At this last sally the young man, feeling that the conversation set
somewhat in his direction, did not desist indeed from his savoury
viands, but helped himself generously to a piece of bread. Socrates was
all-observant, and added: Keep an eye on our friend yonder, you others
next him, and see fair play between the sop and the sauce. (12)
(12) Lit. "see whether he will make a relish of the staple or a staple
of the relish" ("butter his bread or bread his butter").
Another time, seeing one of the company using but one sop of bread
(13) to test several savoury dishes, he remarked: Could there be a more
extravagant style of cookery, or more murderous to the dainty dishes
themselves, than this wholesale method of taking so many dishes
together?--why, bless me, twenty different sorts of seasoning at one
swoop! (14) First of all he mixes up actually more ingredients than the
cook himself prescribes, which is extravagant; and secondly, he has the
audacity to commingle what the chef holds incongruous, whereby if the
cooks are right in their method he is wrong in his, and consequently the
destroyer of their art. Now is it not ridiculous first to procure the
greatest virtuosi to cook for us, and then without any claim to their
skill to take and alter their procedure? But there is a worse thing in
store for the bold man who habituates himself to eat a dozen dishes at
once: when there are but few dishes served, out of pure habit he will
feel himself half starved, whilst his neighbour, accustomed to send his
sop down by help of a single relish, will feast merrily, be the dishes
never so few.
(13) {psomos}, a sop or morsel of bread (cf. {psomion}, N. T., in mod.
Greek = "bread").
(14) Huckleberry Finn (p. 2 of that young person's "Adventures")
propounds the rationale of the system: "In a barrel of odds and
ends it is different; things get mixed up, and the juice kind of
swaps around, and the things go better."
He had a saying that {euokheisthai}, to "make good cheer," (15) was
in Attic parlance a synonym for "eating," and the affix {eu} (the
attributive "good") connoted the eating of such things as would not
trouble soul or body, and were not far to seek or hard to find. So
that to "make good cheer" in his vocabulary applied to a modest and
well-ordered style of living. (16)
(15) {euokheisthai}, cf. "Cyrop." IV. v. 7; "Pol. Ath." ii. 9; Kuhner
cf. Eustah. "ad Il." ii. p. 212, 37, {'Akhaioi ten trophen okhen
legousin oxutonos}. Athen. viii. 363 B. See "Hipparch," viii. 4,
of horses. Cf. Arist. "H. A." viii. 6.
(16) See "Symp." vi. 7; and for similar far-fetched etymologies, Plat.
"Crat." passim.
BOOK IV
I
Such was Socrates; so helpful under all circumstances and in every
way that no observer, gifted with ordinary sensibility, could fail to
appreciate the fact, that to be with Socrates, and to spend long time
in his society (no matter where or what the circumstances), was indeed
a priceless gain. Even the recollection of him, when he was no longer
present, was felt as no small benefit by those who had grown accustomed
to be with him, and who accepted him. Nor indeed was he less helpful to
his acquaintance in his lighter than in his graver moods.
Let us take as an example that saying of his, so often on his lips:
"I am in love with so and so"; and all the while it was obvious the
going-forth of his soul was not towards excellence of body in the bloom
of beauty, but rather towards faculties of the soul unfolding in virtue.
(1) And these "good natures" he detected by certain tokens: a readiness
to learn that to which the attention was directed; a power of retaining
in the memory the lessons learnt; and a passionate predilection for
those studies in particular which serve to good administration of a
house or of a state, (2) and in general to the proper handling of
man and human affairs. Such beings, he maintained, needed only to
be educated (3) to become not only happy themselves and happy
administrators of their private households, but to be capable of
rendering other human beings as states or individuals happy also.
(1) Or, "not excellence of body in respect of beauty, but of the soul
as regards virtue; and this good natural disposition might be
detected by the readiness of its possessor to learn," etc. Cf.
Plat. "Rep." 535 B.
