SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like
health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or
be without them both, at the same time?
CALLICLES: What do you
mean?
SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:--a man may have
the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
CALLICLES: To be
sure.
SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at
the same time?
CALLICLES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And when he
has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too?
Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both
together?
CALLICLES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: That would surely be
marvellous and absurd?
CALLICLES: Very.
SOCRATES: I suppose that
he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way,
by fits?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Or swiftness and
slowness?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And does he have and not
have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar
alternation? (Compare Republic.)
CALLICLES: Certainly he
has.
SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at
the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil--do we agree? Please
not to answer without consideration.
CALLICLES: I entirely
agree.
SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.--Did you say that
to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or
painful?
CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry
is pleasant.
SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful:
am I not right?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is
painful?
CALLICLES: Yes, very.
SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more
instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are
painful?
CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any
more instances.
SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to
drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the
word 'thirsty' implies pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the
word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the
want?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: There is pleasure in
drinking?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: When you are
thirsty?
SOCRATES: And in pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES:
Do you see the inference:--that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you
say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they
not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the
body?--which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence:
Is not this true?
CALLICLES: It is.
SOCRATES: You said also, that
no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time?
CALLICLES:
Yes, I did.
SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might
also have pleasure?
CALLICLES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then pleasure
is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and
therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant?
CALLICLES: I wish
I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
SOCRATES: You know,
Callicles, but you affect not to know.
CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don't
keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition
of me.
SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his
pleasure in drinking at the same time?
CALLICLES: I do not understand
what you are saying.
GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our
sakes;--we should like to hear the argument out.
CALLICLES: Yes,
Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is
always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
GORGIAS: What matter?
Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own
fashion.
CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little
peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
SOCRATES: I
envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries
before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not
allowable. But to return to our argument:--Does not a man cease from
thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the
same moment?
CALLICLES: True.
SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or
has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at
the same moment?
CALLICLES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then he ceases
from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same
moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you
said?
CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
SOCRATES:
Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the
pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of
pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are
different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I
would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I
think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good
good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who
have beauty present with them?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do
you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that
the courageous and the wise are the good--would you not say
so?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And did you never see a
foolish child rejoicing?
CALLICLES: Yes, I have.
SOCRATES: And a
foolish man too?
CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your
drift?
SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only
answer.
CALLICLES: Yes, I have.
SOCRATES: And did you ever see a
sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES:
Which rejoice and sorrow most--the wise or the foolish?
CALLICLES: They
are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
SOCRATES: Enough: And did
you ever see a coward in battle?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES:
And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the
brave?
CALLICLES: I should say 'most' of both; or at any rate, they
rejoiced about equally.
SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not
only the brave, rejoice?
CALLICLES: Greatly.
SOCRATES: And the
foolish; so it would seem?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are only
the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also
pained?
CALLICLES: Both are pained.
SOCRATES: And are they equally
pained?
CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more
pained.
SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy's
departure?
CALLICLES: I dare say.
SOCRATES: Then are the foolish
and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you
were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and
pained than the brave?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But surely the
wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the
bad?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are
pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly
equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e.
in having more pleasure and more pain.)
CALLICLES: I really do not
know what you mean.
SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the
good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil;
and that pleasures were goods and pains evils?
CALLICLES: Yes, I
remember.
SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those
who rejoice--if they do rejoice?
CALLICLES:
Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are
present with them?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And those who are
in pain have evil or sorrow present with them?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason
of the presence of evil?
CALLICLES: I should.
SOCRATES: Then
those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of
pleasure and of pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Have the wise
man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal
degrees? or would you say that the coward has more?
CALLICLES: I
should say that he has.
SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion
which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what
is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave
man we allow to be good?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the
foolish man and the coward to be evil?
CALLICLES:
Certainly.
SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?
CALLICLES:
Certainly.
SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but,
perhaps, the evil has more of them?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES:
Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or,
perhaps, even better?--is not this a further inference which follows equally
with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the
same:--can this be denied, Callicles?
CALLICLES: I have been listening
and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants
you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give
it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies
that some pleasures are good and others bad?
SOCRATES: Alas,
Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child,
sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to
deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not
have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and
now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of
old, and take what I can get out of you.--Well, then, as I understand you to
say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others
evil?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the
hurtful are evil?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And the
beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do
some evil?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily
pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning--you mean
to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are
good, and their opposites evil?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES:
And in the same way there are good pains and there are
evil pains?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And ought we not
to choose and use the good pleasures and pains?
CALLICLES:
Certainly.
SOCRATES: But not the evil?
CALLICLES:
Clearly.
SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that
all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;--and will you
agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and
that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not
the good for the sake of them?--will you add a third vote to our
two?
CALLICLES: I will.
SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything
else, is to be sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which
is good for the sake of pleasure?
CALLICLES: To be
sure.
SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what
are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in
detail?
CALLICLES: He must have art.
SOCRATES: Let me now remind
you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not
have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure,
and know nothing of a better and worse, and there are other processes which
know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an
art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with
pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned
with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you,
Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not
answer at random and contrary to your real opinion--for you will observe that
we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any
sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?--whether he
should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act
what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and
cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the
principles now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of
philosophy;--and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps
we had better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we
have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to
consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we
should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I
mean?
CALLICLES: No, I do not.
SOCRATES: Then I will explain
myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have agreed that there is such a
thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure
is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of
the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of
acquisition of the other, which is good--I wish that you would tell me
whether you agree with me thus far or not--do you agree?
CALLICLES: I
do.
SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with
me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said
to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience,
and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends
to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles
of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon
pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which
she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers
or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and
just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when
producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have
proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other
similar processes which have to do with the soul--some of them processes of
art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest--others despising
the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the
pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering
what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to
afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there
are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term
flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed
with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And
now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this
notion, or whether you differ.
CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the
contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an
end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias.
SOCRATES: And is this notion
true of one soul, or of two or more?
CALLICLES: Equally true of two or
more.
SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have
no regard for their true interests?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES:
Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind--or rather, if you would
prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the
pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of
flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure,
Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
CALLICLES: I
assent.
SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for
example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of
dithyrambic poetry?--are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that
Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement
of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the
multitude?
CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias,
Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the
harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could
he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction
to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general,
what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake
of pleasure?
CALLICLES: That is my notion of them.
SOCRATES:
And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august personage--what are
her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the
spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their
pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and
unwelcome?--which in your judgment is her character?
CALLICLES: There
can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure
and the gratification of the audience.
SOCRATES: And is not that the sort
of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as
flattery?
CALLICLES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that
we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech?
(Compare Republic.)
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And this
speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
CALLICLES:
True.
SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to
be rhetoricians?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then now we have
discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women,
and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we
have described it as having the nature of flattery.
CALLICLES: Quite
true.
SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric
which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in
other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is
best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or
are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them
pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest,
playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but
never considering whether they are better or worse for
this?
CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care
of the public in what they say, while others are such as you
describe.
SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of
two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation;
the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of
the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether
welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a
rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this
stamp, who is he?
CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot
tell you of any such among the orators who are at present
living.
SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former
generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them
worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches?
for, indeed, I do not know of such a man.
CALLICLES: What! did you
never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and
Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard
yourself?
SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said
at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires
and those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled
to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and
of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other,
and there is an art in distinguishing them,--can you tell me of any of
these statesmen who did distinguish them?
CALLICLES: No, indeed, I
cannot.
SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such
a one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as
I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a
view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random;
just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright,
or any other look all of them to their own work, and do not select and apply
at random what they apply, but strive to give a definite form to it? The
artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize
and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and
systematic whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the
trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity
to the body: do you deny this?
CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit
it.
SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is
good; that in which there is disorder, evil?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship?
CALLICLES:
Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human
body?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And what would you say of the
soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in
which there is harmony and order?
CALLICLES: The latter follows from
our previous admissions.
SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the
effect of harmony and order in the body?
CALLICLES: I suppose that you
mean health and strength?
SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which
you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and
discover a name for this as well as for the other.
CALLICLES: Why not
give the name yourself, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that
I should, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not,
you shall refute and answer me. 'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which
is given to the regular order of the body, whence comes health and every
other bodily excellence: is that true or not?
CALLICLES:
True.
SOCRATES: And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to
the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful
and orderly:--and so we have temperance and justice: have we
not?
CALLICLES: Granted.
SOCRATES: And will not the true
rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon
these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all
his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his
aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away
injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every
virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree?
CALLICLES: I
agree.
SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body
of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the
most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may
be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse
if rightly estimated. Is not that true?
CALLICLES: I will not say No
to it.
SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if
his body is in an evil plight--in that case his life also is evil: am I
not right?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: When a man is in health
the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink
when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is
sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will
admit that?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And does not the same
argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is
senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be
controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not
tend to her own improvement.
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Such
treatment will be better for the soul herself?
CALLICLES: To be
sure.
SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise
her?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is
better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you
were just now preferring?
CALLICLES: I do not understand you,
Socrates, and I wish that you would ask some one who does.
SOCRATES:
Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject himself to
that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!
CALLICLES: I do not
heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered hitherto out of
civility to Gorgias.
SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break
off in the middle?
CALLICLES: You shall judge for
yourself.
SOCRATES: Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head
and not break off in the middle,' and I should not like to have the
argument going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a
little longer, and put the head on.
CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are,
Socrates! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get
some one else to argue with you.
SOCRATES: But who else is willing?--I
want to finish the argument.
CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my
help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering
yourself?
SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'Two men spoke
before, but now one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no
help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of
all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to
know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of
the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to
my own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions
which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak
from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves,
and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall
be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that
the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us
leave off and go our ways.
GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should
not go our ways until you have completed the argument; and this appears to me
to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to
hear what more you have to say.
SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have
liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given
him an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are
unwilling to continue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I
seem to you to be in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with
you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of
benefactors on the tablets of my soul.
CALLICLES: My good fellow,
never mind me, but get on.
SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I
recapitulate the argument:--Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the
same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be
pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant?
The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant
at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of
which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever
are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my
conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument
or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by
chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted
to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue
of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that
which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such
is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better
than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order
is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate?
Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give,
Callicles dear; have you any?
CALLICLES: Go on, my good
fellow.
SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul
is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is,
the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.
And will not
the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to
men;--for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what
is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; and in his
relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just
and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for
the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not,
but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently
to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being,
as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than
a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well
and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity
be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this
latter is he whom you were applauding--the intemperate who is the opposite of
the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And
if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must
pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his
legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need
punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private
individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and
he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the
aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the
energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have
temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts
to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading
a robber's life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for
he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also
incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion
and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together
heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called
Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a
philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality
is mighty, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate
inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.--Well, then, either the
principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and
temperance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be
refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the
consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me
whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and
his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he
should use his rhetoric--all those consequences are true. And that which
you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz.,
that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that
degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus,
Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician
ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to
be true.
And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed
in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth
that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to
save them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of
another like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,--he may box
my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or
banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you say,
is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been
already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell
you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst
evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open,
but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more
disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in
any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to
the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths,
which have been already set forth as I state them in the previous
discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use
an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds
of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more
enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I
say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how
these things are, but that I have never met any one who could say
otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my
position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the
greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a
greater than this greatest of evils (compare Republic), in an unjust man
not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will
make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert
the greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences
be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or
his friends?--and next will come that which is unable to avert the
next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third
greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is
the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and
the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles? |
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