[8] As to the construction {themis einai} see Jebb ad "Oed. Col."
1191, Appendix.
Yes (he answered), and the fact is, Socrates, if I mistake not, all
these matters are in close connection, each depending on the other.
Given that a man have a good meal to eat, he has only to work off the
effect by toil [9] directed rightly; and in the process, if I mistake
not, his health will be confirmed, his strength added to. Let him but
practise the arts of war and in the day of battle he will preserve his
life with honour. He needs only to expend his care aright, sealing
his ears to weak and soft seductions, and his house shall surely be
increased. [10]
[9] See "Mem." I. ii. 4; "Cyrop." I. ii. 16. Al. "bring out the effect
of it by toil."
[10] Lit. "it is likely his estate will increase more largely."
I answered: So far I follow you, Ischomachus. You tell me that by
labouring to his full strength, [11] by expending care, by practice and
training, a man may hope more fully to secure life's blessings. So I
take your meaning. But now I fain would learn of you some details. What
particular toil do you impose on yourself in order to secure good health
and strength? After what particular manner do you practise the arts of
war? How do you take pains to create a surplus which will enable you to
benefit your friends and to gratify the state?
[11] Or, "by working off ill-humours," as we should say.
Why then (Ischomachus replied), my habit is to rise from bed betimes,
when I may still expect to find at home this, that, or the other friend,
whom I may wish to see. Then, if anything has to be done in town, I set
off to transact the business and make that my walk; [12] or, if there is
no business to do in town, my serving-boy leads my horse to the farm;
I follow, and so make the country-road my walk, which suits my purpose
quite as well, or better, Socrates, perhaps, than pacing up and down the
colonnade. [13] Then when I have reached the farm, where mayhap some of
my men are planting trees, or breaking fallow, sowing or getting in the
crops, I inspect their various labours with an eye to every detail,
and, whenever I can improve upon the present system, I introduce reform.
After this, as a rule, I mount my horse and take a canter. I put
him through his paces, suiting these, as far as possible, to those
inevitable in war [14]--in other words, I avoid neither steep slope [15]
nor sheer incline, neither trench nor runnel, only giving my utmost heed
the while so as not to lame my horse while exercising him. When that
is over, the boy gives the horse a roll, [16] and leads him homewards,
taking at the same time from the country to town whatever we may chance
to need. Meanwhile I am off for home, partly walking, partly running,
and having reached home I take a bath and give myself a rub; [17] and
then I breakfast--a repast which leaves me neither empty nor replete,
[18] and will suffice to last me through the day.
[12] See "Mem." III. xiii. 5.
[13] {xusto}--the xystus, "a covered corridor in the gymnasium where
the athletes exercised in winter." Vitruv. v. 11. 4; vi. 7. 5. See
Rich, "Companion," s.n.; Becker, op. cit. p. 309. Cf. Plat.
"Phaedr." 227--Phaedrus loq.: "I have come from Lysias the son of
Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I
have been sitting with him the whole morning; and our common
friend Acumenus advises me to walk in the country, which he says
is more invigorating than to walk in the courts."--Jowett.
[14] See "Horsemanship," iii. 7 foll.; ib. viii.; "Hipparch," i. 18.
[15] "Slanting hillside."
[16] See "Horsemanship," v. 3; Aristoph. "Clouds," 32.
[17] Lit. "scrape myself clean" (with the {stleggis} or strigil). Cf.
Aristoph. "Knights," 580. See Becker, op. cit. p. 150.
[18] See "Lac. Pol." ii. 5. Cf. Hor. "Sat." i. 6. 127:
pransus non avide, quantum interpellet inani ventre diem durare.
Then eat a temperate luncheon, just to stay A sinking stomach till the
close of day (Conington).
By Hera (I replied), Ischomachus, I cannot say how much your doings take
my fancy. How you have contrived, to pack up portably for use--together
at the same time--appliances for health and recipes for strength,
exercises for war, and pains to promote your wealth! My admiration is
raised at every point. That you do study each of these pursuits in the
right way, you are yourself a standing proof. Your look of heaven-sent
health and general robustness we note with our eyes, while our ears have
heard your reputation as a first-rate horseman and the wealthiest of
men.
