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SECT. I. CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORY OF HANNIBAL.—When the second
Punic
war was ended, by the treaty of peace concluded with Scipio, Hannibal,
as
he himself observed in the Carthaginian senate, was forty-five years
of
age. What we have farther to say of this great man, includes the space
of
twenty-five years.
_Hannibal undertakes and completes the
Reformation of the Courts of
Justice, and the Treasury of Carthage._—After
the conclusion of the peace,
Hannibal, at least at first, was greatly
respected at Carthage, where he
filled the first employments of the state
with honour and applause. He
headed the Carthaginian forces in some wars
against the Africans:(812) but
the Romans, to whom the very name of Hannibal
gave uneasiness, not being
able to see him in arms without displeasure, made
complaints on that
account, and accordingly he was recalled to
Carthage.
On his return he was appointed prætor, which seems to have been
a very
considerable employment, and to have conferred great authority.
Carthage
is therefore going to be, with regard to him, a new theatre, as it
were,
on which he will display virtues and qualities of a quite different
nature
from those we have hitherto admired in him, and which will finish
the
picture of this illustrious man.
Eagerly desirous of restoring the
affairs of his afflicted country to
their former happy condition, he was
persuaded, that the two most powerful
methods to make a state flourish, were,
an exact and equal distribution of
justice to all its subjects in general,
and a scrupulous fidelity in the
management of the public finances. The
former, by preserving an equality
among the citizens, and making them enjoy
such a delightful, undisturbed
liberty under the protection of the laws, as
fully secures their honour,
their lives, and properties; unites the
individuals of the commonwealth
more closely together, and attaches them more
firmly to the state, to
which they owe the preservation of all that is most
dear and valuable to
them. The latter, by a faithful administration of the
public revenues,
supplies punctually the several wants and necessities of the
state; keeps
in reserve a never failing resource for sudden emergencies, and
prevents
the people from being burthened with new taxes, which are
rendered
necessary by extravagant profusion, and which chiefly contribute to
make
men harbour an aversion for the government.
Hannibal saw, with
great concern, the irregularities which had crept
equally into the
administration of justice, and the management of the
finances. Upon his being
nominated prætor, as his love for regularity and
order made him uneasy at
every deviation from it, and prompted him to use
his utmost endeavours to
restore it; he had the courage to attempt the
reformation of this double
abuse, which drew after it a numberless
multitude of others, without
dreading, either the animosity of the old
faction that opposed him, or the
new enmity which his zeal for the
republic must necessarily draw upon
him.
The judges exercised the most flagrant extortion with impunity.(813)
They
were so many petty tyrants, who disposed, in an arbitrary manner, of
the
lives and fortunes of the citizens; without there being the
least
possibility of putting a stop to their injustice, because they held
their
commissions for life, and mutually supported one another. Hannibal,
as
prætor, summoned before his tribunal an officer belonging to the bench
of
judges, who openly abused his power. Livy tells us that he was a
questor.
This officer, who was of the opposite faction to Hannibal, and had
already
assumed all the pride and haughtiness of the judges, among whom he
was to
be admitted at the expiration of his present office, insolently
refused to
obey the summons. Hannibal was not of a disposition to suffer an
affront
of this nature tamely. Accordingly, he caused him to be seized by
a
lictor, and brought him before an assembly of the people. There,
not
satisfied with directing his resentment against this single officer,
he
impeached the whole bench of judges; whose insupportable and
tyrannical
pride was not restrained, either by the fear of the laws, or a
reverence
for the magistrates. And, as Hannibal perceived that he was heard
with
pleasure, and that the lowest and most inconsiderable of the
people
discovered, on this occasion, that they were no longer able to bear
the
insolent pride of these judges, who seemed to have a design upon
their
liberties; he proposed a law, (which accordingly passed,) by which it
was
enacted, that new judges should be chosen annually; with a clause,
that
none should continue in office beyond that term. This law, at the
same
time that it acquired him the friendship and esteem of the people,
drew
upon him, proportionably, the hatred of the greatest part of the
grandees
and nobility.
He attempted another reformation, which created
him new enemies, but
gained him great honour.(814) The public revenues were
either squandered
away by the negligence of those who had the management of
them, or were
plundered by the chief men of the city and the magistrates; so
that, money
being wanting to pay the annual tribute due to the Romans,
the
Carthaginians were going to levy it upon the people in general.
Hannibal,
entering into a large detail of the public revenues, ordered an
exact
estimate of them to be laid before him; inquired in what manner they
had
been applied; the employments and ordinary expenses of the state;
and
having discovered, by this inquiry, that the public funds had been in
a
great measure embezzled by the fraud of the officers who had
the
management of them, he declared and promised, in a full assembly of
the
people, that, without laying any new taxes upon private men, the
republic
should hereafter be enabled to pay the tribute to the Romans; and he
was
as good as his word. The farmers of the revenues, whose plunder and
rapine
he had publicly detected, having accustomed themselves hitherto to
fatten
upon the spoils of their country, exclaimed(815) vehemently against
these
regulations, as if their own property had been forced out of their
hands,
and not the sums they had plundered from the public.
_The
Retreat and Death of Hannibal._(_816_)—This double reformation of
abuses
raised great clamours against Hannibal. His enemies were writing
incessantly
to the chief men, or their friends, at Rome, to inform them,
that he was
carrying on a secret intelligence with Antiochus king of
Syria; that he
frequently received couriers from him; and that this prince
had privately
despatched agents to Hannibal, to concert with him the
measures for carrying
on the war he was meditating: that as some animals
are so extremely fierce,
that it is impossible ever to tame them; in like
manner this man was of so
turbulent and implacable a spirit, that he could
not brook ease, and
therefore would, sooner or later, break out again.
