(33) Or, "The mass of them."
(34) See Grote, "H. G." ix. p. 491 note. The "Argolising" or philo-
Argeian party, as opposed to the philo-Laconian party. See above,
"Hell." IV. iv. 6.
B.C. 389-388. When Iphicrates first reached the Chersonese he and
Anaxibius carried on war against each other by the despatch of guerilla
or piratic bands across the straits. But as time wore on, information
reached him of the departure of Anaxibius to Antandrus, accompanied
by his mercenaries and his own bodyguard of Laconians and two hundred
Abydenian hoplites. Hearing further that Anaxibius had won the friendly
adhesion of Antandrus, Iphicrates conjectured that after establishing a
garrison in that place he would make the best of his way back, if only
to bring the Abydenians home again. He therefore crossed in the night,
selecting a desert point on the Abydene coast, from which he scaled
the hills above the town and planted himself in ambuscade within their
folds. The triremes which brought him across had orders at break of day
to coast up northwards along the Chersonese, which would suggest the
notion that he was only out on one of his customary voyages to collect
money. The sequel more than fulfilled his expectations. Anaxibius began
his return march, and if report speaks truly, he did so notwithstanding
that the victims were against his marching that day; contemptuously
disregarding the warning, and satisfied that his march lay all along
through a friendly country and was directed to a friendly city. Besides
which, those whom he met assured him that Iphicrates was off on a voyage
to Proconnesus: hence the unusual absence of precaution on the march.
On his side Iphicrates saw the chance, but, so long as the troops of
Anaxibius lingered on the level bottoms, refused to spring from his
lair, waiting for the moment when the Abydenian division in the van
was safely landed in the plain of Cremaste, at the point where the
gold mines stand; the main column following on the downward slope, and
Anaxibius with his Laconians just beginning the descent. At that instant
Iphicrates set his ambuscade in motion, and dashed against the Spartan
at full speed. The latter quickly discerned that there was no hope of
escape as he scanned the long straggling line of his attenuated column.
The troops in advance, he was persuaded, would never be able to come
back to his aid up the face of that acclivity; besides which, he
observed the utter bewilderment of the whole body at sight of the
ambuscade. He therefore turned to those next him, and spoke as follows:
"Sirs, it is good for me to die on this spot, where honour bids me; but
for you, sirs, yonder your path lies, haste and save yourselves (35)
before the enemy can close with us." As the words died on his lips he
took from the hands of his attendant shield-bearer his heavy shield, and
there, at his post, unflinchingly fought and fell; not quite alone,
for by his side faithfully lingered a favourite youth, and of the
Lacedaemonian governors who had rallied to Abydos from their several
cities yet other twelve fought and fell beside the pair. The rest fled,
dropping down one by one as the army pursued them to the walls of the
city. The death-roll amounted to something like fifty hoplites of the
Abydenians, and of the rest two hundred. After this exploit Iphicrates
returned to the Chersonese. (36)
(35) Or, "sauve qui peut."
(36) See Hicks, 76; and below, "Hell." V. i. 31.
BOOK V
I
B.C. 388. Such was the state of affairs in the Hellespont, so far at
least as Athens and Sparta are concerned. Eteonicus was once more in
Aegina; and notwithstanding that the Aeginetans and Athenians had up to
this time held commercial intercourse, yet now that the war was plainly
to be fought out on the sea, that officer, with the concurrence of the
ephorate, gave permission to any one who liked to plunder Attica. (1)
The Athenians retaliated by despatching a body of hoplites under their
general Pamphilus, who constructed a fort against the Aeginetans,
(2) and proceeded to blockade them by land and sea with ten warships.
Teleutias, however, while threading his way among the islands in
question of contributions, had chanced to reach a point where he
received information of the turn in affairs with regard to the
construction of the fortress, whereupon he came to the rescue of the
beleaguered Aeginetans, and so far succeeded that he drove off the
enemy's blockading squadron. But Pamphilus kept a firm hold on the
offensive fortress, and was not to be dislodged.
(1) Or, "determined to let slip the hounds of war;" or, more
prosaically, "issued letters of marque." See Grote, "H. G." ix.
517.
(2) I.e. in Aegina as an {epiteikhisma}.
After this the new admiral Hierax arrived from Lacedaemon. The naval
force was transferred into his successor's hands, and under the happiest
auspices Teleutias set sail for home. As he descended to the seashore
to start on his homeward voyage there was not one among his soldiers
who had not a warm shake of the hand for their old admiral. Here one
presented him with a crown, and there another with a victor's wreath;
and those who arrived too late, still, as the ship weighed anchor, threw
garlands into the sea and wafted him many a blessing with prayerful
lips. I am well aware that in the above incident I have no memorable
story of munificence, peril, or invention to narrate, but in all
sincerity I protest that a man may find food for reflection in the
inquiry what Teleutias had done to create such a disposition in his
subordinates. Here we are brought face to face with a true man's work
more worthy of account than multitudes of riches or adventure. (3)
(3) See Grote, "H. G." ix. 518: "The ideal of government as it
presented itself to Xenophon was the paternal despotism or
something like it," {to ethelonton arkhein}. Cf. "Cyrop." passim,
"Heiro," and his various other compositions.