Isch. Yes, Socrates, such is my conduct, in return for which I am
rewarded with--the calumnies of half the world. You thought, I daresay,
I was going to end my sentence different, and say that a host of people
have given me the enviable title "beautiful and good."
I was indeed myself about to ask, Ischomachus (I answered), whether you
take pains also to acquire skill in argumentative debate, the cut and
thrust and parry of discussion, [19] should occasion call?
[19] Lit. "to give a reason and to get a reason from others." Cf.
"Cyrop." I. iv. 3.
Isch. Does it not strike you rather, Socrates, that I am engaged in one
long practice of this very skill, [20] now pleading as defendant that,
as far as I am able, I do good to many and hurt nobody? And then, again,
you must admit, I play the part of prosecutor when accusing people whom
I recognise to be offenders, as a rule in private life, or possibly
against the state, the good-for-nothing fellows?
[20] "The arts of the defendant, the apologist; and of the plaintiff,
the prosecutor."
But please explain one other thing, Ischomachus (I answered). Do you put
defence and accusation into formal language? [21]
[21] "Does your practice include the art of translating into words
your sentiments?" Cf. "Mem." I. ii. 52.
Isch. "Formal language," say you, Socrates? The fact is, I never cease
to practise speaking; and on this wise: Some member of my household has
some charge to bring, or some defence to make, [22] against some other.
I have to listen and examine. I must try to sift the truth. Or there
is some one whom I have to blame or praise before my friends, or I must
arbitrate between some close connections and endeavour to enforce the
lesson that it is to their own interests to be friends not foes. [23]...
We are present to assist a general in court; [24] we are called upon to
censure some one; or defend some other charged unjustly; or to prosecute
a third who has received an honour which he ill deserves. It frequently
occurs in our debates [25] that there is some course which we strongly
favour: naturally we sound its praises; or some other, which we
disapprove of: no less naturally we point out its defects.
[22] Or, "One member of my household appears as plaintiff, another as
defendant. I must listen and cross-question."
[23] The "asyndeton" would seem to mark a pause, unless some words
have dropped out. See the commentators ad loc.
[24] The scene is perhaps that of a court-martial (cf. "Anab." V.
viii.; Dem. "c. Timocr." 749. 16). (Al. cf. Sturz, "Lex." s.v. "we
are present (as advocates) and censure some general"), or more
probably, I think, that of a civil judicial inquiry of some sort,
conducted at a later date by the Minister of Finance ({to stratego
to epi tas summorias eremeno}).
[25] Or, "Or again, a frequent case, we sit in council" (as members of
the Boule). See Aristot. "Pol." iv. 15.
He paused, then added: Things have indeed now got so far, Socrates, that
several times I have had to stand my trial and have judgment passed upon
me in set terms, what I must pay or what requital I must make. [26]
[26] See "Symp." v. 8. Al. {dielemmenos} = "to be taken apart and have
..."
And at whose bar (I asked) is the sentence given? That point I failed to
catch. [27]
[27] Or, "so dull was I, I failed to catch the point."
Whose but my own wife's? (he answered).
And, pray, how do you conduct your own case? (I asked). [28]
[28] See "Mem." III. vii. 4; Plat. "Euth." 3 E.
Not so ill (he answered), when truth and interest correspond, but when
they are opposed, Socrates, I have no skill to make the worse appear the
better argument. [29]
[29] See Plat. "Apol." 19-23 D; Aristoph. "Clouds," 114 foll.
Perhaps you have no skill, Ischomachus, to make black white or falsehood
truth (said I). [30]
[30] Or, "It may well be, Ischomachus, you cannot manufacture
falsehood into truth." Lit. "Like enough you cannot make an
untruth true."
XII
But (I continued presently), perhaps I am preventing you from going, as
you long have wished to do, Ischomachus?
To which he: By no means, Socrates. I should not think of going away
until the gathering in the market is dispersed. [1]
[1] Lit. "until the market is quite broken up," i.e. after mid-day.
See "Anab." I. viii. 1; II. i. 7; "Mem." I. i. 10. Cf. Herod. ii.
173; iii. 104; vii. 223.
Of course, of course (I answered), you are naturally most careful not
to forfeit the title they have given you of "honest gentleman"; [2] and
yet, I daresay, fifty things at home are asking your attention at this
moment; only you undertook to meet your foreign friends, and rather than
play them false you go on waiting.
[2] Lit. "beautiful and good."
