first put on the Somerset
Coal Canal, which connected with the Kennet
and Avon at Dundas--a point
between Bath and Bradford-on-Avon--and, on
reaching this junction, it was
taken either to towns directly served
by the Kennet and Avon (including Bath,
Bristol, Bradford, Trowbridge,
Devizes, Kintbury, Hungerford, Newbury and
Reading) or, leaving the
Kennet and Avon at Semmington, it passed over the
Wilts and Berks Canal
to various places as far as Abingdon. In proportion,
however, as the
railways developed their superiority as an agent for the
effective
distribution of coal, the traffic by canal declined more and
more,
until at last it became non-existent. Of the three canals affected,
the
Somerset Coal Canal, owned by an independent company, was abandoned,
by
authority of Parliament, two years ago; the Wilts and Berks, also
owned
by an independent company, is practically derelict, and the one
that
to-day survives and is in good working order is the Kennet and
Avon,
owned by a railway company.
Another branch of local traffic that
has left the Kennet and Avon Canal
for the railway is represented by the
familiar freestone, of which
large quantities are despatched from the Bath
district. The stone
goes away in blocks averaging 5 tons in weight, and
ranging up to 10
tons, and at first sight it would appear to be a commodity
specially
adapted for transport by water. But once more the greater
facilities
afforded by the railway have led to an almost complete neglect of
the
canal. Even where the quarries are immediately alongside the
waterway
(though this is not always the case) horses must be employed to get
the
blocks down to the canal boat; whereas the blocks can be put
straight
on to the railway trucks on the sidings which go right into
the
quarry, no horses being then required. In calculating, therefore,
the
difference between the canal rate and the railway rate, the
purchase
and maintenance of horses at the points of embarkation must be
added
to the former. Then the stone could travel only a certain distance
by
water, and further cost might have to be incurred in cartage, if not
in
transferring it from boat to railway truck, after all, for transport
to
final destination; whereas, once put on a railway truck at the
quarry,
it could be taken thence, without further trouble, to any town in
Great
Britain where it was wanted. In this way, again, the Kennet and
Avon
(except in the case of consignments to Bristol) has practically lost
a
once important source of revenue.
A certain amount of foreign timber
still goes by water from Avonmouth
or Bristol to the neighbourhood of Pewsey,
and some English-grown
timber is taken from Devizes and other points on the
canal to Bristol,
Reading, and intermediate places; grain is carried from
Reading to
mills within convenient reach of the canal, and there is also a
small
traffic in mineral oils and general merchandise, including
groceries
for shopkeepers in towns along the canal route; but, whereas,
in
former days a grocer would order 30 tons of sugar from Bristol to
be
delivered to him by boat at one time, he now orders by post,
telegraph,
or telephone, very much smaller quantities as he wants them, and
these
smaller quantities are consigned mainly by train, so that there is
less
for the canal to carry, even where the sugar still goes by water at
all.
Speaking generally, the actual traffic on the Kennet and Avon at
the
western end would not exceed more than about three or four boats a
day,
and on the higher levels at the eastern end it would not average
one
a day. Yet, after walking for some miles along the canal banks at
two
of its most important points, it was obvious to me that the decline
in
the traffic could not be attributable to any shortcomings in the
canal
itself. Not only does the Kennet and Avon deserve to rank as one
of
the best maintained of any canal in the country, but it still
affords
all reasonable facilities for such traffic as is available, or
seems
likely to be offered. Instead of being neglected by the Great
Western
Railway Company, it is kept in a state of efficiency that could
not
well be improved upon short of a complete reconstruction, at a
very
great cost, in the hope of getting an altogether problematical
increase
of patronage in respect to classes of traffic different from what
was
contemplated when the canal was originally built.
[Illustration:
LOCKS ON THE KENNET AND AVON CANAL AT DEVIZES.
(A difference in level of
239 feet in 2-1/2 miles is overcome by 29
locks. Of these, 17 immediately
follow one another in direct line,
"pounds" being provided to ensure
sufficiency of reserve water to work
boats through.)
_Photo by
Chivers, Devizes._] [_To face page 42._
]
Within the last year or
two the railway company have spent ￡3,000 or
￡4,000 on the pumping machinery.