These informations were
listened to at Rome; and as the transactions of
the preceding war had been
begun and carried on almost solely by Hannibal,
they appeared more probable.
However, Scipio strongly opposed the violent
measures which the senate were
going to take on their receiving this
intelligence, by representing it as
derogatory to the dignity of the Roman
people, to countenance the hatred and
accusations of Hannibal’s enemies;
to support, with their authority, their
unjust passions; and obstinately
to persecute him even in the very heart of
his country; as though the
Romans had not humbled him sufficiently, in
driving him out of the field,
and forcing him to lay down his
arms.
But notwithstanding these prudent remonstrances, the senate
appointed
three commissioners to go and make their complaints to Carthage,
and to
demand that Hannibal should be delivered up to them. On their arrival
in
that city, though other motives were speciously pretended, yet
Hannibal
was perfectly sensible that himself only was aimed at. The evening
being
come, he conveyed himself on board a ship, which he had secretly
provided
for that purpose; on which occasion he bewailed his country’s fate
more
than his own. _Sæpiùs patriæ quàm suorum_(_817_)_ eventus miseratus._
This
was the eighth year after the conclusion of the peace. The first place
he
landed at was Tyre, where he was received as in his second country,
and
had all the honours paid him which were due to his exalted merit.
(M134)
After staying some days here, he set out for Antioch, which the king
had
lately left, and from thence waited upon him at Ephesus. The arrival of
so
renowned a general gave great pleasure to the king; and did not a
little
contribute to determine him to engage in war against Rome; for
hitherto he
had appeared wavering and uncertain on that head. In this city,
a
philosopher, who was looked upon as the greatest orator of Asia, had
the
imprudence to make a long harangue before Hannibal, on the duties of
a
general, and the rules of the art-military.(818) The speech charmed
the
whole audience. But Hannibal being asked his opinion of it, “I have
seen,”
says he, “many old dotards in my life, but this exceeds them
all.”(819)
The Carthaginians, justly fearing that Hannibal’s escape would
certainly
draw upon them the arms of the Romans, sent them advice that
Hannibal was
withdrawn to Antiochus.(820) The Romans were very much disturbed
at this
news; and the king might have turned it extremely to his advantage,
had he
known how to make a proper use of it.
The first advice that
Hannibal gave him at this time, and which he
frequently repeated afterwards,
was, to make Italy the seat of the
war.(821) He required an hundred ships,
eleven or twelve thousand land
forces, and offered to take upon himself the
command of the fleet; to
cross into Africa, in order to engage the
Carthaginians in the war; and
afterwards to make a descent upon Italy, during
which the king himself
should remain in Greece with his army, holding himself
constantly in
readiness to cross over into Italy, whenever it should be
thought
convenient. This was the only thing proper to be done, and the king
very
much approved the proposal at first.
Hannibal thought it would be
expedient to prepare his friends at Carthage,
in order to engage them the
more strongly in his views.(822) The
transmitting of information by letters,
is not only unsafe, but they can
give only an imperfect idea of things, and
are never sufficiently
particular. He therefore despatched a trusty person
with ample
instructions to Carthage. This man was scarce arrived in the city,
but his
business was suspected. Accordingly, he was watched and followed:
and, at
last, orders were issued for his being seized. However, he prevented
the
vigilance of his enemies, and escaped in the night; after having fixed,
in
several public places, papers, which fully declared the occasion of
his
journey. The senate immediately sent advice of this to the
Romans.
(M135) Villius, one of the deputies who had been sent into Asia,
to
inquire into the state of affairs there, and, if possible, to discover
the
real designs of Antiochus, found Hannibal in Ephesus.(823) He had
many
conferences with him, paid him several visits, and speciously affected
to
show a particular esteem for him on all occasions. But his chief aim,
by
all this designing behaviour, was to make him be suspected, and to
lessen
his credit with the king, in which he succeeded but too
well.(824)
Some authors affirm, that Scipio was joined in this
embassy;(825) and they
even relate the conversation which that general had
with Hannibal. They
tell us, that the Roman having asked him, who, in his
opinion, was the
greatest captain that had ever lived; he answered, Alexander
the Great,
because, with a handful of Macedonians, he had defeated numberless
armies,
and carried his conquests into countries so very remote, that it
seemed
scarce possible for any man only to travel so far. Being afterwards
asked,
to whom he gave the second rank; he answered, to Pyrrhus: Because
this
king was the first who understood the art of pitching a camp to
advantage;
no commander ever made a more judicious choice of his posts, was
better
skilled in drawing up his forces, or was more dexterous in winning
the
affection of foreign soldiers; insomuch that even the people of Italy
were
more desirous to have him for their governor, though a foreigner, than
the
Romans themselves, who had so long been settled in their country.
Scipio
proceeding, asked him next, whom he looked upon as the third: on
which
Hannibal made no scruple to assign that rank to himself. Here Scipio
could
not forbear laughing: “But what would you have said,” continued
Scipio,
“had you conquered me?” “I would,” replied Hannibal, “have ranked
myself
above Alexander, Pyrrhus, and all the generals the world ever
produced.”
Scipio was not insensible of so refined and delicate a flattery,
which he
no ways expected; and which, by giving him no rival, seemed to
insinuate,
that no captain was worthy of being put in comparison with
him.