The new admiral Hierax, taking with him the larger portion of the fleet,
set sail once more for Rhodes. He left behind him twelve vessels
in Aegina under his vice-admiral Gorgopas, who was now installed as
governor of that island. In consequence of this chance the Athenian
troops inside the fortres were more blockaded than the Aeginetans
themselves, so much so that a vote was passed by the Athenian assembly,
in obedience to which a large fleet was manned, and the garrison, after
four months' sojourn in Aegina, were brought back. But this was
no sooner done than they began to be harassed by Gorgopas and the
privateers again. To operate aganst these they fitted out thirteen
vessels, choosing Eunomus as admiral in command. Hierax was still in
Rhodes when the Lacedaemonians sent out a new admiral, Antalcidas; they
believed that they could not find a better mode of gratifying Tiribazus.
Accordingly Antalcidas, after visiting Aegina in order to pick up the
vessels under Gorgopas, set sail for Ephesus. At this point he sent back
Gorgopas with his twelve ships to Aegina, and appointed his vice-admiral
Nicolochus to command the remainder of the fleet.
Nicolochus was to relieve Abydos, and thither set sail; but in the
course of the voyage turned aside to Tenedos, where he ravaged the
territory, and, with the money so secured, sailed on to Abydos. The
Athenian generals (4) on their side, collecting from Samothrace, Thasos,
and the fortresses in that quarter, hastened to the relief of Tenedos;
but, finding that Nicolochus had continued his voyage to Abydos, they
selected the Chersonese as their base, and proceeded to blockade him
and his fleet of five-and-twenty vessels with the two-and-thirty vessels
under their joint command.
(4) And among the rest Iphicrates and Diotimus. See below, S. 25;
above, IV. viii. 39.
Meanwhile Gorgopas, returning from Ephesus, fell in with the Athenian
admiral Eunomus, and, shunning an encounter at the moment, sought
shelter in Aegina, which he reached a little before sunset; and at
once disembarking his men, set them down to their evening meal; whilst
Eunomus on his side, after hanging back for a little while, sailed away.
Night fell, and the Athenian, showing the customary signal light to
prevent his squadron straggling, led the way in the darkness. Gorgopas
instantly got his men on board again, and, taking the lantern for his
guide, followed the Athenians, craftily lagging behind a little space,
so as not to show himself or raise any suspicion of his presence. In
place of the usual cry the boatswains timed the rowers by a clink of
stones, and silently the oars slid, feathering through the waves (5);
and just when the squadron of Eunomus was touching the coast, off Cape
Zoster (6) in Attica, the Spartan sounded the bugle-note for the charge.
Some of Eunomus's vessels were in the act of discharging their crews,
others were still getting to their moorings, whilst others were as yet
only bearing down to land. The engagement was fought by the light of the
moon, and Gorgopas captured four triremes, which he tied astern, and so
set sail with his prizes in tow towards Aegina. The rest of the Athenian
squadron made their escape into the harbour of Piraeus.
(5) Lit. "the boatswains employing a clink of stones and a sliding
motion of the oars."
(6) I.e. "Cape Girdle," mod. Cape Karvura. See Tozer, "Geog. of
Greece," pp. 78, 372.
It was after these events that Chabrias (7) commenced his voyage to
Cyprus, bringing relief to Evagoras. His force consisted at first of
eight hundred light troops and ten triremes, but was further increased
by other vessels from Athens and a body of heavy infantry. Thus
reinforced, the admiral chose a night and landed in Aegina; and secreted
himself in ambuscade with his light troops in hollow ground some way
beyond the temple of Heracles. At break of day, as prearranged, the
Athenian hoplites made their appearance under command of Demaenetus, and
began mounting up between two and three miles (8) beyond the Kerakleion
at Tripurgia, as it is called. The news soon reached Gorgopas, who
sallied out to the rescue with the Aeginetans and the marines of his
vessels, being further accompanied by eight Spartans who happened to be
with him. Not content with these he issued orders inviting any of the
ships' crews, who were free men, to join the relief party. A large
number of these sailors responded. They armed themselves as best they
could, and the advance commenced. When the vanguard were well past the
ambuscade, Chabrias and his men sprang up from their hiding-place,
and poured a volley of javelins and stones upon the enemy. At the same
moment the hoplites, who had disembarked, (9) were advancing, so that
the Spartan vanguard, in the absence of anything like collective
action, were speedily cut down, and among them fell Gorgopas with the
Lacedaemonians. At their fall the rest of course turned and fled. One
hundred and fifty Aeginetans were numbered among the slain, while the
loss incurred by the foreigners, metics, and sailors who had joined the
relief party, reached a total of two hundred. After this the Athenians
sailed the sea as freely as in the times of actual peace. Nor would
anything induce the sailors to row a single stroke for Eteonicus--even
under pressure--since he had no pay to give.