Isch. Let me so far correct you, Socrates; in no case will the things
you speak of be neglected, since I have stewards and bailiffs [3] on the
farms.
[3] Cf. Becker, op. cit. p. 363.
Soc. And, pray, what is your system when you need a bailiff? Do you
search about, until you light on some one with a natural turn for
stewardship; and then try to purchase him?--as, I feel certain, happens
when you want a carpenter: first, you discover some one with a turn for
carpentry, and then do all you can to get possession of him. [4] Or do
you educate your bailiffs yourself?
[4] The steward, like the carpenter, and the labourers in general,
would, as a rule, be a slave. See below, xxi. 9.
Isch. Most certainly the latter, Socrates; I try to educate them, as you
say, myself; and with good reason. He who is properly to fill my place
and manage my affairs when I am absent, my "alter ego," [5] needs but to
have my knowledge; and if I am fit myself to stand at the head of my own
business, I presume I should be able to put another in possession of my
knowledge. [6]
[5] Or, "my other self."
[6] Lit. "to teach another what I know myself."
Soc. Well then, the first thing he who is properly to take your place
when absent must possess is goodwill towards you and yours; for without
goodwill, what advantage will there be in any knowledge whatsoever which
your bailiff may possess?
Isch. None, Socrates; and I may tell you that a kindly disposition
towards me and mine is precisely what I first endeavour to instil.
Soc. And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you
will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?
Isch. By kindly treatment of him, to be sure, whenever the gods bestow
abundance of good things upon us.
Soc. If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy
your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some
good?
Isch. Yes, for of all instruments to promote good feeling this I see to
be the best.
Soc. Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore
follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff? It cannot have
escaped your observation that albeit human beings, as a rule, are kindly
disposed towards themselves, yet a large number of them will not apply
the attention requisite to secure for themselves those good things which
they fain would have.
Isch. Yes, but believe me, Socrates, when I seek to appoint such men as
bailiffs, I teach them also carefulness and application. [7]
[7] {epimeleia} is a cardinal virtue with the Greeks, or at any rate
with Xenophon, but it has no single name in English.
Soc. Nay, now in Heaven's name, once more, how can that be? I always
thought it was beyond the power of any teacher to teach these virtues.
[8]
[8] For the Socratic problem {ei arete didakte} see Grote, "H. G."
viii. 599.
Isch. Nor is it possible, you are right so far, to teach such
excellences to every single soul in order as simply as a man might
number off his fingers.
Soc. Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege? [9] Should you
mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?
[9] Lit. "what kind of people can be taught them? By all means signify
the sort to me distinctly."
Ishc. Well, in the first place, you would have some difficulty in making
intemperate people diligent--I speak of intemperance with regard to
wine, for drunkenness creates forgetfulness of everything which needs to
be done.
Soc. And are persons devoid of self-control in this respect the only
people incapable of diligence and carefulness? or are there others in
like case?
Isch. Certainly, people who are intemperate with regard to sleep, seeing
that the sluggard with his eyes shut cannot do himself or see that
others do what is right.
Soc. What then? [10] Are we to regard these as the only people incapable
of being taught this virtue of carefulness? or are there others in a
like condition?
[10] Or, "What then--is the list exhausted? Are we to suppose that
these are the sole people..."
Isch. Surely we must include the slave to amorous affection. [11] Your
woeful lover [12] is incapable of being taught attention to anything
beyond one single object. [13] No light task, I take it, to discover any
hope or occupation sweeter to him than that which now employs him, his
care for his beloved, nor, when the call for action comes, [14] will
it be easy to invent worse punishment than that he now endures in
separation from the object of his passion. [15] Accordingly, I am in no
great hurry to appoint a person of this sort to manage [16] my affairs;
the very attempt to do so I regard as futile.
[11] See "Mem." I. iii. 8 foll.; II. vi. 22.
[12] {duserotes}. Cf. Thuc. vi. 13, "a desperate craving" (Jowett).
[13] Cf. "Symp." iv. 21 foll.; "Cyrop." V. i. 7-18.
[14] Or, "where demands of business present themselves, and something
must be done."
[15] Cf. Shakesp. "Sonnets," passim.
[16] Or, "I never dream of appointing as superintendent." See above,
iv. 7.
Soc. Well, and what of those addicted to another passion, that of gain?
