|
The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the
wings, seeing
their centre warmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in
flank.
Hannibal’s main body, after a brave resistance, finding
themselves
furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered by
numbers;
and retired through the interval they had left in the centre of the
line.
The Romans having pursued them thither with eager confusion, the two
wings
of the African infantry, which were fresh, well armed, and in good
order,
wheeled about on a sudden towards that void space in which the Romans,
who
were already fatigued, had thrown themselves in disorder; and
attacked
them vigorously on both sides, without allowing them time to
recover
themselves, or leaving them ground to draw up. In the mean time, the
two
wings of the cavalry, having defeated those of the Romans, which were
much
inferior to them, and having left in the pursuit of the broken
and
scattered squadrons, only as many forces as were necessary to keep
them
from rallying, advanced and charged the rear of the Roman infantry,
which
being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy’s horse and foot
was
all cut to pieces, after having fought with unparalleled bravery.
Æmilius
being covered with the wounds he had received in the fight, was
afterwards
killed by a body of the enemy to whom he was not known; and with
him two
quæstors; one and twenty military tribunes; many who had been
either
consuls or prætors; Servilius, one of the last year’s consuls;
Minucius,
the late general of horse to Fabius; and fourscore senators. Above
seventy
thousand men fell in this battle;(769) and the Carthaginians, so
great was
their fury,(770) did not give over the slaughter, till Hannibal, in
the
very heat of it, called out to them several times; “Stop, soldiers,
spare
the vanquished.” Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the
camp,
surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro the
consul
retired to Venusia, with only seventy horse; and about four thousand
men
escaped into the neighbouring cities. Thus Hannibal remained master of
the
field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his
former
victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Romans.
He
lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and
two
hundred horse.
Maharbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised
Hannibal to march
without loss of time directly to Rome, promising him, that
within five
days they should sup in the Capitol. Hannibal answering, that it
was an
affair which required mature deliberation; “I see,” replies
Maharbal,
“that the gods have not endowed the same man with all talents.
You,
Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of
a
victory.”(771)
It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the
empire. Many authors,
and among the rest Livy, charge Hannibal, on this
occasion, as being
guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are
not for
condemning, without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who in the
rest
of his conduct was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of
the
best expedients, or in readiness to put his designs in execution.
They,
besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority,
or
at least the silence, of Polybius, who, speaking of the
memorable
consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the
Carthaginians were
firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of
Rome at the first
assault; but then he does not mention how this could
possibly have been
effected, as that city was very populous, warlike,
strongly fortified, and
defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he
any where give the
least hint that such a project was feasible, or that
Hannibal did wrong in
not attempting to put it in execution.
And
indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that
according to
the common maxims of war it could not be undertaken. It is
certain, that
Hannibal’s whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but
to forty thousand
men; and, as six thousand of these had been slain in the
action, and
doubtless, many more wounded and disabled, there could remain
but six or
seven and twenty thousand foot fit for service; now this number
was not
sufficient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river
running
through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither
engines,
ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a
siege. For want
of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymenus,
miscarried in his
attempt upon Spoletum;(772) and soon after the battle of
Cannæ, was forced to
raise the siege of a little city,(773) of no note,
and of no great strength.
It cannot be denied, but that had he miscarried
on the present occasion,
nothing less could have been expected but that he
must have been
irrecoverably lost. However, to form a just judgment of
this matter, a man
ought to be a soldier, and a soldier, perhaps, of those
times. This is an old
dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly
well skilled in the art of
war should pretend to give their opinion.
Soon after the battle of Cannæ,
Hannibal had despatched his brother Mago
to Carthage, with the news of his
victory, and at the same time to demand
succours, in order that he might be
enabled to put an end to the war.(774)
Mago, on his arrival, made, in full
senate, a lofty speech, in which he
extolled his brother’s exploits, and
displayed the great advantages he had
gained over the Romans. And, to give a
more lively idea of the greatness
of the victory, by speaking in some measure
to the eye, he poured out, in
the middle of the senate, a bushel(775) of gold
rings, which had been
taken from the fingers of such of the Roman nobility as
had fallen in the
battle of Cannæ. He concluded with demanding money,
provisions, and fresh
troops. All the spectators were struck with an
extraordinary joy; upon
which Imilcon, a great stickler for Hannibal,
fancying he had now a fair
opportunity to insult Hanno, the chief of the
contrary faction, asked him,
whether he was still dissatisfied with the war
they were carrying on
against the Romans, and was for having Hannibal
delivered up to them?