The answer, as told by Plutarch,(826) is less witty, and not so
probable.
In this author, Hannibal gives Pyrrhus the first place, Scipio the
second,
and himself the third.
Hannibal, sensible of the coldness with
which Antiochus received him, ever
since his conferences with Villius or
Scipio, took no notice of it for
some time, and seemed insensible of it.(827)
But at last he thought it
advisable to come to an explanation with the king,
and to open his mind
freely to him. “The hatred (says he) which I bear to the
Romans, is known
to the whole world. I bound myself to it by an oath, from my
most tender
infancy. It is this hatred that made me draw the sword against
Rome during
thirty-six years. It is that, which, even in times of peace, has
caused me
to be driven from my native country, and forced me to seek an
asylum in
your dominions. For ever guided and fired by the same passion,
should my
hopes be frustrated here, I will fly to every part of the globe,
and rouse
up all nations against the Romans. I hate them, and will hate
them
eternally; and know that they bear me no less animosity. So long as
you
shall continue in the resolution to take up arms against them, you
may
rank Hannibal in the number of your best friends. But if other
counsels
incline you to peace, I declare to you, once for all, address
yourself to
others for advice, and not to me.” Such a speech, which came from
his
heart, and expressed the greatest sincerity, struck the king, and
seemed
to remove all his suspicions; so that he now resolved to give Hannibal
the
command of part of his fleet.
But what havoc is not flattery
capable of making in courts and in the
minds of princes!(828) Antiochus was
told, “that it was imprudent in him
to put so much confidence in Hannibal, an
exile, a Carthaginian, whose
fortune or genius might suggest to him, in one
day, a thousand different
projects: that besides, this very fame which
Hannibal had acquired in war,
and which he considered as his peculiar
inheritance, was too great for a
man who fought only under the ensigns of
another: that none but the king
ought to be the general and conductor of the
war, and that it was
incumbent on him to draw upon himself alone the eyes and
attention of all
men; whereas, should Hannibal be employed, he (a foreigner)
would have the
glory of all the successes ascribed to him.” “No minds,”(829)
says Livy,
on this occasion, “are more susceptible of envy, than those whose
merit is
below their birth and dignity; such persons always abhorring virtue
and
worth in others, for this reason alone, because they are strange
and
foreign to themselves.” This observation was fully verified on
this
occasion. Antiochus had been taken on his weak side; a low and
sordid
jealousy, which is the defect and characteristic of little
minds,
extinguished every generous sentiment in that monarch. Hannibal was
now
slighted and laid aside: however, he was greatly revenged on Antiochus,
by
the ill success this prince met with; and showed how unfortunate that
king
is whose soul is accessible to envy, and his ears open to the
poisonous
insinuation of flatterers.
In a council held some time
after, to which Hannibal, for form sake, was
admitted, he, when it came to
his turn to speak, endeavoured chiefly to
prove, that Philip of Macedon
ought, on any terms, to be engaged to form
an alliance with Antiochus, which
was not so difficult as might be
imagined.(830) “With regard,” says Hannibal,
“to the operations of the
war, I adhere immovably to my first opinion; and
had my counsels been
listened to before, Tuscany and Liguria would now be all
in a flame: and
Hannibal (a name that strikes terror into the Romans) in
Italy. Though I
should not be very well skilled as to other matters, yet the
good and ill
success I have met with must necessarily have taught me
sufficiently how
to carry on a war against the Romans. I have nothing now in
my power, but
to give you my counsel, and offer you my service. May the gods
give
success to all your undertakings!” Hannibal’s speech was received
with
applause, but not one of his counsels was put in
execution.
Antiochus, imposed upon and lulled asleep by his flatterers,
remained
quiet at Ephesus, after the Romans had driven him out of
Greece;(831) not
once imagining that they would ever invade his dominions.
Hannibal, who
was now restored to favour, was for ever assuring him, that the
war would
soon be removed into Asia, and that he would soon see the enemy at
his
gates: that he must resolve, either to abdicate his throne, or
oppose
vigorously a people who grasped at the empire of the world. This
discourse
awakened, in some little measure, the king out of his lethargy,
and
prompted him to make some weak efforts. But, as his conduct was
unsteady,
after sustaining a great many considerable losses, he was forced
to
terminate the war by an ignominious peace; one of the articles of
which
was, that he should deliver up Hannibal to the Romans. However, the
latter
did not give him opportunity to put it in execution, but retired to
the
island of Crete, to consider there what course it would be best for him
to
take.
The riches he had brought along with him, of which the people
of the
island got some notice, had like to have proved his ruin.(832)
Hannibal
was never wanting in stratagems, and he had occasion to employ them
now,
to save both himself and his treasure. He filled several vessels
with
molten lead, the tops of which he just covered over with gold and
silver.
These he deposited in the temple of Diana, in presence of several
Cretans,
to whose honesty, he said, he confided all his treasure. A strong
guard
was then posted round the temple, and Hannibal left at full liberty,
from
a supposition that his riches were secured. (M136) But he had
concealed
them in hollow statues of brass,(833) which he always carried along
with
him. And then, embracing a favourable opportunity to make his escape,
he
fled to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia.(834)
It appears
from history, that he made some stay in the court of this
prince, who soon
engaged in war with Eumenes, king of Pergamus, a
professed friend to the
Romans. By means of Hannibal, the troops of
Prusias gained several victories
both by land and sea.