Are they, too, incapable of being trained to give attention to field and
farming operations?
Isch. On the contrary, there are no people easier to train, none so
susceptible of carefulness in these same matters. One needs only to
point out to them that the pursuit is gainful, and their interest is
aroused.
Soc. But for ordinary people? Given they are self-controlled to suit
your bidding, [17] given they possess a wholesome appetite for gain, how
will you lesson them in carefulness? how teach them growth in diligence
to meet your wishes?
[17] Or, "in matters such as you insist on."
Isch. By a simple method, Socrates. When I see a man intent on
carefulness, I praise and do my best to honour him. When, on the other
hand, I see a man neglectful of his duties, I do not spare him: I try in
every way, by word and deed, to wound him.
Soc. Come now, Ischomachus, kindly permit a turn in the discussion,
which has hitherto concerned the persons being trained to carefulness
themselves, and explain a point in reference to the training process.
Is it possible for a man devoid of carefulness himself to render others
more careful?
No more possible (he answered) than for a man who knows no music to make
others musical. [18] If the teacher sets but an ill example, the pupil
can hardly learn to do the thing aright. [19] And if the master's
conduct is suggestive of laxity, how hardly shall his followers attain
to carefulness! Or to put the matter concisely, "like master like man."
I do not think I ever knew or heard tell of a bad master blessed with
good servants. The converse I certainly have seen ere now, a good master
and bad servants; but they were the sufferers, not he. [20] No, he who
would create a spirit of carefulness in others [21] must have the skill
himself to supervise the field of labour; to test, examine, scrutinise.
[22] He must be ready to requite where due the favour of a service well
performed, nor hesitate to visit the penalty of their deserts upon those
neglectful of their duty. [23] Indeed (he added), the answer of the
barbarian to the king seems aposite. You know the story, [24] how the
king had met with a good horse, but wished to give the creature flesh
and that without delay, and so asked some one reputed to be clever about
horses: "What will give him flesh most quickly?" To which the other:
"The master's eye." So, too, it strikes me, Socrates, there is nothing
like "the master's eye" to call forth latent qualities, and turn the
same to beautiful and good effect. [25]
[18] Or, "to give others skill in 'music.'" See Plat. "Rep." 455 E;
"Laws," 802 B. Al. "a man devoid of letters to make others
scholarly." See Plat. "Phaedr." 248 D.
[19] Lit. "when the teacher traces the outline of the thing to copy
badly." For {upodeiknuontos} see "Mem." IV. iii. 13; "Horsem." ii.
2. Cf. Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; "Ath. Pol." 41. 17; and Dr. Sandys'
note ad loc.
[20] Or, "but they did not go scot-free"; "punishments then were
rife."
[21] Cf. Plat. "Polit." 275 E: "If we say either tending the herds, or
managing the herds, or having the care of them, that will include
all, and then we may wrap up the statesman with the rest, as the
argument seems to require."--Jowett.
[22] Or, "he must have skill to over-eye the field of labour, and be
scrutinous."
[23] "For every boon of service well performed he must be eager to
make requital to the author of it, nor hesitate to visit on the
heads of those neglectful of their duty a just recompense." (The
language is poetical.)
[24] See Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; Aesch. "Pers." 165; Cato ap. Plin.
"H. N." xviii. 5. Cic. ap. Colum. iv. 18; ib. vi. 21; La Fontaine,
"L'Oeil du Maitre."
[25] Or, "so, too, in general it seems to me 'the master's eye' is
aptest to elicit energy to issue beautiful and good."
XIII
But now (I ventured), suppose you have presented strongly to the mind of
some one [1] the need of carefulness to execute your wishes, is a person
so qualified to be regarded as fit at once to be your bailiff? or is
there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an
efficient bailiff?
[1] Breit. cf. "Pol. Lac." xv. 8. Holden cf. Plat. "Rep." 600 C.
Most certainly there is (he answered): it still remains for him to learn
particulars--to know, that is, what things he has to do, and when and
how to do them; or else, if ignorant of these details, the profit of
this bailiff in the abstract may prove no greater than the doctor's
who pays a most precise attention to a sick man, visiting him late and
early, but what will serve to ease his patient's pains [2] he knows not.
[2] Lit. "what it is to the advantage of his patient to do, is beyond
his ken."