Hanno, without discovering the least emotion, replied,
that he was still
of the same mind; and that the victories of which they so
much boasted
(supposing them real) could not give him joy, but only in
proportion as
they should be made subservient to an advantageous peace: he
then
undertook to prove, that the mighty exploits, on which they insisted
so
much, were wholly chimerical and imaginary. “I have cut to pieces,”
says
he (continuing Mago’s speech,) “the Roman armies: send me
some
troops.—What more could you ask had you been conquered? I have
twice
seized upon the enemy’s camp, full (no doubt) of provisions of
every
kind.—Send me provisions and money.—Could you have talked otherwise
had
you lost your camp?” He then asked Mago, whether any of the Latin
nations
had come over to Hannibal, and whether the Romans had made him
any
proposals of peace? To this Mago answering in the negative: “I
then
perceive,” replied Hanno, “that we are no farther advanced, than
when
Hannibal first landed in Italy.” The inference he drew from hence
was,
that neither men nor money ought to be sent. But Hannibal’s
faction
prevailing at that time, no regard was paid to Hanno’s
remonstrances,
which were considered merely as the effect of prejudice and
jealousy; and,
accordingly, orders were given for levying, without delay, the
supplies of
men and money which Hannibal required. Mago set out immediately
for Spain,
to raise twenty-four thousand foot, and four thousand horse in
that
country; but these levies were afterwards stopped, and sent to
another
quarter; so eager was the contrary faction to oppose the designs of
a
general whom they utterly abhorred. While in Rome, a consul,(776) who
had
fled, was thanked because he had not despaired of the commonwealth;
at
Carthage, people were almost angry with Hannibal, for being
victorious.
But Hanno could never forgive him the advantages he had gained in
this
war, because he had undertaken it in opposition to his counsel. Thus
being
more jealous for the honour of his own opinions than for the good of
his
country, and a greater enemy to the Carthaginian general than to
the
Romans, he did all that lay in his power to prevent future success, and
to
render of no avail that which had been already gained.
_Hannibal
takes up his Winter Quarters in Capua._(_777_)—The battle of
Cannæ subjected
the most powerful nations of Italy to Hannibal, drew over
to his interest
Græcia Magna,(778) with the city of Tarentum; and thus
wrested from the
Romans their most ancient allies, among whom the Capuans
held the first rank.
This city, by the fertility of its soil, its
advantageous situation, and the
blessings of a long peace, had risen to
great wealth and power. Luxury, and a
fondness for pleasure, (the usual
attendants on wealth,) had corrupted the
minds of all its citizens, who,
from their natural inclination, were but too
much inclined to
voluptuousness and excess.
Hannibal(779) made choice
of this city for his winter quarters. Here it
was that those soldiers, who
had sustained the most grievous toils, and
braved the most formidable
dangers, were overthrown by abundance and a
profusion of luxuries, into which
they plunged with the greater eagerness,
as they, till then, had been
strangers to them. Their courage was so
greatly enervated in this bewitching
retirement, that all their after
efforts were owing rather to the fame and
splendour of their former
victories than to their present strength. When
Hannibal marched his forces
out of the city, one would have taken them for
other men, and the reverse
of those who had so lately marched into it.
Accustomed, during the winter
season, to commodious lodgings, to ease and
plenty, they were no longer
able to bear hunger, thirst, long marches,
watchings, and the other toils
of war; not to mention that all obedience, all
discipline, were entirely
laid aside.
I only transcribe on this
occasion from Livy. If we are to adopt his
opinion on this subject,
Hannibal’s stay at Capua was a capital blemish in
his conduct; and he
pretends, that this general was guilty of an
infinitely greater error, than
when he neglected to march directly to Rome
after the battle of Cannæ. For
this delay,(780) says Livy, might seem only
to have retarded his victory;
whereas this last misconduct rendered him
absolutely incapable of ever
defeating the enemy. In a word, as Marcellus
observed judiciously afterwards,
Capua was to the Carthaginians and their
general, what Cannæ(781) had been to
the Romans. There their martial
genius, their love of discipline, were lost:
there their former fame, and
their almost certain hopes of future glory,
vanished at once. And, indeed,
from thenceforth the affairs of Hannibal
advanced to their decline by
swift steps; fortune declared in favour of
prudence, and victory seemed
now reconciled to the Romans.
I know not
whether Livy has just ground to impute all these fatal
consequences to the
delicious abode of Capua. If we examine carefully all
the circumstances of
this history, we shall scarce be able to persuade
ourselves, that the little
progress which was afterwards made by the arms
of Hannibal, ought to be
ascribed to his wintering at Capua. It might,
indeed, have been one cause,
but a very inconsiderable one: and the
bravery with which the forces of
Hannibal afterwards defeated the armies
of consuls and prætors; the towns
they took even in sight of the Romans;
their maintaining their conquests so
vigorously, and staying fourteen
years after this in Italy, in spite of the
Romans: all these circumstances
may induce us to believe, that Livy lays too
great a stress on the
delights of Capua.
The real cause of the decline
of Hannibal’s affairs, was owing to his want
of necessary recruits and
succours from Carthage. After Mago’s speech, the
Carthaginian senate had
judged it necessary,(782) in order for the
carrying on the conquests in
Italy, to send thither a considerable
reinforcement of Numidian horse, forty
elephants, and a thousand talents;
and to hire, in Spain, twenty thousand
foot, and four thousand horse, to
reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy.
Nevertheless, Mago could obtain
an order but for twelve thousand foot, and
two thousand five hundred
horse:(783) and even when he was just going to
march to Italy with this
reinforcement, so much inferior to that which had
been promised him, he
was countermanded and sent to Spain. So that Hannibal,
after these mighty
promises, had neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor
money sent him;
but was left to depend upon his own personal resources. His
army was now
reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse.