(7) According to Diod. xiv. 92, Chabrias had been for some time in
Corinth. See also above, IV. viii. 24.
(8) Lit. "about sixteen stades."
(9) Or, reading {oi anabebekotes}, "who had scaled the height." See
Hartman, "Anal. Xen." p. 364.
Subsequently the Lacedaemonians despatched Teleutias once again to take
command of the squadron, and when the sailors saw it was he who had
come, they were overjoyed. He summoned a meeting and addressed them
thus: "Soldiers, I am back again, but I bring with me no money. Yet if
God be willing, and your zeal flag not, I will endeavour to supply
you with provisions without stint. Be well assured, as often as I find
myself in command of you, I have but one prayer--that your lives may
be spared no less than mine; and as for the necessaries of existence,
perhaps it would astonish you if I said I would rather you should
have them than I. Yet by the gods I swear I would welcome two days'
starvation in order to spare you one. Was not my door open in old days
to every comer? Open again it shall stand now; and so it shall be; where
your own board overflows, you shall look in and mark the luxury of your
general; but if at other times you see him bearing up against cold and
heat and sleepless nights, you must apply the lesson to yourselves
and study to endure those evils. I do not bid you do aught of this for
self-mortification's sake, but that you may derive some after-blessing
from it. Soldiers, let Lacedaemon, our own mother-city, be to you an
example. Her good fortune is reputed to stand high. That you know; and
you know too, that she purchased her glory and her greatness not by
faint-heartedness, but by choosing to suffer pain and incur dangers in
the day of need. 'Like city,' I say, 'like citizens.' You, too, as I
can bear you witness, have been in times past brave; but to-day must we
strive to be better than ourselves. So shall we share our pains without
repining, and when fortune smiles, mingle our joys; for indeed the
sweetest thing of all surely is to flatter no man, Hellene or Barbarian,
for the sake of hire; we will suffice to ourselves, and from a source
to which honour pre-eminently invites us; since, I need not remind you,
abundance won from the enemy in war furnishes forth not bodily nutrition
only, but a feast of glory the wide world over."
So he spoke, and with one voice they all shouted to him to issue what
orders he thought fit; they would not fail him in willing service. The
general's sacrifice was just concluded, and he answered: "Good, then, my
men; go now, as doubtless you were minded, and take your evening meal,
and next provide yourselves, please, with one day's food. After that
repair to your ships without delay, for we have a voyage on hand,
whither God wills, and must arrive in time." So then, when the men
returned, he embarked them on their ships, and sailed under cover of
night for the great harbour of Piraeus: at one time he gave the rowers
rest, passing the order to take a snatch of sleep; at another he pushed
forward towards his goal with rise and fall of oars. If any one supposes
that there was a touch of madness in such an expedition--with but
twelve triremes to attack an enemy possessed of a large fleet--he should
consider the calculations of Teleutias. He was under the firm persuasion
that the Athenians were more careless than ever about their navy in the
harbour since the death of Gorgopas; and in case of finding warships
riding at anchor--even so, there was less danger, he conjectured, in
attacking twenty ships in the port of Athens than ten elsewhere; for,
whereas, anywhere outside the harbour the sailors would certainly be
quartered on board, at Athens it was easy to divine that the captains
and officers would be sleeping at their homes, and the crews located
here and there in different quarters.
This minded he set sail, and when he was five or six furlongs (10)
distant from the harbour he lay on his oars and rested. But with the
first streak of dawn he led the way, the rest following. The admiral's
orders to the crews were explicit. They were on no account to sink any
merchant vessel; they were equally to avoid damaging (11) their own
vessels, but if at any point they espied a warship at her moorings they
must try and cripple her. The trading vessels, provided they had got
their cargoes on board, they must seize and tow out of the harbour;
those of larger tonnage they were to board wherever they could and
capture the crews. Some of his men actually jumped on to the Deigma
quay, (12) where they seized hold of various traders and pilots and
deposited them bodily on board ship. So the Spartan admiral carried out
his programme.
(10) Lit. "five or six stades."
(11) See Hartman, "Anal. Xen." pp. 365, 366.
(12) See Grote ("H. G." ix. 523): cf. Thuc. ii. 94, the attempt of
Brasidas on the port of Megara. For the wealth of Piraeus, Grote
"H. G." ix. 351. See below, "Pol. Ath." i. 17; "Rev." iii. 13.
As to the Athenians, meanwhile, some of them who got wind of what was
happening rushed from indoors outside to see what the commotion meant,
others from the streets home to get their arms, and others again were
off to the city with the news. The whole of Athens rallied to the rescue
at that instant, heavy infantry and cavalry alike, the apprehension
being that Piraeus was taken. But the Spartan sent off the captured
vessels to Aegina, telling off three or four of his triremes to convoy
them thither; with the rest he followed along the coast of Attica, and
emerging in seemingly innocent fashion from the harbour, captured
a number of fishing smacks, and passage boats laden with passengers
crossing to Piraeus from the islands; and finally, on reaching Sunium
he captured some merchantmen laden with corn or other merchandise. After
these performances he sailed back to Aegina, where he sold his prizes,
and with the proceeds was able to provide his troops with a month's
pay, and for the future was free to cruise about and make what reprisals
chance cast in his way. By such a procedure he was able to support a
full quota of mariners on board his squadron, and procured to himself
the prompt and enthusiastic service of his troops.