Soc. But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will
he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute? [3]
[3] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 566 D. Or, "the perfect and consummate type of
bailiff."
Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.
What! (I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that
extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?
At any rate I try to do so (he replied).
And how, in Heaven's name (I asked), do you contrive to educate another
in the skill to govern human beings?
Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I daresay, you
will simply laugh at me.
Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who
can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the
master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is
grander still, a kingly being. [4] Once more, therefore, I protest: A
man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far
from it, but of the highest praise.
[4] i.e. {arkhikos} includes (1) {despotikos}, i.e. an arbitrary head
of any sort, from the master of one's own family to the {turannos
kai despotes} (Plat. "Laws," 859 A), despotic lord or owner; (2)
{basilikos}, the king or monarch gifted with regal qualities.
Thus, then, I reason, [5] Socrates (he answered): The lower animals are
taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished
when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness
when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted
in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and
something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of
something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at
last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another
instance: Young dogs, [6] however far inferior to man in thought
and language, [7] can still be taught to run on errands and turn
somersaults, [8] and do a host of other clever things, precisely on
this same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets
something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it
gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a
creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason; [9]
only make it plain to him "it is his interest to obey." Or if they
happen to be slaves, [10] the more ignoble training of wild animals
tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their
bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much
from them. [11] But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise,
[12] since some natures hunger after praise no less than others crave
for meats and drinks. My practice then is to instruct those whom I
desire to appoint as my bailiffs in the various methods which I have
found myself to be successful in gaining the obedience of my fellows. To
take an instance: There are clothes and shows and so forth, with which
I must provide my workfolk. [13] Well, then, I see to it that these are
not all alike in make; [14] but some will be of better, some of less
good quality: my object being that these articles for use shall vary
with the service of the wearer; the worse man will receive the worse
things as a gift, the better man the better as a mark of honour. For I
ask you, Socrates, how can the good avoid despondency seeing that
the work is wrought by their own hands alone, in spite of which these
villains who will neither labour nor face danger when occasion calls are
to receive an equal guerdon with themselves? And just as I cannot bring
myself in any sort of way to look upon the better sort as worthy to
receive no greater honour than the baser, so, too, I praise my bailiffs
when I know they have apportioned the best things among the most
deserving. And if I see that some one is receiving preference by dint
of flatteries or like unworthy means, I do not let the matter pass; I
reprimand my bailiff roundly, and so teach him that such conduct is not
even to his interest.
[5] {oukoun}. "This, then, is my major premiss: the dumb animal..."
(lit. "the rest of animals").
[6] {ta kunidia} possibly implies "performing poodles."
[7] {te gnome... te glotte}, i.e. mental impression and expression,
"mind and tongue."
[8] Or, "to run round and round and turn heels over head." Al. "dive
for objects."
[9] "Logic, argument." Or, "a creature more compliant; merely by a
word demonstrate to him..."
[10] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 591 C.
[11] See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," "Lacedaemon," p. 196 foll.
[12] See "Cyrop." passim.
[13] {ergastersi}, Xenophontic for the common Attic {ergatais}. See
Hold. ad loc. for similar forms, and cf. Rutherford, "New
Phrynichus," 59.
[14] Cf. Aristot. "Oecon." i. 5 (where the thesis is developed
further).
XIV
Soc. Well, then, Ischomachus, supposing the man is now so fit to rule
that he can compel obedience, [1] is he, I ask once more, your bailiff
absolute? or even though possessed of all the qualifications you have
named, does he still lack something? [2]
[1] Or, "that discipline flows from him;" al. "he presents you with
obedient servants."
[2] Lit. "will he still need something further to complete him?"
Most certainly (replied Ischomachus). One thing is still required of
him, and that is to hold aloof from property and goods which are his
master's; he must not steal. Consider, this is the very person through
whose hands the fruits and produce pass, and he has the audacity to make
away with them! perhaps he does not leave enough to cover the expenses
of the farming operations! Where would be the use of farming the land by
help of such an overseer?
What (I exclaimed), can I believe my ears? You actually undertake to
teach them virtue! What really, justice!