How could it
be possible for him, with so inconsiderable an army, to seize,
in an
enemy’s country, on all the advantageous posts; to awe his new allies;
to
preserve his old conquests and form new ones; and to keep the field,
with
advantage, against two armies of the Romans which were recruited
every
year? This was the true cause of the declension of Hannibal’s affairs,
and
of the ruin of those of Carthage. Was the part where Polybius treated
this
subject extant, we doubtless should find, that he lays a greater stress
on
this cause, than on the luxurious delights of Capua.
(M123)
_Transactions relating to Spain and Sardinia._(_784_)—The two
Scipios still
continued in the command of Spain, and their arms were
making a considerable
progress there, when Asdrubal, who alone seemed able
to cope with them,
received orders from Carthage to march into Italy to
the relief of his
brother. Before he left Spain, he writ to the senate, to
convince them of the
absolute necessity of their sending a general in his
stead, who was capable
of making head against the Romans. Imilcon was
therefore sent thither with an
army; and Asdrubal set out upon his march
with his, in order to go and join
his brother. The news of his departure
was no sooner known, than the greatest
part of Spain was subjected by the
Scipios. These two generals, animated by
such signal success, resolved to
prevent him, if possible, from leaving
Spain. They considered the danger
to which the Romans would be exposed, if,
being scarce able to resist
Hannibal alone, they should be attacked by the
two brothers, at the head
of two powerful armies. They therefore pursued
Asdrubal, and, coming up
with that general, forced him to fight against his
inclination. Asdrubal
was overcome; and, so far from being able to continue
his march for Italy,
he found that it would be impossible for him to continue
with any safety
in Spain.
The Carthaginians had no better success in
Sardinia. Designing to take
advantage of some rebellions which they had
fomented in that country, they
lost twelve thousand men in a battle fought
against the Romans, who took a
still greater number of prisoners, among whom
were Asdrubal, surnamed
Calvus, Hanno, and Mago,(785) who were distinguished
by their birth as
well as military exploits.
(M124) _The ill Success
of Hannibal. The Sieges of Capua and
Rome._(_786_)—From the time of
Hannibal’s abode in Capua, the Carthaginian
affairs in Italy no longer
supported their former reputation. M.
Marcellus, first as prætor, and
afterwards as consul, had contributed very
much to this revolution. He
harassed Hannibal’s army on every occasion,
seized upon his quarters, forced
him to raise sieges, and even defeated
him in several engagements; so that he
was called the Sword of Rome, as
Fabius had before been named its
Buckler.
(M125) But what most affected the Carthaginian general, was, to
see Capua
besieged by the Romans. In order, therefore, to preserve his
reputation
among his allies, by a vigorous support of those who held the
chief rank
as such, he flew to the relief of that city, brought forward his
forces,
attacked the Romans, and fought several battles to oblige them to
raise
the siege. (M126) At last, seeing all his measures defeated, he
marched
hastily towards Rome, in order to make a powerful diversion. He was
not
without hope of being able, in case he could have an opportunity, in
the
first consternation, to storm some part of the city, of drawing the
Roman
generals with all their forces from the siege of Capua, to the relief
of
their capital; at least he flattered himself, that if, for the sake
of
continuing the siege, they should divide their forces, their
weakness
might then offer an occasion, either to the Capuans or himself,
of
engaging and defeating them. Rome was surprised, but not confounded.
A
proposal being made by one of the senators, to recall all the armies
to
succour Rome; Fabius(787) declared, that it would be shameful in them
to
be terrified, and forced to change their measures upon every motion
of
Hannibal. They therefore contented themselves with only recalling part
of
the army, and one of the generals, Q. Fulvius the proconsul, from
the
siege. Hannibal, after making some devastations, drew up his army in
order
of battle before the city, and the consul did the same. Both sides
were
preparing to signalize themselves in a battle, of which Rome was to be
the
recompense, when a violent storm obliged them to separate. They were
no
sooner returned to their respective camps, than the face of the
heavens
grew calm and serene. The same incident happened frequently
afterwards;
insomuch that Hannibal, believing that there was something
supernatural in
the event, said, according to Livy, that sometimes(788) his
own will, and
sometimes fortune, would not suffer him to take
Rome.
But the circumstance which most surprised and intimidated him, was
the
news, that, whilst he lay encamped at one of the gates of Rome, the
Romans
had sent out recruits for the army in Spain at another gate; and that
the
ground, whereon his camp was pitched, had been sold, notwithstanding
that
circumstance, for its full value. So barefaced a contempt stung
Hannibal
to the quick; he, therefore, on the other side, put up to auction
the
shops of the goldsmiths round the Forum. After this bravado he
retired,
and, in his march, plundered the rich temple of the goddess
Feronia.(789)
Capua, thus left to itself, held out but very little
longer. After that
such of its senators as had the chief hand in the revolt,
and consequently
could not expect any quarter from the Romans, had put
themselves to a
truly tragical death,(790) the city surrendered at
discretion. The success
of this siege, which, by the happy consequences
wherewith it was attended,
proved decisive, and fully restored to the Romans
their superiority over
the Carthaginians; displayed, at the same time, how
formidable the power
of the Romans was,(791) when they undertook to punish
their perfidious
allies; and the feeble protection which Hannibal could
afford his friends
at a time when they most wanted it.