The main water supply is derived from
a reservoir, about 9 acres in extent,
at Crofton, this reservoir being
fed partly by two rivulets (which dry up in
the summer) and partly
by its own springs; and extensive pumping machinery is
provided for
raising to the summit level the water that passes from the
reservoir
into the canal at a lower level, the height the water is thus
raised
being 40 feet. There is also a pumping station at Claverton, near
Bath,
which raises water from the river Avon. Thanks to these provisions,
on
no occasion has there been more than a partial stoppage of the
canal
owing to a lack of water, though in seasons of drought it is
necessary
to reduce the loading of the boats.
The final ascent to the
Devizes level is accomplished by means of
twenty-nine locks in a distance of
2-1/2 miles. Of these twenty-nine
there are seventeen which immediately
follow one another in a direct
line, and here it has been necessary to
supplement the locks with
"pounds" to ensure a sufficiency of reserve water
to work the boats
through. No one who walks alongside these locks can fail to
be
impressed alike by the boldness of the original constructors of
the
canal and by the thoroughness with which they did their work. The
walls
of the locks are from 3 to 6 feet in thickness, and they seem to
have
been built to last for all eternity. The same remark applies to
the
constructed works in general on this canal. For a boat to pass
through
the twenty-nine locks takes on an average about three hours. The
39-1/2
miles from Bristol to Devizes require at least two full
days.
Considerable expenditure is also incurred on the canal in
dredging
work; though here special difficulties are experienced, inasmuch
as
the geological formation of the bed of the canal between Bath
and
Bradford-on-Avon renders steam dredging inadvisable, so that the
more
expensive and less expeditious system of "dragging" has to be relied
on
instead.
Altogether it costs the Great Western Railway Company
about ￡1 to
earn each 10s. they receive from the canal; and whether or
not,
considering present day conditions of trade and transport, and
the
changes that have taken place therein, they would get their money
back
if they spent still more on the canal, is, to say the least of
it, extremely
problematical. One fact absolutely certain is that the
canal is already
capable of carrying a much greater amount of traffic
than is actually
forthcoming, and that the absence of such traffic is
not due to any neglect
of the waterway by its present owners. Indeed,
I had the positive assurance
of Mr Saunders that, in his capacity as
Canals Engineer to the Great Western,
he had never yet been refused by
his Company any expenditure he had
recommended as necessary for the
efficient maintenance of the canals under
his charge. "I believe," he
added, "that any money required to be spent for
this purpose would
be readily granted. I already have power to do anything I
consider
advisable to keep the canals in proper order; and I say
without
hesitation that all the canals belonging to the Great Western
Railway
Company are well maintained, and in no way starved. The decline in
the
traffic is due to obvious causes which would still remain, no
matter
what improvements one might seek to carry out."
The story
told above may be supplemented by the following extract from
the report of
the Great Western Railway Company for the half-year
ending December 1905,
showing expenses and receipts in connection with
the various canals
controlled by that company:--
GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY CANALS,
for
half-year ending 31st December 1905.
Canal. To Canal
Expenses. By Canal Traffic.
Bridgwater and Taunton
￡1,991 2 8 ￡664 8 9
Grand Western
197 7 1 119 10 10
Kennet and Avon
5,604 0 9 2,034 18 8
Monmouthshire
1,557 3 3 886 16 8
Stourbridge Extension 450
19 4 765 7 1
Stratford-upon-Avon 1,349
11 3 724 1 4
Swansea 1,643 15 7 1,386
14 9
--------------
--------------
￡12,793 19 11 ￡6,581
18 1
-------------- --------------
The
capital expenditure on these different canals, to the same date,
was as
follows:--
Brecon ￡61,217 19 0
Bridgwater
and Taunton 73,989 12 4
Grand
Western 30,629 8 7
Kennet and Avon 209,509
19 3
Stourbridge Extension 49,436
15 0
Stratford-on-Avon
172,538 9 7
Swansea 148,711
17 6
--------------
Total,
￡746,034 1 3
---------------
These
figures give point to the further remark made by Mr Inglis at the
meeting of
the Institution of Civil Engineers when he said, "It was
not to be imagined
that the railway companies would willingly have all
their canal property
lying idle; they would be only too glad if they
could see how to use the
canals so as to obtain a profit, or even to
reduce the loss."
On the
same occasion, Mr A. Ross, who also took part in the debate,
said he had had
charge of a number of railway-owned canals at different
times, and he was of
opinion there was no foundation for the
allegation that railway-owned canals
were not properly maintained. His
first experience of this kind was with the
Sankey Brook and St Helens
Canal, one of wide gauge, carrying a first-class
traffic, connecting
the two great chemical manufacturing towns of St Helens
and Widnes,
and opening into the Mersey. Early in the seventies the canal
became
practically a wreck, owing to the mortar on the walls having
been
destroyed by the chemicals in the water which the manufactories
had
drained into the canal. In addition, there was an overflow into
the
Sankey Brook, and in times of flood the water flowed over the
meadows,
and thousands of acres were rendered barren. Mr Ross continued (I
quote
from the official report):--
"The London and North-Western
Railway Company, who owned the canal,
went to great expense in litigation,
and obtained an injunction
against the manufacturers, and in the result they
had to purchase all
the meadows outright, as the quickest way of settling the
question
of compensation. The company rebuilt all the walls and some of
the
locks. If that canal had not been supported by a powerful
corporation
like the London and North-Western Railway, it must inevitably
have
been in ruins now. The next canal he had to do with, the
Manchester
and Bury Canal, belonging to the Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway
Company, was almost as unfortunate. The coal workings underneath
the
canal absolutely wrecked it, compelling the railway company to
spend
many thousands of pounds in law suits and on restoring the
works,
and he believed that no independent canal could have survived
the
expense. Other canals he had had to do with were the Peak Forest,
the
Macclesfield and the Chesterfield canals, and the Sheffield and
South
Yorkshire Navigation, which belonged to the old Manchester
Sheffield
and Lincolnshire Railway. Those canals were maintained in good
order,
although the traffic was certainly not large."
On the strength
of these personal experiences Mr Ross thought that
"if a company came forward
which was willing to give reasonable
compensation, the railway companies
would not be difficult to deal
with."
The "Shropshire Union" is a
railway-controlled canal with an especially
instructive history.
This
system has a total mileage of just over 200 miles. It extends
from
Wolverhampton to Ellesmere Port on the river Mersey, passing
through
Market Drayton, Nantwich and Chester, with branches to
Shrewsbury,
Newtown (Montgomeryshire), Llangollen, and Middlewich (Cheshire).
Some
sections of the canal were made as far back as 1770, and others
as
recently as 1840. At one time it was owned by a number of
different
companies, but by a process of gradual amalgamation, most of
these
were absorbed by the Ellesmere and Chester Canal Company. In
1846
this company obtained Acts of Parliament which authorised them
to
change their name to that of "The Shropshire Union Railways and
Canal
Company," and gave them power to construct three lines of
railway:
(1) from the Chester and Crewe Branch of the Grand Junction
Railway
at Calveley to Wolverhampton; (2) from Shrewsbury to Stafford, with
a
branch to Stone; and (3) from Newtown (Montgomeryshire) to Crewe.
Not
only do we get here a striking instance of the tendency shown by
canal
companies to start railways on their own account, but in each one
of
the three Acts authorising the lines mentioned I find it provided
that
"it shall be lawful for the Chester and Holyhead Railway Company
and
the Manchester and Birmingham Railway Company, or either of them,
to
subscribe towards the undertaking, and hold shares in the
Shropshire
Union Railways and Canal Company."
Experience soon showed
that the Shropshire Union had undertaken more
than it could accomplish. In
1847 the company obtained a fresh Act
of Parliament, this time to authorise a
lease of the undertakings of
the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company
to the London and
North-Western Railway Company. The Act set forth that the
capital
of the Shropshire Union Company was ￡482,924, represented by
shares
on which all the calls had been paid, and that the indebtedness
on
mortgages, bonds and other securities amounted to ￡814,207. Under
these
adverse conditions, "it has been agreed," the Act goes on to
say,
"between the Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Company and the
London
and North-Western Railway Company, with a view to the economical
and
convenient working" of the three railways authorised, "that a lease
in
perpetuity of the undertaking of the Shropshire Union Railways and
Canal
Company should be granted to the London and North-Western Railway
Company,
and accepted by them, at a rent which shall be equal to ...
half the rate per
cent. per annum of the dividend which shall from time
to time be payable on
the capital stock of the London and North-Western
Railway
Company."
[Illustration: WAREHOUSES AND HYDRAULIC CRANES AT ELLESMERE
PORT.