Isch. To be sure, I do. but it does not follow therefore that I find
all equally apt to lend an ear to my instruction. However, what I do is
this. I take a leaf now out of the laws of Draco and again another out
of the laws of Solon, [3] and so essay to start my household on the path
of uprightness. And indeed, if I mistake not (he proceeded), both those
legislators enacted many of their laws expressly with a view to teaching
this branch of justice. [4] It is written, "Let a man be punished for
a deed of theft"; "Let whosoever is detected in the act be bound and
thrown in prison"; "If he offer violence, [5] let him be put to death."
It is clear that the intention of the lawgivers in framing these
enactments was to render the sordid love of gain [6] devoid of profit
to the unjust person. What I do, therefore, is to cull a sample of their
precepts, which I supplement with others from the royal code [7] where
applicable; and so I do my best to shape the members of my household
into the likeness of just men concerning that which passes through
their hands. And now observe--the laws first mentioned act as penalties,
deterrent to transgressors only; whereas the royal code aims higher:
by it not only is the malefactor punished, but the righteous and just
person is rewarded. [8] The result is, that many a man, beholding how
the just grow ever wealthier than the unjust, albeit harbouring in his
heart some covetous desires, is constant still to virtue. To abstain
from unjust dealing is engrained in him. [9]
[3] Cobet, "Pros. Xen." cf. Plut. "Solon," xvii. {proton men oun tous
Drakontos nomous aneile k.t.l.} "First, then, he repealed all
Draco's laws, except those concerning homicide, because they were
too severe and the punishments too great; for death was appointed
for almost all offences, insomuch that those that were convicted
of idleness were to die, and those that stole a cabbage or an
apple to suffer even as villains that committed sacrilege or
murder" (Clough, i. 184). See Aul. Gell. "N. A." xi. 13.
[4] "The branch of justice which concerns us, viz. righteous dealing
between man and man."
[5] For this sense of {tous egkheirountas} cf. Thuc. iv. 121; "Hell."
IV. v. 16. Al. {dedesthai tous egkheirountas kai thanatousthai en
tis alo poion} (Weiske), "let the attempt be punished with
imprisonment"; "let him who is caught in the act be put to death."
[6] Cf. Plat. "Laws," 754 E.
[7] Or, "the royal laws," i.e. of Persia. Cf. "Anab." I. ix. 16;
"Cyrop." I. ii. 2, 3. Or possibly = "regal"; cf. Plat. "Minos,"
317 C; {to men orthon nomos esti basilikos}.
[8] Lit. "benefited."
[9] Lit. "Whereby, beholding the just becoming wealthier than the
unjust, many albeit covetous at heart themselves most constantly
abide by abstinence from evil-doing."
Those of my household (he proceeded) whom, in spite of kindly treatment,
I perceive to be persistently bent on evil-doing, in the end I treat as
desperate cases. Incurable self-seekers, [10] plain enough to see, whose
aspiration lifts them from earth, so eager are they to be reckoned just
men, not by reason only of the gain derivable from justice, but through
passionate desire to deserve my praise--these in the end I treat as
free-born men. I make them wealthy, and not with riches only, but in
honour, as befits their gentle manliness. [11] For if, Socrates, there
be one point in which the man who thirsts for honour differs from him
who thirsts for gain, it is, I think, in willingness to toil, face
danger, and abstain from shameful gains--for the sake of honour only and
fair fame. [12]
[10] Lit. "Those, on the other hand, whom I discover to be roused" (to
honesty--not solely because honesty is the best policy).
[11] Or, "men of fair and noble type"; "true gentlemen." This passage
suggests the "silver lining to the cloud" of slavery.
[12] Cf. Hom. "Il." ix. 413, {oleto men moi nostos, atar kleos
aphthiton estai}, "but my fame shall be imperishable."
XV
Soc. But now, suppose, Ischomachus, you have created in the soul of some
one a desire for your welfare; have inspired in him not a mere passive
interest, but a deep concern to help you to achieve prosperity; further,
you have obtained for him a knowledge of the methods needed to give the
operations of the field some measure of success; you have, moreover,
made him capable of ruling; and, as the crowning point of all your
efforts, this same trusty person shows no less delight, than you might
take yourself, in laying at your feet [1] earth's products, each in
due season richly harvested--I need hardly ask concerning such an one,
whether aught else is lacking to him. It is clear to me [2] an overseer
of this sort would be worth his weight in gold. But now, Ischomachus,
I would have you not omit a topic somewhat lightly handled by us in the
previous argument. [3]
[1] {apodeiknuon}, i.e. in presenting the inventory of products for
the year. Cf. "Hell." V. iii. 17; "Revenues," ii. 7.