B.C. 388-387. Antalcidas had now returned from the Persian court with
Tiribazus. The negotiations had been successful. He had secured the
alliance of the Persian king and his military co-operation in case the
Athenians and their allies refused to abide by the peace which the king
dictated. But learning that his second in command, Nicolochus, was being
blockaded with his fleet by Iphicrates and Diotimus (13) in Abydos, he
set off at once by land for that city. Being come thither he took the
fleet one night and put out to sea, having first spread a story that he
had invitations from a party in Calchedon; but as a matter of fact
he came to anchorage in Percote and there kept quiet. Meanwhile the
Athenian forces under Demaenetus and Dionysius and Leontichus and
Phanias had got wind of his movement, and were in hot pursuit towards
Proconnesus. As soon as they were well past, the Spartan veered round
and returned to Abydos, trusting to information brought him of the
approach of Polyxenus with the Syracusan (14) and Italian squadron of
twenty ships, which he wished to pick up and incorporate with his own.
(13) See above; Lysias, "de bon. Arist." (Jebb, "Att. Or." i. p. 327).
(14) See below, VI. ii. 4 foll; Hicks, 71, 84, 88.
A little later the Athenian Thrasybulus (15) (of Collytus) was making
his way up with eight ships from Thrace, his object being to effect
a junction with the main Athenian squadron. The scouts signalled the
approach of eight triremes, whereupon Antalcidas, embarking his marines
on board twelve of the fastest sailers of his fleet, ordered them to
make up their full complements, where defective, from the remaining
vessels; and so lay to, skulking in his lair with all possible secrecy.
As soon as the enemy's vessels came sailing past he gave chase; and
they catching sight of him took to flight. With his swiftest sailors
he speedily overhauled their laggards, and ordering his vanguard to let
these alone, he followed hard on those ahead. But when the foremost
had fallen into his clutches, the enemy's hinder vessels, seeing their
leaders taken one by one, out of sheer despondency fell an easy prey
to the slower sailors of the foe, so that not one of the eight vessels
escaped.
(15) His name occurs on the famous stele of the new Athenian
confederacy, B.C. 378. See Hicks, 81; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 17;
Demos. "de. Cor." p. 301; Arist. "Rhet." ii. 23; Demos. "c.
Timocr." 742.
Presently the Syracusan squadron of twenty vessels joined him, and again
another squadron from Ionia, or rather so much of that district as lay
under the control of Tiribazus. The full quota of the contingent
was further made up from the territory of Ariobarzanes (which whom
Antalcidas kept up a friendship of long standing), in the absence of
Pharnabazus, who by this date had already been summoned up country on
the occasion of his marriage with the king's daughter. With this fleet,
which, from whatever sources derived, amounted to more than eighty sail,
Antalcidas ruled the seas, and was in a position not only to cut off the
passage of vessels bound to Athens from the Euxine, but to convoy them
into the harbours of Sparta's allies.
The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the growth of the enemy's
fleet, and began to fear a repetition of their former discomfiture.
To be trampled under foot by the hostile power seemed indeed no remote
possibility, now that the Lacedaemonians had procured an ally in the
person of the Persian monarch, and they were in little less than a state
of siege themselves, pestered as they were by privateers from Aegina. On
all these grounds the Athenians became passionately desirous of peace.
(16) The Lacedaemonians were equally out of humour with the war for
various reasons--what with their garrison duties, one mora at Lechaeum
and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of keeping watch and ward
on the states, if loyal not to lose them, if disaffected to prevent
their revolt; not to mention that reciprocity of annoyance (17) of which
Corinth was the centre. So again the Argives had a strong appetite for
peace; they knew that the ban had been called out against them, and,
it was plain, that no fictitious alteration of the calendar would any
longer stand them in good stead. Hence, when Tiribazus issued a summons
calling on all who were willing to listen to the terms of peace sent
down by the king (18) to present themselves, the invitation was promptly
accepted. At the opening of the conclave (19) Tiribazus pointed to
the king's seal attached to the document, and proceeded to read the
contents, which ran as follows:
(16) See, at this point, Grote on the financial condition of Athens
and the "Theorikon," "H. G." ix. 525.
(17) Or, "that give-and-take of hard knocks."
(18) See Hicks, 76.
(19) At Sardis, doubtless.
"The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in Asia, with the
islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to himself; the rest of
the Hellenic cities he thinks it just to leave independent, both small
and great, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three
are to belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties concerned
not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against him or them with
those who share my views. This will I do by land and by sea, with ships
and with money."