(M127) _The
Defeat and Death of the two Scipios in Spain._(_792_)—The face
of affairs was
very much changed in Spain. The Carthaginians had three
armies in that
country; one commanded by Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo; the
second by Asdrubal,
son of Hamilcar; and a third under Mago, who had
joined the first Asdrubal.
The two Scipios, Cneus and Publius, were for
dividing their forces, and
attacking the enemy separately, which was the
cause of their ruin. They
agreed that Cneus, with a small number of
Romans, and thirty thousand
Celtiberians, should march against Asdrubal,
the son of Hamilcar; whilst
Publius, with the remainder of the forces,
composed of Romans and the Italian
allies, should advance against the
other two generals.
Publius was
vanquished first. To the two leaders whom he had to oppose,
Masinissa, elate
with the victories he had lately gained over Syphax,
joined himself; and was
to be soon followed by Indibilis, a powerful
Spanish prince. The armies came
to an engagement. The Romans, being thus
attacked on all sides at once, made
a brave resistance as long as they had
their general at their head; but the
moment he fell, the few troops which
had escaped the slaughter, secured
themselves by flight.
The three victorious armies marched immediately in
quest of Cneus, in
order to put an end to the war by his defeat. He was
already more than
half vanquished by the desertion of his allies, who all
forsook him; and
left to the Roman generals this important instruction;(793)
_viz._ never
to let their own forces be exceeded in number by those of
foreigners. He
guessed that his brother was slain, and his army defeated,
upon seeing
such great bodies of the enemy arrive. He survived him but a
short time,
being killed in the engagement. These two great men were equally
lamented
by their citizens and allies; and Spain deeply felt their loss,
because of
the justice and moderation of their conduct.
These
extensive countries seemed now inevitably lost; but the valour of
L.
Marcius,(794) a private officer of the equestrian order, preserved them
to
the Romans. Shortly after this, the younger Scipio was sent thither,
who
severely revenged the death of his father and uncle, and restored
the
affairs of the Romans in Spain to their former flourishing
condition.
(M128) _The Defeat and Death of Asdrubal._(_795_)—One
unforeseen defeat
ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of
Hannibal with regard
to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the
eleventh of the second
Punic war, (for I pass over several events for
brevity’s sake,) were C.
Claudius Nero, and M. Livius. The latter had, for
his province, the
Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it
was reported, was
preparing to pass the Alps. The former commanded in the
country of the
Brutians, and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity
of Italy, and
was there making head against Hannibal.
The passage of
the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his
brother had cleared
the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to
receive him. Some time
after this, he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but
they were intercepted.
Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was
hastening to join his brother
in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so important
a nature as this, when the safety
of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself
at liberty to dispense with the
established rules(796) of his duty, for
the welfare of his country. In
consequence of this, it was his opinion,
that such a bold and unexpected blow
ought to be struck, as might be
capable of striking terror into the enemy; by
marching to join his
colleague, in order that they might charge Asdrubal
unexpectedly with
their united forces. This design, if the several
circumstances of it are
thoroughly examined, should not be hastily charged
with imprudence. To
prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was
to save the state.
Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should
be informed of
the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of
forty-two
thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own
detachment, which
indeed were the flower of his troops, but, at the same
time, a very
inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp,
which was
advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now could it be
supposed
that Hannibal would attack, and force a strong camp defended
by
thirty-five thousand men?
Nero set out without giving his soldiers
the least notice of his design.
When he had advanced so far, as that it might
be communicated without any
danger, he told them, that he was leading them to
certain victory: that,
in war, all things depended upon reputation; that the
bare rumour of their
arrival would disconcert all the measures of the
Carthaginians; and that
the whole honour of this battle would fall to
them.
They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other
consul in
the night, but did not pitch separate camps, the better to impose
upon the
enemy. The troops which were newly arrived joined those of Livius.
The
army of Porcius the prætor was encamped near that of the consul, and
in
the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that
it
would be better to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves;
but
Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which
despatch
only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the
enemy,
as well absent as present. This advice was complied with, and
accordingly
the signal for battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his
foremost
ranks, discovered, by several circumstances, that fresh troops
were
arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other
consul.
This made him conjecture, that his brother had sustained a
considerable
loss, and, at the same time, fear, that he was come too late to
his
assistance.
After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to
be sounded, and his
army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking
him, and his
guides deserting, he was uncertain what way to go. He marched at
random,
along the banks of the river Metaurus,(797) and was preparing to
cross it,
when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this
extremity, he
saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an
engagement; and
therefore did every thing which could be expected from the
presence of
mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous
post, and
drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity
of
posting his left wing (the weakest part of his army) in such a
manner,
that it could neither be attacked in front, nor charged in flank; and
of
giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front.
After
this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre,
and
was the first to march to attack the enemy’s left wing; well knowing
that
all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The
battle
lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed by both
parties.
Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and
added new
glory to that he had already acquired by a series of shining
actions. He
led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an
enemy
superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by
his
words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and
menaces,
endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing
that
victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss
of
so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow his
fortune,
he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died
in a
manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of
Hannibal.
This was the most bloody battle the Carthaginians had fought
during this
war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the
slaughter
made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a
reprisal for
the battle of Cannæ. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand
men,(798)
and six thousand were taken prisoners. The Romans lost eight
thousand.