[2] {ede}, at this stage of the discussion.
[3] Or, "that part of the discussion which we ran over in a light and
airy fashion," in reference to xiii. 2.
What topic, pray, was that? (he asked).
Soc. You said, if I mistake not, that it was most important to learn
the methods of conducting the several processes of husbandry; for, you
added, unless a man knows what things he has to do and how to do them,
all the care and diligence in the world will stand him in no stead.
At this point [4] he took me up, observing: So what you now command me
is to teach the art itself of tillage, Socrates?
[4] Keeping the vulg. order of SS. 3-9, which many commentators would
rearrange in various ways. See Breit. ad loc.; Lincke, op. cit. p.
111 foll.
Yes (I replied), for now it looks as if this art were one which made the
wise and skilled possessor of it wealthy, whilst the unskilled, in spite
of all the pains he takes, must live in indigence.
Isch. Now shall you hear, then, [5] Socrates, the generous nature of
this human art. For is it not a proof of something noble in it, that
being of supreme utility, so sweet a craft to exercise, so rich in
beauty, so acceptable alike to gods and men, the art of husbandry may
further fairly claim to be the easiest of all the arts to learn? Noble I
name it! this, at any rate, the epithet we give to animals which, being
beautiful and large and useful, are also gentle towards the race of man.
[6]
[5] Or, "Listen, then, and whilst I recount to you at once the
loving-kindness of this art, to man the friendliest."
[6] Schenkl regards this sentence as an interpolation. For the epithet
{gennaios} applied to the dog see "Cyrop." I. iv. 15, 21;
"Hunting," iv. 7.
Allow me to explain, Ischomachus (I interposed). Up to a certain point
I fully followed what you said. I understand, according to your theory,
how a bailiff must be taught. In other words, I follow your descriptions
both as to how you make him kindly disposed towards yourself; and how,
again, you make him careful, capable of rule, and upright. But at that
point you made the statement that, in order to apply this diligence to
tillage rightly, the careful husbandman must further learn what are the
different things he has to do, and not alone what things he has to do,
but how and when to do them. These are the topics which, in my opinion,
have hitherto been somewhat lightly handled in the argument. Let me make
my meaning clearer by an instance: it is as if you were to tell me that,
in order to be able to take down a speech in writing, [7] or to read a
written statement, a man must know his letters. Of course, if not
stone deaf, I must have garnered that for a certain object knowledge
of letters was important to me, but the bare recognition of the fact,
I fear, would not enable me in any deeper sense to know my letters. So,
too, at present I am easily persuaded that if I am to direct my care
aright in tillage I must have a knowledge of the art of tillage. But
the bare recognition of the fact does not one whit provide me with the
knowledge how I ought to till. And if I resolved without ado to set
about the work of tilling, I imagine, I should soon resemble your
physician going on his rounds and visiting his patients without knowing
what to prescribe or what to do to ease their sufferings. To save
me from the like predicaments, please teach me the actual work and
processes of tillage.
[7] Or, "something from dictation."
Isch. But truly, [8] Socrates, it is not with tillage as with the other
arts, where the learner must be well-nigh crushed [9] beneath a load
of study before his prentice-hand can turn out work of worth sufficient
merely to support him. [10] The art of husbandry, I say, is not so ill
to learn and cross-grained; but by watching labourers in the field, by
listening to what they say, you will have straightway knowledge enough
to teach another, should the humour take you. I imagine, Socrates (he
added), that you yourself, albeit quite unconscious of the fact, already
know a vast amount about the subject. The fact is, other craftsmen (the
race, I mean, in general of artists) are each and all disposed to keep
the most important [11] features of their several arts concealed:
with husbandry it is different. Here the man who has the most skill in
planting will take most pleasure in being watched by others; and so too
the most skilful sower. Ask any question you may choose about results
thus beautifully wrought, and not one feature in the whole performance
will the doer of it seek to keep concealed. To such height of nobleness
(he added), Socrates, does husbandry appear, like some fair mistress, to
conform the soul and disposition of those concerned with it.
[8] "Nay, if you will but listen, Socrates, with husbandry it is not
the same as with the other arts."