(2) Cf. above, I. i. 7.
(3) Or, "A person of this type would, if educated, not only prove a
fortune-favoured individual himself and," etc. Al. Kuhner, "Eos,
qui ita instituti sunt, ut tales sint."
He had indeed a different way of dealing with different kinds of
people. (4) Those who thought they had good natural ability and despised
learning he instructed that the most highly-gifted nature stands most
in need of training and education; (5) and he would point out how in the
case of horses it is just the spirited and fiery thoroughbred which, if
properly broken in as a colt, will develop into a serviceable and superb
animal, but if left unbroken will turn out utterly intractable and good
for nothing. Or take the case of dogs: a puppy exhibiting that zest for
toil and eagerness to attack wild creatures which are the marks of high
breeding, (6) will, if well brought up, prove excellent for the chase or
for any other useful purpose; but neglect his education and he will turn
out a stupid, crazy brute, incapable of obeying the simplest command. It
is just the same with human beings; here also the youth of best natural
endowments--that is to say, possessing the most robust qualities of
spirit and a fixed determination to carry out whatever he has laid his
hand to--will, if trained and taught what it is right to do, prove a
superlatively good and useful man. He achieves, in fact, what is best
upon the grandest scale. But leave him in boorish ignorance untrained,
and he will prove not only very bad but very mischievous, (7) and for
this reason, that lacking the knowledge to discern what is right to do,
he will frequently lay his hand to villainous practices; whilst the very
magnificence and vehemence of his character render it impossible either
to rein him in or to turn him aside from his evil courses. Hence in his
case also his achievements are on the grandest scale but of the worst.
(8)
(4) Or, "His method of attack was not indeed uniformly the same. It
varied with the individual."
(5) Or, "If any one was disposed to look down upon learning and study
in reliance upon his own natural ability, he tried to lesson him
that it is just the highly-gifted nature which stands," etc. See
Newman, op. cit. i. 397.
(6) Cf. Aristot. "H. A." ix. 1; and "Hunting," iii. 11.
(7) Or, "and the same man may easily become a master villain of the
most dangerous sort."
(8) Kuhner ad loc. after Fr. Hermann cf. Plato. "Crito," 44 E; "Hipp.
min." 375 E; "Rep." vi. 491 E; "Gorg." 526 A; "Polit." 303 A.
Or to take the type of person so eaten up with the pride of riches that
he conceives himself dispensed from any further need of education--since
it is "money makes the man," and his wealth will amply suffice him to
carry out his desires and to win honours from admiring humanity. (9)
Socrates would bring such people to their senses by pointing out the
folly of supposing that without instruction it was possible to draw the
line of demarcation (10) between what is gainful and what is hurtful
in conduct; and the further folly of supposing that, apart from such
discrimination, a man could help himself by means of wealth alone to
whatever he liked or find the path of expediency plain before him; and
was it not the veriest simplicity to suppose that, without the power of
labouring profitably, a man can either be doing well or be in any sort
of way sufficiently equipped for the battle of life? and again, the
veriest simplicity to suppose that by mere wealth without true knowledge
it was possible either to purchase a reputation for some excellence, or
without such reputation to gain distinction and celebrity?
(9) Or, "and to be honoured by mankind."
(10) Or, "that without learning the distinction it was possible to
distinguish between," etc.
II
Or to come to a third kind--the class of people who are persuaded that
they have received the best education, and are proud of their wisdom:
his manner of dealing with these I will now describe.