These were so weary of killing, that some person telling Livius,
that he
might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying:
“It
is fit,” says he, “that some should survive, in order that they may
carry
the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians.”
Nero set out upon
his march, on the very night which followed the
engagement. Through every
place where he passed, in his return, shouts of
joy and loud acclamations
welcomed him, instead of those fears and
uneasiness which his coming had
occasioned. He arrived in his camp the
sixth day. Asdrubal’s head being
thrown into the camp of the
Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother’s
unhappy fate. Hannibal
perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of
Carthage: “All is over,”
says he,(799) “I shall no longer send triumphant
messages to Carthage. In
losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope,
all my good fortune.” He
afterwards retired to the extremities of the country
of the Brutians,
where he assembled all his forces, who found it a very
difficult matter to
subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from
Carthage.
(M129) _Scipio conquers all Spain. Is appointed Consul, and
sails into
Africa. Hannibal is recalled._(_800_)—The fate of arms was not
more
propitious to the Carthaginians in Spain. The prudent vivacity of
young
Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their
former
flourishing state, as the courageous slowness of Fabius had before
done in
Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of
Gisco,
Hanno, and Mago, having been defeated with their numerous armies by
the
Romans in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of
Spain,
and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time
that
Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans,
and
Syphax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians.
(M130) Scipio, at
his return to Rome, was declared consul, being then
thirty years of age. He
had P. Licinius Crassus for his colleague. Sicily
was allotted to Scipio,
with permission for him to cross into Africa, if
he found it convenient. He
set out with all imaginable expedition for his
province; whilst his colleague
was to command in the country whither
Hannibal was retired.
The taking
of New Carthage, where Scipio had displayed all the prudence,
the courage,
and capacity which could have been expected from the greatest
generals, and
the conquest of all Spain, were more than sufficient to
immortalize his name:
but he had considered these only as so many steps by
which he was to climb to
a nobler enterprise: this was the conquest of
Africa. Accordingly, he crossed
over thither, and made it the seat of the
war.
The devastation of the
country, the siege of Utica, one of the strongest
cities of Africa; the
entire defeat of the two armies under Syphax and
Asdrubal, whose camp was
burnt by Scipio; and afterwards the taking Syphax
himself prisoner, who was
the most powerful resource the Carthaginians had
left; all these things
forced them at last to turn their thoughts to
peace. For this purpose they
deputed thirty of their principal senators,
who were selected from that
powerful body at Carthage, called the _council
of the hundred_. Being
introduced into the Roman general’s tent, they all
threw themselves prostrate
on the earth, (such was the custom of their
country,) spoke to him in terms
of great submission, accusing Hannibal as
the author of all their calamities,
and promising, in the name of the
senate, an implicit obedience to whatever
the Romans should please to
ordain. Scipio answered, that though he was come
into Africa not for
peace, but conquest, he would however grant them a peace,
upon condition
that they should deliver up all the prisoners and deserters to
the Romans;
that they should recall their armies out of Italy and Gaul;
should never
set foot again in Spain; should retire out of all the islands
between
Italy and Africa; should deliver up all their ships, twenty excepted,
to
the victor; should give to the Romans five hundred thousand bushels
of
wheat, three hundred thousand of barley, and pay fifteen thousand
talents:
that in case they were pleased with these conditions, they then, he
said,
might send ambassadors to the senate. The Carthaginians feigned
a
compliance, but this was only to gain time, till Hannibal should
be
returned. A truce was then granted to the Carthaginians, who
immediately
sent deputies to Rome, and at the same time an express to
Hannibal, to
order his return into Africa.
(M131) He was then, as was
observed before, in the extremity of Italy.
Here he received the orders from
Carthage, which he could not listen to
without groans, and almost shedding
tears; and was exasperated almost to
madness, to see himself thus forced to
quit his prey. Never banished
man(801) showed so much regret at leaving his
native country, as Hannibal
did in going out of that of an enemy. He often
turned his eyes wishfully
to Italy, accusing gods and men of his misfortunes,
and calling down a
thousand curses, says(802) Livy, upon himself, for not
having marched his
soldiers directly to Rome, after the battle of Cannæ,
whilst they were
still reeking with the blood of its citizens.
At
Rome, the senate, greatly dissatisfied with the excuses made by
the
Carthaginian deputies, in justification of their republic, and
the
ridiculous offer which they made, in its name, of adhering to the
treaty
of Lutatius; thought proper to refer the decision of the whole to
Scipio,
who, being on the spot, could best judge what conditions the welfare
of
the state required.
About the same time, Octavius the prætor
sailing from Sicily into Africa
with two hundred vessels of burden, was
attacked near Carthage by a
furious storm, which dispersed all his fleet. The
citizens, not bearing to
see so rich a prey escape them, demanded
importunately that the
Carthaginian fleet might sail out and seize it. The
senate, after a faint
resistance, complied. Asdrubal, sailing out of the
harbour, seized the
greatest part of the Roman ships, and brought them to
Carthage, although
the truce was still subsisting.