He employed a stratagem of an extraordinary kind,
in a sea-fight.(835) As
the enemy’s fleet consisted of more ships than his,
he had recourse to
artifice. He put into earthen vessels all kinds of
serpents, and ordered
these vessels to be thrown into the enemy’s ships. His
chief aim was to
destroy Eumenes; and for that purpose it was necessary for
him to find out
which ship he was on board of. This Hannibal discovered by
sending out a
boat, upon pretence of conveying a letter to him. Having gained
his point
thus far, he ordered the commanders of the respective vessels to
direct
their attack principally against Eumenes’s ship. They obeyed, and
would
have taken it, had he not outsailed his pursuers. The rest of the ships
of
Pergamus sustained the fight with great vigour, till the earthen
vessels
had been thrown into them. At first they only laughed at this, and
were
very much surprised to find such weapons employed against them. But
when
they saw themselves surrounded with the serpents, which darted out
of
these vessels when they flew to pieces, they were seized with
dread,
retired in disorder, and yielded the victory to the
enemy.
(M137) Services of so important a nature seemed to secure for ever
to
Hannibal an undisturbed asylum at that prince’s court.(836) However,
the
Romans would not suffer him to be easy there, but deputed Q. Flamininus
to
Prusias, to complain of the protection he gave Hannibal. The latter
easily
guessed the motive of this embassy, and therefore did not wait till
his
enemies had an opportunity of delivering him up. At first he attempted
to
secure himself by flight; but perceiving that the seven secret
outlets,
which he had contrived in his palace, were all seized by the
soldiers of
Prusias, who, by perfidiously betraying his guest, was desirous
of making
his court to the Romans; he ordered the poison, which he had long
kept for
this melancholy occasion, to be brought him; and taking it in his
hand,
“Let us,” said he, “free the Romans from the disquiet with which they
have
so long been tortured, since they have not patience to wait for an
old
man’s death. The victory which Flamininus gains over a man disarmed
and
betrayed will not do him much honour. This single day will be a
lasting
testimony of the great degeneracy of the Romans. Their fathers sent
notice
to Pyrrhus, to desire he would beware of a traitor who intended to
poison
him, and that at a time when this prince was at war with them in the
very
centre of Italy; but their sons have deputed a person of consular
dignity
to spirit up Prusias, impiously to murder one who is not only his
friend,
but his guest.” After calling down curses upon Prusias, and having
invoked
the gods, the protectors and avengers of the sacred rights of
hospitality,
he swallowed the poison,(837) and died at seventy years of
age.
This year was remarkable for the death of three great men,
Hannibal,
Philopœmen, and Scipio, who had this in common, that they all died
out of
their native countries, by a death little correspondent to the glory
of
their actions. The two first died by poison: Hannibal being betrayed
by
his host; and Philopœmen being taken prisoner in a battle against
the
Messenians, and thrown into a dungeon, was forced to swallow poison. As
to
Scipio, he banished himself, to avoid an unjust prosecution which
was
carrying on against him at Rome, and ended his days in a kind
of
obscurity.
_The Character and Eulogium of Hannibal._—This would be
the proper place
for representing the excellent qualities of Hannibal, who
reflected so
much glory on Carthage. But as I have attempted to draw his
character
elsewhere,(838) and to give a just idea of him, by making a
comparison
between him and Scipio, I think myself dispensed from giving his
eulogium
at large in this place.
Persons who devote themselves to the
profession of arms, cannot spend too
much time in the study of this great
man, who is looked upon, by the best
judges, as the most complete general, in
almost every respect, that ever
the world produced.
During the whole
seventeen years that the war lasted, two errors only are
objected to him:
first, his not marching, immediately after the battle of
Cannæ, his
victorious army to Rome, in order to besiege that city:
secondly, his
suffering their courage to be softened and enervated during
their
winter-quarters in Capua: errors, which only show that great men are
not so
in all things;(839) _summi enim sunt, homine tamen_; and which,
perhaps, may
be partly excused.
But then, for these two errors, what a multitude of
shining qualities
appear in Hannibal! How extensive were his views and
designs, even in his
most tender years! What greatness of soul! What
intrepidity! What presence
of mind must he have possessed, to be able, even
in the fire and heat of
action, to turn every thing to advantage! With what
surprising address
must he have managed the minds of men, that, amidst so
great a variety of
nations which composed his army, who often were in want
both of money and
provisions, his camp was not once disturbed with any
insurrection, either
against himself or any of his generals! With what
equity, what moderation
must he have behaved towards his new allies, to have
prevailed so far as
to attach them inviolably to his service, though he was
reduced to the
necessity of making them sustain almost the whole burthen of
the war, by
quartering his army upon them, and levying contributions in their
several
countries! In short, how fruitful must he have been in expedients, to
be
able to carry on, for so many years, a war in a remote country, in
spite
of the violent opposition made by a powerful faction at home,
which
refused him supplies of every kind, and thwarted him on all occasions;
it
may be affirmed, that Hannibal, during the whole series of this
war,
seemed the only prop of the state, and the soul of every part of
the
empire of the Carthaginians, who could never believe themselves
conquered,
till Hannibal confessed that he himself was so.
But our
acquaintance with Hannibal will be very imperfect, if we consider
him only at
the head of armies. The particulars we learn from history,
concerning the
secret intelligence he held with Philip of Macedon; the
wise counsels he gave
to Antiochus, king of Syria; the double reformation
he introduced in
Carthage, with regard to the management of the public
revenues and the
administration of justice, prove, that he was a great
statesman in every
respect. So superior and universal was his genius, that
it took in all parts
of government; and so great were his natural
abilities, that he was capable
of acquitting himself in all the various
functions of it with glory. Hannibal
shone as conspicuously in the cabinet
as in the field; equally able to fill
the civil as the military
employments. In a word, he united in his own person
the different talents
and merits of all professions, the sword, the gown, and
the finances.