[9] {katatribenai}, "worn out." See "Mem." III. iv. 1; IV. vii. 5. Al.
"bored to death."
[10] Or, "before the products of his pupilage are worth his keep."
[11] Or, "critical and crucial."
The proem [12] to the speech is beautiful at any rate (I answered), but
hardly calculated to divert the hearer from the previous question. A
thing so easy to be learnt, you say? then, if so, do you be all the
readier for that reason to explain its details to me. No shame on you
who teach, to teach these easy matters; but for me to lack the knowledge
of them, and most of all if highly useful to the learner, worse than
shame, a scandal.
[12] Or, "the prelude to the piece."
XVI
Isch. First then, Socrates, I wish to demonstrate to you that what
is called [1] "the intricate variety in husbandry" [2] presents no
difficulty. I use a phrase of those who, whatever the nicety with
which they treat the art in theory, [3] have but the faintest practical
experience of tillage. What they assert is, that "he who would rightly
till the soil must first be made acquainted with the nature of the
earth."
[1] "They term"; in reference to the author of some treatise.
[2] Or, "the riddling subtlety of tillage." See "Mem." II. iii. 10;
Plat. "Symp." 182 B; "Phileb." 53 E.
[3] Theophr. "De Caus." ii. 4, 12, mentions Leophanes amongst other
writers on agriculture preceding himself.
And they are surely right in their assertion (I replied); for he who
does not know what the soil is capable of bearing, can hardly know, I
fancy, what he has to plant or what to sow.
But he has only to look at his neighbour's land (he answered), at his
crops and trees, in order to learn what the soil can bear and what
it cannot. [4] After which discovery, it is ill work fighting against
heaven. Certainly not by dint of sowing and planting what he himself
desires will he meet the needs of life more fully than by planting and
sowing what the earth herself rejoices to bear and nourish on her bosom.
Or if, as well may be the case, through the idleness of those who occupy
it, the land itself cannot display its native faculty, [5] it is often
possible to derive a truer notion from some neighbouring district that
ever you will learn about it from your neighbour's lips. [6] Nay, even
though the earth lie waste and barren, it may still declare its nature;
since a soil productive of beautiful wild fruits can by careful tending
be made to yield fruits of the cultivated kind as beautiful. And on
this wise, he who has the barest knowledge [7] of the art of tillage can
still discern the nature of the soil.
[4] Holden cf. Virg. "Georg." i. 53; iv. 109. According to the
commentator Servius, the poet drew largely upon Xenophon's
treatise.
[5] Or, "cannot prove its natural aptitude."
[6] Or, "from a neighbouring mortal."
[7] Or, "a mere empiric in the art of husbandry."
Thank you (I said), Ischomachus, my courage needs no further fanning
upon that score. I am bold enough now to believe that no one need
abstain from agriculture for fear he will not recognise the nature of
the soil. Indeed, I now recall to mind a fact concerning fishermen, how
as they ply their business on the seas, not crawling lazily along, nor
bringing to, for prospect's sake, but in the act of scudding past the
flying farmsteads, [8] these brave mariners have only to set eyes upon
crops on land, and they will boldly pronounce opinion on the nature
of the soil itself, whether good or bad: this they blame and that they
praise. And these opinions for the most part coincide, I notice, with
the verdict of the skilful farmer as to quality of soil. [9]
[8] Or, "the flying coastland, fields and farmyards."
[9] Lit. "And indeed the opinions they pronounce about 'a good soil'
mostly tally with the verdict of the expert farmer."
Isch. At what point shall I begin then, Socrates, to revive your
recollection [10] of the art of husbandry? since to explain to you the
processes employed in husbandry means the statement of a hundred details
which you know yourself full well already.
[10] Or, "begin recalling to your mind." See Plat. "Meno," for the
doctrine of Anamensis here apparently referred to.
Soc. The first thing I should like to learn, Ischomachus, I think, if
only as a point befitting a philosopher, is this: how to proceed and how
to work the soil, did I desire to extract the largest crops of wheat and
barley.
Isch. Good, then! you are aware that fallow must be broken up in
readiness [11] for sowing?
[11] Or, "ploughed up." Cf. Theophr. "Hist. Pl." iii. i. 6; Dion. Hal.
"Ant." x. 17.
Soc. Yes, I am aware of that. |
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