After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors from the
several states proceeded to report the same to their respective
governments. One and all of these took the oaths (20) to ratify and
confirm the terms unreservedly, with the exception of the Thebans,
who claimed to take the oaths in behalf of all Boeotians. This claim
Agesilaus repudiated: unless they chose to take the oaths in precise
conformity with the words of the king's edict, which insisted on "the
future autonomy of each state, small or great," he would not admit them.
To this the Theban ambassadors made no other reply, except that
the instructions they had received were different. "Pray go, then,"
Agesilaus retorted, "and ask the question; and you may inform your
countrymen that if they will not comply, they will be excluded from the
treaty." The Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of hatred
to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got the consent of
the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The offerings for crossing
the frontier were propitious, and he pushed on to Tegea. From Tegea he
despatched some of the knights right and left to visit the perioeci
and hasten their mobilisation, and at the same time sent commanders of
foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar errand. But before
he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes arrived; the point was
yielded, they would suffer the states to be independent. Under these
circumstances the Lacedaemonians returned home, and the Thebans were
forced to accept the truce unconditionally, and to recognise the
autonomy of the Boeotian cities. (21) But now the Corinthians were by
no means disposed to part with the garrison of the Argives. Accordingly
Agesilaus had a word of warning for both. To the former he said, "if
they did not forthwith dismiss the Argives," and to the latter, "if
they did not instantly quit Corinth," he would march an army into their
territories. The terror of both was so great that the Argives marched
out of Corinth, and Corinth was once again left to herself; (22)
whereupon the "butchers" (23) and their accomplices in the deed of blood
determined to retire from Corinth, and the rest of the citizens welcomed
back their late exiles voluntarily.
(20) At Sparta, doubtless.
(21) See Freeman, op. cit. pp. 168, 169.
(22) See "Ages." ii. 21; Grote, "H. G." ix. 537.
(23) {oi sphageis}, a party catchword (in reference to the incidents
narrated above, "Hell." IV. iv. 2). See below, {ton bareon
demagogon}, "Hell." V. ii. 7; {oi kedomenoi tes Peloponnesou},
"Hell." VII. v. 1; above, {oi sphageis}, "Hell." III. ii. 27, of
the philo-Laconian oligarchs in Elis. See Dem. "c. Lept." 473.
Now that the transactions were complete, and the states were bound by
their oaths to abide by the peace sent down to them by the king, the
immediate result was a general disarmament, military and naval forces
being alike disbanded; and so it was that the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians, with their allies, found themselves in the enjoyment of peace
for the first time since the period of hostilities subsequent to the
demolition of the walls of Athens. From a condition which, during
the war, can only be described as a sort of even balance with their
antagonists, the Lacedaemonians now emerged; and reached a pinnacle
of glory consequent upon the Peace of Antalcidas, (24) so called.
As guarantors of the peace presented by Hellas to the king, and as
administrators personally of the autonomy of the states, they had added
Corinth to their alliance; they had obtained the independence of
the states of Boeotia at the expense of Thebes, (25) which meant the
gratification of an old ambition; and lastly, by calling out the ban in
case the Argives refused to evacuate Corinth, they had put a stop to the
appropriation of that city by the Argives.
(24) Or, more correctly, the peace "under," or "at the date of," {ep
'Antalkidou}. See Grote, "H. G." x. 1, note 1.
(25) Or, "they had made the states of Boeotia independent of Thebes."
See Grote, "H. G." x. 44.
II
B.C. 386. Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped themselves in
conformity with the wishes of the Lacedaemonians, that they determined
to go a step farther and chastise those of their allies who either had
borne hard on them during the war, or otherwise had shown themselves
less favourable to Lacedaemon than to her enemies. (1) Chastisement was
not all; they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as
should render the like disloyalty impossible again. (2) As the first
step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the
Mantinaeans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole ground
that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with their enemies.
Many things in their conduct, they alleged, from time to time, had not
escaped their notice: their frequent despatches of corn to the Argives
while at war with Lacedaemon; at other times their refusal to furnish
contingents during a campaign, on the pretext of some holy truce or
other; (3) or if they did reluctantly take the field--the miserable
inefficiency of their service. "But, more than that," they added, "we
note the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune which may betide
our state; the extravagant pleasure (4) you exhibit at the sudden
descent of some disaster."
(1) See Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 367 foll.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 129
foll.
(2) Or, "they determined to chastise... and reduce to such order
that disloyalty should be impossible."
(3) See above, "Hell." IV. ii. 16.
(4) Ib. IV. v. 18.
This very year, moreover, it was commonly said, (5) saw the expiration,
as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of the thirty years' truce,
consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. On their refusal, therefore,
to raze their fortification walls the ban was called out against them.
Agesilaus begged the state to absolve him from the conduct of this war
on the plea that the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to
his father (6) in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the
expedition--in spite of the cordial relations of his father Pausanias
(7) with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea.