He had some learning, and though he was so much employed in
military
labours, and engaged in so many wars, he, however, found some
leisure to
devote to literature.(840) Several smart repartees of Hannibal,
which have
been transmitted to us, show that he had a great fund of natural
wit; and
this he improved by the most polite education that could be bestowed
at
that time, and in such a republic as Carthage. He spoke Greek
tolerably
well, and even wrote some books in that language. His preceptor was
a
Lacedæmonian, named Sosilus, who, with Philenius, another
Lacedæmonian,
accompanied him in all his expeditions. Both these undertook to
write the
history of this renowned warrior.
With regard to his
religion and moral conduct, he was not altogether so
profligate and wicked as
he is represented by Livy:(841) “cruel even to
inhumanity, more perfidious
than a Carthaginian; regardless of truth, of
probity, of the sacred ties of
oaths; fearless of the gods, and utterly
void of religion.” _Inhumana
crudelitas, perfida plusquam Punica; nihil
veri, nihil sancti, nullus deúm
metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla __
religio._ According to Polybius,(842) he
rejected a barbarous proposal
that was made him before he entered Italy,
which was, to eat human flesh,
at a time when his army was in absolute want
of provisions. Some years
after, so far from treating with barbarity, as he
was advised to do, the
dead body of Sempronius Gracchus, which Mago had sent
him, he caused his
funeral obsequies to be solemnized in presence of the
whole army.(843) We
have seen him, on many occasions, evince the highest
reverence for the
gods; and Justin,(844) who copied Trogus Pompeius, an
author worthy of
credit, observes, that he always showed uncommon moderation
and
continence, with regard to the great number of women taken by him
during
the course of so long a war; insomuch that no one would have imagined
he
had been born in Africa, where incontinence is the predominant vice of
the
country. _Pudicitiamque eum tantam inter tot captivas habuisse, ut
in
Africa natum quivis negaret._
His disregard of wealth, at a time
when he had so many opportunities to
enrich himself by the plunder of the
cities he stormed, and the nations he
subdued, shows that he knew the true
and genuine use which a general ought
to make of riches, _viz._ to gain the
affection of his soldiers, and to
attach his allies to his interest, by
diffusing his beneficence on proper
occasions, and not being sparing in his
rewards: a quality very essential,
and at the same time as uncommon, in a
commander. The only use Hannibal
made of money was to purchase success;
firmly persuaded, that a man who is
at the head of affairs is sufficiently
recompensed by the glory derived
from victory.
He always led a very
regular, austere life;(845) and even in times of
peace, and in the midst of
Carthage, when he was invested with the first
dignity of the city, we are
told that he never used to recline himself on
a bed at meals, as was the
custom in those ages, and that he drank but
very little wine. So regular and
uniform a life may serve as an
illustrious example to our commanders, who
often include, among the
privileges of war and the duty of officers, the
keeping of splendid
tables, and living luxuriously.
I do not, however,
pretend altogether to exculpate Hannibal from all the
errors with which he is
charged. Though he possessed an assemblage of the
most exalted qualities, it
cannot be denied but that he had some little
tincture of the vices of his
country; and that it would be difficult to
excuse some actions and
circumstances of his life. Polybius observes,(846)
that Hannibal was accused
of avarice in Carthage, and of cruelty in Rome.
He adds, on the same
occasion, that people were very much divided in
opinion concerning him; and
it would be no wonder, as he had made himself
so many enemies in both cities,
that they should have drawn him in
disadvantageous colours. But Polybius is
of opinion, that though it should
be taken for granted, that all the defects
with which he is charged are
true; yet that they were not so much owing to
his nature and disposition,
as to the difficulties with which he was
surrounded, in the course of so
long and laborious a war; and to the
complacency he was obliged to show to
the general officers, whose assistance
he absolutely wanted, for the
execution of his various enterprises; and whom
he was not always able to
restrain, any more than he could the soldiers who
fought under them.
SECT. II. DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE CARTHAGINIANS AND
MASINISSA, KING OF
NUMIDIA.—Among the conditions of the peace granted to the
Carthaginians,
there was one which enacted, that they should restore to
Masinissa all the
territories and cities he possessed before the war; and
further, Scipio,
to reward the zeal and fidelity which that monarch had shown
towards the
Romans, had added to his dominions those of Syphax. This
present
afterwards gave rise to disputes and quarrels between the
Carthaginians
and Numidians.
These two princes, Syphax and Masinissa,
were both kings in Numidia, but
reigned over different nations. The subjects
of Syphax were called
Masæsuli, and their capital was Cirtha. Those of
Masinissa were the
Massyli: but they are better known by the name of
Numidians, which was
common to them both. Their principal strength consisted
in their cavalry.
They always rode without saddles, and some even without
bridles, whence
Virgil(847) calls them _Numidæ infræni_.
In the
beginning of the second Punic war,(848) Syphax siding with the
Romans, Gala,
the father of Masinissa, to check the career of so powerful
a neighbour,
thought it his interest to join the Carthaginians, and
accordingly sent out
against Syphax a powerful army under the conduct of
his son, at that time but
seventeen years of age. Syphax, being overcome
in a battle, in which it is
said he lost thirty thousand men, escaped into
Mauritania. However, the face
of things was afterwards greatly changed.