[_To face page 48._
]
We have in this another
example of the way in which a railway company
has saved a canal system from
extinction, while under the control
of the London and North-Western the
Shropshire Union Canal is still
undoubtedly one of the best maintained of any
in the country.
There may be sections of it, especially in out-lying parts,
where
the traffic is comparatively small, but a considerable business
is
still done in the conveyance of sea-borne grain from the Mersey to
the
Chester district, or in that of tinplates, iron, and manufactured
articles
from the Black Country to the Mersey for shipment. For
traffic such as this
the canal already offers every reasonable
facility. The Shropshire Union is
also a large carrier of goods to
and from the Potteries district, in
conjunction with the Trent and
Mersey. So little has the canal been
"strangled," or even neglected,
by the London and North-Western Railway
Company that, in addition
to maintaining its general efficiency, the
expenditure incurred by
that company of late years for the development of
Ellesmere Port--the
point where the Shropshire Union Canal enters the
Manchester Ship
Canal--amounts to several hundred thousand pounds, this money
having
been spent mainly in the interest of the traffic along the
Shropshire
Union Canal. Deep-water quay walls of considerable length
have
been built; warehouses for general merchandise, with an
excellent
system of hydraulic cranes, have been provided; a large grain
depot,
fully equipped with grain elevators and other appliances, has
been
constructed at a cost of ￡80,000 to facilitate, more especially,
the
considerable grain transport by canal that is done between the
River
Mersey and the Chester district; and at the present time the dock
area
is being enlarged, chiefly for the purpose of accommodating
deeper
barges, drawing about 7 feet of water.
Another fact I might
mention in regard to the Shropshire Union Canal
is in connection with
mechanical haulage. Elaborate theories, worked
out on paper, as to the
difference in cost between rail transport and
water transport, may be
completely upset where the water transport is
to be conducted, not on a river
or on a canal crossing a perfectly
level plain, but along a canal which is
raised, by means of locks,
several hundred feet on one side of a ridge, or of
some elevated
table-land, and must be brought down in the same way on the
other side.
So, again, the value of what might otherwise be a useful system
of
mechanical haulage may be completely marred owing to the existence
of
innumerable locks.
This conclusion is the outcome of a series of
practical experiments
conducted on the Shropshire Union Canal at a time when
the theorists
were still working out their calculations on paper. The
experiments
in question were directed to ascertaining whether economy could
be
effected by making up strings of narrow canal boats, and having
them
drawn by a tug worked by steam or other motive power, instead
of
employing man and horse for each boat. The plan answered
admirably
until the locks were reached. There the steam-tug was, temporarily,
no
longer of any service. It was necessary to keep a horse at every
lock,
or flight of locks, to get the boats through, so that, apart from
the
tedious delays (the boats that passed first having to wait for
the
last-comers before the procession could start again), the
increased
expense at the locks nullified any saving gained from the
mechanical
haulage.
As a further illustration--drawn this time
from Scotland--of the
relations of railway companies to canals, I take the
case of the Forth
and Clyde Navigation, controlled by the Caledonian Railway
Company.
This navigation really consists of two sections--the Forth and
Clyde
Navigation, and the Monkland Navigation. The former, authorised
in
1768, and opened in 1790, commences at Grangemouth on the Firth
of
Forth, crosses the country by Falkirk and Kirkintilloch, and
terminates
at Bowling on the Clyde. It has thirty-nine locks, and at one
point has
been constructed through 3 miles of hard rock. The original depth
of 8
feet was increased to 10 feet in 1814. In addition to the canal
proper,
the navigation included the harbours of Grangemouth and Bowling,
and
also the Grangemouth Branch Railway, and the Drumpeller Branch
Railway,
near Coatbridge. The Monkland Canal, also opened in 1790, was
built
from Glasgow _via_ Coatbridge to Woodhall in Lanarkshire, mainly
for
the transport of coal from the Lanarkshire coal-fields to Glasgow
and
elsewhere. Here the depth was 6 feet. The undertakings of the Forth
and
Clyde and the Monkland Navigations were amalgamated in 1846.
Prior
to 1865, the Caledonian Railway did not extend further north than
Greenhill,
about 5 miles south of Falkirk, where it joined the Scottish
Central Railway.
This undertaking was absorbed by the Caledonian in
1865, and the Caledonian
system was thus extended as far north as
Perth and Dundee. The further
absorption of the Scottish North-Eastern
Railway Company, in 1866, led to the
extension of the Caledonian system
to Aberdeen.