(5) As to this point, see Curtius, "H. G." V. v. (iv. 305 note, Eng.
trans.) There appears to be some confusion. According to Thuc. v.
81, "When the Argives deserted the alliance (with Mantinea,
Athens, and Elis, making a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon
for fifty years) the Mantineans held out for a time, but without
the Argives they were helpless, and so they came to terms with the
Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claims to supremacy over the
cities in Arcadia, which had been subject to them.... These
changes were effected at the close of winter (418 B.C.) towards
the approach of spring (417 B.C.), and so ended the fourteenth
year of the war." Jowett. According to Diod. xv. 5, the
Lacedaemonians attacked Mantinea within two years after the Peace
of Antalcidas, apparently in 386 B.C. According to Thuc. v. 82,
and "C. I. A. 50, in B.C. 417 Argos had reverted to her alliance
with Athens, and an attempt to connect the city with the sea by
long walls was made, certain other states in Peloponnese being
privy to the project" (Thuc. v. 83)--an attempt frustrated by
Lacedaemon early in B.C. 416. Is it possible that a treaty of
alliance between Mantinea and Lacedaemon for thirty years was
formally signed in B.C. 416?
(6) I.e. Archidamus.
(7) See above, "Hell." III. v. 25.
B.C. 385. The first move of the invader was to subject the enemy's
territory to devastation; but failing by such means to induce them to
raze their walls, he proceeded to draw lines of circumvallation round
the city, keeping half his troops under arms to screen the entrenching
parties whilst the other half pushed on the work with the spade. As soon
as the trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty in
building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the existence of a
huge supply of corn inside the town, the result of the bountiful harvest
of the preceding year, and averse to the notion of wearing out the city
of Lacedaemon and her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit upon the
expedient of damming up the river which flowed through the town.
It was a stream of no inconsiderable size. (8) By erecting a barrier at
its exit from the town he caused the water to rise above the basements
of the private dwellings and the foundations of the fortification walls.
Then, as the lower layers of bricks became saturated and refused their
support to the rows above, the wall began to crack and soon to totter
to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop it with pieces
of timber, and used other devices to avert the imminent ruin of their
tower; but finding themselves overmatched by the water, and in dread
lest the fall at some point or other of the circular wall (9) might
deliver them captive to the spear of the enemy, they signified their
consent to raze their walls. But the Lacedaemonians now steadily refused
any form of truce, except on the further condition that the Mantineans
would suffer themselves to be broken up and distributed into villages.
They, looking the necessity in the face, consented to do even that. The
sympathisers with Argos among them, and the leaders of their democracy,
thought their fate was sealed. Then the father treated with the son,
Pausanias with Agesipolis, on their behalf, and obtained immunity for
them--sixty in number--on condition that they should quit the city. The
Lacedaemonian troops stood lining the road on both sides, beginning
from the gates, and watched the outgoers; and with their spears in
their hands, in spite of bitter hatred, kept aloof from them with less
difficulty than the Mantineans of the better classes themselves--a
weighty testimony to the power of Spartan discipline, be it said. In
conclusion, the wall was razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts,
(10) assuming once again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants.
The first feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down
their present houses and erecting others, yet when the owners (11)
found themselves located so much nearer their estates round about the
villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid for ever of
"those troublesome demagogues," they were delighted with the turn which
affairs had taken. It became the custom for Sparta to send them, not one
commander of contingents, (12) but four, one for each village; and the
zeal displayed, now that the quotas for military service were furnished
from the several village centres, was far greater than it had been under
the democratic system. So the transactions in connection with Mantinea
were brought to a conclusion, and thereby one lesson of wisdom was
taught mankind--not to conduct a river through a fortress town.
(8) I.e. the Ophis. See Leake, "Morea," III. xxiv. p. 71; Pausan.
"Arcad." 8; Grote, "H. G." x. 48, note 2.
(9) Or, "in the circuit of the wall."
(10) See Diod. xv. 5; Strab. viii. 337; Ephor. fr. 138, ed. Did.; and
Grote, "H. G." x. 51.
(11) Or, "holders of properties." The historian is referring not to
the population at large, I think, but to the rich landowners, i.e.
the {Beltistoi}, and is not so partial as Grote supposes ("H. G."
x. 51 foll.)
(12) Technically {zenagoi}, Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the
contingents of the several allies. See above, "Hell." III. v. 7;
Thuc. ii. 76; and Arnold's note ad loc.; also C. R. Kennedy, "ap.
Dict. of Greek and Roman Antiquities," s.v.; Muller, "Dorians,"
ii. 250, Eng. tr.; Busolt, "Die Lak." p. 125.