Masinissa, after his father’s
death, was often reduced to the brink of
ruin;(849) being driven from his
kingdom by an usurper; pursued warmly by
Syphax; in danger every instant of
falling into the hands of his enemies;
destitute of forces, money, and of
every resource. He was at that time in
alliance with the Romans, and the
friend of Scipio, with whom he had had
an interview in Spain. His misfortunes
would not permit him to bring great
succours to that general. When Lælius
arrived in Africa, Masinissa joined
him with a few horse, and from that time
continued inviolably attached to
the Roman interest. Syphax, on the contrary,
having married the famous
Sophonisba, daughter of Asdrubal, went over to the
Carthaginians.(850)
The fate of these two princes again changed, but the
change was now
final.(851) Syphax lost a great battle, and was taken alive by
the enemy.
Masinissa, the victor, besieged Cirtha, his capital, and took it.
But he
met with a greater danger in that city than he had faced in the field,
and
this was Sophonisba, whose charms and endearments he was unable to
resist.
To secure this princess to himself, he married her, but a few days
after,
he was obliged to send her a dose of poison, as her nuptial present;
this
being the only way that he could devise to keep his promise with
his
queen, and preserve her from the power of the Romans.
This was a
considerable error in itself, and one that could not fail to
disoblige a
nation that was so jealous of its authority: but this young
prince gloriously
made amends for his fault, by the signal services he
afterwards rendered to
Scipio. We observed, that after the defeat and
capture of Syphax, the
dominions of this prince were bestowed upon
him;(852) and that the
Carthaginians were forced to restore all he
possessed before. This gave rise
to the divisions which we are now going
to relate.
A territory
situated towards the sea-side, near the lesser Syrtis, was the
subject of the
dispute.(853) The country was very rich, and the soil
extremely fruitful; a
proof of which is, that the city of Leptis alone,
which belonged to that
territory, paid daily a talent to the
Carthaginians, by way of tribute.
Masinissa had seized part of this
territory. Each side despatched deputies to
Rome, to plead the cause of
their respective superiors before the senate.
This assembly thought proper
to send Scipio Africanus, with two other
commissioners, to examine the
controversy upon the spot. However, they
returned without coming to any
decision, and left the business in the same
uncertain state in which they
had found it. Possibly they acted in this
manner by order of the senate,
and had received private instructions to
favour Masinissa, who was then
possessed of the district in
question.
(M138) Ten years after, new commissioners having been appointed
to examine
the same affair, they acted as the former had done, and left the
whole
undetermined.(854)
(M139) After the like distance of time, the
Carthaginians again brought
their complaint before the senate, but with
greater importunity than
before.(855) They represented, that besides the
lands at first contested,
Masinissa had, during the two preceding years,
dispossessed them of
upwards of seventy towns and castles: their hands were
bound up by that
article of the last treaty, which forbade their making war
upon any of the
allies of the Romans: that they could no longer bear the
insolence, the
avarice, and cruelty of that prince: that they were deputed to
Rome with
three requests, (one of which they desired might be immediately
complied
with,) _viz._ either that the affair might be examined and decided
by the
senate; or, secondly, that they might be permitted to repel force
by
force, and defend themselves by arms; or, lastly, that, if favour was
to
prevail over justice, they then entreated the Romans to specify once
for
all, which of the Carthaginian lands they were desirous should be given
up
to Masinissa, that they, by this means, might hereafter know what they
had
to depend on, and that the Roman people would show some moderation
in
their behalf, at a time that this prince set no other bounds to
his
pretensions, than his insatiable avarice. The deputies concluded
with
beseeching the Romans, that if they had any cause of complaint against
the
Carthaginians since the conclusion of the last peace, that they
themselves
would punish them; and not to give them up to the wild caprice of
a
prince, by whom their liberties were made precarious, and their
lives
insupportable. After ending their speech, being pierced with
grief,
shedding floods of tears, they fell prostrate upon the earth; a
spectacle
that moved all who were present to compassion, and raised a violent
hatred
against Masinissa. Gulussa, his son, who was then present, being
asked
what he had to reply, he answered, that his father had not given him
any
instructions, not knowing that any thing would be laid to his charge.
He
only desired the senate to reflect, that the circumstance which drew
all
this hatred upon him from the Carthaginians, was, the inviolable
fidelity
with which he had always been attached to the side of the Romans.
The
senate, after hearing both sides, answered, that they were inclined to
do
justice to either party to whom it might be due: that Gulussa should
set
out immediately with their orders to his father, who was thereby
commanded
to send immediately deputies with those of Carthage; that they
would do
all that lay in their power to serve him, but not to the prejudice
of the
Carthaginians: that it was but just the ancient limits should
be
preserved; and that it was far from being the intention of the Romans,
to
have the Carthaginians dispossessed, during the peace, of
those
territories and cities which had been left them by the treaty.
The
deputies of both powers were then dismissed with the usual
presents.
But all these assurances were but mere words.(856) It is plain
that the
Romans did not once endeavour to satisfy the Carthaginians, or do
them the
least justice; and that they protracted the business, on purpose to
give
Masinissa time to establish himself in his usurpation, and weaken
his
enemies.
(M140) A new deputation was sent to examine the affair
upon the spot, and
Cato was one of the commissioners.(857) On their arrival,
they asked the
parties if they were willing to abide by their determination.
Masinissa
readily complied. The Carthaginians answered, that they had fixed a
rule
to which they adhered, and that this was the treaty which had
been
concluded by Scipio, and desired that their cause might be examined
with
all possible rigour. They therefore could not come to any decision.