Scipio sent
deputies to the Carthaginian senate, to complain of this, but
they were
little regarded. Hannibal’s approach had revived their courage,
and filled
them with great hopes. The deputies were even in great danger
of being ill
treated by the populace. They therefore demanded a convoy,
which was granted,
and accordingly two ships of the republic attended
them. But the magistrates,
who were absolutely against peace, and
determined to renew the war, gave
private orders to Asdrubal, (who was
with the fleet near Utica,) to attack
the Roman galley when it should
arrive in the river Bagrada near the Roman
camp, where the convoy was
ordered to leave them. He obeyed the order, and
sent out two galleys
against the ambassadors, who nevertheless made their
escape, but with
difficulty and danger.
This was a fresh subject for a
war between the two nations, who now were
more animated, or rather more
exasperated, one against the other, than
ever: the Romans, from a desire of
taking vengeance for so black a
perfidy; and the Carthaginians, from a
persuasion that they were not now
to expect a peace.
At the same time,
Lælius and Fulvius, who carried the full powers with
which the senate and
people of Rome had invested Scipio, arrived in the
camp, accompanied by the
deputies of Carthage. As the Carthaginians had
not only infringed the truce,
but violated the law of nations, in the
person of the Roman ambassadors, it
might naturally be expected that they
should order the Carthaginian deputies
to be seized by way of reprisal.
However, Scipio,(803) more attentive to what
was required by the Roman
generosity, than by the perfidy of the
Carthaginians, in order not to
deviate from the principles and maxims of his
own countrymen, nor his own
character, dismissed the deputies, without
offering them the least injury.
So astonishing an instance of moderation, and
at such a juncture,
terrified the Carthaginians, and even put them to the
blush; and made
Hannibal himself entertain a still higher idea of a general,
who, to the
dishonourable practices of his enemies, opposed only a rectitude
and
greatness of soul, that was still more worthy of admiration than all
his
military virtues.
In the mean time, Hannibal, being strongly
importuned by his
fellow-citizens, advanced forward into the country; and
arriving at Zama,
which is five days’ march from Carthage, he there pitched
his camp. He
thence sent out spies to observe the position of the Romans.
Scipio having
seized these, so far from punishing them, only commanded them
to be led
about the Roman camp, in order that they might take an exact survey
of it,
and then sent them back to Hannibal. The latter knew very well whence
so
noble an assurance flowed. After the strange reverses he had met with,
he
no longer expected that fortune would again be propitious. Whilst
every
one was exciting him to give battle, himself only meditated a peace.
He
flattered himself that the conditions of it would be more honourable,
as
he was at the head of an army, and as the fate of arms might still
appear
uncertain. He, therefore, sent to desire an interview with Scipio,
which
accordingly was agreed to, and the time and place fixed.
(M132)
_The Interview between Hannibal and Scipio in Africa, followed by
a
Battle._(_804_)—These two generals, who were not only the most
illustrious
of their own age, but worthy of being ranked with the most
renowned
princes and warriors that had ever lived, having met at the
place
appointed, continued for some time in a deep silence, as though they
were
astonished, and struck with a mutual admiration at the sight of
each
other. At last Hannibal spoke, and after having praised Scipio in the
most
artful and delicate manner, he gave a very lively description of
the
ravages of the war, and the calamities in which it had involved both
the
victors and the vanquished. He conjured him not to suffer himself to
be
dazzled by the splendour of his victories. He represented to him, that
how
successful soever he might have hitherto been, he ought, however, to
be
aware of the inconstancy of fortune: that without going far back
for
examples, he himself, who was then speaking to him, was a glaring proof
of
this: that Scipio was at that time what Hannibal had been at
Thrasymenus
and Cannæ: that he ought to make a better use of opportunity than
himself
had done, by consenting to a peace, now it was in his power to
propose the
conditions of it. He concluded with declaring, that the
Carthaginians
would willingly resign Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and all the
islands
between Africa and Italy, to the Romans: that they must be forced,
since
such was the will of the gods, to confine themselves to Africa;
whilst
they should see the Romans extending their conquests to the most
remote
regions, and obliging all nations to pay obedience to their
laws.
Scipio answered in few words, but not with less dignity. He
reproached the
Carthaginians for their perfidy, in plundering the Roman
galleys before
the truce was expired. He imputed to them alone, and to their
injustice,
all the calamities with which the two wars had been attended.
After
thanking Hannibal for the admonition he had given him, with regard to
the
uncertainty of human events, he concluded with desiring him to prepare
for
battle, unless he chose rather to accept of the conditions that had
been
already proposed; to which (he observed) some others would be added,
in
order to punish the Carthaginians for their having violated the
truce.
Hannibal could not prevail with himself to accept these
conditions, and
the generals left one another, with the resolution to decide
the fate of
Carthage by a general battle. Each commander exhorted his troops
to fight
valiantly. Hannibal enumerated the victories he had gained over
the
Romans, the generals he had slain, the armies he had cut to pieces.
Scipio
represented to his soldiers, the conquest of both the Spains,
his
successes in Africa, and the confession the enemies themselves made
of
their weakness, by thus coming to sue for peace. All this he
spoke(805)
with the tone and air of a conqueror. Never were motives more
powerful to
prompt troops to behave gallantly. This day was to complete the
glory of
the one or the other of the generals; and to decide whether Rome
or
Carthage was to prescribe laws to all other nations.
I shall not
undertake to describe the order of the battle, nor the valour
of the forces
on both sides. The reader will naturally suppose, that two
such experienced
generals did not forget any circumstance which could
contribute to the
victory. The Carthaginians, after a very obstinate
fight, were obliged to
fly, leaving twenty thousand men on the field of
battle, and the like number
of prisoners were taken by the Romans.
Hannibal escaped in the tumult, and
entering Carthage, owned that he was
irrecoverably overthrown, and that the
citizens had no other choice left
than to accept of peace on any conditions.
Scipio bestowed great eulogiums
on Hannibal, chiefly with regard to his
ability in taking advantages, his
manner of drawing up his army, and giving
out his orders in the
engagement; and he affirmed, that Hannibal had this day
surpassed himself,
although the success had not answered his valour and
conduct.
With regard to himself, he well knew how to make a proper
advantage of the
victory, and the consternation with which he had filled the
enemy. He
commanded one of his lieutenants to march his land army to
Carthage,
whilst himself prepared to conduct the fleet thither.
He was
not far from the city, when he met a vessel covered with streamers
and
olive-branches, bringing ten of the most considerable persons of the
state,
as ambassadors to implore his clemency. However, he dismissed them
without
making any answer, and bade them come to him at Tunis, where he
should halt.
The deputies of Carthage, thirty in number, came to him at
the place
appointed, and sued for peace in the most submissive terms. He
then called a
council there, the majority of which were for rasing
Carthage, and treating
the inhabitants with the utmost severity. But the
consideration of the time
which must necessarily be employed before so
strongly fortified a city could
be taken; and Scipio’s fear lest a
successor might be appointed him whilst he
should be employed in the
siege, made him incline to clemency.
_A
Peace concluded between the Carthaginians and the __ Romans. The End of
the
Second Punic War._(_806_)—The conditions of the peace dictated by
Scipio to
the Carthaginians were, “That the Carthaginians should continue
free, and
preserve their laws, their territories, and the cities they
possessed in
Africa before the war—That they should deliver up to the
Romans all
deserters, slaves, and prisoners belonging to them; all their
ships, except
ten triremes; all the elephants which they then had, and
that they should not
train up any more for war—That they should not make
war out of Africa, nor
even in that country, without first obtaining leave
for that purpose from the
Roman people—Should restore to Masinissa every
thing of which they had
dispossessed either him or his ancestors—Should
furnish money and corn to the
Roman auxiliaries, till their ambassadors
should be returned from Rome—Should
pay to the Romans ten thousand Euboic
talents(807) of silver in fifty annual
payments; and give a hundred
hostages, who should be nominated by Scipio. And
in order that they might
have time to send to Rome, he agreed to grant them a
truce, upon condition
that they should restore the ships taken during the
former, without which
they were not to expect either a truce or
peace.”
When the deputies were returned to Carthage, they laid before the
senate
the conditions dictated by Scipio. But they appeared so intolerable
to
Gisgo, that rising up, he made a speech, in order to dissuade his
citizens
from accepting a peace on such shameful terms. Hannibal, provoked at
the
calmness with which such an orator was heard, took Gisgo by the arm,
and
dragged him from his seat. A behaviour so outrageous, and so remote
from
the manners of a free city like Carthage, raised an universal
murmur.
Hannibal himself was vexed when he reflected on what he had done,
and
immediately made an apology for it. “As I left,” says he, “your city
at
nine years of age, and did not return to it till after thirty-six
years’
absence, I had full leisure to learn the arts of war, and flatter
myself
that I have made some improvement in them. As for your laws and
customs,
it is no wonder I am ignorant of them, and I therefore desire you
to
instruct me in them.” He then expatiated on the indispensable
necessity
they were under of concluding a peace. He added, that they ought to
thank
the gods for having prompted the Romans to grant them a peace even
on
these conditions. He pointed out to them the great importance of
their
uniting in opinion; and of not giving an opportunity, by their
divisions,
for the people to take an affair of this nature under their
cognizance.
The whole city came over to his opinion; and accordingly the
peace was
accepted. The senate made Scipio satisfaction with regard to the
ships
reclaimed by him; and, after obtaining a truce for three months, they
sent
ambassadors to Rome.
These Carthaginians, who were all venerable
for their years and dignity,
were admitted immediately to an audience.
Asdrubal, surnamed Hœdus, who
was still an irreconcileable enemy to Hannibal
and his faction, spoke
first; and after having excused, to the best of his
power, the people of
Carthage, by imputing the rupture to the ambition of
some particular
persons, he added, that had the Carthaginians listened to his
counsels and
those of Hanno, they would have been able to grant the Romans
the peace
for which they now were obliged to sue. “But,”(808) continued he,
“wisdom
and prosperity are very rarely found together. The Romans are
invincible,
because they never suffer themselves to be blinded by good
fortune. And it
would be surprising should they act otherwise. Success
dazzles those only
to whom it is new and unusual; whereas the Romans are so
much accustomed
to conquer, that they are almost insensible to the charms of
victory; and
it may be said to their glory, that they have extended their
empire, in
some measure, more by the humanity they have shown to the
conquered, than
by the conquest itself.” The other ambassadors spoke with a
more plaintive
tone of voice, and represented the calamitous state to which
Carthage was
going to be reduced, and the grandeur and power from which it
was fallen.
The senate and people being equally inclined to peace, sent
full power to
Scipio to conclude it; left the conditions to that general, and
permitted
him to march back his army, after the treaty should be
concluded.
The ambassadors desired leave to enter the city, to redeem
some of their
prisoners, and they found about two hundred whom they desired
to ransom.
But the senate sent them to Scipio, with orders that they should
be
restored without any pecuniary consideration, in case a peace should
be
concluded.
The Carthaginians, on the return of their ambassadors,
concluded a peace
with Scipio, on the terms he himself had prescribed. They
then delivered
up to him more than five hundred ships, all which he burnt in
sight of
Carthage; a lamentable spectacle to the inhabitants of that
ill-fated
city! He struck off the heads of the allies of the Latin name, and
hanged
all the Roman citizens who were surrendered up to him, as
deserters.
When the time for the payment of the first tribute imposed by
the treaty
was expired, as the funds of the government were exhausted by this
long
and expensive war; the difficulty of levying so great a sum, threw
the
senate into deep affliction, and many could not refrain even from
tears.
Hannibal on this occasion is said to have laughed; and when he
was
reproached by Asdrubal Hœdus, for thus insulting his country in
the
affliction which he had brought upon it, “Were it possible,”
says
Hannibal, “for my heart to be seen, and that as clearly as my
countenance;
you would then find that this laughter which offends so much,
flows not
from an intemperate joy, but from a mind almost distracted with the
public
calamities. But is this laughter more unseasonable than your
unbecoming
tears? Then, then, ought you to have wept, when your arms
were
ingloriously taken from you, your ships burnt, and you were forbidden
to
engage in any foreign wars. This was the mortal blow which laid
us
prostrate.—We are sensible of the public calamity, so far only as we
have
a personal concern in it; and the loss of our money gives us the
most
pungent sorrow. Hence it was, that when our city was made the spoil of
the
victor; when it was left disarmed and defenceless amidst so many
powerful
nations of Africa, who had at that time taken the field, not a
groan, not
a sigh was heard. But now, when you are called on to
contribute
individually to the tax imposed upon the state, you bewail and
lament as
if all were lost. Alas! I only wish that the subject of this day’s
grief
does not soon appear to you the least of your
misfortunes.”
Scipio, after all things were concluded, embarked, in order
to return to
Italy. He arrived at Rome, through crowds of people, whom
curiosity had
drawn together to behold his march. The most magnificent
triumph that Rome
had ever seen was decreed him, and the surname of Africanus
was bestowed
upon this great man; an honour till then unknown, no person
before him
having assumed the name of a vanquished nation. Such was the
conclusion of
the second Punic war, after having lasted seventeen
years.
(M133) _A short Reflection on the Government of Carthage in the
time of
the Second Punic War._—I shall conclude the particulars which relate
to
the second Punic war, with a reflection of Polybius,(809) which will
show
the difference between the two commonwealths of Rome and Carthage. It
may
be affirmed, in some measure, that at the beginning of the second
Punic
war, and in Hannibal’s time, Carthage was in its decline. The flower
of
its youth, and its sprightly vigour were already diminished. It had
begun
to fall from its exalted pitch of power, and was inclining towards
its
ruin; whereas Rome was then, as it were, in its bloom and prime of
life,
and swiftly advancing to the conquest of the universe. The reason of
the
declension of the one, and the rise of the other, is deduced, by
Polybius,
from the different form of government established in these
commonwealths,
at the time we are now speaking of. At Carthage, the common
people had
seized upon the sovereign authority with regard to public affairs,
and the
advice of their ancient men or magistrates was no longer listened to;
all
affairs were transacted by intrigue and cabal. To take no notice of
the
artifices which the faction adverse to Hannibal employed, during the
whole
time of his command, to perplex him; the single instance of burning
the
Roman vessels during a truce, a perfidious action to which the
common
people compelled the senate to lend their name and assistance, is a
proof
of Polybius’s assertion. On the contrary, at this very time, the
Romans
paid the highest regard to their senate, that is, to a body composed
of
the greatest sages; and their old men were listened to and revered
as
oracles. It is well known that the Roman people were exceedingly
jealous
of their authority, and especially in whatever related to the
election of
magistrates. A century of young men, who by lot were to give the
first
vote, which generally directed all the rest, had nominated
two
consuls.(810) On the bare remonstrance of Fabius,(811) who represented
to
the people, that in a tempest, like that with which Rome was
then
struggling, the ablest pilots ought to be chosen to steer the vessel
of
the state, the century returned to their suffrages, and nominated
other
consuls. Polybius infers, that a people, thus guided by the prudence
of
old men, could not fail of prevailing over a state which was
governed
wholly by the giddy multitude. And indeed, the Romans, under the
guidance
of the wise counsels of their senate, gained at last the superiority
with
regard to the war considered in general, though they were defeated
in
several particular engagements; and established their power and
grandeur
on the ruin of their rivals.
_The interval between the Second
and Third Punic War._—This interval,
though considerable enough with regard
to its duration, since it took up
above fifty years, is very little
remarkable as to the events which relate
to Carthage. They may be reduced to
two heads; of which the one relates to
the person of Hannibal, and the other
to some particular differences between the Carthaginians and Masinissa king of
the Numidians. We shall treat both separately, but at no great
length. |
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