B.C. 384-383. To pass on. The party in exile from Phlius, seeing the
severe scrutiny to which the behaviour of the allies of Lacedaemon
during the late war was being subjected, felt that their opportunity had
come. They repaired to Lacedaemon, and laid great emphasis on the fact
that, so long as they had been in power themselves at home, "their
city used to welcome Lacedaemonians within her walls, and her citizens
flocked to the campaign under their leadership; but no sooner had they
been driven into exile than a change had come. The men of Phlius now
flatly refused to follow Lacedaemon anywhere; the Lacedaemonians, alone
of all men living, must not be admitted within their gates." After
listening to their story, the ephors agreed that the matter demanded
attention. Then they sent to the state of Phlius a message to this
effect; the Phliasian exiles were friends of Lacedaemon; nor did
it appear that they owed their exile to any misdoing. Under the
circumstances, Lacedaemon claimed their recall from banishment, not by
force, but as a concession voluntarily granted. When the matter was thus
stated, the Phliasians were not without alarm that an army might much
upon Phlius, and a party inside the town might admit the enemy within
the walls; for within the walls of Phlius were to be found many who,
either as blood relations or for other reasons, were partisans of the
exiles, and as so often happens, at any rate in the majority of states,
there was a revolutionary party who, in their ardour to reform, would
welcome gladly their restoration. Owing to fears of this character, a
formal decree was passed: to welcome home the exiles, and to restore
to them all undisputed property, the purchasers of the same being
indemnified from the treasury of the state; and in the event of any
ambiguity or question arising between the parties, the same to be
determined before a court of justice. Such was the position of affairs
in connection with the Phliasian exiles at the date in question.
B.C. 383. (13) And now from yet another quarter ambassadors arrived at
Lacedaemon: that is to say, from Acanthus and Apollonia, the two largest
and most important states of the Olynthian confederacy. The ephorate,
after learning from them the object of their visit, presented them to
the assembly and the allies, in presence of whom Cleigenes of Acanthus
made a speech to this effect:
(13) Al. B.C. 382.
"Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states," he said, "are you aware of
a silent but portentous growth within the bosom of Hellas? (14) Few here
need to be told that for size and importance Olynthus now stands at
the head of the Thracian cities. But are you aware that the citizens of
Olynthus had already brought over several states by the bribe of joint
citizenship and common laws; that they have forcibly annexed some of the
larger states; and that, so encouraged, they have taken in hand
further to free the cities of Macedonia from Amyntas the king of the
Macedonians; that, as soon as their immediate neighbours had shown
compliance, they at once proceeded to attack larger and more distant
communities; so much so, that when we started to come hither, we left
them masters not only of many other places, but of Pella itself, the
capital of Macedonia. Amyntas, (15) we saw plainly, must ere long
withdraw from his cities, and was in fact already all but in name an
outcast from Macedonia.
(14) Or, "are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas?"
(15) For Amyntas's reign, see Diod. xiv. 89, 92; xv. 19; Isocr.
"Panegyr." 126, "Archid." 46.
"The Olynthians have actually sent to ourselves and to the men of
Apollonia a joint embassy, warning us of their intention to attack us if
we refuse to present ourselves at Olynthus with a military contingent.
Now, for our parts, men of Lacedaemon, we desire nothing better than to
abide by our ancestral laws and institutions, to be free and independent
citizens; but if aid from without is going to fail us, we too must
follow the rest and coalesce with the Olynthians. Why, even now they
muster no less than eight hundred (16) heavy infantry and a considerably
larger body of light infantry, while their cavalry, when we have joined
them, will exceed one thousand men. At the date of our departure we left
embassies from Athens and Boeotia in Olynthus, and we were told that
the Olynthians themselves had passed a formal resolution to return the
compliment. They were to send an embassy on their side to the aforesaid
states to treat of an alliance. And yet, if the power of the Athenians
and the Thebans is to be further increased by such an accession of
strength, look to it," the speaker added, "whether hereafter you will
find things so easy to manage in that quarter.
(16) See Grote, "H. G." x. 72; Thirlwall, "H. G." v. 12 (ch. xxxvii).
"They hold Potidaea, the key to the isthmus of Pallene, and therefore,
you can well believe, they can command the states within that peninsula.
If you want any further proof of the abject terror of those states, you
have it in the fact that notwithstanding the bitter hatred which they
bear to Olynthus, not one of them has dared to send ambassadors along
with us to apprise you of these matters.
"Reflect, how you can reconcile your anxiety to prevent the unification
of Boeotia with your neglect to hinder the solidifying of a far larger
power--a power destined, moreover, to become formidable not on land
only, but by sea? For what is to stop it, when the soil itself supplies
timber for shipbuilding, (17) and there are rich revenues derived
from numerous harbours and commercial centres?--it cannot but be that
abundance of food and abundance of population will go hand in hand. Nor
have we yet reached the limits of Olynthian expansion; there are their
neighbours to be thought of--the kingless or independent Thracians.
These are already to-day the devoted servants of Olynthus, and when it
comes to their being actually under her, that means at once another vast
accession of strength to her. With the Thracians in her train, the gold
mines of Pangaeus would stretch out to her the hand of welcome.
(17) See Hicks, 74, for a treaty between Amyntas and the Chalcidians,
B.C. 390-389: "The article of the treaty between Amyntas III.,
father of Philip, and the Chalcidians, about timber, etc., reminds
us that South Macedonia, the Chalcidic peninsula, and Amphipolis
were the chief sources whence Athens derived timber for her
dockyards." Thuc. iv. 108; Diod. xx. 46; Boeckh, "P. E. A." p.