The
deputies visited all the country, and found it in a very good
condition,
especially the city of Carthage: and they were surprised to see
it, after
having been involved in such a calamity, so soon again raised to
so
exalted a pitch of power and grandeur. The deputies, on their return,
did
not fail to acquaint the senate with this circumstance; and declared,
Rome
could never be in safety, so long as Carthage should subsist. From
this
time, whatever affair was debated in the senate, Cato always added
the
following words to his opinion, “and I conclude that Carthage ought to
be
destroyed.” This grave senator did not give himself the trouble to
prove,
that bare jealousy of the growing power of a neighbouring state, is
a
warrant sufficient for destroying a city, contrary to the faith
of
treaties. Scipio Nasica on the other hand, was of opinion, that the
ruin
of this city would draw after it that of their commonwealth; because
that
the Romans, having then no rival to fear, would quit the ancient
severity
of their manners, and abandon themselves to luxury and pleasures,
the
never-failing subverters of the most flourishing empires.
In the
mean time, divisions broke out in Carthage.(858) The popular
faction, being
now become superior to that of the grandees and senators,
sent forty citizens
into banishment; and bound the people by an oath,
never to suffer the least
mention to be made of recalling those exiles.
They withdrew to the court of
Masinissa, who despatched Gulussa and
Micipsa, his two sons, to Carthage, to
solicit their recall. However, the
gates of the city were shut against them,
and one of them was closely
pursued by Hamilcar, one of the generals of the
republic. This gave
occasion to a new war, and accordingly armies were levied
on both sides. A
battle was fought; and the younger Scipio, who afterwards
ruined Carthage,
was spectator of it. He had been sent from Lucullus, who was
then carrying
on war in Spain, and under whom Scipio then served, to
Masinissa, to
desire some elephants from that monarch. During the whole
engagement, he
stood upon a neighbouring hill; and was surprised to see
Masinissa, then
upwards of eighty years of age, mounted (agreeably to the
custom of his
country) on a horse without a saddle; flying from rank to rank
like a
young officer, and sustaining the most arduous toils. The fight was
very
obstinate, and continued from morning till night, but at last
the
Carthaginians gave way. Scipio used to say afterwards, that he had
been
present at many battles, but at none with so much pleasure as at
this;
having never before beheld so formidable an army engage, without
any
danger or trouble to himself. And being very conversant in the writings
of
Homer, he added, that till his time, there were but two more who had
had
the pleasure of being spectators of such an action, _viz._ Jupiter
from
mount Ida, and Neptune from Samothrace, when the Greeks and Trojans
fought
before Troy. I know not whether the sight of a hundred thousand men
(for
so many there were) butchering one another, can administer a
real
pleasure; or whether such a pleasure is consistent with the sentiments
of
humanity, so natural to mankind.
The Carthaginians, after the
battle was over, entreated Scipio to
terminate their contests with
Masinissa.(859) Accordingly, he heard both
parties, and the Carthaginians
consented to yield up the territory of
Emporium,(860) which had been the
first cause of the dispute, to pay
Masinissa two hundred talents of silver
down, and eight hundred more, at
such times as should be agreed. But
Masinissa insisting on the return of
the exiles, and the Carthaginians being
unwilling to agree to this
proposition, they did not come to any decision.
Scipio, after having paid
his compliments, and returned thanks to Masinissa,
set out with the
elephants for which he had been sent.
The king,
immediately after the battle was over, had blocked up the
enemy’s camp, which
was pitched upon a hill, whither neither troops nor
provisions could come to
them.(861) During this interval, there arrived
deputies from Rome, with
orders from the senate to decide the quarrel, in
case the king should be
defeated; otherwise, to leave it undetermined, and
to give the king the
strongest assurances of the continuation of their
friendship; and they
complied with the latter injunction. In the mean
time, the famine daily
increased in the enemy’s camp; and to add to their
calamity, it was followed
by a plague, which made dreadful havoc. Being
now reduced to the last
extremity, they surrendered to Masinissa,
promising to deliver up the
deserters, to pay him five thousand talents of
silver in fifty years, and
restore the exiles, notwithstanding their oaths
to the contrary. They all
submitted to the ignominious ceremony of passing
under the yoke,(862) and
were dismissed, with only one suit of clothes for
each. Gulussa, to satiate
his vengeance for the ill treatment which, as we
before observed, he had met
with, sent out against them a body of cavalry,
whom, from their great
weakness, they could neither escape nor resist. So
that of fifty-eight
thousand men, very few returned to Carthage.
(M141) _The Third Punic
War._—The third Punic war, which was less
considerable than either of the two
former, with regard to the number and
greatness of the battles, and its
continuance, which was only four years,
was still more remarkable with
respect to the success and event of it, as
it ended in the total ruin and
destruction of Carthage.
The inhabitants of this city, from their last
defeat, knew what they had
to fear from the Romans, who had uniformly
displayed great ill-will
towards them, as often as they had addressed them
upon their disputes with
Masinissa.(863) To prevent the consequences of it,
the Carthaginians, by a
decree of the senate, impeached Asdrubal, general of
the army, and
Carthalo, commander of the auxiliary(864) forces, as guilty of
high
treason, for being the authors of the war against the king of
Numidia.
They then sent a deputation to Rome, to inquire what opinion that
republic
entertained of their late proceedings, and what was desired of them.
The
deputies were coldly answered, that it was the business of the senate
and
people of Carthage to know what satisfaction was due to the Romans.
A
second deputation bringing them no clearer answer, they fell into
the
greatest dejection; and being seized with the strongest terrors, from
the
recollection of their past sufferings, they fancied the enemy was
already
at their gates, and imagined to themselves all the dismal
consequences of
a long siege, and of a city taken sword in hand.
In
the mean time, the senate debated at Rome on the measures it would be
proper
for them to take; and the disputes between Cato the elder and
Scipio Nasica,
who entertained totally different opinions on this subject,
were
renewed.(865) The former, on his return from Africa, had declared, in
the
strongest terms, that he had found Carthage, not as the Romans
supposed it to
be, exhausted of men or money, or in a weak and humble
state; but, on the
contrary, that it was crowded with vigorous young men,
abounded with immense
quantities of gold and silver, and prodigious
magazines of arms and all
warlike stores; and was so haughty and confident
on account of this force,
that their hopes and ambition had no bounds. It
is farther said, that after
he had ended his speech, he threw, out of the
lappet of his robe, in the
midst of the senate, some African figs; and, as
the senators admired their
beauty and size, “Know,” says he, “that it is
but three days since these figs
were gathered. Such is the distance
between the enemy and
us.”(866)
Cato and Nasica had each of them their reasons for voting as
they
did.(867) Nasica, observing that the people had risen to such a height
of
insolence, as led them into excesses of every kind; that their
prosperity
had swelled them with a pride which the senate itself was not able
to
check; and that their power was become so enormous, that they were able
to
draw the city, by force, into every mad design they might
undertake;
Nasica, I say, observing this, was desirous that they should
continue in
fear of Carthage, in order that this might serve as a curb to
restrain and
check their audacious conduct. For it was his opinion, that
the
Carthaginians were too weak to subdue the Romans; and at the same time
too
strong to be considered by them in a contemptible light. With regard
to
Cato, he thought that as his countrymen were become haughty and
insolent
by success, and plunged headlong into profligacy of every kind;
nothing
could be more dangerous, than for them to have for a rival and an
enemy, a
city that till now had been powerful, but was become, even by
its
misfortunes, more wise and provident than ever; and not to remove
the
fears of the inhabitants entirely with regard to a foreign power;
since
they had, within their own walls, all the opportunities of
indulging
themselves in excesses of every kind.
To lay aside, for one
instant, the laws of equity, I leave the reader to
determine which of these
two great men reasoned most justly, according to
the maxims of sound policy,
and the true interest of a state. One
undoubted circumstance is, that all
historians have observed that there
was a sensible change in the conduct and
government of the Romans,
immediately after the ruin of Carthage:(868) that
vice no longer made its
way into Rome with a timorous pace, and as it were by
stealth, but
appeared barefaced, and seized, with astonishing rapidity, upon
all orders
of the republic: that the senators, plebeians, in a word, all
conditions,
abandoned themselves to luxury and voluptuousness, without
moderation or
sense of decency, which occasioned, as it must necessarily, the
ruin of
the state. “The first Scipio,”(869) says Paterculus, speaking of
the
Romans, “had laid the foundations of their future grandeur; and the
last,
by his conquests, opened a door to all manner of luxury and
dissoluteness.
For, after Carthage, which obliged Rome to stand for ever on
its guard, by
disputing empire with that city, had been totally destroyed,
the depravity
of manners was no longer slow in its progress, but swelled at
once into
the utmost excess of corruption.”
Be this as it may, the
senate resolved to declare war against the
Carthaginians; and the reasons or
pretences urged for it were, their
having maintained ships contrary to the
tenour of the treaty; their having
sent an army out of their territories,
against a prince who was in
alliance with Rome, and whose son they had
treated ill, at the time that
he was accompanied by a Roman
ambassador.(870)
(M142) An event, that chance occasioned to happen very
fortunately, at the
time that the senate of Rome was debating on the affair
of Carthage,
doubtless contributed very much to make them take that
resolution.(871)
This was the arrival of deputies from Utica, who came to
surrender up
themselves, their effects, their lands, and their city, into the
hands of
the Romans. Nothing could have happened more seasonably. Utica was
the
second city of Africa, vastly rich, and had a port equally spacious
and
commodious; it stood within sixty furlongs of Carthage, so that it
might
serve as a place of arms in the attack of that city. The Romans
now
hesitated no longer, but formally proclaimed war. M. Manilius, and
L.
Marcius Censorinus, the two consuls, were desired to set out as soon
as
possible. They had secret orders from the senate, not to end the war
but
by the destruction of Carthage. The consuls immediately left Rome,
and
stopped at Lilybæum in Sicily. They had a considerable fleet, on board
of
which were fourscore thousand foot, and about four thousand
horse.
The Carthaginians were not yet acquainted with the resolutions
which had
been taken at Rome.(872) The answer brought back by their deputies,
had
only increased their fears, _viz._ “It was the business of
the
Carthaginians to consider what satisfaction was due to them.”(873)
This
made them not know what course to take. At last they sent new
deputies,
whom they invested with full powers to act as they should see
fitting; and
even (what the former wars could never make them stoop to) to
declare,
that the Carthaginians gave up themselves, and all they possessed,
to the
will and pleasure of the Romans. This, according to the import of
the
clause, _se suaque eorum arbitrio permittere_, was submitting
themselves,
without reserve, to the power of the Romans, and acknowledging
themselves
their vassals. Nevertheless, they did not expect any great success
from
this condescension, though so very mortifying; because, as the Uticans
had
been beforehand with them on that occasion, this circumstance had
deprived
them of the merit of a ready and voluntary
submission. |
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