At this time the
Caledonian Railway Company owned no port or harbour
in Scotland, except the
small and rather shallow tidal harbour of
South Alloa. Having got possession
of the railway lines in Central
Scotland, they thought it necessary to obtain
control of some port on
the east coast, in the interests of traffic to or
from the Continent,
and especially to facilitate the shipment to the
Continent of coal
from the Lanarkshire coal-fields, chiefly served by them.
The port of
Grangemouth being adapted to their requirements, they entered
into
negotiations with the proprietors of the Forth and Clyde
Navigation,
who were also proprietors of the harbour of Grangemouth, and
acquired
the whole undertaking in 1867, guaranteeing to the original company
a
dividend of 6-1/4 per cent.
Since their acquisition of the canal,
the Caledonian Railway Company
have spent large sums annually in maintaining
it in a state of
efficiency, and its general condition to-day is better than
when it
was taken over. Much of the traffic handled is brought into or
sent
out from Grangemouth, and here the Caledonian Railway Company
have
more than doubled the accommodation, with the result that the
imports
and exports have enormously increased. All the same, there has been
a
steady decrease in the actual canal traffic, due to various causes,
such
as (_a_) the exhaustion of several of the coal-fields in the
Monkland
district; (_b_) the extension of railways; and (_c_) changes
in the sources
from which certain classes of traffic formerly carried
on the canal are
derived.
In regard to the coal-fields, the closing of pits adjoining the
canal
has been followed by the opening of others at such a distance from
the
canal that it was cheaper to consign by rail.
In the matter of
railway extensions, when the Caledonian took over
the canal in 1867, there
were practically no railways in the district
through which it runs, and the
coal and other traffic had, perforce,
to go by water. But, year by year, a
complete network of railways
was spread through the district by independent
railway companies,
notwithstanding the efforts made by the Caledonian to
protect the
interests of the canal-efforts that led, in some instances,
to
Parliament refusing assent to the proposed lines. Those that
were
constructed (over a dozen lines and branches altogether), were
almost
all absorbed by the North British Railway Company, who are
strong
competitors with the Caledonian Railway Company, and have
naturally
done all they could to get traffic for the lines in question. This,
of
course, has been at the expense of the canal and to the detriment
of
the Caledonian Railway Company, who, in view of their having
guaranteed
a dividend to the original proprietors, would prefer that the
traffic
in question should remain on the canal instead of being diverted to
an
opposition line of railway. Other traffic which formerly went by
canal,
and is now carried on the Caledonian Railway, is of a character
that
would certainly go by canal no longer, and for this the Caledonian
and
the North British Companies compete.
The third factor in the
decline of the canal relates to the general
consideration that, during the
last thirty or forty years, important
works have no longer been necessarily
built alongside canal banks,
but have been constructed wherever convenient,
and connected with the
railways by branch lines or private sidings, expense
of cartage to or
from the canal dock or basin thus being saved. On the Forth
and Clyde
Canal a good deal of coal is still carried, but mainly to
adjoining
works. Coal is also shipped in vessels on the canal for transport
to
the West Highlands and Islands, where the railways cannot compete;
but
even here there is an increasing tendency for the coal to be
bought in
Glasgow (to which port it is carried by rail), so that the
shippers can have
a wider range of markets when purchasing. Further
changes affecting the Forth
and Clyde Canal are illustrated by the
fact that whereas, at one time, large
quantities of grain were brought
into Grangemouth from Russian and other
Continental ports, transhipped
into lighters, and sent to Glasgow by canal,
the grain now received at
Glasgow comes mainly from America by direct
steamer.
That the Caledonian Railway Company have done their duty towards
the
Forth and Clyde Canal is beyond all reasonable doubt. It is true
that
they are not themselves carriers on the canal. They are only
toll-takers.
Their business has been to maintain the canal in efficient
condition, and
allow any trader who wishes to make use of it so to do,
on paying the tolls.
This they have done, and, if the traders have not
availed themselves of their
opportunities, it must naturally have been
for adequate reasons, and
especially because of changes in the course
of the country's business which
it is impossible for a railway company
to control, even where, as in this
particular case, they are directly
interested in seeing the receipts from
tolls attain to as high a figure as
practicable. |
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