Euthydemus (1) "the beautiful" had (Socrates was given to understand)
collected a large library, consisting of the most celebrated poets and
philosophers, (2) by help of which he already believed himself to be
more than a match for his fellows in wisdom, and indeed might presently
expect to out-top them all in capacity of speech and action. (3) At
first, as Socrates noted, the young man by reason of his youth had not
as yet set foot in the agora, (4) but if he had anything to transact,
his habit was to seat himself in a saddler's shop hard by. Accordingly
to this same saddler's shop Socrates betook himself with some of those
who were with him. And first the question was started by some one: "Was
it through consorting with the wise, (5) or by his own unaided talent,
that Themistocles came so to surpass his fellow-citizens that when the
services of a capable man were needed the eyes of the whole community
instinctively turned to him?" Socrates, with a view to stirring (6)
Euthydemus, answered: There was certainly an ingenuous simplicity in the
belief that superiority in arts of comparatively little worth could only
be attained by aid of qualified teachers, but that the leadership of the
state, the most important concern of all, was destined to drop into the
lap of anybody, no matter whom, like an accidental windfall. (7)
(1) Euthydemus, the son of Diocles perhaps. See Plat. "Symp." 222 B,
and Jowet ad loc.; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; K. Joel, op. cit.
p. 372 foll. For {ton kalon} cf. "Phaedr." 278 E, "Isocrates the
fair." For the whole chapter cf. Plat. "Alc." i.; "Lys." 210 E.
See above, "Mem." I. ii. 29; Grote, "Plato," i. ch. x. passim.
(2) Lit. "sophists." See Grote, "H. G." viii. p. 480, note. For
private libraries see Becker, "Char." p. 272 foll. (Eng. tr.)
(3) See "Hipparch," i. 24; "Cyrop." V. v. 46.
(4) See above, III. vi. 1; Schneid. cf. Isocr. "Areop." 149 C.
(5) Cf. Soph. fr. 12, {sophoi turannoi ton sophon xunousia}.
(6) L. and S. cf. Plat. "Lys." 223 A; "Rep." 329 B: "Wishing to draw
him out."
(7) Cf. Plat. "Alc." i. 118 C: "And Pericles is said not to have got
his wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with
several of the philosophers" (Jowett).
On a subsequent occasion, Euthydemus being present, though, as was plain
to see, somewhat disposed to withdraw from the friendly concourse, (8)
as if he would choose anything rather than appear to admire Socrates on
the score of wisdom, the latter made the following remarks.
(8) {sunedrias}, "the council."
Soc. It is clear from his customary pursuits, is it not, sirs, that when
our friend Euthydemus here is of full age, and the state propounds some
question for solution, he will not abstain from offering the benefit
of his advice? One can imagine the pretty exordium to his parliamentary
speeches which, in his anxiety not to be thought to have learnt anything
from anybody, he has ready for the occasion. (9) Clearly at the outset
he will deliver himself thus: "Men of Athens, I have never at any time
learnt anything from anybody; nor, if I have ever heard of any one as
being an able statesman, well versed in speech and capable of action,
have I sought to come across him individually. I have not so much as
been at pains to provide myself with a teacher from amongst those who
have knowledge; (10) on the contrary, I have persistently avoided, I
will not say learning from others, but the very faintest suspicion of
so doing. However, anything that occurs to me by the light of nature I
shall be glad to place at your disposal."... How appropriate (11) would
such a preface sound on the lips of any one seeking, say, the office of
state physician, (12) would it not? How advantageously he might begin
an address on this wise: "Men of Athens, I have never learnt the art of
healing by help of anybody, nor have I sought to provide myself with any
teacher among medical men. Indeed, to put it briefly, I have been ever
on my guard not only against learning anything from the profession, but
against the very notion of having studied medicine at all. If, however,
you will be so good as to confer on me this post, I promise I will do
my best to acquire skill by experimenting on your persons." Every one
present laughed at the exordium (and there the matter dropped).
(9) Or, "the pretty exordium... now in course of composition. He
must at all hazards avoid the suspicion of having picked up any
crumb of learning from anybody; how can he help therefore
beginning his speech thus?"
(10) Or, "scientific experts."
(11) Al. "Just as if one seeking the office of state physician were to
begin with a like exordium." {armoseie} = "it would be consistent
(with what has gone before)."
