Gorgias, by Plato 7

	Gorgias, by Plato 7

SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time? CALLICLES: What do you mean? SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:--a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? CALLICLES: To be sure. SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time? CALLICLES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together? CALLICLES: Certainly not. SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd? CALLICLES: Very. SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare Republic.) CALLICLES: Certainly he has. SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil--do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration. CALLICLES: I entirely agree. SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.--Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant. SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful? CALLICLES: Yes, very. SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful? CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances. SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word 'thirsty' implies pain? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: When you are thirsty? SOCRATES: And in pain? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:--that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?--which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true? CALLICLES: It is. SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time? CALLICLES: Yes, I did. SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure? CALLICLES: Clearly. SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant? CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in drinking at the same time? CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying. GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;--we should like to hear the argument out. CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion. CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:--Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment? CALLICLES: True. SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? CALLICLES: Very true. SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said? CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference? SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good--would you not say so? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? CALLICLES: Yes, I have. SOCRATES: And a foolish man too? CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer. CALLICLES: Yes, I have. SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most--the wise or the foolish? CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? CALLICLES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave? CALLICLES: I should say 'most' of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally. SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? CALLICLES: Greatly. SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained? CALLICLES: Both are pained. SOCRATES: And are they equally pained? CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure? CALLICLES: I dare say. SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.) CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean. SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils? CALLICLES: Yes, I remember. SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice--if they do rejoice? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil? CALLICLES: I should. SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more? CALLICLES: I should say that he has. SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?--is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:--can this be denied, Callicles? CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad? SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.--Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others evil? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil? CALLICLES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are those which do some evil? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which we were just now mentioning--you mean to say that those which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains? CALLICLES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: But not the evil? CALLICLES: Clearly. SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;--and will you agree with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake of them?--will you add a third vote to our two? CALLICLES: I will. SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure? CALLICLES: To be sure. SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail? CALLICLES: He must have art. SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random and contrary to your real opinion--for you will observe that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense at all, what question can be more serious than this?--whether he should follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;--and in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean? CALLICLES: No, I do not. SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good--I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not--do you agree? CALLICLES: I do. SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul--some of them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest--others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or whether you differ. CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias. SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more? CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more. SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for their true interests? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind--or rather, if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else? CALLICLES: I assent. SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic poetry?--are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude? CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates. SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure? CALLICLES: That is my notion of them. SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august personage--what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths welcome and unwelcome?--which in your judgment is her character? CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience. SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now describing as flattery? CALLICLES: Quite true. SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.) CALLICLES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric? CALLICLES: True. SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery. CALLICLES: Quite true. SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse for this? CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe. SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he? CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among the orators who are at present living. SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do not know of such a man. CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard yourself? SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in distinguishing them,--can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did distinguish them? CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot. SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny this? CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it. SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in which there is disorder, evil? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order? CALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions. SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in the body? CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength? SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for the other. CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates? SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. 'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is that true or not? CALLICLES: True. SOCRATES: And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and orderly:--and so we have temperance and justice: have we not? CALLICLES: Granted. SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree? CALLICLES: I agree. SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true? CALLICLES: I will not say No to it. SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his body is in an evil plight--in that case his life also is evil: am I not right? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement. CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself? CALLICLES: To be sure. SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring? CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask some one who does. SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks! CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias. SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle? CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself. SOCRATES: Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head and not break off in the middle,' and I should not like to have the argument going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a little longer, and put the head on. CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you. SOCRATES: But who else is willing?--I want to finish the argument. CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or questioning and answering yourself? SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'Two men spoke before, but now one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways. GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say. SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my soul. CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on. SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:--Is the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any? CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow. SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true. And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods and to men;--for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding--the intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about geometry.--Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his rhetoric--all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true. And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,--he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these things are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils (compare Republic), in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends?--and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles?