|
THERE
SHALL BE PEACE BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE (IN CASE THE ROMAN
PEOPLE
APPROVE
OF IT) ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: THE CARTHAGINIANS SHALL
EVACUATE
ALL SICILY; SHALL NO LONGER MAKE WAR UPON HIERO, THE SYRACUSANS,
OR
THEIR ALLIES: THEY SHALL RESTORE TO THE ROMANS, WITHOUT RANSOM, ALL
THE
PRISONERS
WHICH THEY HAVE TAKEN FROM THEM; AND PAY THEM, WITHIN TWENTY
YEARS,
TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EUBOIC TALENTS OF SILVER.(696) It is
worth
the
reader’s remarking, by the way, the simple, exact, and clear terms
in
which
this treaty is expressed; that, in so short a compass, adjusts
the
interests
of two powerful republics and their allies, both by sea and
land.
When
these conditions were brought to Rome, the people, not approving
of
them,
sent ten commissioners to Sicily, to terminate the affair. These
made
no alteration as to the substance of the treaty;(697) only
shortening
the
time appointed for the payment, reducing it to ten years: a
thousand
talents
were added to the sum that had been stipulated, which were to be
paid
immediately; and the Carthaginians were required to depart out of
all
the
islands situated between Italy and Sicily. Sardinia was not
comprehended
in this treaty; but they gave it up by another treaty which
was
made some years afterwards.
(M115)
Such was the conclusion of a war, one of the longest mentioned in
history,
since it continued twenty-four years without intermission. The
obstinacy,
in disputing for empire, was equal on either side: the same
resolution,
the same greatness of soul, in forming as well as in executing
of
projects, being conspicuous on both sides. The Carthaginians had
the
superiority
in their acquaintance with naval affairs; in their skill in
the
construction of their vessels; the working of them; the experience
and
capacity
of their pilots; the knowledge of coasts, shallows, roads, and
winds;
and in the inexhaustible fund of wealth, which furnished all the
expenses
of so long and obstinate a war. The Romans had none of these
advantages;
but their courage, zeal for the public good, love of their
country,
and a noble emulation of glory, supplied all other deficiencies.
We
are astonished to see a nation, so raw and inexperienced in naval
affairs,
not only making head against a people who were better skilled in
them,
and more powerful than any that had ever been before; but even
gaining
several victories over them at sea. No difficulties or calamities
could
discourage them. They certainly would not have thought of peace,
in
the
circumstances under which the Carthaginians demanded it. One
unfortunate
campaign dispirits the latter; whereas the Romans are not
shaken
by a succession of them.
As
to soldiers, there was no comparison between those of Rome and
Carthage,
the former being infinitely superior in point of courage. Among
the
generals who commanded in this war, Hamilcar, surnamed Barca,
was,
doubtless,
the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence.
_The
Libyan War; or against the Mercenaries._(698)—The
war which the
Carthaginians
waged against the Romans, was succeeded immediately by
another,(699)
which, though of much shorter continuance, was infinitely
more
dangerous; as it was carried on in the very heart of the
republic,
and
attended with such cruelty and barbarity, as is scarce to be
paralleled
in history; I mean the war which the Carthaginians were obliged
to
sustain against their mercenary troops, who had served under them
in
Sicily,
and which is commonly called the African or Libyan war.(700) It
continued
only three years and a half, but was a very bloody one. The
occasion
of it was this:
As
soon as the treaty was concluded with the Romans,(701) Hamilcar,
having
carried
to Lilybæum the forces which were in Eryx, resigned his
commission;
and left to Gisgo, governor of the place, the care of
transporting
these forces into Africa. Gisgo, as though he had foreseen
what
would happen, did not ship them all off at once, but in small and
separate
parties, in order that those who came first might be paid off,
and
sent home, before the arrival of the rest. This conduct evinced
great
forecast
and wisdom, but was not seconded equally at Carthage. As the
republic
had been exhausted by the expense of a long war, and the payment
of
near one hundred and thirty thousand pounds to the Romans on
signing
the
peace, the forces were not paid off in proportion as they arrived;
but
it
was thought proper to wait for the rest, in the hopes of obtaining
from
them
(when they should be all together) a remission of some part of
their
arrears.
This was the first oversight.
Here
we discover the genius of a state composed of merchants, who know
the
full
value of money, but are little acquainted with that of the
services
of
soldiers; who bargain for blood, as though it were an article of
trade,
and
always go to the cheapest market. In such a republic, when an
exigency
is
once answered, the merit of services is no longer remembered.
These
soldiers, most of whom came to Carthage, having been long
accustomed
to
a licentious life, caused great disturbances in the city; to
remedy
which,
it was proposed to their officers, to march them all to a little
neighbouring
town called Sicca, and there supply them with whatever was
necessary
for their subsistence, till the arrival of the rest of their
companions;
and that then they should all be paid off, and sent home. This
was
a second oversight.
A
third was, the refusing to let them leave their baggage, their
wives,
and
children in Carthage, as they desired; and the forcing them to
remove
these
to Sicca; whereas, had they staid in Carthage, they would have
been
in
a manner so many hostages.
Being
all met together at Sicca, they began (having little else to do)
to
compute
the arrears of their pay, which they made amount to much more
than
was
really due to them. To this computation, they added the mighty
promises
which had been made them, at different times, as an encouragement
for
them to do their duty; and pretended that these likewise ought to
be
brought
into the account. Hanno, who was then governor of Africa, and had
been
sent to them from the magistrates of Carthage, proposed to them
to
consent
to some abatement of their arrears; and to content themselves
with
receiving
a part, in consideration of the great distress to which the
commonwealth
was reduced, and its present unhappy circumstances. The
reader
will easily guess how such a proposal was received. Complaints,
murmurs,
seditious and insolent clamours, were every where heard. These
troops
being composed of different nations, who were strangers to one
another’s
language, were incapable of hearing reason when they once
mutinied.
Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians; inhabitants of the Balearic isles;
Greeks,
the greatest part of them slaves or deserters, and a very great
number
of Africans, composed these mercenary forces. Transported with
rage,
they immediately break up, march towards Carthage, (being upwards
of
twenty
thousand,) and encamp at Tunis, not far from that metropolis.
The
Carthaginians discovered too late their error. There was no
compliance,
how grovelling soever, to which they did not stoop, to soothe
these
exasperated soldiers: who, on their side, practised every knavish
art
which could be thought of, in order to extort money from them.
When
one
point was gained, they immediately had recourse to a new artifice,
on
which
to ground some new demand. Was their pay settled beyond the
agreement
made with them, they still would be reimbursed for the losses
which
they pretended to have sustained, either by the death of their
horses,
by the excessive price which, at certain times, they had paid for
bread-corn;
and still insisted on the recompense which had been promised
them.
As nothing could be fixed, the Carthaginians, with great
difficulty,
prevailed
on them to refer themselves to the opinion of some general who
had
commanded in Sicily. Accordingly they pitched upon Gisgo, who had
always
been very acceptable to them. This general harangued them in a
mild
and
insinuating manner; recalled to their memories the long time they
had
been
in the Carthaginian service; the considerable sums they had
received
from
the republic; and granted almost all their demands.
The
treaty was upon the point of being concluded, when two mutineers
occasioned
a tumult in every part of the camp. One of those was Spendius a
Capuan,
who had been a slave at Rome, and had fled to the Carthaginians.
He
was tall and bold. The fear he was under, of falling into the hands
of
his
former master, by whom he was sure to be hanged, (as was the
custom,)
prompted
him to break off the agreement. He was seconded by one
Matho,(702)
who had been very active in forming the conspiracy. These two
represented
to the Africans, that the instant after their companions
should
be discharged and sent home, they, being thus left alone in their
own
country, would fall a sacrifice to the rage of the Carthaginians,
who
would
take vengeance upon them for the common rebellion. This was
sufficient
to raise them to fury. They immediately made choice of Spendius
and
Matho for their chiefs. No remonstrances were heard; and whoever
offered
to make any, was immediately put to death. They ran to Gisgo’s
tent,
plundered it of the money designed for the payment of the forces:
dragged
that general himself to prison, with all his attendants; after
having
treated them with the utmost indignities. All the cities of
Africa,
to
whom they had sent deputies to exhort them to recover their
liberty,
came
over to them, Utica and Hippacra excepted, which they therefore
immediately
besieged.
Carthage
had never been before exposed to such imminent danger. The
citizens
individually drew each his subsistence from the rents or revenues
of
their lands, and the public expenses from the tribute paid by
Africa.
But
all this was stopped at once; and (a much worse circumstance) was
turned
against them. They found themselves destitute of arms and forces,
either
for sea or land; of all necessary preparations either for the
sustaining
of a siege, or the equipping of a fleet; and, to complete their
misfortunes,
without any hopes of foreign assistance, either from their
friends
or allies.
They
might, in some sense, impute to themselves the distress to which
they
were
reduced. During the last war, they had treated the African
nations
with
the utmost rigour, by imposing excessive tributes on them, in the
exaction
of which no allowance was made for poverty and extreme misery;
and
governors, such as Hanno, were treated with the greater respect,
the
more
severe they had been in levying those tributes. So that no great
efforts
were necessary to prevail upon the Africans to engage in this
rebellion.
At the very first signal that was made, it broke out, and in a
moment
became general. The women, who had often, with the deepest
affliction,
seen their husbands and fathers dragged to prison for
non-payment,
were more exasperated than the men; and with pleasure gave up
all
their ornaments towards the expenses of the war; so that the chiefs
of
the
rebels, after paying all they had promised the soldiers, found
themselves
still in the midst of plenty: an instructive lesson, says
Polybius,
to ministers, how a people should be treated; as it teaches them
to
look, not only to the present occasion, but to extend their views
to
futurity.
The
Carthaginians, notwithstanding their present distress, did not
despond,
but made the most extraordinary efforts. The command of the army
was
given to Hanno. Troops were levied by land and sea; horse as well
as
foot.
All citizens, capable of bearing arms, were mustered; mercenaries
were
invited from all parts; and all the ships which the republic had
left
were
refitted.
The
rebels discovered no less ardour. We related before, that they
had
formed
the siege of the two only cities which refused to join them.
Their
army
was now increased to seventy thousand men. After detachments had
been
drawn
from it to carry on those sieges, they pitched their camp at
Tunis;
and
thereby held Carthage in a kind of blockade, filling it with
perpetual
alarms,
and frequently advancing up to its very walls by day as well as
by
night.
Hanno
had marched to the relief of Utica, and gained a considerable
advantage,
which, had he made a proper use of it, might have proved
decisive:
but entering the city, and only diverting himself there, the
mercenaries,
who had retreated to a neighbouring hill covered with trees,
hearing
how careless the enemy were, poured down upon them; found the
soldiers
straggling in all parts; took and plundered the camp, and seized
upon
all the supplies that had been brought from Carthage for the
relief
of
the besieged. Nor was this the only error committed by Hanno; and
errors,
in such critical junctures, are much the most fatal. Hamilcar,
surnamed
Barca, was therefore appointed to succeed him. This general
answered
the idea which had been entertained of him; and his first success
was
the obliging the rebels to raise the siege of Utica. He then
marched
against
their army which was encamped near Carthage; defeated part of it,
and
seized almost all their advantageous posts. These successes
revived
the
courage of the Carthaginians.
The
arrival of a young Numidian nobleman, Naravasus by name, who, out
of
esteem
for the person and merit of Barca, joined him with two thousand
Numidians,
was of great service to that general. Animated by this
reinforcement,
he fell upon the rebels, who had cooped him up in a valley;
killed
ten thousand of them, and took four thousand prisoners. The young
Numidian
distinguished himself greatly in this battle. Barca took into his
troops
as many of the prisoners as were desirous of being enlisted, and
gave
the rest free liberty to go wherever they pleased, on condition
that
they
should never take up arms any more against the Carthaginians;
otherwise,
that every man of them, if taken, should be put to death. This
conduct
proves the wisdom of that general. He thought this a better
expedient
than extreme severity. And indeed where a multitude of mutineers
are
concerned, the greatest part of whom have been drawn in by the
persuasions
of the most hotheaded, or through fear of the most furious,
clemency
seldom fails of being successful.
Spendius,
the chief of the rebels, fearing that this affected lenity of
Barca
might occasion a defection among his troops, thought the only
expedient
left him to prevent it, would be, to strike some signal blow,
which
would deprive them of all hopes of being ever reconciled to the
enemy.
With this view, after having read to them some fictitious
letters,
by
which advice was given him, of a secret design concerted betwixt
some
of
their comrades and Gisgo for rescuing him out of prison, where he
had
been
so long detained; he brought them to the barbarous resolution of
murdering
him and all the rest of the prisoners; and any man, who durst
offer
any milder counsel, was immediately sacrificed to their fury.
Accordingly,
this unfortunate general, and seven hundred prisoners who
were
confined with him, were brought out to the front of the camp,
where
Gisgo
fell the first sacrifice, and afterwards all the rest. Their
hands
were
cut off, their thighs broken, and their bodies, still breathing,
were
thrown
into a hole. The Carthaginians sent a herald to demand their
| 
댓글 없음:
댓글 쓰기