(12) Schneider cf. Plat. "Laws," iv. 720 A; "Gorg." 456 A; and for
"the parish doctor," "Polit." 259 A; Arist. "Acharn." 1030.
Presently, when it became apparent that Euthydemus had got so far that
he was disposed to pay attention to what was said, though he was still
at pains not to utter a sound himself, as if he hoped by silence to
attach to himself some reputation for sagacity, Socrates, wishing to
cure him of that defect, proceeded.
Soc. Is it not surprising that people anxious to learn to play the
harp or the flute, or to ride, or to become proficient in any like
accomplishment, are not content to work unremittingly in private by
themselves at whatever it is in which they desire to excel, but they
must sit at the feet of the best-esteemed teachers, doing all things
and enduring all things for the sake of following the judgment of those
teachers in everything, as though they themselves could not otherwise
become famous; whereas, among those who aspire to become eminent
politically as orators and statesmen, (13) there are some who cannot
see why they should not be able to do all that politics demand, at a
moment's notice, by inspiration as it were, without any preliminary
pains or preparations whatever? And yet it would appear that the latter
concerns must be more difficult of achievement than the former, in
proportion as there are more competitors in the field but fewer who
reach the goal of their ambition, which is as much as to say that a more
sustained effort of attention is needed on the part of those who embark
upon the sea of politics than is elsewhere called for.
(13) Or, more lit. "powerful in speech and action within the sphere of
politics."
Such were the topics on which Socrates was wont in the early days of
their association to dilate in the hearing of Euthydemus; but when the
philosopher perceived that the youth not only could tolerate the turns
of the discussion more readily but was now become a somewhat eager
listener, he went to the saddler's shop alone, (14) and when Euthydemus
was seated by his side the following conversation took place.
(14) The question arises: how far is the conversation historical or
imaginary?
Soc. Pray tell me, Euthydemus, is it really true what people tell me,
that you have made a large collection of the writings of "the wise," as
they are called? (15)
(15) Or, "have collected several works of our classical authors and
philosophers."
Euthydemus answered: Quite true, Socrates, and I mean to go on
collecting until I possess all the books I can possibly lay hold of.
Soc. By Hera! I admire you for wishing to possess treasures of wisdom
rather than of gold and silver, which shows that you do not believe gold
and silver to be the means of making men better, but that the thoughts
(16) of the wise alone enrich with virtue their possessions.
(16) Lit. "gnomes," maxims, sententiae. Cf. Aristot. "Rhet." ii. 21.
And Euthydemus was glad when he heard that saying, for, thought he
to himself, "In the eyes of Socrates I am on the high road to the
acquisition of wisdom." But the latter, perceiving him to be pleased
with the praise, continued.
Soc. And what is it in which you desire to excel, Euthydemus, that you
collect books?
And when Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer he should
make, Socrates added: Possibly you want to be a great doctor? Why,
the prescriptions (17) of the Pharmacopoeia would form a pretty large
library by themselves.
(17) {suggrammata}, "medical treatises." See Aristot. "Eth." x. 9, 21.
No, indeed, not I! (answered Euthydemus).
Soc. Then do you wish to be an architect? That too implies a man of
well-stored wit and judgment. (18)
(18) Or, "To be that implies a considerable store of well-packed
wisdom."
I have no such ambition (he replied).
Soc. Well, do you wish to be a mathematician, like Theodorus? (19)
(19) Of Cyrene (cf. Plat. "Theaet.") taught Plato. Diog. Laert. ii. 8,
19.
Euth. No, nor yet a mathematician.
Soc. Then do you wish to be an astronomer? (20) or (as the youth
signified dissent) possibly a rhapsodist? (21) (he asked), for I am told
you have the entire works of Homer in your possession. (22)
(20) Cf. below, IV. vii. 4.
(21) See "Symp." iii. 6; Plat. "Ion."
(22) See Jowett, "Plato," i. 229; Grote, "Plato," i. 455.
Nay, God forbid! not I! (ejaculated the youth). Rhapsodists have a very
exact acquaintance with epic poetry, I know, of course; but they are
empty-pated creatures enough themselves. (23)
(23) Or, "are simply perfect in the art of reciting epic poetry, but
are apt to be the veriest simpletons themselves."
At last Socrates said: Can it be, Euthydemus, that you are an aspirant
to that excellence through which men become statesmen and administrators
fit to rule and apt to benefit (24) the rest of the world and
themselves?
(24) Or, "statesmen, and economists, and rules, and benefactors of
the rest of the world and themselves."
Yes (replied he), that is the excellence I desire--beyond measure.
Upon my word (said Socrates), then you have indeed selected as the
object of your ambition the noblest of virtues and the greatest of the
arts, for this is the property of kings, and is entitled "royal"; but
(he continued) have you considered whether it is possible to excel in
these matters without being just and upright? (25)
(25) Just, {dikaios} = upright, righteous. Justice, {dikaiosune} =
social uprightness = righteousness, N.T. To quote a friend: "The
Greek {dikaios} combines the active dealing out of justice with
the self-reflective idea of preserving justice in our conduct,
which is what we mean by 'upright.'"
Euth. Certainly I have, and I say that without justice and uprightness
it is impossible to be a good citizen.
No doubt (replied Socrates) you have accomplished that initial step?
Euth. Well, Socrates, I think I could hold my own against all comers as
an upright man.
And have upright men (continued Socrates) their distinctive and
appropriate works like those of carpenters or shoe-makers?
Euth. To be sure they have.
Soc. And just as the carpenter is able to exhibit his works and
products, the righteous man should be able to expound and set forth his,
should he not?
I see (replied Euthydemus) you are afraid I cannot expound the works
of righteousness! Why, bless me! of course I can, and the works of
unrighteousness into the bargain, since there are not a few of that sort
within reach of eye and ear every day.
Shall we then (proceeded Socrates) write the letter R on this side, (26)
and on that side the letter W; and then anything that appears to us
to be the product of righteousness we will place to the R account, and
anything which appears to be the product of wrong-doing and iniquity to
the account of W?
(26) The letter R (to stand for Right, Righteous, Upright, Just). The
letter W (to stand for Wrong, Unrighteous, Unjust).
By all means do so (he answered), if you think that it assists matters.
Accordingly Socrates drew the letters, as he had suggested, and
continued.
Soc. Lying exists among men, does it not?
Euth. Certainly.
To which side of the account then shall we place it? (he asked).
Euth. Clearly on the side of wrong and injustice.
Soc. Deceit too is not uncommon?
Euth. By no means.
Soc. To which side shall we place deceit?
Euth. Deceit clearly on the side of wrong.
Soc. Well, and chicanery (27) or mischief of any sort?
(27) Reading {to kakourgein} (= furari, Sturz); al. {kleptein}, Stob.
Euth. That too.
Soc. And the enslavement of free-born men? (28)
(28) Or, "the kidnapping of men into slavery." {to andrapodizesthai} =
the reduction of a free-born man to a state of slavery. Slavery
itself ({douleia}) being regarded as the normal condition of a
certain portion of the human race and not in itself immoral.
Euth. That too.
Soc. And we cannot allow any of these to lie on the R side of the
account, to the side of right and justice, can we, Euthydemus?
It would be monstrous (he replied).
Soc. Very good. But supposing a man to be elected general, and he
succeeds in enslaving an unjust, wicked, and hostile state, are we to
say that he is doing wrong?
Euth. By no means.
Soc. Shall we not admit that he is doing what is right?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. Again, suppose he deceives the foe while at war with them?
Euth. That would be all fair and right also.
Soc. Or steals and pillages their property? would he not be doing what
is right?
Euth. Certainly; when you began I thought you were limiting the question
to the case of friends.
Soc. So then everything which we set down on the side of Wrong will now
have to be placed to the credit of Right?