250; and for a treaty between Athens and Amyntas, B.C. 382, see
Hicks, 77; Kohler, "C. I. A." ii. 397, 423.
"In making these assertions, we are but uttering remarks ten thousand
times repeated in the democracy of Olynthus. And as to their confident
spirit, who shall attempt to describe it? It is God, for aught I know,
who, with the growth of a new capacity, gives increase also to the proud
thoughts and vast designs of humanity. For ourselves, men of Lacedaemon
and of the allied states, our task is completed. We have played our
parts in announcing to you how things stand there. To you it is left to
determine whether what we have described is worthy of your concern. One
only thing further you ought to recognise: the power we have spoken
of as great is not as yet invincible, for those states which are
involuntary participants in the citizenship of Olynthus will, in
prospect of any rival power appearing in the field, speedily fall away.
On the contrary, let them be once closely knit and welded together
by the privileges of intermarriage and reciprocal rights of holding
property in land--which have already become enactments; let them
discover that it is a gain to them to follow in the wake of conquerors
(just as the Arcadians, (18) for instance, find it profitable to march
in your ranks, whereby they save their own property and pillage their
neighbours'); let these things come to pass, and perhaps you may find
the knot no longer so easy to unloose."
(18) For the point of the comparison, see Freeman, "Hist. Fed. Gov."
ch. iv. "Real nature of the Olynthian scheme," pp. 190 foll., and
note 2, p. 197; also Grote, "H. G." x. 67 foll., 278 foll.
At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedaemonians requested the
allies to speak, bidding them give their joint advice as to the best
course to be pursued in the interests of Peloponnese and the allies.
Thereupon many members, and especially those who wished to gratify
the Lacedaemonians, agreed in counselling active measures; and it was
resolved that the states should severally send contingents to form a
total of ten thousand men. Proposals were also made to allow any state,
so wishing, to give money instead of men, at the rate of three Aeginetan
obols (19) a day per man; or where the contingent consisted of cavalry,
the pay given for one horseman was to be the equivalent to that of
four hoplites; while, in the event of any defaulting in service, the
Lacedaemonians should be allowed to mulct the said state of a stater
per man per diem. These resolutions were passed, and the deputies
from Acanthus rose again. They argued that, though excellent, these
resolutions were not of a nature to be rapidly carried into effect.
Would it not be better, they asked, pending the mobilisation of the
troops, to despatch an officer at once in command of a force from
Lacedaemon and the other states, not too large to start immediately. The
effect would be instantaneous, for the states which had not yet given in
their adhesion to Olynthus would be brought to a standstill, and those
already forcibly enrolled would be shaken in their alliance. These
further resolutions being also passed, the Lacedaemonians despatched
Eudamidas, accompanied by a body of neodamodes, with perioeci and
Sciritae, (20) to the number of two thousand odd. Eudamidas lost no time
in setting out, having obtained leave from the ephors for his brother
Phoebidas to follow later with the remainder of the troops assigned
to him. Pushing on himself to the Thracian territory, he set about
despatching garrisons to various cities at their request. He also
secured the voluntary adhesion of Potidaea, although already a member
of the Olynthian alliance; and this town now served as his base of
operations for carrying on war on a scale adapted to his somewhat
limited armament.
(19) I.e. "rather more than sixpence a day for a hoplite, and two
shillings for a horseman." "The Aeginetan stater weighed about 196
grains, rather more than two of our shillings, and was divided
into two drachms of 98 grains, each of which contained six obols
of about 16 grains each." See Percy Gardner, "Types of Greek
Coins," "Hist. Int." p. 8; Jowett, note to Thuc. III. lxx. 4, vol.
i. pp. 201, 202.
(20) Or, "new citizens, provincials, and Sciritae."
Phoebidas, when the remaining portion of his brother's forces was duly
mustered, put himself at their head and commenced his march. On reaching
Thebes the troops encamped outside the city, round the gymnasium.
Faction was rife within the city. The two polemarchs in office, Ismenias
and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed, (21) being the respective
heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, while
Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, would not come
anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, on the other hand,
was assiduous in courting him; and when a sufficient intimacy was
established between them, he made a proposal as follows: "You have it
in your power," he said, addressing Phoebidas, "this very day to confer
supreme benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and I
will introduce you into the citadel. That done, you may rest assured
Thebes will be completely under the thumb of Lacedaemon and of us, your
friends. At present, as you see, there is a proclamation forbidding any
Theban to take service with you against Olynthus, but we will change all
that. You have only to act with us as we suggest, and we shall at once
be able to furnish you with large supplies of infantry and cavalry, so
that you will join your brother with a magnificent reinforcement, and
pending his proposed reduction of Olynthus, you will have accomplished
the reduction of a far larger state than that--to wit, this city of Thebes." |
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