Euth. Apparently.
Soc. Very well then, let us so place them; and please, let us make a
new definition--that while it is right to do such things to a foe, it is
wrong to do them to a friend, but in dealing with the latter it behoves
us to be as straightforward as possible. (29)
(29) Or, "an absolutely straightforward course is necessary."
I quite assent (replied Euthydemus).
So far so good (remarked Socrates); but if a general, seeing his troops
demoralised, were to invent a tale to the effect that reinforcements
were coming, and by means of this false statement should revive the
courage of his men, to which of the two accounts shall we place that act
of fraud? (30)
(30) Cf. "Hell." IV. iii. 10; "Cyrop." I. vi. 31.
On the side of right, to my notion (he replied).
Soc. Or again, if a man chanced to have a son ill and in need of
medicine, which the child refused to take, and supposing the father by
an act of deceit to administer it under the guise of something nice to
eat, and by service of that lie to restore the boy to health, to which
account shall we set down this fraud?
Euth. In my judgment it too should be placed to the same account.
Soc. Well, supposing you have a friend in deplorably low spirits, and
you are afraid he will make away with himself--accordingly you rob him
of his knife or other such instrument: to which side ought we to set the
theft?
Euth. That too must surely be placed to the score of right behaviour.
Soc. I understand you to say that a straightforward course is not in
every case to be pursued even in dealing with friends?
Heaven forbid! (the youth exclaimed). If you will allow me, I rescind my
former statement. (31)
(31) See above, I. ii. 44 ({anatithemai}).
Soc. Allow you! Of course you may--anything rather than make a false
entry on our lists.... But there is just another point we ought not to
leave uninvestigated. Let us take the case of deceiving a friend to
his detriment: which is the more wrongful--to do so voluntarily or
unintentionally?
Euth. Really, Socrates, I have ceased to believe in my own answers, for
all my former admissions and conceptions seem to me other than I
first supposed them. (32) Still, if I may hazard one more opinion, the
intentional deceiver, I should say, is worse than the involuntary.
(32) Or, "all my original positions seem to me now other than I first
conceived them"; or, "everything I first asserted seems now to be
twisted topsy-turvy."
Soc. And is it your opinion that there is a lore and science of Right
and Justice just as there is of letters and grammar? (33)
(33) {mathesis kai episteme tou dikaiou}--a doctrine and a knowledge
of the Just.
Euth. That is my opinion.
Soc. And which should you say was more a man of letters (34)--he who
intentionally misspells or misreads, or he who does so unconsciously?
(34) Or, "more grammatical"; "the better grammarian."
Euth. He who does so intentionally, I should say, because he can spell
or read correctly whenever he chooses.
Soc. Then the voluntary misspeller may be a lettered person, but the
involuntary offender is an illiterate? (35)
(35) Or, "In fact, he who sins against the lore of grammer
intentionally may be a good grammarian and a man of letters, but
he who does so involuntarily is illiterate and a bad grammarian?"
Euth. True, he must be. I do not see how to escape from that conclusion.
Soc. And which of the two knows what is right--he who intentionally lies
and deceives, or he who lies and deceives unconsciously? (36)
(36) Or, Soc. And does he who lies and deceives with intent know what
is right rather than he who does either or both unconsciously?
Euth. Clearly he does.
Euth. The intentional and conscious liar clearly.
Soc. Well then, your statement is this: on the one hand, the man who
has the knowledge of letters is more lettered than he who has no such
knowledge? (37)
(37) Or, Soc. It is a fair inference, is it not, that he who has the
{episteme} of grammar is more grammatical than he who has no such
{episteme}?
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And he who has the {episteme} of things rightful is more
righteous than he who lacks the {episteme}? See Plat. "Hipp.
min."; Arist. "Eth. Eud." VI. v. 7.
Euth. Yes.
Soc. And, on the other, he who has the knowledge of what is right is
more righteous than he who lacks that knowledge?
Euth. I suppose it is, but for the life of me I cannot make head or tail
of my own admission. (38)
(38) Lit. "Apparently; but I appear to myself to be saying this also,
heaven knows how." See Jowett, "Plato," ii. p. 416 (ed. 2).
Soc. Well (look at it like this). Suppose a man to be anxious to speak
the truth, but he is never able to hold the same language about a thing
for two minutes together. First he says: "The road is towards the east,"
and then he says, "No, it's towards the west"; or, running up a column
of figures, now he makes the product this, and again he makes it that,
now more, now less--what do you think of such a man?
Euth. Heaven help us! clearly he does not know what he thought he knew.
Soc. And you know the appellation given to certain people--"slavish,"
(39) or, "little better than a slave?"
(39) {andropododeis}, which has the connotation of mental dulness, and
a low order of intellect, cf. "boorish," "rustic," "loutish,"
("pariah," conceivably). "Slavish," "servile," with us connote
moral rather than intellectual deficiency, I suppose. Hence it is
impossible to preserve the humour of the Socratic argument. See
Newman, op. cit. i. 107.
Euth. I do.
Soc. Is it a term suggestive of the wisdom or the ignorance of those to
whom it is applied?
Euth. Clearly of their ignorance.
Soc. Ignorance, for instance, of smithying?
Euth. No, certainly not.
Soc. Then possibly ignorance of carpentering?
Euth. No, nor yet ignorance of carpentering.
Soc. Well, ignorance of shoemaking?
Euth. No, nor ignorance of any of these: rather the reverse, for the
majority of those who do know just these matters are "little better than
slaves."
Soc. You mean it is a title particularly to those who are ignorant of
the beautiful, the good, the just? (40)
(40) Cf. Goethe's "Im Ganzen Guten Schonen resolut zu leben."
It is, in my opinion (he replied).
Soc. Then we must in every way strain every nerve to avoid the
imputation of being slaves?
Euth. Nay, Socrates, by all that is holy, I did flatter myself that
at any rate I was a student of philosophy, and on the right road to
be taught everything essential to one who would fain make beauty and
goodness his pursuit. (41) So that now you may well imagine my despair
when, for all my pains expended, I cannot even answer the questions put
to me about what most of all a man should know; and there is no path of
progress open to me, no avenue of improvement left.
(41) {tes kalokagathias}, the virtue of the {kalos te kagathos}--
nobility of soul. Cf. above, I. vi. 14.
Thereupon Socrates: Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever been to Delphi?
Yes, certainly; twice (said he).
Soc. And did you notice an inscription somewhere on the temple:
{GNOMI SEAUTON}--KNOW THYSELF?
Euth. I did.
Soc. Did you, possibly, pay no regard to the inscription? or did you
give it heed and try to discover who and what you were?
I can safely say I did not (he answered). That much I made quite sure
I knew, at any rate; since if I did not know even myself, what in the
world did I know?
Soc. Can a man be said, do you think, to know himself who knows his own
name and nothing more? or must he not rather set to work precisely like
the would-be purchaser of a horse, who certainly does not think that he
has got the knowledge he requires until he has discovered whether the
beast is tractable or stubborn, strong or weak, quick or slow, and
how it stands with the other points, serviceable or the reverse, in
reference to the use and purpose of a horse? So, I say, must a man
in like manner interrogate his own nature in reference to a man's
requirements, and learn to know his own capacities, must he not?
Euth. Yes, so it strikes me: he who knows not his own ability knows not
himself.
Soc. And this too is plain, is it not: that through self-knowledge men
meet with countless blessings, and through ignorance of themselves
with many evils? Because, the man who knows himself knows what is
advantageous to himself; he discerns the limits of his powers, and by
doing what he knows, he provides himself with what he needs and so does
well; or, conversely, by holding aloof from what he knows not, he avoids
mistakes and thereby mishaps. And having now a test to gauge other human
beings he uses their need as a stepping-stone to provide himself with
good and to avoid evil. Whereas he who does not know himself, but is
mistaken as to his own capacity, is in like predicament to the rest of
mankind and all human matters else; he neither knows what he wants,
nor what he is doing, nor the people whom he deals with; and being all
abroad in these respects, he misses what is good and becomes involved in
what is ill.
Again, he that knows what he is doing through the success of his
performance attains to fame and honour; his peers and co-mates are glad
to make use of him, whilst his less successful neighbours, failing
in their affairs, are anxious to secure his advice, his guidance, his
protection; (42) they place their hopes of happiness in him, and for all
these causes (43) single him out as the chief object of their affection.
He, on the contrary, who knows not what he does, who chooses amiss and
fails in what he puts his hands to, not only incurs loss and suffers
chastisement through his blunders, but step by step loses reputation
and becomes a laughing-stock, and in the end is doomed to a life of
dishonour and contempt.
(42) Cf. Dante, "Tu duca, tu maestro, tu signore."
(43) Reading, {dia panta tauta}, or if {dia tauta}, translate "and
therefore."
What is true of individuals is true also of communities. (44) That state
which in ignorance of its power goes to war with a stronger than itself
ends by being uprooted or else reduced to slavery.
(44) Or, more lit. "A law which applies, you will observe, to bodies
politic."
Thereupon Euthydemus: Be assured I fully concur in your opinion; the
precept KNOW THYSELF cannot be too highly valued; but what is the
application? What the starting-point of self-examination? I look to you
for an explanation, if you would kindly give one. (45)
(45) Or, "at what point to commence the process of self-inspection?--
there is the mystery. I look to you, if you are willing, to
interpret it."
Well (replied Socrates), I presume you know quite well the distinction
between good and bad things: your knowledge may be relied upon so far?
Why, yes, to be sure (replied the youth); for without that much
discernment I should indeed be worse than any slave. (46)
(46) Lit. "if I did not know even that."
Come then (said he), do you give me an explanation of the things so
termed.
That is fortunately not hard (replied the youth). First of all, health
in itself I hold to be a good, and disease in itself an evil; and in the
next place the sources of either of those aforenamed, meats and drinks,
and habits of life, (47) I regard as good or evil according as they
contribute either to health or to disease.
(47) Or, "pursuits and occupations"; "manners and customs."
Soc. Then health and disease themselves when they prove to be sources of
any good are good, but when of any evil, evil?
And when (asked he), can health be a source of evil, or disease a source
of good?
Why, bless me! often enough (replied Socrates). In the event, for
instance, of some ill-starred expedition or of some disastrous voyage
or other incident of the sort, of which veritably there are enough to
spare--when those who owing to their health and strength take a part
in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind--as hors de
combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness--are saved.
Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages
to be got from strength and lost through weakness.
Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment
benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather
than evil?
Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom,
(48) Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good;
since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better
than a fool.
(48) See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.
Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus, (49) how he was
seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave,
and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while
endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's
death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among
barbarians and again enslaved?
(49) See Ovid. "Met." viii. 159 foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. "Fab." 39,
40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii. 4. 6.
Yes, I know the old story (he answered). (50)
(50) Or, "Ah yes, of course; the tale is current."
Soc. Or have you not heard of the "woes of Palamedes," (51) that
commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him
and slew him?
(51) See Virg. "Aen." ii. 90; Hygin. 105; Philostr. "Her." x.
Euth. That tale also is current.
Soc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on
account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his
court enslaved? (52)
(52) Cf. Herod. iii. 129.
Well, prosperity, well-being (53) (he exclaimed), must surely be a
blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?
(53) {to eudaimonein}, "happiness." Cf. Herod. i. 86.
It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in
itself a compound of other questionable blessings.
Euth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can
possibly be questionable?
None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these
components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything else of that kind? |
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